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ABSTRACT
The Constitutional Rights of College Students:
The Principles of the First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendments as They Apply
To Higher Education
(May 1976)
Michael A. West, B.S., Springfield College
M.Ed.
,
Springfield College, Ed.D. University
of Massachusetts/Amherst
Directed by: Dr. David S. Flight
A growth in individual rights, a new awareness of the
law as it affects the individual, and a change in societal
values since World War II, have combined to effect a
change in the student-college relationship. The constitu-
tion and the courts have come to the campus.
Few organized programs have been developed to provide
the college administrator with the skills necessary oo
understand the constitutional rights of students and how
they apply in a college environment.
Given the need of college officials to better under-
stand students' rights, and the impact of the law on
higher education, the purposes of this dissertation
are
to: 1) provide the college administrator with a
working
knowledge of the first, fourth, and fourteenth
amendments
viii
to the constitution, by utilizing historical analysis;
identifying legal precedents, doctrines and theories; and,
applying principles of law to modern case material; 2)
sensitize the college administrator to the legal implica-
tions and consequences of his/her professional activities
and actions; and, to ways of using the law effectively;
3) sensitize the college administrator to the constitutional
rights of citizenship; to show how 'these rights have developed
historically, and how such rights have applied to students;
*0 provide the college administrator with a legal perspective
for his/her decision-making process, and to sensitize the
educator to the need for including this perspective in that
decision-making process; and 5) provide the college
administrator with illustrative material from extracts and
discussions of the courts, showing princioles of law, doc-
trines, and theories in action.
The difficulty that college officials will have when
studying the law as it affects higher education and the
student that, thp law changes in both time and place. It
is because of this that educators should rely on understanding
general principles of law as derived from an historical
perspective of legal decisions and social influence, rathe*
than relying on individual and/or isolated court cases.
In this dissertation, fundamental principles of law are
identified in past decisions. of the courts, and then applied
to student-related problems in higher education.
ix
The main body of the dissertation considers the first,
fourth, and fourteenth amendments, and their impact on the
student and college administrator. Each amendment is con-
sidered in like manner: an introduction to and historical
analysis of the amendment, to include decisions of the courts
over the past century, and the effects of Dublic policy,
politics, the economy, and societal values on those
decisions; the application .of the amendment to students’
rights cases; the identification of general principles of
law; and conclusions. In each case example, much of the
courts’ own words and phrasing has been used to allow the
reader the opportunity to see how each judge utilizes
precedent, promotes his/her reasoning, and justifies the
courts' conclusions.
Prior to this section, the relationship between law and
education, and the impact of law on higher education is
presented. Past and present judicial attitudes towards
higher education, and the historical relationships between
f-vio qf nflprjt p nd college are explained •
A final chapter discusses the. impact that the law
will have on the college administrator , and takes a look
into the forseeable and more distant future.
x
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"Perhaps no social issue disturbs teachers more pro-
foundly today than youth’s challenge to established order.
An epoch is passing, and no clearly persuasive body of
professional literature has emerged to lead educators into
the next ." 1
XPhi Delta Kappan, Vol. II, No. H, December 1969
2CHAPTER I
1.1 Significance of the Problem:
A Need For Greater Understanding
For most of the history of our system of higher educa-
tion, it has been the practice of society to place the rights
and responsibilities of parents, with respect to their
children, in the hands of those who would administer the
educational program.
However, the past fifteen years have brought dramatic
changes for college officials
. "We find ourselves in an
adversary relationship, rather than an in loco parentis
situation. We’ve had to defend what we have done, not only
as good administrative procedure, but also as a matter
2
of law." Once having had to answer only to his superiors,
or the college Board of Trustees, today’s administrator
has become aware that he may now have to answer to State
and Federal judges as well as students.
The American people have moved into a period of greater
awareness of the law as it affects the individual. The
social upheavals of the 1960's and 70’ s, -the Civil Rights
movement and corresponding legislation, and the lowering
2 Cowen, lindsey, "Administrators Rights and Responsi-
bilities" Higher Education: The Law and Individual Rights
and Responsibilities
,
Institute of Higher Education, Uni-
versity of Georgia, Athens, Georgia, 1971» P- 18.
3of the age of majority in many states, are examples of changes
in our society which have caused students and other citizens
to develop a greater sense of awareness regarding their
legal rights and responsibilities. This new awareness,
coupled with an affirmative program in the courts to
further define individual rights, has shattered the
traditional relationships between the student and the uni-
"3
versity.
Within higher education, symptoms of this change in
student/university relationships are the hiring, by students,
of lawyers to represent students' concerns; the establish-
ment of student legal service offices to help and advise
students with their legal problems; the creation of student
(work) unions and tenants associations; and legal insurance
4for college administrators and faculty.
Another aspect of the change in this relationship has
been the increase in judicial concern with regard to viola-
tions of student’s constitutional rights. "More attuned
to the rights of students than they were a decade ago, our
courts will no longer permit schools to be run as
^See Pepe, Thomas J. , "Student's Rights: Winds of
Change". NOLPE School Law Journal, Vol. 3? Mo. 2, Pall,
1972, p. lBI
Vhe June 8, 1975 Boston Globe printed the following:
"Teachers ... in several parts ’of the country are already
covered by this new employer-paid fringe benefit which offers
legal consultation and courtroom services for 30 to bO hours
annually. Experts predict that legal insurance will be
a
way of life for 70 percent of Americans within the next decade
ft
authoritarian institutions, dictating each detail of stu-
c:
dent behavior."
Clearly, beginning in the late 1950’s and reaching
through the i960 s into the first half of this decade, more
and more attention has been called to the legal system in
general, the courts and court system, legislation, and civil
liberties. In the latter part of the 1960’s, this new
awareness was manifested in demonstrations and court
decisions which have tested, broadened, and redefined the
individual’s rights in our society, and, as a direct con-
sequence, the rights and place of the college student
within the university community.
"Few subjects mark so dramatically the change that has
taken place in American Higher Education in the last half
century, than the whole relationship between the institu-
c
tion and its constituents." From rule by authority (in
loco parentis) and a hierarchical structure in the first
half of the century, to a contractual, horizontal structure
in the 1970 's, with a corresponding commitment to relation-
ships between and among campus citizens, the student has
come to be a citizen, who also happens to be a student.
^Pepe
,
op . cit
.
,
p
c
Perkins, James A.
paper, presented to The
and Secondary School’s
December 8
,
196?
•
.
18.
,
The Univers ity and Due Process ,
Mew England Association of College
82nd meeting, Boston, Massachusetts 3
5How has it come about that the once unquestionable con-
trol over the student has changed so dramatically and become
a target for judicial review? Several reasons are suggested:
'1) The increase in financial support by both Federal and
State Governments; 2) Because education is now a crucial
public service, institutional performance is becoming
subject to public standards. There is a stronger tendency
to examine more critically the behavior of associations
whose actions may adversely affect their own members, and
the wider society; 3) The expansion of civil rights
protection and the pervasive thrust in our society to
achieve equal rights for all disadvantaged groups; 4) A
wider acceptance of the rights of dissenters and advocates
of various causes to fuller freedom of expression; 5) An
upsurge in the demand for wider sharing and participation
in the decision making process, and a readiness to challenge
existing allocations of power; and 6) The acquiring of
... C legal comDetence and the vote) at an earlier age, and
the recognition that youth are both political and economic
force to be reckoned with." 7 All of these things have
played a part in bringing the American college and univer-
sity into constitutionalism; college and university
7 Beany, William M. , "Students, Higher Education, and
the Law", 45 Denver Law Journal 511, 515 (19 68).
6officials must treat students as any other citizen would be
treated under our Constitution.
Kenniston has said that n
. . .a sudden increase in the
administrative wisdom in college deans and presidents
could reduce the number of available on-campus issues ..." 8
He also noted that the attainment of this knowledge was not
imminent. And therein is the problem.
Moore identified the problem and proposed its solution
this way: "until just a few years ago. University adminis-
trators had been reluctant to view educational problems
from a legal standpoint. Today, with the prospect of con-
frontation, and the association of determined legal rights,
we have no alternative but to acquire some laymen’s legal
gknowledge."^ And Brubacher has said that college educators
"...must acquaint themselves with the impact the courts are
exerting on the campus ." 10
r\
uKenniston, Kenneth, "The Sources of Student Dissent",
The Age of Protest, Walt Anderson (Editor), Goodyear Pub-
lishing Company, Pacific Palisades, California, 1969, p. 242.
^Moore, Donald R., "A Discussion of Legal Principles
and Implications Affecting Today's College Housing Manager",
a paper presented to tne College and University Housing
Officers Management Institute, Tampa, Florida, December,
1970.
10Brubacher
,
John S., The Courts and Higher Education ,
Jossey-Bass Inc., San Francisco, California, 1971, p. xii.
1.2 A Review of Professional Literature:
A Need Nor Basic Legal Knowledge
Rapid changes in court decisions and civil liberties,
as well as limited legal experience, have left college
authorities poorly prepared to deal with the 'development
and enforcement of policy, and the citizenship of the
college’s constituents.
In 1971, Carlson and Hubell noticed an increased con-
cern by student personnel staffs about their inability to
deal with legal aspects of student cases. They noted that
this lack of a background in law, or the time to explore
the intricacies of the legal system, left the educator, and
the institution, in a disadvantageous position.
11
Legal aspects of higher education have rarely been
part of the professional preparation of higher education
administrators, nor, has the study of law, or the basic
rights of individuals, as they affect higher education and
the student
,
been a part of the in-service training pro-
grams for those already practicing in the field. A study
by Rhatigan
12
would seem to indicate that none of the
^Carlson, Jan M. , and Hubell, Robert N. , "One More
Time: The Future of College Student Discipline ,
NAS_i_A
Journal, Vol. 9* No. 2, October 1971} P* 127-
12
Student
t loners
sonnel
,
Rhatigan, James J., "Professional Preparation of
Personnel Administrators as Perceived by p^ct
and Faculty", The Journal of College
Student Per
Vol. 9, No'. 1, January 1968, p. 17.
8personnel administrators responding to his questionnaire
had had any formal training in the law, prior to assuming
administrative positions.
While the National Organization on Legal Problems in
Education (NOLPE ) reports no knowledge of organized pro-
grams on higher education and the law, programs on the law
as it relates to secondary schoolshave flourished. Mandel 1 ^
(quoting Robert E. Phay) reports that the number of schools
of education offering courses in secondary school law in-
creased by 4
0
% in the decade 1962-72. More than 90 % of the
schools of education offering graduate programs, now offer
courses in secondary school law.
While greater attention should be given to the student
as a citizen, little has been done nationally to provide
the college administrator with the knowledge and skills
necessary to understand the constitutional rights of citizen-
ship within a college environment.
To a certain extent, the memhers of the legal profes-
sion have been more productive in their literature than
educators. The Index to Legal Periodicals indicates that
there was little interest in the subject of students'
rights until a New York court heard Anthon y v. Syracuse ,
1
^Mandel, Richard L. , "Teaching Law to Educators: The
Case for the Case Method, " Current Trends in Schoql_law,
NOLPE, Topeka, Kansas, 1973-
9231 N.Y.S. 435 (1927), a private college case. That piece
of litigation generated articles in several law school
j ournals
.
From that date, one finds a number of articles, on
specific aspects of the law in relation to higher education,
among the several law school journals and reviews.^ For
the most part, however, these articles are written by
members of the legal profession for their colleagues.
Educators have, by no means, been silent on the issue.
M. M. Chambers first published College and the Courts 1 ^
in 1936, as a "pioneer effort" to collect judicial decisions
regarding higher education in the United States. This
book was re-published, with updated material, every five
years until 1952, and then again in 1964, 1967 , and 1972 .
^
Brubacher, Blackwell, D. Parker Young, and others, have
produced similar texts.
For the most part, however, the literature available in
this subject area, does little but acquaint the reader with
1
^The list of articles is too numerous to mention
here. The reader is referred to the Index to Legal
Periodicals .
1
^M. M. Chambers and Edward Elliott, The College and
the Courts , Carnegie Foundation, 1936.
l6 Chambers, M. M. , The College and the Courts: The
Developing Law of the Student and the College , The.Inter-
state Printers and Publishers, Inc., Danville, Illinois,
1972.
10
what the law is. Most publications suffer from brevity
in subject matter, a lack of historical background or dis-
cussion of precedence, and are devoid of discussion of the
dynamics of the law and its imnact on society and education,
and vice versa. Such publications are, to borrow Chamber’s
opinion of his own book, nothing but "terse condensations
of the story", which leave the reader with no working
knowledge of the law,, but only a dangerous "acquaintance"
with particular decisions based on particular facts.
It should be noted, also, that within the literature
of higher education, there has been little attempt to explore
17how to teach educators about the law. Mandel reports
that only a few papers on the subject of training higher
education administrators in the law have been presented
nationally, and these dealt more with method, than with
content
.
While college authorities may need and want legal
training, and a knowledgeable background in the law, a
review of the literature in the field indicates that there
are no texts which meet this need, beyond those that cover
what the courts have decided in specific cases.
17Mandel, op. cit.
11
1.3 Purpose of the Study
Given the need of college officials for a better under-
standing of student’s rights and the impact of the law on
higher education, the purposes of this dissertation are:
1. To provide the college educator with a working
knowledge of certain amendments to the United States
Constitution, through historical analysis, the
identification and growth of precedents, doctrines, and
theories, and the application of principles of law to
modern case material;
2. To sensitize the college educator to the basic
constitutional rights of citizenship; to show how
those rights have developed historically; and, to show
how these rights have applied to students in tax sup-
ported institutions;
3. To sensitize the college administrator to the
process of the law, the legal implications and con-
sequences of professional activities and actions;
and the effective use of the law;
4. To provide the college educator -with a fundamental
background in constitutional rights and the relation-
ships between colleges and the students, so that he/
she may use reference material and professional
literature to greater advantage;
12
5. To provide the college administrator with a legal
perspective for the decision-making process, and to
sensitize the educator to the need for including this
perspective in decision making; and,
6. To provide the college administrator with illustra-
tive material from extracts and discussions of the courts
showing principles of lav;, doctrines, and theories in
action
.
1.4 Nature of the Study: The Approach
1
B
"The law never is, but is always about to be."
This short truism acknowledges one difficulty that
college administrators will have when they study the law as
it affects higher education and students: the law changes
constantly in both time and place.
Each day, the laws of this country are either being
changed or are in the process of change. Legislatures enact
new legislation; courts at all levels, state and federal.
Consider, modify, change, ur uphold precedent, or nnKc
out to establish new precedent; and appellate courts change
or modify lower court decisions.
Laws also vary from region to region. The decisions
^Cardozo, Benjamin, N., The Nature of the Judicial
Process, Yale University Press, 1921, p. 126.
13
of one Federal District Court may differ from that of another
Federal District Court elsewhere in the country; as an
example, the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Federal Circuit
Courts have adopted less stringent standards of precision
for written regulations, than has the Ninth .Circuit Court.
Society's meaning attached to a principle of law may
also change, and this may have an effect similar to that of
changing the principle itself. Oliver Wendell Holmes put it
this way, "we do not realize how large a part of our law is
open to reconsideration upon a slight change in the habit of
19the public mind." And Mandel, paraphrasing Mr. Justice
Cardoza, points out that "the law rests, in part, on a legal
application of established rules, legal precedent, to new
situations. But when society has evolved to the point where,
on the whole, a greater social harm is done by following a rule
than by modifying or abandoning it, then the courts, utiliz-
ing the many traditional techniques of legal arguments at their
20
^•icnnoai ad 1^ 1^''' V"> o mi io fn current social needs." The
public law of one generation is rarely the public law of the
next generation: At the time of the signing of the United
State's Declaration of Independence, death was the penalty
^Holmes, Oliver Wendell, "The Path of the Law", 10
Harvard Law Review, 5^7 ( 1897 )*
20Mandel, op. cit.
for stealing sheep in England; and the first United States
Congress enacted legislation requiring the death penalty
for counterfeiters.
And, of course, the interpretation of a law may be
changed because of the background or philosophy of a judge;
because of the social forces of the community in which the
judge lives: the difference between a trial judge’s
decision and an Appeals Court judge’s subsequent decision
may rest in the individual preferences of the judges; the
philosophical and social preferences unique to that jurist.
It is precisely because the law does change, that
educators, studying higher education law, must rely on
general principles of the law, as derived from an historical
perspective of legal decisions and social influence, rather
than rely on individual and/or isolated court cases.
’’One purpose of a course oriented to teaching the
dynamic nature of law is to teach the ’logic’ of the legal
process, th ^ »uj in AtixCii -x ^ ^^ -x ^ x
^ 4 ~ 4 ~ ~ A
UJ- lUUO-ii UU-LliV^U
over time. How the facts of a present case may be related
to the facts of a preceeding case, how a legal rule is
derived from a. precedent and applied to the present case, and
how the present case then, in turn, logically suggests
future developments of legal principles.
.,21
21 ibid.
,
p. 216
15
Many legal scholars feel that such an historical
perspective is indespensible : "One of the casualties of
modern law study is a sense for history; a feeling of
motion and direction. Not too many years ago, we would at
least start with the English and early American ancestry
of the problem at hand; nowadays, the pressure from current
problems often crowds out a genetic examination of the
22
rules;" Mott has said that "lav; should be taught as an
21historical science;" and Young points out that "because
our system of law is what it is, if those in the educational
system are troubled by what the judicial system is doing,
they must take a look at the past, if they are to have any
24hope for the future."
It is through such an historical analysis that the
educator will find "...the fundamental principles of law
which lie deeper than superficial differences in form and
temperament." 25 And, if the educator can recognize these
22Hannold
,
John (Editor), The Life of the Law, Read -
ings on the Legal Institutions , The Free Fress of Glencoe,
Collier-Macmillan LTD., London, 1964 (introduction).
2
^Mott
,
Rodney L.
,
Due Process of Lav; , Bobbs-Merrill
Co., New York, (1926), p. iii.
Young, Don J., "’Interesting Times' for School
Administrators", National Organization on Legal Problems
in Education’s School Lav; Journal , Volume 4 , No. 2 , 197 >
p. 179.
25Mott, op cit . , at p. iii
.
16
basic principles of law, so fundamental that the courts
tend to use them in case after case, and apply them to his
own situations, than he is likely to be correct the great
p c
majority of the time.
In this dissertation, these fundamental .principles of
law will be traced through decisions of the courts, and then
applied to problems in higher education. The reader will be
given clusters of case material, involving similar facts
and legal principles, and will be able to see how a prin-
ciple grows and is applied to different circumstances: the
reader will see the logic of the law.
These cases in higher education will be edited to
indicate the nature of the court's decision, and to eliminate
duplication and questions of law which lie outside of the
general areas of constitutional rights. The author,
concerned that the feelings, and ultimately, the conclusions
cf the court can be misunderstood if the court's opinion
i 5 i-aivon out n ^ nontext, has endeavored to print as much
each decision as is practical, in the judge's own words.
In the opening chapter the relationship between law
and education will be discussed, along with the '.mpact of
law on higher education. Past judicial attitudes towards
26 ibid.
,
at p. iii.
17
higher education, and the relationship between the student
and the college will be explored.
Each of the three amendments to the Constitution dis-
cussed in this dissertation (First, Fourth, and Fourteenth)
will explored in the same manner: an introduction and
explanation of the amendment; an historical analysis of the
amendment based on major decisions of the courts over the
past 100 years, including the effects of public policy,
politics, morality, and the like on the amendments and the
principles of lav; derived from it; application of these
fundamental principles of law to modern students’ rights
cases; and the identification of these fundamental
principles of law and the author's conclusion.
A concluding chapter will include a discussion of the
impact that the law has and will have on the college
administrator, and an analysis of what the administrators
can expect in the forseeable, and more distant, future.
1.5 Delimitations
This dissertation is limited to Constitutional law,
the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and leaves
tort liability, and state law, as well as other constitutional
amendments to further research.
The once solid doctrine that constitutional rights
were not guaranteed to students attending private colleges
has been raised for review since the state and federal
18
government began giving money to private colleges for
financial aid, building construction, research grants, and
various programs. So much has the Federal Government
become involved in private education, thsfc.it is now un-
clear as to how and when the courts might apply the Constitu-
tion when there is federal or state involvement in a private
college. As far as student's constitutional rights are con-
cerned, the application of these rights is clearest in the
public sector. Therefore, this dissertation is limited
27to public higher education in its scope.
Within the chapter on First Amendment Rights, the author
does not include the freedom of religion clause; in chapter
four there is no discussion of the Fifth Amendment as it
relates to Fourth Amendment rights, nor is there discussion
of a student's right to privacy of records.
This dissertation is limited to student's consitutional
rights, and does not touch on faculty or administrator
rights or relationships with the university.
Finally, a piece of work of this size must answer for
27 See also Gossett, William T. , Chairman, 'Report of
The American Bar Association Commission on Campus Govern-
ment and Student Dissent", American Bar Foundation, . .
Chicago, 1970, for a further discussion on the relationsnip
cf public and private institutions under the Constitution.
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sins of omission. Many topics were omitted, for it is
impossible, and fruitless, to try and cover each and
every problem that an administrator will face. Full
qualification of every problem would have called for a
library, not just a text.
1.6 Controls
People, in general, make decisions based upon the
basic value systems that they hold, and whatever they
choose to use in the decision-making process in terms of
knowledge or information is filtered through such value
screens
.
Formal research projects have detailed methods designed
to screen out the influence of value systems, so that re-
sults are "untainted" by researcher's personal value systems.
Such a screening process, however, is not easily controlled
in this type of study.
This dissertation is written from the perspective of
a college administrator. To this extent, it reflects con-
flict in the law from an administrator’s viewpoint, and not,
necessarily, from that of a student.
Nevertheless, the author has tried to "control" his
own value judgments by including not only a broad perspective
of court cases, but also an historical as well as present
day perspective..
There is the question of. how the author chose the
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cases to include in this dissertation. In the historical
section, cases were selected which demonstrate how a legal
precedent is found from a precedent case, how a precedent
is applied to subsequent cases, and how a legal principle
can take on new meaning over time, as the facts and/or
society change. Present day cases were not chosen to
provide legal answers. Rather, on' the basis of ten years
of administrative experience as well as a thorough review
of educational and legal professional literature, the author
has tried to choose cases which document as many aspects
of the legal question posed by the amendment as possible,
as well as cases which show how fundamental principles
of law are used by the courts to decide education cases.
Thus, while the author believes that the Tinker decision
could be considered a landmark decision in the area of
students' rights, he has also Included subsequent cases to
show how the principles derived from Tinker have been
ncoH r> f a yn r* administrators as well as students.
Finally, the author does not wish to indicate that
either his perspective, or the cases he has chosen, are the
only correct ones for college administrators to considei . Iti
haps it is clearest In law, that there is more than one per-
spective to the myriad of problems facing college administrators.
A look at most major cases would indicate this clearly: maj cn I t\v
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and dissenting opinions differ. Sometimes this is a result
of a differing system of values, or a different philosophy;
in the end it is important to note that judges have taken
the same case, and the same facts, and from differing per-
spectives, arrived at different conclusions. It has been
said more than once, that one can read the majority and dis-
senting opinions in a case, and agree with both, particularly
as to the logic used in determing a conclusion.
1.7 Caution and Disclaimor
This dissertation is not an attempt to make a lawyer
out of the college administrator. Nor is it intended to
be used as a replacement for competent legal advice and
counsel
.
It is an attempt, however, to help free the administra-
tor from complete reliance on lawyers and the courts. The
college administrator must acquire some knowledge of the
law, some competence and mastery over it, some ability to
apply it and make correct decisions; and he/she must be
able to recognize when, and to what level, individual rights
are involved in problem situations, and when they are not;
when a lawyer is needed, and when a problem is not "legal".
The author hopes that this study will also prepare the
college administrator to distinguish between the kinds
of activities, conflicts, and decisions confronted, when
he/she should seek legal counsel and be guided, and
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other kinds of activities, conflicts, and decisions where
he/she can act in a self
—direct ed manner.
The educator must be cautioned against excessive
reliance on lawyers and the courts. Lawyers and judges
are not educators, and vice-versa. Each has. a different
decision-making process, based on very different per-
spectives, from which may be drawn' vastly different con-
clusions to campus problems; nor should the educator rely
solely on lawyers and legal research when formulating
educational policy.
Once the lawyer, or the court, has taken control over
a problem situation, the educator has lost his/her impact
on the end results, and the result could be that the
lawyer or court becomes the "real" administrator, and
the administrator is relegated to the role of carrying out
directions from people outside of the educational community.
At least one Federal District Court judge has pointed out
thst " . . on f,p rptjnr’i- i <5 made to processes of the 1aw
for the resolution of disputes ... there is no way to tell
where the end will be", and that "those who resort to the
law for an easy solution to their problem, instead of solving
their problems for themselves, run the risk of finding the
law dominating them."
2
^ Educators have an obligation to
23Young, Donald J., op. cit., p. 180, l 8 l.
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make human judgments, and not to, as is the pitfall of the
lawyer, excessively focus on the legality of problems/
situations when seeking answers.
Lastly, the author cautions against using any legal
knowledge or court opinion as an intimidation device. The
complexities of the law and the legal process, and the
lack of understanding of both, can be frightening and
frustrating. The college campus is no place to use this
knowledge in a negative fashion.
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CHAPTER 2:
BACKGROUND
2.1 The Relationship of Law and Education
The words Law and Educat ion are so broad in scope and
application, that it is necessary to apply a limiting
definition to each, in order to better understand their
relationship
.
For the purpose of this dissertation, the term lav;
shall refer to all of the rules of conduct, behavior, and
procedure that are established by an authority, legislation,
or customs of a given United States community. Included
in this definition are both rules and regulations, which
are observed in the irterest of order and uniformity, as
well as court interpretation.
Law, as such, is a body of knowledge and a collection
of rules, which define the rights, liberties, and obligations
of people within the society as well as limitations estab-
lished for those people as they function within their society.
Law sets order to that society, and is part of the social
and cultural foundation, without which 'the society would not
exist
.
Education is growth, and must also be considered as
part of the foundation of a society. Aristotle once said
that all who had meditated on the art of governing mankind
have been convinced that the fate of empires depends on the
education of its people.
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As it relates to growth, education is the increase in
the knowledge and skill of the individual, as well as the
formation and development of character; it is the process by
which the mind, skill, character, and knowledge are developed,
and the process by which a society grows; education is also
a. system of institutions and planned programs and curricula;
it is a body of knowledge in itself, as well as experience
with and appreciation of all bodies of knowledge; it is learn-
ing how to learn, and the ability to apply all that is learned
to the present and future.
Both law and education are integral to an evolving
civilization. Both, to be understood and appreciated, must
be viewed historically, as part of the total history of a
people. Each passes the best of a culture on from generation
to generation, while at the same time providing perspective
to the negative aspects of previous cultures, societies, and
generations. To paraphrase Mr. Justice Holmes, through
V» 4- V% 1 O T.f V*> 1 1 A *\ ^ ^
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society, but the lives and societies of all men that have
been
.
There is, between law and education, a relationship which
generates both an immediate and latent affect.
The direct or immediate relationship is perhaps clear-
est. Education in its structural format of institutions,
programs, curricula, and processes, etc. is created by law.
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Some believe it to be a "fundamental right", along with
freedom of speech, religion, etc. However, most courts
have treated education as a "fundamental interest", not list-
ed in the United States Constitution as a basic right of
the people, but so important to the individual and society,
that it should be treated, under law, as a "fundamental
right"
.
While the power to create a system of education cannot
be found explicitly in the United States Constitution, many
legal scholars believe that it is one of the powers that is
delegated by the Federal Government to the states. Indeed,
state legislatures have the power to create and control the
educational systems of their states. Further, city and town
legislative bodies control local school systems, programs,
curricula, books, etc.
As it created the systems for education, so has the law
controlled them. Both federal and state legislative bodies
and courts have developed, and shaped educational oolicv and
programs. Compulsory attendance, truancy laws, desegregation
orders, classification of students, building construction,
busing, tuition rates, and curricula and program content,
are a few of the examples of how educational policy has
been controlled by the law.
The law and legislatures have also had a similar affect
on higher education: public higher education was developed
27
and is controlled by Federal and State Government; Federal
and State legislation has resulted in greater educational
opportunities for minorities; and the effects of Federal
and State law, and court interpretation on school rules
and regulations (dress regulations, parietal hours, housing
regulations, out—ot -state tuition fees, etc.) are examples.
Within public higher education there is hardly an area in
which law and the courts have not been involved.
Education institutions have a responsibility to teach
law, and to transmit it from generation to generation; to
pass the values of the society on, so that individuals may
understand why there are laws, how laws are created, and hew
they may participate in governance and in the creation or
modification of laws. It is only through education that
people gain the perspective necessary to consider how the
society should be governed, what laws should be operative,
and how laws affect people. Education develops within the
individual the process of critical thought, and study, and
each is necessary so that people may be capable of interpret-
ing, changing, or creating new laws as society’s needs change.
There is also a non-direct connection between law and
education in which there is a latent cause and effect rela-
tionship .
If one accepts, as the author does, the theory that the
laws of this land have been shaped by our society and
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culture (morals economics, politics, etc.) as these have
continuously evolved, and that our society and culture are
directly affected by, and undergo change through education,
then a continuum of cause and effect exists: education
changes society, society changes the laws. It can be
argued also that the law, in its effect on education, changes
education, thus creating a circular cause and affect rela-
tionship, with changes taking place in both directions.
Many laws which have been created, or judicial interpre-
tations which have been levied, to solve societal problems
outside of the system of education, have eventually had a
major impact on education both as a system and in the
growth of individuals. Here too are examples of a latent
cause-affect relationship. Civil rights legislation has
led to greater educational opportunities for minorities, as
well as major affirmative action programs. Decisions in such
diversified areas as administration of wills and estates,
hours of operation for San Francisco’s public laundries, and
a bartending license for women, have led to greater pro-
tection of women’s rights, changes in college curfew hours
for women, and the admittance of women to previously all-
male athletic teams. And procedures developed in criminal
Education
Law -<r
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cases have led to changes in the manner in which college
administrators may treat students in cases of suspension
from school, or in deciding who may use campus facilities.
The issue of school desegregation, for example, can be
traced back to an 1861 Supreme Court decision regarding
separate but equal facilities on passenger trains
.
The reverse can also be argued. The Civil Rights
movement, which had part of its roots in campus activism,
and the unrest on college campuses in the 1960’s, had an
effect on legislation passed during that decade and the early
1970’ s. And the Civil Rights movement also had a direct
affect on due process rights of students.
Finally, education has been responsible for the growth
of new social classes and ethnic groups. As we moved from
an aristocratic society to a democratic society; as
sections of the country have developed agricultural and then
industrial classes; and as ethnic groups grew out of immigrant
ppr»b pmpr»cn' no* crr»nnn bp c Qpnrrbf b n cbcmo Q lir> n 1. ° "t Yj w-- - - * it ~ w ~ w ir ^ ~ u
in its own interest, reflecting its own values. History shows
us that as these various groups and classes emerged, our
society and culture changed a little. History also shows us
thd: our nation’s laws do change to reflect societal needs.
2.2 The Law and Higher Education
The impact of the law on a public institution of higher
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education is profound. It is difficult to consider any
aspect of a public college’s operation without including
some consideration of law.
Laws, as with society, set some order to an institu-
tion. Educators are responsible to these laws on many
levels: federal, state, county, town and even board of
trustee regulation. While., in the confusing and complicated
myriad of laws, educators must conform to such state statutes
as those dealing with employment
,
construction, health, and
public safety, and such county and town laws as those deal-
ing with housing, waste disposal, water and sewer regulations,
it is the federal law, mostly in the area of constitutional
and civil rights, that has had the most impact on public
institutions in the last fifteen years. Such federal
legislation and court opinion have drastically changed and
challenged not only our methods of operation, but also our
attitudes and educational philosophies and goals.
rornr^ij^cjoc: ca r> *-> -f- Vi a ki -hpoy Were 15 years agO j
even 5 years ago. Rules and regulations, methods of opera-
tion, and the relationship between students and faculty and
students and the college administration have changed, and
are continuing to change. Indeed, the mission and goals
cf today's public institutions reflect recent societal
changes, and the impact of state and federal law, and
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the direction of those laws, as interpreted by the courts.
A Dean of Students was once heard to say that hardly
a day went by without his having to deal with some legal
question. Like "Future Shock", the volume and complexities
of those questions have grown tremendously. And the problems
are infinite: each law and court decision, each change in
societal values, has an impact on the campus community.
From student s ' rights to faculty unions; from zoning and
construction laws to waste disposal; from privacy of records
to due process; the higher education administrator has been
poorly prepared by training and experience to deal with
questions of law, lawyers, and the legal process. Without
exception, the controversial decision of the Supreme Court
in recent years were rendered in cases that could and
should have been avoided, if the party, whose exercise of
power was overturned, had exercised that power properly to
2Qbegin with.
The higher education administrator, teachers, and stu-
dents, working within the educational system to better
society have had a tremendous impact on the nation’s laws,
which are, in the end, changing the educational system.
Law, then, in this cause and effect cycle, has come back
^Young, Donald J., op. cit., p. 182.
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to the campus with greater impact than it ever has had.
Educators are treading in unfamiliar areas, and unprepared,
have become servants to the legal situation, rather than
its master.
2.3 The Relationship Between The
Courts and Higher Education
In order to better understand the present judicial
attitudes towards higher education, and the Court’s applica-
tion of constitutional rights to college students, it is
helpful to cite past and present judicial opinion regarding
the relationship between the Courts and higher education.
The author believes that the economic, political, and
moral climates of the country are reflected in higher federal
court opinions. The Supreme Court, in deciding the 195^
Brown school desegregation case, did so by interpreting
the 14th Amendment "in light of the times", and not by the
nat.innnl standards of whpn the l4th Amendment was
ratified by the states.
Prior to the 1960’s, most courts when addressing a
college/student related issue, found in favor of the
college officials. Most decisions favoring the student
came during and after the 1960’s. The most dramatic change
in judicial thinking, therefore, came during the decade of
the civil rights movement and the liberal "Warren Court .
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For most of the past 100 years, the courts have advo-
cated a "hands off policy”. 30 Generally speaking, the
Federal Courts wanted nothing to do with education; they
left it to the state courts. And the state courts left
education to the professional educators. As long as
college regulations were "reasonable", the courts were
willing not to interfere. Indeed, education was to be
left to professional educators, and judges were not pro-
fessional educators.
As previously noted, the attitudes and opinions of
the Court change, over a period of time, to reflect the
climate of the country. A quick review of our nation's
history, from the post Civil War era to the 1970's, shows
a nation undergoing great changes: from the one-room
schoolhouse, to large public and private universities; from
a "children should be seen and not heard" culture, to a
"youth culture" which has become a major economic and
"f* to /*» • o v\ -P >or» w-i »-> 4- A w> ^ ^ P "I A tv«
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freedom, to a major dedication to human rights.
Court opinion regarding college/student relationships
30See Beany, op. cit., p. 51^-
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changed slowly during this 100 year period, from the
mid-l 800 ’s to the 1940’s.
Then, the courts in the 19^0's and 1950's began to
temper their opinions, ever so slightly ,. with restrictive
words and phrases, aimed at college authorities.
World War II had had an affect on public policy, and
this was being reflected in the courts.
‘•he Supreme Cour o dramatically and historically
the Constitution to public secondary schools in
the mid-1950's (Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka
,
3^7 U.S. 482), but, with the exception of pre-3rown
higher education desegregation cases (see Chapter 5),
it was not until the early 1960’s that a Federal Court
acknowledged that students in tax-suoported institu-
tions of higher education had some rights." 1 And, it
was not until 1969* when the Supreme Court decided
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
,
393 U.S. 503 j that it was clearly stated that students
"do not shed their constitutional rights at the school
house gate."
On a few occasions, in the past few years, courts
took the opportunity to talk about their relationship to
^ 1See Dixon v. Alabama, 2?4 F.2d 150 (l?6l).
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higher education. During Knight v. State Board of Education
200 F. Supp. 174 (1961), a case involving the denial of due
process, the Court said "a state college or university must
necessarily possess a very wide latitude in disciplining
its students.
. .this power should not be encumbered with
restrictions which would embarrass the institution in
maintaining good order and discipline among members of the
student body
. . . it is a delicate matter for a court to
interfere with the internal affairs and operations of a
college or university ... such interference should not occur
in the absence of the most compelling reasons.”
In 1967, the Court in Goldberg v. Regents of the
University of California 57 CAL RPTR 463 (1967), said,
"historically
,
the academic community has been unique in
having its own standards, rewards
,
and punishments. Its
members have been
. allowed to go about their business of
teaching and learning largely free of outside interference.
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the same standards and penalties that prevail in the broader
social community would serve neither the special needs and
interests of the educational institution nor the ultimate
advantages that society derives therefrom. Thus, in an
academic community, greater freedoms and greater restrictions
may prevail than in society at large, and the subtle fixing
of these limits should, in a large measure, be left to the
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educational institution itself.”
Present day judicial attitudes, however, have been
expressed most eloquently and comprehensively in the
General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedures and
Substance in Review of Student Discipline in Tax Supported
Institutions of Higher Education 45 Federal Rules Decisions
133 (1968), developed by the United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri sitting "en banc."
Because of the significance of this statement, appro-
priate sections are reproduced in their entirety as an
appendix to this dissertation.
2.4 Student-College Relationship
Since cases involving students in higher education
began appearing on court dockets, the courts, educators, and
legal scholars have been attempting to define the relation-
ship between the college student and his/her institution.
TiM tto nnr>Tr onf +- V* c-O v> ^ o r\ f' 4- Vi ji^ c« la1 1 On C h Ip k C.VC tCCn
considered and/or argued before the courts.
In many of the early cases, the courts recognized the
inherent authority of colleges and universities to estab-
lish rules and regulations, reasonable or not, and enforce
them. Pratt v. Wheaton College (1866) is a case often
cited as an example of the "inherent authority" theory.
A once very popular theory, which has roots in common
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law, is in loc o parentis : the teacher stands in place
of the parent, and can control behavior, and discipline
the student to the same extent as the parent. The case
most often cited as an example of this theory is Gott
v * Berea College (1913). In that case, the Court said:
"As a father may direct his children, those in charge
of the college are well within their rights and powers
when they direct students what to eat, where they may
get it, where they may go, and what forms of amusement
are forbidden.”
This concept, today, really has no validity in
higher education. With the lowering of the age of
majority in a number of states to eighteen, most college
students are now considered to be adults. This fact
alone should spell the end of the in loco oarentis
doctrine
.
a tmra reianonsnip tneory wnicn was once sanctioned
by the courts, but which has been discredited more recently,
is the Contract Theory . "This theory holds that when a
student enters a college (and this entrance is of his/her
own free will), he/she enters into a contract with the
institution and thereby agrees to abide by certain rules
and regulations set down by the college. The student: agieeb
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to these restrictions and regulations, even though, under
other circumstances, he/she would not have to abide by such
rules... It is assumed that the administration will decide
when rules are broken; and the procedures and the discipline
itself will only have to fall within the purview of not being
arbitrary, unreasonable, or outside the legal limits of the
discretion allowed to administrators of institutions of
higher education."^ The leading cases most cited in
setting forth the "Contract Theory" are Goldstein v. New
York University 78 N.Y.S. 739 (1902), and Jones v. Vassar
299 N.Y.S. 283 (1969).
Two reasons why the courts are rejecting this theory
are the inequality of the relationship (a one-sided con-
tract, drawn up by, and in favor of, the institution),
and the requirement that a student must sign away some of
his/her rights before he/she can enter the college.
Anthony v. Syracuse (1927) best illustrates the misuse of
1" Vi £* r'finfT’Qnf 4~ Vi • nrinnlroyi t r M^t.t V^vilr TTv^-itt, v»n ? 4- »» ( ~\ C\ C Q \
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is a more recent case which discredited both the Anthony
case and the contract theory.
Young, D. Parker, The Legal Aspects of Student
Dissent and Discipline in Higher Education ; Institute of
Higher Education, University of Georgia, 1970, p. 5.
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Each of these previous theories of relationship points
to the power, control, and elitism of the University. Kow
is it that college authorities had all of this control to
begin with?
1. The ecclesiastical background of American higher
education, and the consequent concerns for morality.
American colleges, prior to the 20th century, were
conceived and operated as pillars of the church.
Faculty were more often trained as clergy than
33
scholars . J
2. Lay Boards of Control (and legislatures) have
historically served as instruments to facilitate the
imposition of non-academic values in the academic
community. Board members "...share the upper middle
3 li
class allergy to trouble of whatever sort." "It
is as sure as anything. . .that Democracy and Due Pro-
cess on campus will create what appears to Board
35
members as trouble."
3. The property orientation of the American Judiciary
33Jencks, Christopher and Riesman, David, The Academic
Revolution
,
Doubleday and Company, Garden City, NY, 1968.
3
4
ibid.
35Ratliff, Richard C., Constititional Rights of
College Students: A Study in Case Law, The Scarecrow
Press, Inc., Metuchen, NJ , 1972, p. 79*
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until recent decades. "Property and contract have
always been two major concerns of the law.
. .The role
of the judiciary in the United States, historically
has been primarily the protection of property." 36
Institutions, including colleges and universities,
have historically been identified with property -
the scholarly estate, the Land Grant Universities.
Students have not been identified with property.
This power and control and the importance of the
institution, are manifested, even today, in the decisions
of the University, which are most likely made in terms of
what is best for the institution, not what is best for the
student. And consider the modern day attitudes of Boards of
Trustees: an Educational Testing Service 1969 Survey of
5,000 trustees at 536 colleges and universities concluded:
"Trustees do not read - indeed have generally never heard
of the more relevent higher education books and journals...
Most trustees feel that the administration should control
the content of student newspapers; well over 1/3 believe
it is reasonable to require loyalty oaths for faculty; 1/3
hold that students punished (by civil authorities) for off-
campus behavior, should also be disciplined by the college;
and \ would screen campus speakers and deny to faculty
36 ibid.
members the right to free expression of opinions .” 37
Even the image of the modern university suggests
power
. Once, the "alma mater" image prevailed; today
it is the corporate image. So to a great extent, these
"power" theories of relationship still persist in some
minds
.
While rarely argued before a court, some legal/educa-
tional scholars argue that the student/institution rela-
tionship should be one of a fiduciary nature. 3 ^ Writing
in the NASPA Journal
, Mash notes that "a fiduciary is one
whose function it is to act for the benefit of another in
matters concerning the relationship between them. Since
schools exist primarily for the education of their student
a fiduciary relationship exists between the student on the
one hand, the faculty and administration on the other.
The fiduciary theory has some of its roots in the law
o
of trusts. Just as in a doctor/patient, lawyer/client,
confessor/penitent relationship, the University in its
•37
Commonweal
,
January 31, 1969 , p.,544 .
3
^See Goldman, Alvin L.
,
"The University and the
Liberty of Its Students - A Fiduciary Theory", 54
Kentucky Law Journal
,
643 ( 1
9
6
6
)
.
3
^Mash, Donald J., "Student Discipline in Higher
Education: A Collision Course with the Courts", NASPA
Journal, Volume 8
,
No. 3, January 1971, p. 151.
WoGoldman, op. cit.
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dominance over the student, would be held to one of the
highest standards of trust known in law.^
While one can argue that it would be desirable for
higher education institutions to strive to meet this high
standard of trust, the reality of its application does not
fit with modern day educational goals. "Because of the
exceptionally high standard of conduct placed on the
fiduciary - there is necessarily very little responsibility,
if any at all, placed on the beneficiary of the fiduciary,
...(which 3s) in our frame of reference, the student.
A review of the professional educational literature
indicates that one of the goals of higher education is to
develop a sense of responsibility on the part of the student;
indeed, the awareness of one's rights under our Constitution,
has led many students to demand more responsibility in the
student/institution relationship, and more input into the
decision-making structure of the University.
Within the last ten ypnrs^ the court? have been
developing a Constitutional Rights theory of the student/
institution relationship. As Mash indicates, "The Constitu-
tion provides a format that has been utilized everywhere
43
in society except in dealing with students." This
^Munch, Christopher H.-, "Comment", 45 Denver Lav:
Journal 533, 534, ( 1968 ).
2 ibid, p. 534.
4 ?JMash, op. cit., p< 151*
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theory holds that the university or college is made up of
campus citizens, each enjoying the same rights and
privileges as other citizens under the Constitution. Broadly
applied, this theory would call for all rules, regulations,
and policy to be established in light of the Bill of
Rights. While the institution may establish policies that
are more restrictive, or broader in nature, than the
Constitution, it would guarantee that students would be
afforded the same rights as ether citizens. Many cases in
the I960' s and early 1970 T s espouse this constitutional
relationship theory; most notable of these are Tinker
,
Dixon,
Soglin v. Kauffman
, 295 F. Supp . 97 8 , Knight v. State Board
of Education
,
200 F. Supp. 174, Dickey v. Alabama State Board
of Education
,
273 F. Supp. 613, and Moore v. Student Affairs
Committee of Troy State University
,
284 F. Supp. 725.
This author believes that legal questions which arise
between college officials and students should and will be
^ s-N ~ 4- 1 ID A +- f-y m>5 A r* 4- A 4- i iUCO V UiiO w WHO 0/J_ x l_L a ^ ^ J w -*
tion/student relationship. While all of the problems,
policies, regulations, and conflicts which can develop on
a college campus may net lie tranquilly within this theory,
the principle underlying this relationship should be the
keynote to the college educator's philosophy of adminis-
Adoption of this relationship may have greattrat ion
.
significance in the shaping of the behavior and attitudes
of institutional staff and students, and will influence
the style and process of actual governance.
2.5 Student's Rights
The roots of the student/institution relationship
as already noted, go deep into our country’s history of
educational development. Student’s rights were defined by
the relationship of the student and parent to the school, and
this relationship, in turn, had its basis in the morals, mood,
and attitudes prevalent in the country at that point in time.
By the end of the 19th century, the country was in
the middle of a sweep of industrial progress characterized
by rapid industrialization, growth of cities and corporate
enterprises, and a mindboggling growth of industrial and
farming technology.
It was an age of puritanism and educational formalism:
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bootstraps. In the schools of that period, little atten-
tion was given to individual differences. Control of stu-
dents was repressive. Stepping out of line, or failure
in studies meant repeating the grade. The teacher was the
dominant force in the classroom, and the concept of in
loco parentis was paramount
.
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By the end of the first quarter of this century the
student/college relationship had been established by two
leading cases: North v. Illinois
, 27 N.E
.
5*1 ( 18 91 ) and
Gott v. Berea, 161 S.W. 204 (1913). Both cases dramatically
and unequivocally spelled out the meaning of in loco
parent is and its important application in a school setting:
in order to guarantee a proper education, the school had to
exercise complete control over its students.
In North
,
a student was made to attend a place of
worship against his consent, and the student brought suit,
claiming an infringement of his constitutional rights,
pointing out that the Constitution of Illinois said, "No
person shall be required to attend or support any ministry
or place of worship against his consent."
The Court responded...
"It is doubtlessly true that one owing obedience to
no one else cannot be required to explain or give an
excuse why he does not attend places of religious
worship; but a moments reflection will convince any-
nnp that the reasons for so holding c arret be arplicd
to those who voluntarily place themselves under the
government of others, or who are, by parents or
guardians placed in institutions, of learning, where
a code of rules must be adopted for the general
government of all students attending there. In
the one case, a citizen has a right to use his time
as he pleases, and, so long as he does not inter-
fere with the rights of others, he may go where
he will, and conduct himself as he sees proper...
on the other case, the will of a student is
necessarily subservient to that of those who are
at the time being his masters. By voluntarily entering
the Univers-ity, or being placed there by those having
the right to control him, he necessarily surrendors
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very many of his original rights. How his time
shall be occupied, what his habits shall be hisgeneral deportment, that he shall not visit certainplaces, his hours of study and recreation, — in all
matters, and many others, he must yield obedienceto those who, for the time being, are his masters; and
y t, were it not for the fact that he were under thegovernment
_ of the University, he could find ampleprovision in the Constitution to protect him against
liberty
0
"
Cement rules abridging his personal
The Gott case, although 22 years later, reflected the
same judicial attitude. Berea College had promulgated a
rule which said: "eating houses and places of amusement
in Berea, not controlled by the college, must not be
entered by students on pain of immediate dismissal."
While the suit was not brought by a student, the court
took the occasion to comment on the relationship between
the student and college; and said: "College authorities
stand in loco parentis as to the mental training and physical
and moral welfare of pupils, and may in their discretion,
make any regulation for their government which a parent
could make for the seme nnrnosp. without, interference of
the courts, unless the regulations are unlawful or against
public policy... a college may prescribe requests for the
admission of students and rules of conduct governing them.
...and a student entering college impliedly agrees to con-
form to such rules."
The next 30 years were tumultuous for the United
States. The American people. were lead through "the Great
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War", a period of normality, the great Depression, the
New Deal
,
and finally global war. It was a period
characterized by the growth of the federal government,
Americanism", and "Nationalism". The mood of the country
had changed. once, production was the key to the American
economy; now it is consumption. We had passed from a
period of industry and frugality to a period of reckless
pleasure and extravagance. Attitudes towards sex, personal
enjoyment, creativity, and moral life had become more
liberal
.
It was during this period, also, that progressive
education emerged. The teacher became a guide and leader
in the classroom, as opposed to a dictator. The study of
teaching became a highly specialized branch of the social
sciences. An emphasis was placed on the needs and abilities
of individual students; education was to be a stimulant
for better citizenship.
Tv, i nip the Supreme
modify its previous, statements on student/institution rela-
tionships. In West Virginia v. Barnette , 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
a case in which suit was brought because school children
were compelled to salute the flag, the Court said:
"The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the
States, protects the citizens against the State itself
and all of its creatures - Board of Education not
excepted. These have, of course, important,
delicate, and highly discretionary functions
,
.
but
none that they may not perform within the limits
of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating
the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulousprotection of Constitutional freedoms of the individualif we are not to strangle the free mind at its source
and teach youth to discount important principles of
our government as mere platitudes."
In this same case, however, the Court also affirmed
its belief that school authorities needed to have the
authority to prescribe and control student conduct, con-
sistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards
.
It was within the context of Barnette
,
the mood of
the country, the trend in the United States towards civil
rights and liberties, the liberal Warren Supreme Court, the
Vietnam War, the growing concern that young adults, who
could fight for their country in war, should be able to
enjoy the benefits of citizenship, and several cases re-
garding constitutional guarantees in education,^ that the
Supreme Court was to make one of its most dramatic and
sweeping decision regarding student’s rights.
In Tinker, v. Pes Moines Independent Community School
District
, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) the issue was one of symbolic
speech
.
^See Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (1966); McCollum
v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Dixon v. Alabama ,
294 F . 2d 150 (19ol); Knight v. Board of Education 200, F.
Supp. 174 (1961); Dickey v. Alabama , 273 F. Supp. 613
(1967); and perhaps most important of all, Brown v. Board
of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 413 (1954).
^9
In December 1965, a group of citizens in Des Moines,
Iowa, decided to publicize their objections to the conflict
in Vietnam by wearing black armbands. Among this group
were John Tinker and Chris Eckhardt, high school students,
and Mary Beth Tinker, a junior high school student.
The principals of the Des Moines School System became
aware of this plan, and on December 14
, 1965 issued a
policy that essentially stated: any student wearing an
armband to school would be asked to remove it; failure to
remove the armband would result in suspension from school
until he/she returned without the armband. John and Mary
Beth Tinker and Chris Eckhardt, as well as their parents,
were aware that such a rule had been adopted by the school
officials
.
On December 16
,
Mary Beth and Christopher wore their
armbands to school. John Tinker wore his armband to school
the next day. Each was suspended from school. They did
not return until after the nl anned pe-rind fnr wearing
armbands had expired.
The students’ fathers filed suit in the U.S. District
Court, seeking an injunction restraining the school officials
from disciplining the students. They argued that the
school policy deprived them of their constitutional rights
under the Freedom of Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
The District Court dismissed the complaint, upholding
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the school authorities action on the grounds that it was
reasonable in order to prevent disturbance of school
discipline
.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the
case on appeal. The Court was equally divided on the
question, and the District Court’s decision was affirmed,
without opinion. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the
case in 1968.
The Supreme Court chose not to limit its decision to
just the instant issue. Instead, while confirming that the
wearing of an armband for the purpose of expressing certain
views is akin to pure speech or expression, that persons
are guaranteed freedom of expression by the First Amendment
and that freedom of expression/speech is not absolute,
they also developed and expressed some general legal prin-
ciples which were to have immediate impact on the student/
institution relationship as well as subsequent court cases
J 1 . JL.. J _ i. _ « _ _ „ 1 4
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1. "It can hardly be argued that either students
or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the school-
house gate.”
2. "Teachers and students are entitled to First
Amendment Rights."
3. "In the absence of a specific showing of con-
stitutionally valid reasons to regulate their
speech, students are entitled to freedom of
expression of their views."
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These basic principles of law can be interpreted as
providing students with all of the rights and privileges
enjoyed by any other citizen. The Court had declared that
students were persons under the Constitution.
CHAPTER III:
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
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First Amendment
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition
the government for a redress of grievances."
3.1 Introduction
The original Constitution, passed in 1787, contained
relatively few protections of individual rights, such as
freedom of speech. This omission created widespread mis-
trust and suspicion among the people.
To correct this situation. Congress proposed, and the
States ratified, in 1791, amendments that were to become
the Eill of Rights.
The Bill of Rights was only addressed to, and limits
the National Government, not the states. In the early
1790's the people were confident that they could control
their local state politicians; and, most states had a Bill
of Rights in the State Constitution. It was the new, more
distant Federal Government that the people feared, and the
Bill of Rights was intended to control that government.
Ironically, it was the Federal Government, not the
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State Governments, that in the years to come, was to be more
responsive to civil liberties. Soon, the people began to
see the mistake of exempting state governments from the
restrictions of the national Bill of Rights. Even though
each state had its own Bill of Rights, state judges were
reluctant to use these Bills of Rights to protect civil
liberties.^
In 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment became part of the
United States Constitution. This Amendment did apply to the
states, and for several years the Courts were pressed to
construe that the "due process” clause of this amendment
made the states responsive to the Bill of Rights, just as
the National Government was.
It was not until 1925 that the Supreme Court of the
United States decided in Git low v. New York
,
268 U.S. 652
(1925) that "For present purposes we may and do assume that
freedom of speech and of press, which are protected from
9hr»1 Hcromonf V, xr pAnrrvi aoo ^>*0 r* 4- w o ^ A ~ — a— i -*
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rights and liberties protected by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the states."
Since that date, the same kind of restrictions that
h c
Burns, James MacGregor and Peltason, Jack Walter,
Government By The People, The Dynamics of American National
Government
,
Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, I960
,
p. 136.
the first amendment placed on the Federal Government
,
were
placed on the states, or subdivisions thereof (cities,
counties, public schools, etc.).
language of the first amendment forbids the Congress
from making an£ law abridging the freedom of speech or
press, or the right of peaceful assembly. An historical
perspective, however, reveals that the amendment has never
been interpreted in such absolute terms, and that the right
of free speech, press, and assembly "...are relative in
the sense that they are limited by the coexisting rights
of others.
3.2 Historical Analysis
Limitations on free speech, press, and assembly become
acutely apparent in time of war. Where does one draw the
line between free discussion arri legitimate criticism, and
speech, so disloyal to the government, that it must be
i|7
banned for the .safety of tbo public?
Fear of the enemy, fear of internal subversion, and
tighter controls imposed on the people during World War I,
resulted in Congress passing the Espionage Act cf 1917 and
^Cushman, Robert F., Leading Constitutional Decisions ,
14th Edition, Appleton-Century-Crof t s , NY, 1971, P- 270.
47 ibid., p. 270 and 271.
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the Sedition Act of 1918. These pieces of legislation made
it illegal to interfere with the operation of the military,
promote the success of the enemy, cause insubordination,
disloyalty, or mutiny, or obstruct recruiting; or "...to
say or do anything which could obstruct the sale of govern-
ment bonds, or to utter or publish words intended to bring
into contempt or disrepute the form of government of the
United States, the Constitution, flag, uniform, etc ."*18
These pieces of legislation, directed at the control
of free speech critical of national politics, resulted in
litigation at the Supreme Court level, which became known
as the "clear and present danger" cases.
In Schenck v. United States
. 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct.
247 ( 1919 ) the defendent was charged with violating the
Espionage Act; specifically, attempting to cause insubordina-
tion in the military, and obstructing the recruiting and
enlistment service of the United States, when the United
States was at war. The defendent. it was alTeced- consDired
with others to print and circulate to men who had been
called to and accepted for military service, a document
calculated to cause such insubordination and obstruction.
Schenck claimed that his First Amendment rights had
48ibid
. ,
p . 271 .
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been violated.
The opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes, who delivered the
opinion of the Court in this case, is critical, as it
established a principle of law that was to become a standard
doctrine, from which all other free speech cases would be
tested. He said.
We admit that in many places and in ordinary times
the defendants in saying all that was said in the
circular would have been within their constitutional
rights. But the character of every act depends upon
the circumstances in which it was done. The
most stringent protection of free speech would not
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre
and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man
from an injunction against uttering words that may
have all the effect of force. The question in every
case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent . It is a question of proximity and degree.
When a nation is at war many things that might be
said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its
effort that their utterance will not be endured so
long as men fight, and that no Court could regard them
as protected by any constitutional right. It seems
to bp admitted that if an actual obstruct A on of ftp
recruiting service were proved, liability for words
that produced that effect might be enforced. The
Statute of 1917 ••• punishes conspiracies to obstruct
as well as actual obstruction. If the act (speaking,
or circulating a paper), its tendency and the intent
with which it is done are the same, we preceive no
ground for saying that success alone warrants making
the act a crime." (emphasis added)
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Within a week of Schenck; the Court heard two similar
cases. In delivering the opinion of the Court in both
cases
,
Frohwerk v. United States
, 249 U.S. 204 ( 1 9 19
)
and Debs v. United States
, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), Holmes
relied upon and upheld the clear and present danger
principle.
In 1918, the Espionage Act was amended to include a
new series of offenses, including the urging of any cur-
tailment of production of materials necessary to the
prosecution of the war with intent to hinder its prose-
cution .
It was under this new section of the Espionage Act
that the defendent in Abram s v. United States
,
250 U.S.
6l6 (1919), was convicted of publishing a pamphlet
"intended to incite, provoke, and encourage resistance
to the United States" during the First World War, and
conspiring "to urge, incite and advocate curtailment of
production of ... ordinance and ammunition, necessary...
to the prosecution of the War." The Court based its
decision wholly on Schenck and the clear and present
danger test. '
It is important to note here that the war had ended by
the time that Abrams came to the Supreme Court. The
period immediately following the war was characterized by
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a rising economy, economic and industrial expansion,
growth and improvement of the educational enterprise, and
a national laissez faire policy. People were trying to
forget the war; fear of the enemy, within and overseas,
was at least put on the back burner.
The importance of the Abrams case, and a year later
Schaefer v. United States
, 251 U.S. 466 (1920), is that
Holmes, the architect and defender of the clear and
present danger test, dissented from the majority opinion;
he was joined in his dissent by Justice Brandeis.
Holmes questioned how the clear and present danger
test should be applied, indicating that there cannot be
an anticipated danger; it must be an emergency; an immediate
risk of an evil
. He also raised for debat e the definition
of "intent", and indicated that criminal intent should have
to be proved, i.e., was there an urge to action? In an
important dissent, he said.
"It is only the present danger of immediate evil
or an intent to bring it about that warrants
Congress in setting a limit to the expression
of opinion where private rights are not con-
cerned. Congress certainly cannot forbid all
effort to change the mind of the country.
Now nobody can suppose that the surreptitious
publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown
man, without more, would present any immediate
danger that its opinions would hinder the
success of the government arms or have any
appreciable tendency to do so."
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...a deed is not done with intent to produce aconsequence, unless that consequence is the aim
aofnr
e may bC obvlous
> and obvious to thecto , that the consequence will follow, and hemay be liable for it, even if he regrets it, buthe does not do the act with intent to produce it
unless the aim to produce it is the proximate motiveof the specific act...
An actual intent in the sense that I have explainedis necessary to constitute an attempt, where afurther act of the same individual is required to
complete the substantive crime;..
In the Schaefer dissent, Mr. Justice Brandeis said
of the clear and present danger standard:
This is a rule of reason, correctly applied, it
will preserve the right of free speech both from
suppression by tyrannous, well meaning majorities.
Raising the question of degree, first raised in
Schenck
,
he went on to say.
In my opinion, no jury acting in calmness could
reasonably say that any of the publications set
forth in the indictment was of such a character or
was under such circumstances as to create a clear
and present danger. .
.
While the economy continued to grow in the 1920’s,
and the country maintained its laissez faire posture, other
world events triggered what was to become known as the
"Red Scare", or an increasing fear of communism. To defend,
internally, against communism, there grew increasing
legislation, particularly at the state level, so-called
"forbidden advocacy" laws directed at criminal anarchy.
It was from such legislation in New York and
California that the next round of free speech cases was to
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reach the Supreme Court.
In Git low v. New York
, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), the
defendant was convicted of "criminal anarchy" for distribut-
ing a document similar to the Communist Manifesto of Marx
and Engels. He was prosecuted under the New York Criminal
Anarchy Act which made illegal certain kinds of speech or
publications, regardless of the intent of the speaker or
publisher.
Noting that "a single revolutionary spark may kindle
a fire that, smoldering for a time, may burst into a
sweeping and destructive conflagration," and that a
State does not act arbitrarily or unreasonably when "...
it seeks to extinguish the spark without waiting until it
has kindled the flame or blazed into the conflagration,"
the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction using the Schenck
standard
.
Holmes and Brandeis dissented once again, questioning
whether there was a clear and present danger, and suggesting
that there was not.
In a similar case, the defendant in Whitney v. California ,
274 U.S. 357 (1927), had joined the International Workers
of the World (IV/W), and attended a 1919 rally of that
organization. The convention was split, and Whitney left with
the more radical group to help form the Communist Labor
Party
.
While at the convention of this latter group, she
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worked to support resolutions endorsing the value of
political action. Such a resolution was defeated on the
floor, and a more radical program was adopted. She
testified at her trial "that it was not her intention
that the Communist Labor Party of California should be an
instrument of terrorism or violence."
She was tried and convicted under the Criminal
Syndicalism Act of California, which in part, made it
illegal to advocate, teach, or aid in the commission of
a crime as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial
ownership or control, or effecting any political change.
Mr. Justice Br-andeis, in concurring with the
conviction and majority of the Court, took the opportunity
to review, in very positive terms, the safeguards and
standards that had been established by the Court in pro-
tecting free speech and assembly.
It is said to be the function of the legislature
to determine whether at a particular time and
under the particular circumstances the
formation of, or assembly with, a society
organized to advocate criminal syndicalism
constitutes a clear and present danger of
substantive evil; and by enacting the law
here in question the legislature of California
determined that question in the affirmative.
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Brandeis noted that the states cannot, and ordinarily
would not, be allowed to let stand legislation which
would oppose any speech. And, in considering just how
far states may go in such legislation, he concluded:
To justify suppression of free speech there must be
reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will
result if free speech is practiced. There must be
a reasonable ground to b elieve that the danger
apprehended is imminent. There" must be reasonable
ground to believe that the evil to be prevented
is a serious one
. Every denunciation of existing
law tends in some measure to increase the proba-
bility that there will be a violation of it.
Condonation of a breach enhances the probability.
Expressions of approval add to the probability.
Propagation of the criminal state of mind by
teaching sydicalism increases it. Advocacy
of lawbreaking heightens it still further. But
even advocacy of violation, however reprehensible
morally, is not a justification for denying free
speech where the advocacy falls short of incite-
ment and there is nothing to indicate that the
advocacy would be immediately acted on. The
wide difference between advocacy and incitement,
between preparation and attempt, between
o #-» o T
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mind . In order to support a finding of clear and
present danger it must be shown either that
immediate serious violence was to be expected
or advocated, or that the past conduct furnished
reason to believe that such advocacy was then
contemplated ! (emphasis added).
...no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear
and present, unless the incident of the evil apprehended
is so imminent that it may befall before there is oppor-
tunity for full discussion. . .only an emergency can
justify repression.
Moreover, even imminent danger cannot justify resort_
to prohibition of these functions essential to
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effective democracy,
relatively serious
.
unless the evil apprehended is
(emphasis added)
Justice Brandeis pointed out that to voluntarily
assemble to teach and advocate trespass on another’s property,
even though such trespass may lead to violence or destruction
of property
,
was not enough of an evil to warrant suppression
of speech.
To assemble for the purpose of teaching and advocating
criminal syndicalism, as the Communist Labor Party of
California had done, was however, much more serious an evil
than trespass, and Miss Whitney as an organizer and partici-
pant in that Party was, as the Supreme Court affirmed, prop-
erly convicted. Mr. Justice Holmes concurred.
Following World War I, many states enacted anti-
sedition laws similar to the ones used to convict both
Gitlow and Whitney. Some of these laws were patterned
after the New York and California legislation; some were
more extreme.
in a striking comparison, the Supreme Court decided
Fiske v. Kansas
,
274 U.S. 380 (1927), (the same day as
Whitney) under the Kansas syndicalism act, of soliciting
new members for a branch of the Industrial Workers of the
World ( IWW) . The only evidence offered against Fiske, was
the preamble to the IWW Constitution, which stated in part,
"Between classes a struggle must go on until the workers of
the world organize as a class, take possession of the earth.
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and the machinery of production and abolish the wage system."
Fiske testified that this preamble sought change peacefully,
not criminally or unlawfully
,
and that he had never advocated
criminal syndicalism.
Following the opinions in Gitlow and Schenck, the
State Court convicted Fiske.
In deciding this case, Mr. Justice Sanford, delivering
the opinion of the Supreme Court, surfaced the standard
set forth in the strong dissenting opinions of both Holmes
and Brandeis in the Abrams case, decided eight* years earlier.
He distinguished the "intent" and meaning of the words in
the preamble of the IWW Constitution, with the Communist
Manifesto type material that was the matter in question in
Gitlow
,
and found them to be different, and noted, "...it
is not as if the preamble were shown to have been followed
by further statements or declarations indicating that it
was intended to mean, and to be understood as advocating,
that the ends outlined therein would be accomplished nr>
brought about by violence or other related unlawful acts or
methods..." He concluded that the syndicalism act had been
wrongly applied in this case, as there was no evidence that
the IWW advocated crime, violence, or unlawful acts. The
Court had affirmed that there must be a concrete connection
between advocacy and intent .
There followed, in the United States, a period of
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economic rebuilding; a sense of nationalism and national
self-evaluation. The late 1920 's were characterized by what
historians refer to as "normalcy", business as usual with
a minimum of public interference. The indiscriminate
"red hunts" of the past war period had ended; wartime
public controls were eliminated; and in the words of Calvin
Coolidge, "the business of America
... (was ) business."
Then came the depression; four years when the United
States touched bottom and millions faced starvation. The
nation fought back to life, and the decade of the 30’ s,
under Roosevelt’s "New Deal", was characterized by a deepened
sense of social responsibility and restoration of both
agriculture and industry. By the mid— 193C’s most of the
country had breathed a sigh of relief. There was a setback
in 1937, however, and many judge the depression not to have
ended before World War II.
It is important to note that the Supreme Court came
under heavy attack in 1937 by the President ef the
United States. Roosevelt was determined that the conserva-
tive "nine old men" of the Court would not cripple his
"New Deal" programs. He proposed the "court-packing" Bill
of 1937, which was designed to force the retirement of
these justices, or to replace them with new sympathetic
justices. Congressional committees killed the bill before
it could get before Congress; but in the end the Court
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itself resolved the conflict. A switch from their con-
servative positions by two justices, Roberts and Chief
Justice Hughes, and subsequent retirement of other "con-
servative justices, coupled with- the appointment of more
liberal justices, caused the conservative majority to
become a minority.
in 1937, the Court heard DeJonge v. Oregon
, 299 U.S.
353 (1937). As in Fiske, ten years earlier, DeJonge had
been convicted of a State Syndicalism Act. DeJonge was
charged with assisting in the conduct of a meeting, "called
under the auspices of the Communist Party, an organization
which advocated criminal syndicalism." During the trial,
it was brought cut that the meeting had been public and
orderly
,
and at no time was criminal syndicalism either
taught or advocated by DeJonge or others.
The Court overturned the conviction, and Chief Justice
Hughes, in rendering the opinion, added a new dimension to
the protection of free speech and assembly:
The right to peaceable assembly is a right cognate
to those of free speech and free press, and is
equally fundamental ... These rights may be abused by
using speech or press or assembly in order to incite
to violence and crime... Eut the legislative inter-
vention can find constitutional justification only
by dealing with the abuse. The rights themselves must
not be curtailed.
Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be
made a crime. The holding of meetings for peaceable
political action cannot be proscribed. Those who
assist in the conduct of such meetings cannot be
branded as criminals on that score. The question, if
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the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are
® P£f served > is not as to the auspices under whichthe meeting was held, but as to its purpose; not asto the relations of the speakers, but whether their
utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of
speech which the Constitution protects.
The next 14 years were ones of war, new restrictions of
personal liberties, and a second "Red Scare". It may be
helpful to look at a chronology of events leading up to
"The Smith. Act Prosecutions":
1939 - Start of World War II
19^0 - Anti-sedition Smith. Act passed^
- Selective Service Act passed
- France surrenders to Germany
19^1 - Pearl Harbor attacked
- numerous war agencies established to direct
resources, rationing, censorship, etc.
19^2 - Japanese-Americans transferred to interior
"relation camps"
19^5 - First American Atomic Bomb tested
- Hiroshima hit by atomic bomb
- Nuremburg trials of top Nazi war criminals
19^7 - Department of Defense created
^The first peacetime Sedition Act, the Smith Act made
it illegal to advocate the overthrew of the government by
force, with the intent to bring about this overthrow. It
introduced for the first time in federal law, guilt by
association
.
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15^8 - the Berlin Blockade
1950 - Korean war broke out
- Alger Hiss convicted
Senator McCarthy alleges that there are 57
reds" in the State Department
United States forces sent to Korea
McCarran Internal Security Act passed
Pear of the Russians; alarm at the Russian's atomic
discoveries, and the revelation that some atomic scientists
had given United States secrets to the Russians; and appre-
hension over Soviet espionage had many Americans calling
for a tightening up of loyalty and security regulations.
The communist party era brought with it a series of
Smith Act prosecutions, and the first of these was Dennis
v. United States
, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Mr. Justice Douglas
was to later call this M an all out political trial which
was part and parcel of the Cold War", indicating just how
closely tied decisions of the Court are to the climate of
the country.
The defendants were charged with willfully and knowingly
conspiring to organize as the Communist Party of the United
States of America, a society that teaches and advocates
the overthrow and destruction of the government of the
United States by force and violence, and knowingly and will-
fully advocates and teaches the duty and necessity of over-
throwing and destroying the government of the United States
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by force and violence.
The question of ’’degree", widely used in the Holmes-
Brandeis dissents, became the theme of this decision to
uphold the conviction.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter recounted that "it is a
familiar experience in the law that new situations do not
fit neatly into legal conceptions that arose under cir-
cumstances to satisfy different needs..." He questioned,
then, the use of the clear and present danger test, as it
was developed to deal with Abrams or Gitlow, and concluded
that it would be a "mockery" of Justice Holmes' reasoning;
to compare the "puny" incidents in Abrams and Gitlow to the
settings and events of this case in 1950.
Chief Justice Vinton, writing the majority’s opinion,
noted that the Court was faced with applying the "clear and
present danger" test, but had to decide what that phrase
meant under the present circumstances. In doing so, the Courts
rejected one earlier "rule" and adopted another. It re-
jected "...the contention that success or probability of
success is the criterion", and adopted Chief Judge Learned
Hand’s definiton of "clear and present danger": " In each
case courts must ask whether the gravity of the evil, dis-
counted by is improbability, justified such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger ." (emphasis
added
)
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The Court acknowledged that overthrow of the government
by force and violence was certainly a substantial enough
Interest for the government to limit free speech, and noted
'It is the existence of the conspiracy which creates the
danger ...”
In a decision which has been widely construed as an
abandonment by the Court of. the "clear and present danger"
approach to the first amendment, the Court, utilizing a
reasoning that prevailed in Git low twenty-six years earlier,
said: "Obviously, the words cannot mean that before the
government may act, it must wait until the 'Putsch’ is
about to be executed, the plans have been laid and the
signal is awaited."
If the "clear and present danger" test is applied
here, "It means that communist plotting is protected during
its period of incubation; its preliminary stages of organiza-
tion and preparation are immune from the law; the government
can mnvp nniv immi 1'1 action is ^^nifcst when it
would, of course, be too late."
Mr. Justice Black, in his dissent from the opinion
said, "Public opinion being what it now is, few will protest
the conviction of these communist petitioners. There is
hope, however, that in calmer times, wrhen present pressures,
passions and fears subside, this or some later Court will
restore the first amendment liberties to the high preferred
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place where they belong in a free society."
Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissent, said: "Free
speech - the glory of our system of government - should not
be sacrificed on anything less than plain and objective proof
of danger that the evil advocated is imminent."
These two dissents were to become accurate predictions
of the future.
Yates v. United States
, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), which
came six years after Dennis
, was based also on the Smith
Act, and involved lower level Communist Party leaders.
The Court indicated that the trial court judge had
misunderstood the Dennis case, and sought to define its
Dennis decision in terms closer to the "clear and present
danger' test. The difference that the Court must consider,
in reasonably applying the "clear and present danger" test,
is... "the distinction between advocacy of an abstract doc-
trine and advocacy of action..."
"Mere advocacy is too remote from concretp action...
people must be urged to do something now or in the future
,
rather than merely to believe in something ... Advocacy must
have some immediate relationship to an unlawful act. "
(emphasis added)
The Court distinguished Yates from Dennis on this
singular point: Dennis indoctrinated a group in preparation
for future violent action, as well as gave exhortations to
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immediate action, by advocating direct action for the
forceable overthrow of the government; the group he ''taught”
was sufficiently oriented towards action, that there was
reasonable justification to assume that action would occur.
Yates, who advocated the overthrow of the United States
government as a doctrine, did not present a "clear and
present danger".
In two more cases. Scales v. United States
, 367 U.S.
203 (1961), and Noto v. United States
. 367 U.S. 290 ( 1961 ),
the Court re-emphasized the Yates decision.
"There must be clear proof that a defendant specifically
intends to accomplish the aims of the organization by resort
to violence."
"Thus the member for whom the organization is a
vehicle for the advancement of legitimate aims and policies
does not fall within. the ban of the statute (i.e., Smith
Act): he lacks the specific intent to bring about the
overthrow of the government as speedily as circumstances
would permit."
Justice Harlan explained the Yates criteria for measur-
ing the evidence and establishing clear proof:
In order for a jury to find that there was advocacy of
action, and that the defendant was responsible for such
advocacy, there had to be at least two patterns of
evidence: "(a) the teaching of forceful overthrow,
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accompanied by directions as to the type of illegal action
which must be taken when the time for the revolution is
reached; and (b) the teaching of forceful overthrow,
accompanied by a contemporary, though legal, course of
conduct clearly undertaken for the specific purpose of
rendering effective the later illegal activity which is
advocated.
"
The Court found this evidentiary criteria satisfied
in Scales
,
but not in Noto . They concluded in Noto: "The
mere abstract teaching.
. .of the moral propriety or even moral
necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the
same as preparing a group for violent action and stealing
it to such action."
As is sometimes the case in law, the Court found itself
hearing a case in 1969 which paralleled a case heard almost
a half century earlier. Brandenberg v. Ohio
, 395 U.S. 444
(1969), was the Warren Court’s answer to Whitney .
Brandenberg was a member of the Ku Kinx Klan, and was
convicted of violating the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act,
which like the others, made it a crime to "...advocate
crime, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a
means of accomplishing industrial or political reform",
and of "voluntarily assembling with any society, group or
assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the
doctrines of criminal syndicalism."
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Brandenberg was filmed participating in and making a
speech at a Ku Klux Klan meeting. In one speech a reference
was made to "revengence", and the prosecution also intro-
duced into evidence a pistol, a rifle, a shotgun, ammunition,
a Bible, and a red hood, all said to have appeared in the
film.
The Court noted that in 1927 it had sustained the
constitutionality of such syndicalism acts, (see Whitney )
,
and had concluded that advocating violent means to effect
political and economic change involves such dangers to the
security of the state that the state may outlaw it (see
Fiske )
.
But the Court acknowledged that Whitney and Fiske had
been thoroughly discredited by later decisions. "These
later cases had fashioned the principle that the constitu-
tional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit
a state to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force
or of law violation, exceDt where such advocacy is directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely
to incite or produce such action." (see Dennis , Yates ,
Scales
,
and Noto .
)
Mr. Justice Douglas, In a concurring opinion that
traces the first amendment decisions of the Court from
Schenck, emphasized that the Court must establish a distinc-
tion between mere advocacy, and incitement to imminent
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lawless action, and noted that "the Court quite properly
overrules Whitney
.
11
he barren Court was to uphold a large number of first
amendment claims in a variety of contexts. We shall see
how cases were decided in the context of education in the
next section.
3-3 Pure and Symbolic Speech
Incitement To Action
. On the morning of May 15
, 1969,
the Regents of the University of California/Berkeley,
erected a fence around the perimeter of a piece of park
property owned by them, popularly referred to as the "people's
park"
.
A student rally was held that same day to pretest the
erection of the fence. The rally was addressed by the
President of the Student Government Organization, Daniel
Mark Siegel. He concluded his speech with the following:
OW
- W^ nQt 1 Of] DYQ^f 1 T7 O 4- T»rr\ o v> (''v rr -l’ n ri*
to do. But there are some plans* I have a suggestion*
let's go down to the People's Park, because we are the
people. But a couple of things, a couple of points
I would like to make. If we are to win this thing, it
is because we are making it more costly for the
University to put up its fence than it is for them to
take down their fence. What we have to do then is
maximize the cost to them, minimize the cost to us.
So what that means, is people be careful. Don't let
those pigs beat the shit out of you, don't let
yourselves get arrested on felonies, go down there
and take the park.
Following Siegel's speech, several thousand students
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marched down the street towards the park. They were met by
police and violence erupted, resulting in several Injuries
and one death.
Siegel was notified that he had violated the University's
regulations on the Standard of Conduct, and that there
would be a hearing to determine what action the University
might take.
The Berkeley Campus Student/Faculty Committee on student
conduct heard the case, and concluded:
...that the action of Mr. Siegel did constitute viola-
tions of the University's regulations on the Standard
of Conduct by exposing the University and its people
to mob formation and its attendant potential conse-
quence of violence. Therefore the Committee as a whole
agrees that disciplinary action is warranted.
That he,
...knowingly spoke at a rally in reckless disregard
of the tense and angry nature of the crowd without
regard to the forseeable consequences. At best, his
conduct exhibits inexcusable ignorance of the
dangerous circumstances.
That
. . .by his initiation of the march to the "Park" through
his reckless words, greatly inflamed the situation at
Haste and Telegraph ...(Streets) by sending a great
crowd to join anotha? smaller one which was described
in great detail by the defense counsel in such words as
"unruly'’, "hostile", "aggressive", "undisciplined",
"angry", etc.
That his
...reckless choice of words spoken in an angry and
highly excited tone, nevertheless, lose significance
as an appeal to reason or aggressive persuasion.
They become instead part of the instrument of force
and violence. Such disorderly and disruptive conduct
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which endangers the welfare anr» ^
regulations']
15 ^ % SS^
The Chancellor of the Berkeley campus accepted the
recommendation of the Student Conduct Committee, that Siegel
be placed on one year's disciplinary probation, which in-
cluded a denial of participating in the privileges and
extracurricular activities associated with being a student.
Siegel brought his case to court, 50 contending that
the University’s regulations were "overbroad" and "vague"
and restricted his right to free speech under the first
amendment
.
District Judge Sweigert, in delivering the opinion of
the court, noted:
...that the regulations in question here are on theirface
. directeo
,
not to speech or mere expression of
opinion, but to conduct.
There is nothing in these regulations that could be
fairly said to have a "chilling effect" upon a
students exercise of First Amendment rights of free
speech or expression because of "vagueness" or
"overbreadth" or otherwise.
Nor is the record such as to show that the regulations
have been applied with that effect as to this
particular plaintiff.
The complaint, itself, sets forth the exhortation by
plaintiff at the close of his speech to "Go down and
take the park" and the circumstances under which these
words were uttered.
308
,
50Siegel v. Regents of the University of California,
F. Supp. 832 "(1970).
bv^lsfntif? P < * nt alleges that this exhortation
not
P
for fh
ff Intended by him as mere rhetoric andt e purpose of directing a physical seizure
Plaintiff
1,
nevertheless, discloses that
5! evident-elect of the Associated Students
f
studentK already aroused over the parksituation, told them to "Go down and take the park".
The record also shows that plaintiff has admitted byhis own testimony at the hearing that he attempted tomake his comments sound militant so he wouldn't betuned off; that he couldn't say simply "Now stay
away from the police" because they would have toldhim to sit down; that he couldn't say it in those
words because a moderate sounding statement "wouldn'thave any effect on them, whereas a statement made intheir own language would have a modifying effect on
them, I hoped .
"
Under the circumstances, shown by the record, that
statement transcends mere expression of opinion and
becomes conduct— a distinct
, affirmative verbal act—
overt conduct for which plaintiff could be properly
called to account under the regulations whatever might
be his claim as to his subjective purpose and intent,
(emphasis added).
Illegal conduct is not protected merely because it is
in part initiated, evidenced or carried out by language.
Utterance in a context of violence, involving a clear
and present danger, can lose its significance as an
appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of
force and as such unprotected by the Constitution.
(See Schenck and Dennis
.
)
Obviously, such oonduct, according to any reasonable,
educational standard, would materially and substantially
intrude upon University administration within the
meaning of Tinker .
The Court found that the school had acted within its
rights, and that Seigel's actions were in no way covered
by the first amendment.
The Seigel case is similar to Yates (1957), Scales
(1961), Noto (1961), and Brandenberg (1969). Not all
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speech and conduct are protected by the first amendment.
Conduct which is violent, reckless, unjustifiable, improper
or denies rights to others is indefensible. So too, speech
which exhorts people to do unlawful acts.
Here, Seigel did more than ask people to believe in
a cause. He prepared a group for illegal action, and even
gave them directions as to the type of illegal action they
should take: "...go down there and take the park." In
doing so, he transcended the line from mere advocacy of an
abstract idea, which is protected by the first amendment,
to advocacy of actions, which is not protected. He demon-
strated a clear intent to break the law (see Schaefer,
1920). His speech became part of the instrument of force
and violence; part of an illegal act.
The college administrator would do well, in these
situations, to remember the principle laid down in Yates :
"...people must be urged to do something now or in the
future, rather than merely to believe in something- - -
advocacy must have some immediate relationship to an unlaw-
ful act."
Symbolic Speech . For over 50 years the courts had
recognized that symbolic acts were akin to freedom of
speech and were therefore covered by the first amendment.
There follow three cases which offer an opportunity to
see how the courts dealt with this subject in a public
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school environment.-^ 1
In 1966 a principal of a high school in Mississippi
learned that a number of students were planning on wearing
freedom buttons" to school. The buttons read "one man one
vote" around the perimeter and "SNCC" in the middle.
The principal, Mr. Moore, upon learning of this,
announced to the student body that they would not be per-
mitted to wear such buttons because they "didn't have any
bearing on their... (the student's) education," "would cause
commotion," and "would be disturbing.
.. (to) the school
program by taking up time trying to get order, passing them
around and discussing them in the classroom and explaining
to the next child why they were wearing them."
Despite the principal’s announcement, 30 or 40 children
wore the buttons to school, and a teacher complained that
this was causing a commotion in the classroom. Mr. Moore
gathered the students in his office and reminded them of
his a. ein^-iA u
,
o.n oc
^
c- ^nc u mix j.
l
to x enio v c?
the buttons or be sent home. The majority elected to return
^ NOTE: Even though these cases deal with high school
students, the affect of the cases and decisions would be
the same at the college level. If anything, the courts
would be more likely to be more restrictive with high
school students, than with college age adults. The Court
in Brooks v. Auburn University , 296 F. Supp. 188 ( 1969 )
notedl fr . ..and in terms of freedom of expression, what
is true of elementary and secondary education, must be true...
of colleges and universities."
81
home, and were suspended for one week. A letter was sent
to the parents explaining that "it is against the school
policy for anything to be brought into the school that is
not educational."
All parents agreed to abide by the school regulation,
except the plaintiffs in this case, who sought in Federal
District Court to enjoin the school officials from en-
forcing the regulation, contending that the regulation
abridged the student’s first amendment rights. The Federal
District Court denied the preliminary injunction and the
case was appealed.
Circuit Judge C-ewin wrote the opinion of the Court in
Burnside v. Byars
, 363 F.2d 755 (1966):
The ...(Black) school children who attended an all
. .
. (Black) hj.gh school wore the "freedom buttons" as
a means of silently communicating an idea and to
encourage the members of their community to exercise
their civil rights. The right to communicate a matter
of vital public concern is embraced in the first
amendment right to freedom of speech and therefore is
clearly protected against infringement by state
officials
.
But the liberty of expression guaranteed by the first
amendment can be abridged by state officials if their
protection of legitimate state interests necessitates
an invasion of free speech.
The interest of the state in maintaining an educational
system is a compelling one, giving rise to a balancing
of first amendment rights with the duty of the state
to further and protect the public school system. The
establishment of an educational program requires the
formulation of rules and regulations necessary for the
maintenance of an orderly program of classroom learning.
In formulating regulations, including those pertaining
to the discipline of school children, school officials
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have a wide latitude of discretion. But the schoolis always bound by the requirement that the rules andregulations must be reasonable. It is not for us to
wh:ther
e
?h
SUCh rUleS are WlSe - expedient butmerely e t ey are a reasonable exercise of thepower and discretion of the school authorities.
In outlining what are reasonable regulations, the
court said:
Regulations which are essential in maintaining order
and discipline on school property are reasonable,hus school rules which assign students to a particular
class, forbid unnecessary discussion in the class-
room and prohibit the exchange of conversation between
students are reasonable even though these regulationsinfringe
_
on such basic rights as freedom of speech ar.d
association, because they are necessary for the orderly
presentation of classroom activities. Therefore, a
reasonable regulation is one which measurably contributes
to the maintenance of order and decorum within the
educational system.
In confronting the situation before the court, Judge
Gewin found the school regulation regarding "freedom
buttons" to be unreasonable:
The regulation which is before us now prohibits the
wearing of "freedom buttons" on school property. The
record indicates only a showing of mild curiosity on
the part of the other school children over the presence
of some 30 or 40 children wearing such insignia.
Even the principal testified that the children were
expelled not for causing a commotion or disrupting
classes but for violating the school regulation.
Thus it appears that the presence of "freedom buttons"
did not hamper the school in carrying on its regular
schedule of activities; nor would it seem likely that
the simple wearing of buttons unaccompanied by
improper conduct would ever do so. Wearing buttons
on collars or shirt fronts is certainly not in the
class of those activities which inherently distract
students and break down the regimentation of the
classroom such as carrying banners, scattering leaflets,
and speechmaking, all of which are protected methods
of expressions, but all of which have no place in an
orderly classroom. If the decorum had been so disturbed
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regulation forbiddin g
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lterrerence with educational activity
tion or that ? <.
con°luslon that there was a conrno-
of the atnden^
butt $ns tended to distract the minds
i, ay frora their teachers. Nor do weth presence of "freedom buttons" is
"
calculated to cause a disturbance suffic ient f.o
tjieir exclusion from school premises unless ttierp i r,some student mis conduct involved
. Cemphasis added).herefore, we conclude after carefully examining all theevidence presented that the regulation forbidding thewearing of freedom buttons" on school grounds is
arbitrary and unreasonable, and an unnecessary infringe-
ment on the student’s protected right of free expressionin the circumstances revealed by the record.
ihe Appeals Court had reversed the decision of the
District Court, and in doing so, also took the opportunity
to give the Court’s opinion on school authority;
We wish to make it quite clear that we do not applaud
any attempt to undermine the authority of the school.
We support all efforts made by the school to fashion
reasonable regulations for the conduct of their
students and enforcement of the punishment incurred
when such regulations are violated. Obedience to duly
constituted authority is a valuable tool, and respect
for those in authority must hp instil Ted in onr> voung
people.
But, with all of this in mind, we must also emphasize
that school officials cannot ignore expressions of
feelings with which they do not wish to contend .
(emphasis added). They camot infringe on their student’s
right to free and unrestricted expression as
guaranteed to them under the first amendment to the
Constitution, where the exercise of such rights in the
school buildings and schoolrooms do not materially and
substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.
On the same day, the same Circuit Judge heard a
similar case involving students wearing similar "SNCC
buttons, but the situation was different, as was the
Court's decision.
from the Dis?rt^ r % US ’ the affidavi^ and testimony
»i t»‘ ^ ^ present quite a different
of classes 1 schoo?°r i? Burnside where no disruption
Hprp th! n- f 1
routine appeared in the evidence,
.ere, e District Court was presented with evidencenumerous instances
,
which have been set out in the
in a
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?Cts, where students conducted themselvesdisorderly manner, disrupted classroom procedure,interfered with
. the proper decorum and discipline ofthe school and disturbed other students who did netwish to participate in the wearing of the buttons.Despite the factual differences in the two cases, thequestion we must decide remains the same. Is the
regulation forbidding the wearing of freedom buttonsby school children reasonable? A reasonable regulationis one which is "Essential in maintaining order anddiscipline on school property" and "which measurably
contributes to the maintenance of order and decorum
within the educational system." (See Eurnside)
The facts demonstrate that during the time students
wore freedom buttons to school, such disturbance was
created by these students. Their actions in the school
building are indeed reprehensible and the school
officials certainly have the authority to mete out
punishment as they deem appropriate for their discour-
^ AAnc f r. « U a « 1 4-1 -•
w w w VA ^ Owxawwa. aUotlUi jl is a. v** o 3 vuClx —
regard for the orderly progression of classroom instruc-
tion, and their complete disregard for the rights of
52Blackwell v. Issaauena County Board of Education,
363 F . 2 d 7^9 (1966).
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^fellow students. The record clearly indicate*that these
. actions by the students in distributingbuttons
,
pinning them ^ on others, and throwing themthrough windows constituted a complete breakdown
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ine ’ Tt is necessary to prohibit
fn°ni usmg^ buttons or any other means of dis-
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g school routine in order to maintain discipline,therefore regulations against the distribution,
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^^
hr0WinS ° f buttons as well as regulationsproh biting discourteous remarks to school personnel,the deliberate absence of a student from class withoutpermission and loud conversation in halls and corridors
which can be heard in classrooms are necessary if the
school is to continue to properly instruct its students.
~ -is always within the province of school authorities
——
—
by regulation the prohibition and punish-
ment
.
Ox act s calculated to undermine the school
routine. This is not only proper in our opinion but
is necessary
. (emphasis added]
Cases of this nature, which involve regulations limiting
freedom of expression and the communication of an
idea which are protected by the first amendment, present
serious constitutional questions. A valuable constitu-
tional right is involved and decisions must be made on
a case by case basis, keeping in mind always the
fundamental constitutional rights of those being affected.
Courts are required to "weigh the circumstances" and
"appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced"
which are asserted to have given rise to the regulations
in the first instance.
The constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech "does
not confer an absolute right to speak" and the law
recognizes that there can be an abuse of such freedom.
The Constitution does not confer "unrestricted and
unbridled license giving immunity for every possible
use of language and preventing the punishment of those
who abuse this freedom." See Whitney v. People of
State of California
,
27^ U.S. 357 (1927). The
interests which the regulation seeks to protect must
be fundamental and substantial if there is to be a
restriction of speech. In Dennis v. United States
,
3^1
U.S. 49^ (1951), the Supreme Court approved the
following statement of the rule by Chief Judge Learned
Hand
:
"In each case (courts) must ask whether
the gravity of the ’evil’, discounted
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by its improbability, justifiesinvasion of free speech as is
necessary to avoid the danger."
such
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Wlth 0r deny rleh ts of others to do sohe behavior involved was "peaceable and orderly".
In the instant case, as distinguished f-om the factsin Burnside, there was more than a mild curiosity ontne part of those who were wearing, distributing, dis-
cussing and promoting the wearing of buttons. There
was an unusual degree of
• commotion
,
boisterous
conduct,. a collision with the rights of others, an
undermining of authority, and a lack of order,discipline and decorum. The- proper operation of public
school systems is one of the highest and most funda-
mental
.
responsibilities of the state. The school
authorities in the instant case had a legitimate and
substantial interest in the orderly conduct of the
school and a duty to protect such substantial interests
in the school's operation. Again we emphasize the
difference in the conduct here involved and that
involved in Burnside
. In this case the reprehensible
conduct described above was so inexorably tied to the
wearing of the buttons that the two are not separable.
In these circumstances we consider the rule of the
school authorities reasonable. As we said in Burnside,
"it is not for us to consider whether such rules are
wise or expedient but merely whether they are a reason-
P h 1 0 ^ D f* f b 0 vn r\wo oriH ^ 0 £* thl-
authorities". There was an abundance of clear, con-
vincing and unequivocal testimony which supported the
action of the District Court in refusing to grant the
requested preliminary injunction. We are unable to
find an abuse of discretion.
O vyiiO v J.
In the same year that Burnside and Blackwell were
being decided, a case was being heard which was to work its
way to the Supreme Court. Besides being a landmark decision
regarding students' rights. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District
, 393 U.S. 303 (1969) was to reveal
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how the Supreme Court would consider first amendment riehts
In a school setting. The basic facts of the case are de-
scribed in Chapter 2, Section 2.5.
The opinion of the Court, delivered by Mr. Justice
Portas, is produced in part below:
This complaint was filed in the United States District
Court by petitioners, through their fathers. It
prayed for an injunction restraining the respondent
school officials and the respondent members of the
board of directors of the school district from disciplin-
ing the petitioners, and it sought nominal damages.
After an evidentiary hearing the District Court dis-
missed the complaint. It upheld the constitutionality
of the school authorities:, action on the ground that it
was reasonable in order to prevent disturbance of school
discipline. The court referred to but expressly declined
to follow the Fifth Circuit's holding in a similar
case that the wearing of symbols like the armbands
cannot be prohibited unless it "materially and sub-
stantially interfere(s) with the requirements of appro-
priate discipline in the operation of the school".
(see Burnside )
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
considered the case en banc. The court was equally
divided, and the District Court's decision was
accordingly affirmed, without opinion.
The District Court recognized that the wearing of an
armband for the purpose of eypresslrcr certain views ^
«
the type of symbolic act that is within the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
As we shall discuss, the wearing of armbands in the
circumstances of this case was entirely divorced from
actually or potentially disruptive conduct by those
participating in it. It was closely akin to "pure
speech" which, we have repeatedly held, is entitled
to comprehensive protection under the first amendment.
First amendment rights, applied in light of special
characteristics of the school environment, are avail-
able to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued
that either students or teachers shed their constitu-
tional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
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hSl/o^b?^ 8fV Thls has been the unmistakablenold of this Court for almost 50 years.
undeFth^ff 111^ V ' farnette > this Court held thatr t e fiist. amendment, the student in public schooln°t he compelled to salute the flag. Speakingthrough Mr. Justice Jackson, the Court said:
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now appliedto the States, protects the citizen
against the State itself and all of its
creatures—Board of Education not
excepted. These have, of course, important,delicate, and highly discretionary
functions, but none that they may not
perform within the limits of the Bill of
Rights. That they are educating the
young for citizenship is reason for
scrupulous protection of Constitutional
freedoms of the individual, if we are not
to strangle the free mind at is source and
teach youth to discount important prin-
ciples of our government as mere platitudes."
319 U.S.
,
at 637.
On the other hand, the Court has repeatedly emphasized
the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of
the States and of school officials, consistent with
fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe
and control conduct in the schools.
Our problem lies in the area where students in the
exercise of first amendment rights collide with the
rules of the school authorities.
The problem posed by the present case does not relate
to regulation of the length of skirts or the type of
clothing, to hair style, or deportment. It does not
concern agressive, disruptive action or even group
demonstrations. Our problem involves direct, primary
first amendment rights akin to "pure speech".
The school officials banned and sought to punish
petitioners for a silent, passive expression of
opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance
on the part of petitioners. There is here no evidence
whatever of petitioners’ interference, actual or
nascent, with the schools' work or of collision with
the rights of other students to be secure and to be
let alone. Accordingly, this case does not concern
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speech or action that intrudes upon the work of theschools or the rights of other students.
fy/'
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the 18,000 students in the school system
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aC armbands * °^ly five students were
suspended for wearing them. There is no indication
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Of thS schools or any class was disrupted,uutside the classrooms, a few students made hostile
remarks to the children wearing armbands, but there
were no threats or acts of violence on school premises.
The District Court concluded that the action of the
school authorities was. reasonable because it wasbased upon their fear of a disturbance from the wearing
of the armbands. But, in our system, undifferentiated
1 ear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to
—
overcome the right to freedom of expression
, (emphasis
added) Any departure from absolute regimentation
may cause trouble. Any word spoken, in class, in
the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from
the views of another person may start an argument or
cause a disturbance. But our Constitutuion says we
must take this risk, and our history says that it is
this sort of hazardous freedom—this kind of openness
—
that is the basis of our national strength and of the
independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live
in this relatively permissive, often disputatious,
society
.
In order for the State in the person of school officials
to justify prohibition of a particular expression of
opinion, it must be able to show that its action was
caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid
the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany
an unpopular vi ewpojnt
. ( empha sis a ) Cert airly
where there is no finding and no showing that engaging
in the forbidden conduct would "materially and substan-
tially interfere with the requirements of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school", the pro-
hibition cannot be sustained.
In the present case, the District Court made no such
finding, and our independent examination of the record
fails to yield evidence that the school authorities
had reason to anticipate that the wearing of the
armbands would substantially interfere with the work of
the school or impinge upon the rights of other students.
Even an official memorandum prepared after the sus-
pension that listed the reasons for the ban on wearing
the armbands made no reference to the anticipation of
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such disruption.
On the contrary, the action of the school authoritiesappears to have been based upon an urgent wish toavoid the controversy which might result from the
nn!™!^
0n\ eVfu, by the silent'symbol of armbands, ofopposition to th.,s Nation's part in the conflagrationin Vietnam. It is revealing, in this respect, thatthe meeting at which the school principals decided toissue the contested regulation was called in response to
a student s statement to the journalism teacher in oneof the schools that he wanted to write an article onletnam ana have it published in the school paper.(The student was dissuaded.)
It is also relevant that the school authorities did
not purport to prohibit the wearing of all symbols
of political or controversial significance. The record
shows
. that students in some of the schools wore buttons
relating to national political campaigns, and some
even wore the Iron Cross, traditionally a symbol of
Nazism. The order prohibiting the wearing or armbands
did not extend to these. Instead, a particular symbol
—
black armbands worn to exhibit opposition to this
Nation's involvement in Vietnam—was singled out for
prohibition. Clearly, the prohibition of expression
of one particular opinion, at least without evidence
that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial
interference with schoolwork or discipline, is not
constitutionally permissible
. (emphasis added)
In our. system, state operated schools may not be
enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do not
possess absolute authority over their students.
Students in school as well as out of sehnnl are "persons"
under our Constitution. They are possessed of funda-
mental rights which the state must respect, just as
they themselves must respect their obligations to
the state. In our system, students may not be regarded
as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the
state chooses to communicate.
They may not be confined to the expression of those
sentiments that are officially approved. In the
absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid
reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled
to freedom of expression of their views. As Judge
Gewin, speaking for the Fifth Circuit, said, school
officials cannot suppress "expressions of feelings with
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v/hich they do not wish to contend." (see Burnside)
In Meyer v. Nebraska
,
262 U.S. 390, Mr. Justice Mc-Reynolds expressed this Nation's repudiation of theprinciple that a State might so conduct its schools
as to foster a homogeneous people". He said:
In order to submerge the individual anddevelop ideal citizens, Sparta assembled
the males at seven into barracks and
intrusted their subsequent education and
training to official guardians. Although
such measures have been deliberately
approved by. men of great genius, their
ideas touching the relation between
individual and State were wholly different
from those upon which our institutions
rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that
any legislature could impose such restric-
tions upon the people of a State without
doing violence to both letter and spirit
of the Constitution."
This principle has been repeated by this Court on
numerous occasions during the intervening years. In
Keyishian v. Board of Regents
, 385 U.S, 589
,
Mr.
Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, said:,
"The vigilant protection of constitutional
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in
the community of American schools."
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 at 487.
The classroom is peculiarly the "market-
place of ideas." The Nation's future
depends upon leaders trained through
wide exposure to that robust exchange
of ideas which discovers truth "out of
a multitude of tongues, ...(rather) than
through any kind of authoritative
selection .
"
The principle of these cases is not confined to the
supervised and ordained discussion which takes place
in the classroom. The principal use to which the
schools are dedicated is to accommodate students
during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain
types of activities. Among those activities is personal
intercommunication among the students. This is not only
an inevitable part of the process of attending school;
it is also an important part of the educational process.
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( emphasis added) '
Under
. our Constitution, free speech is not a rightthat is. given only to be so circumscribed that it
exists in principle but not- in fact. Freedom of
expression would not truly exist if the right couldbe exercised only in an area that a benevolent govern-
ment has provided as a safe haven for crackpots. The
Constitution says that Congress (and the States) may
not abridge. the right to free speech. This provision
means what it says . We properly read it to permit
reasonable regulation of speech-connected activities
in carefully restricted circumstances. But we do not
confine the permissible exercise of first amendment
rights to a telephone booth or the four corners of a
pamphlet, or to supervised and ordained discussion in
a school classroom.
If a regulation were adopted by school officials for-
hl n(r (S-i r\ f' 4- V. TT A ^ v, ™ A ~~ j- 1_ _
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expression by any student of opposition to it anywhere
on school property except as part of a prescribed
classroom exercise, it would be obvious that the
regulation would violate the constitutional rights of
students, at least if it could not be justified by a
showing that the students’ activities would materially
and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of
the school. In the circumstances of the present case,
the prohibition of the silent, passive "witness of
the armbands", as one of the children called it, is
no less offensive to the Constitution's guarantees.
As we have discussed, the record does not demonstrate
any facts which might reasonably have led school
authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or
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material interference with school activities
and no disturbances or disorders on the schoolpremises in fact occurred. These petitioners
merely went about their ordained rounds in
school. Their deviation consisted only in
wearing on their sleeve a band of black cloth,
not more
. than two inches wide. They wore itto exhibit their disapproval of the Vietnamhostilities and their advocacy of a truce,
to make their views known, and, by their
example, to influence others to adoDt them.
They neither interrupted school activities
nor sought to intrude .in the school affairs
or the lives of others. They caused dis-
cussion outside of the classrooms, but no
interference with work and no disorder. In
these circumstances, our Constitution does
not permit officials of the State to deny
their form of expression.
Summary . Thus the Supreme Court held that symbolic
acts are protected by the first amendment. In order to
justify the suppression of this type of "speech", there
must be reasonable grounds to fear that the expression
will materially and substantially interfere with the
activities or discipline of the school.
College authorities cannot suppress speech, symbolic
or otherwise, because they anticipate danger. The burden
of proof is on the college officials to demonstrate any
facts which might reasonably have led them to forecast
substantial disruption or material interference with
college activities.
9 ^
And, even when there is a clear indication that a speech
or symbolic act may result in some disruption of the normal
school activities, consideration must be given to the nature
of the distruption. Is the disruption likely to result
in a material and substantial disruption of the school
activities? Decisions must be made on a case by case basis,
keeping in mind the fundamental rights of students, balanced
by the right of the college to be able to conduct its day-
to-day operations.
A symbolic sit-in on the lawn in front of the college
administration building, or students wearing armbands to
indicate their disDleasure with an administrative policy,
are one level of symbolic speech which mav be a nuisance,
or embarrassing to college officials. But neither repre-
sents any great danger to the orderly operation of the
school. There is no emergency or immediate risk of evil
present. (see Schaefer )
A in which orevent <? voces '5 t n ^he administration
building, or which denies public and student access to
classrooms, may, however, materially and substantially
disrupt the operation of the college, and would not be
protected by the first amendment.
In determining whether or not a symbolic act or speech
will result in material and substantial disruption of the
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operations of a college, officials may consider such relevent
factors as the demography of the college population, the
location of the school or the location of the event in
question, the history of past incidents or disruptions,
etc. However, the college administrator is cautioned to
consider each case separately, remembering that fear of an
incident is not enough reason to suppress speech; and just
because the college was materially and substantially dis-
rupted by an event two or three or more years ago, this is
not enough reason to believe that the same event will result
in a similar disruption.
3 . 4 Speaker Bans
Circuit Judge Heaney, in Pickings v. Bruce
,
430 F.2d
595 (1970), said, "we have been unable to find a single
case decided in the 1960’s in which a speaker ban has been
upheld by a federal Court." Most of the Speaker Ban policies
established at colleges and universities were struck down
as being vague and overbroad, and therefore in violation of
the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (see
section 6.10 of Chapter 6).
Speaker bans, however, do relate directly to the first
amendment, and the rights of individuals to speak and be
heard as well as the rights of an audience to listen.
The following three cases deal with speaker bans in this
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context
.
The President’s Veto. On November 13, 1968, Larry
Brooks and other students at Auburn University, and some
faculty
,
together acting as the Human Rigts Forum, an
officially recognized organization at Auburn, requested
from the Public Affairs Seminar Board, $650 to pay the
Reverend William Sloan Coffin to speak at the campus.
The- Public Affairs Seminar Board, created by the
University, had as its function, to "allocate funds to
departments or groups for the presentation of seminars,
conferences, individual lectures, or other activites which
encourage the worthwhile discussion of public affairs."
The Public Affairs Seminar Board met, and unanimously
approved the request.
On November 22
,
1968
,
the President of Auburn University,
Harry Philpott, informed the Public Affairs Seminar Board
that the Reverend Mr. Coffin would not be invited to speak
at the campus because he was a convicted felon and might
advocate breaking the 1elw.
At a meeting between the President and the Chairman
of the Human Rights Forum, Philpott outlined his rules
relative to inviting outside speakers:
"Student organizations could not invite (a) a speaker
that could reasonably be expected to advocate breaking
the law, (b) a speaker who had been previously convicted
of a felony, and (c) a speaker of the type as the
Reverend Mr. Coffin because it would be tantamount to
Auburn University’s sanctioning what the Reverend Mr.
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Coffin advocated."
On December 4, 1968, President Philpott met with the
Public Affairs Seminar Board, and told them that he was
using his powers as President to veto their vote to pay the
Reverend Mr. Coffin to speak at Auburn, and would, in fact
not allow Coffin to speak on the campus. At that meeting
he handed out "Guidelines for Issuing Invitations to Cutside
Speakers", the most pertinent part of which reads:
"Invitations to speak at Auburn University should
not be extended to persons who by prior expression
might reasonably be expected to advocate:
a. Disregard for the lav/s of our society or the
breaking of these laws.
b. The violent overthrow of our government."
Prior to the issuing of these "guidelines" Auburn
University had no written or orally announced guidelines for
inviting speakers to campus.
The Reverend William Sloan Coffin was an outspoken
critic of the Vietnam War. In connection with his activities
as a leader of the opposition to war, he was convicted by a
United States District Court in Massachusetts for counseling
young men against the draft. This conviction was under
appeal at the time, of the invitation to speak at Auburn.
In considering Brooks v. Auburn University , 296 F. Supp.
188 (1969), the court noted that Auburn University had been
inviting speakers to its campus for several years, and that,
based on President Philpott T s testimony, "...the ban is not
based upon the probability of violence, riots, or other
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disorders accompanying the proposed speech."
Since the Reverend Mr. Coffin was not a part of the
suit, the Court considered the right of the people who
wished to listen to him (i.e., the plaintiffs in this case)
lnvolves the rights of students andfaculty to hear a speaker invited to the camDus bvthem according to the University's authorized pro-cedures. The Supreme Court has recognized that hearers
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in the ma«3°rit y opinion is made
explicit in the concurring opinion of JusticesBrennan and Goldberg:
(T,he addresses assert First Amendment
claims in their own right: they contend
that the Government is powerless to inter-
fere with the delivery of the material
because the First Amendment 'necessarily
protects the right to receive it."’...
It is true that the First Amendment con-
tains no. specific guarantee of access to
publications. However, the protection of
the Bill of Rights goes beyond the specific
guarantees to protect from congressional
abridgment those equally fundamental personal
rights necessary to make the express
guarantees fully meaningful."..*.
"I think the right to rpo.eive publications
is such a fundamental right. The dissemina-
tion of ideas can accomplish nothing if
otherwise willing addresses are not free to
receive and consider them. It would be a
barren market place of ideas that had only
sellers and no buyers."
Judge Johnson then began to review the relevent law
regarding this case, and precedents that would apply:
There can no longer be much doubt that constitutional
freedoms must be respected in the relationships
between students and faculty and their university.
As this Court said in Dickey v. Alabama State Board
^ — —
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_o_f Education
, 273 F. Supp. 613
,
618 ( 1967 ):
"A state cannot force a college student
to forfeit his constitutionally protected
right of freedom of expression as a con-
dition to his attending a state-supported
institution.
"
In Dickey
,
this Court relied heavily upon the leading
case of West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnett
, 319 U . S . 624
,
in which the Supreme Court
stated
:
"The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied
to the States, protects the citizen against
the State itself arid all of its creatures—
Boards of Education not excepted. These
have, of course, important, delicate, and
highly discretionary functions, but none
that they may not perform within the limits
of the Bill of Rights. That they are educat-
ing the young for citizenship is reason for
scrupulous protection of Constitutional
freedoms of the individual, if we are not
to strangle the free mind at its source and
teach youth to discount important principles
of our government as mere platitudes."
Auburn University is, of course, a state agency, and
in terms of freedom of expression what is true of
elementary and secondary education must be true of
colleges and universities. Indeed, it could be argued
that an open forum is even more important on a campus
than among th.e public generally. Chief Justice
Wflr>r*^n seemed to be suggesting just that in Swc czy v.
New Hampshire
,
35^ U.S. 23^ (1957), when he stated:
"The essentiality of freedom in the
community of American universities is
almost self-evident... Teachers and
students must always remain free to
inquire, to study and to evaluate, to
gain new maturity and understanding;
otherwise our civilization will stagnate
and die .
"
It is these considerations which have repeatedly led
courts to strike down restrictions on First Amendment
rights in this context.
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The issue of whether or not Auburn University could
close its doors to all speakers was not raised in this case.
However, the court said that once the doors were opened to
speakers, ’’...they must be opened under conditions consistent
with Constitutional principle." 53
After identifying the principle problem in this case
as one of First Amendment rights, the court set as its task:
...to demarcate the line between speech, the
regulation of which is strictly limited by the
First Amendment, and action, the regulation of
which is permitted subject only to other con-
stitutional provisions and legal doctrines.
...in some cases action will be treated as symbolic
speech, and if speech is so abused as to intentionally
incite violence and crime, that speech will be treated
functionally as conduct and may be punished.
The Court quoted extensively from the Supreme Court,
noting that "...most direct regulations or prohibitions on
speech are precluded by the First Amendment", and that any
system or regulation whidtimposes a prior restraint on speech
or expression "...comes to this court bearing a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity."
After outlining the "void for vagueness" doctrines,
established by the Courts to strike down speaker bans that
were so vague and overbroad as to not be understood, and
open to differing interpretation, by reasonable people,
53The Court here is quoting from a New York case,
Buckley v. Mer.g
,
230 N.Y.S. 2d at 933*
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the court settled into its decision:
Laving stated the governing principles, one must turn
to the occasionally more difficult problem of applying
them to a concrete situation. Among other things/
plaintiffs contend that Auburn’s rules are vague and
overbroad. Certainly they are that. In barring anyone
who "advocates" breaking of the laws, the regulations
run afoul of the almost constitutional ambiguity of
"advocate". See Yates v. United States . Broadly
speaking, Yates says advocating disobedience of the
law in the abstract is constitutionally protected
speech; incitement to illegal action is not , (emphasis
added)
In barring all speakers convicted of a felony, the
regulations run afoul of the ambiguity of "convicted".
In most instances lawyers would use "convicted" to
refer to a final conviction after all appeals had teen
exhausted. The meaning must be unclear, however, since
here President Philpott has applied it to a speaker
whose conviction is still on appeal. The defendants
as justification for banning the appearance and lecture
of the Reverend Mr. Coffin place considerable emphasis
upon the fact that he has been "convicted of a felony".
As a matter of fact, this is the primary justification
for the invocation of the regulations by Dr. Philpott,
the effect of which bars the Reverend Mr. Coffin from
appearing and speaking and consequently deprives these
plaintiffs of the opportunity to hear and weigh what
the Reverend Mr. Coffin may have to say...
This Court is of the opinion that the present status
of the criminal prosecution against the Reverend Mr.
Coffin cannot hr used as a justification for the
regulations in question.
That part of the regulation which would bar speakers
whose views Auburn could not sanction also sweeps
overbroadly
,
although it is difficult for this Court
to see why a university administration should be
thought to have the authority to approve the ideas of
a campus speaker as a condition to the speaker’s appear-
ance at the invitation of students and faculty.
_
If/
this is a legitimate concern, it can be dealt with in
ways other than totally barring the speaker.
The vice in these regulations, however, is really far
more basic than their just being vague and overbroad.
These regulations of Dr. Philpott are not regulations
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of conduct at all. That would presuppose that theydealt with activities which the state had a legitimateinterest in restricting. No such interest has been
suggested here. Rather, we have here direct regula-tion of speech, regulations which on their face restrictthe nature and source—both the medium and the
message— to which these student and faculty plaintiffs
may be exposed. In plain words these regulations mustfall because they constitute blatant political censor-
ship.
The State of Alabama cannot, through its President of
Auburn University, regulate the content of the ideas
students may hear. To do so is illegal and thus un-
constitutional censorship in its rawest form.
It is the duty of this Court, however, to review the
exercise of governmental power where there is a tenable
claim that it has been exercised in a manner inconsistent
with the Constitution of the United States. The point
which defendants have forgotten, as persons in authority
are wont to forget, is that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments are limitations on governmental power.
They were intended to have and do have the force of
law. If Acts of Congress, state statutes, or administra-
tive actions conflict with these limitations, they must
yield; the Constitution is the supreme law of the land.
Thus, while it can be said that President Philpott has
the ultimate power to determine whether a speaker is
invited to the campus, the First Amendment right to
hear of the students and faculty of Auburn University
means that this determination may not be made for the
wrong reasons or for no reason at all.
Their vagueness and overbreadth aside, the stated
reasons will not pass muster. There is no relationship
between a speaker's criminal conviction—especially
one on appeal—and the value of his words to the
listener. Advocating disobedience of the law may or
may not be constitutionally protected. If It is not
and constitutes a violation of law, the speaker sub-
sequently can be punished. The speech may not be
restrained in advance except where there is a clear and
unmistakable determination that the speaker will
violate the law in the course of the speech , (emphasis
added) Such a determination can only be made if
adequate procedures are adopted. No such determination
was made here.
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In one of its final statements, the court raised the
problem of adm.istrators who are placed in the position of
denying First Amendment rights, as well as their own
principles, perhaps, because of pressure, or the possibility
thereof, from "above":
The arbitrary acts of a censor cannot be tolerated; notbecause arbitrary power will be abused in every casebut because cf its inherent potential for discrimination
against unorthodox views. For example, arbitrary power
in the administration would permit discrimination
against speakers who it was felt would be unpopular
with a . state legislature. Although this Court accepts
Dr. Philpott’s testimony that such considerations did
not . influence his decision in this case, the evidence
indicates that officials who would be in a position to
influence that decision expressed concerns that the
Alabama legislature might react to an invitation to the
Reverend Mr. Coffin by cutting the University’s appro-
priation or by enacting a Speaker Ban Lav;. Such con-
cerns, if acted upon, could troadly stifle the right
to hear.
The Court found in favor of the students, but offered
no remedies for university administrators.
The Court Offers Help . In 1969
,
a group of students
at the University of Mississippi and Mississippi State
University, as well as some faculty associations at those
same schools, challenged the constitutionality of policies
regarding on campus speakers established by the Board of
Trustees of Institutions of Higher Learning of the State of
Mississippi
.
On January 14, 1969, a three judge panel met to con-
sider the constitutionality of these speaker regulations,
adopted over a period of 13 years. The Court in Stacy_ v.
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Williams, 306 P. Supp. 963 ( 1969 ), found the regulations to
be unconstitutionally vague.
.'..the standards adopted by the Board for ludging
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necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application violates due process
Postponing any decision for 60 days the Court allowed
the Board of Trustees to develop new regulations consistent
with the ruling of the Court.
On February 20
, 1969, new regulations were adopted by
the Board, and once again the students and faculty filed
objections. The Court, in considering this new set of
regulations, said:
In all essential parts, we find the second set of
regulations either invalid for vagueness under the
Due Process Clause, as were the former regulations,
or in clear violation of the Free Speech and Assembly
provisions of the first and fourteenth amendments as
well as the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth
amendment
.
Quoting from Burnside
,
the Court acknowledged the
authority of college officials to make and enforce reasonable
rules to insure order and decorum in schools. And then
proceeded to consider where that power ends and students'
rights begin.
We begin with the premise that the facilities of state
colleges and universities, dedicated as they are to the
specialized function of education, may be utilized
solely for that purpose. "The State, no less than a
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private owner of property, has power to preserve theproperty under its control for the use to which it islawfully dedicated." Adderly v. State of Florida,
U.S. 39 (1966). J '
The interest of both students and Board can, and must,
yield to harmonious accommodation under the Constitution.
In this case, the Board has not adopted an all-inclusiveban
,
but rather has sought to provide some opportunity,
albeit limited, for students at the various institutions
to hear guest speakers. For this non-exclusionary
attitude it is to be commended, but as it opens the
lecture halls it must do so nondiscriminatorily
.
College administrators
,
in drafting a rule to regulate
speaking
,
must give primary consideration to students'
rights entitled to "comprehensive protection under the
first amendment." Utmost care must be shown for the
recognition of those rights, particularly since a
regulation of this type undertakes to bar certain speech
and thus becomes a limitation upon freedom of speech
and assembly. Indeed, speaker regulations, by their
very nature, constitute "prior restraints" upon the
freedoms of speech and assembly. Although the law
presumes their invalidity, prior restraints are not
unconstitutional per se. But, in order to withstand
constitutional attack, prior restraints must be narrowly
drafted so as to suppress only that speech which presents
a "clear and present danger" of resulting in serious
substantive evil which a university has the right to
prevent. Schenck v. United States
,
24? U.S. 47, 39,
(1919); Dennis v. United States , 341 U.S. 494 (1950).
In Dennis
,
the Supreme Court made an exhaustive review
of all of the cases involving application of the clear
and present danger test for suppressing speech and con-
cluded by adopting Chief Judge Learned Hand's interpre-
tation of the phrase: "In each case ,... (court s ) must
ask whether the gravity of the 'evil', discounted by
its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."
Obviously the evils, sought to be avoided and their
seriousness are to be judged within the context of
each case, here, the peaceful functioning of institu-
tions of higher learning.
While first amendment rights are not to be taken
lightly, a court, reiterating a long standing principle of
law, quoted from Tinker
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•••ft 1 f equally true that student's activity, whetherby a guest speaker or other mode of expressionhich materially disrupts classroom work or involves^substantial disorder or invasion of the rights ofothers is
,
of course, not immunized by the constitutionalguaranty of freedom of speech."
This court, relying on precedent established in cases
briefed in the historical section of this Chapter defined the
use of the "clear and present danger" doctrine:
To satisfy the clear and present danger test, there
must be a finding by proper authority "either thatimmediate serious violence (or other substantive evil)
was to be expected or was advocated, or that the past
conduct furnished reason to believe that such advocacy
was then contemplated", wrote Mr. Justice Brandeis, in
a concurring opinion, in Whitney v. California. 27^
U.S. 357.
This guide was followed by Mr. Justice Black in
Bridges v. California
, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941), by
stating it to be 'k working principle that the sub-
stantive evil must be extremely high" before utterances
can be proscribed. Also, there must be recognized the
material difference between speech which agitates and
exhorts, calling for present violent action creating
clear and present danger of serious substantive evil,
which may assuredly be prohibited, and speech which is
mere doctrinal justification of a thought or idea,
leaving an "opportunity for general discussion and the
calm process of thought and reason", which cannot be
prohibited. This last Drinciple was recently reiterated
by the Supreme Court when it declared that "a statute
which fails to draw this distinction impermissibly
intrudes upon the freedoms guaranteed by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments", and "it sweeps within its
condemnation speech which our Constitution has immunized
from governmental control."
Wtihin these Constitutional principles, the Court
outlined regulations which could be developed by college
authorities
:
1. No requests for speakers need be honored, unless
made to the University by a recognized student
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or faculty group;
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made within a reasonable period
q rpi_
time pi lor t0 the proposed speaking engagement;3. The request should set forth the name of the re-
°^anization, the proposed date, time, andlocation of the meeting, the expected size of theaudience, and the topic of the speech.
Requirements such as these clearly relate to legitimatehousekeeping needs of the institution, both to provide
a suitable forum for the invited speaker and to allow
orderly scheduling of facilities and avoidance of
conflict with academic functions.
Additonally, the Court said,
1. An invitation should not be issued to a guest
speaker unless approved by the executive head
of the educational institution;
2. The approving authority must act in accordance
with correctly prescribed standards, and must
act upon a request within a reasonable period
of time;
3. A prompt review of the executive head’s decision
be afforded.
It is essential that procedural due process be built
into such a regulation, in order for it to be valid,
so as to relieve against the possibility of censor-
ship, arbitrary decision, or unbridled discretion.
The crux of a valid regulation must, in objective
language, preclude only that speech subject to being
forbidden under the doctrine of clear and present
danger. For purpose of illustration, we have no
doubt that tne college or university authority may
deny an invitation to a guest speaker requested by a
campus group if it reasonably appears that such
person.would
,
in the course of his speech, advocate:
1) violent overthrow of the government of the United
States, the State of Mississippi, or any political
subdivision thereof; 2) willful destruction or seizure
of the institution's buildings or other’ property; 3)
disruption or impairment, by force of the institution’s
regularly scheduled classes or other educational
functions; ^ ) physical harm, coercion, intimidation
or other invasion of lawful rights of the institution's
officials, faculty members or students; or 5) other
campus disorder cf violent nature. In drafting a
regulation so providing, it must be made clear that
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deqUate review Procedure in event speech
Finally
,
the Court listed three more regulations that
could be established by college authorities:
1. Preference
. can be given to an academic event over
an invitation to a guest speaker sought to be
scheduled for the same time;
2. The speaker may be required to assume full
responsibility for any violation of law caused
by his own conduct;
3 • The college authorities may demand that a state-
ment be made at the meeting that the views pre-
sented by the speaker are not necessarily those
of the institution or sponsoring group.
While the r»nnr»t reviewed and °tr ii ^i k ^ ovrn *"* o ^-t
of regulations adopted by the Board, the court was
reluctant to " ...leave the state's institutions of higher
learning entirely without protection afforded by reasonable
and valid rules."
The court, then, fashioned its own speaker regulations,
to be adopted by the institutions of higher education in
Mississippi, noting that the Board could repeal such a
109
regulation, since it was not required to have one. How-
ever, the Board could not adopt any other regulation re-
garding speakers that would be inconsistent with the Court’s
ruling
.
The court’s speaker policy is reproduced here in its
entirety as both an aide to understanding the court's
decision, and helping college administrators in developing
speaker policies on their campuses.
UNIFORM REGULATIONS FOR OFF-CAMPUS SPEAKERS INVITED
BY ORGANIZED STUDENT AND FACULTY GROUPS APPLICABLE TO
ALL INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING WITHIN THE STATE
OF MISSISSIPPI
The freedoms of speech and assembly guaranteed by the
first and . fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution shall be enjoyed by the students and
faculties of the several Institutions of Higher Learn-
ing of the State of Mississippi as respects the oppor-
tunity to hear off-campus, or outside, speakers on the
various campuses. Free discussion of subjects of
either controversial or noncontroversial nature shall
not be curtailed.
However, as there is no absolute right to assemble
or to make or hear a speech at any time or place re-
gardless of the circumstances, content of the speech,
Durpose of assembly, nr probable consequences of such
meeting or speech, the issuance of invitations to
outside speakers shall be limited in the following
particulars, but only in the manner set forth herein:
1. A request to invite an outside speaker will be
considered only when made by an organized student
or faculty group, recognized by the head of the
college or university;
2. No invitation by such organized group shall issue
to an outside speaker without prior written con-
currence by the head of the institution, or such
person or committee as may be designated by him
(hereafter referred to as his authorized designee),
for scheduling of speaker dates and assignment of
campus facilities;
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4.
Any speaker request shall be made in writing bv
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ent or faoulty organizationi g sponsor the proposed speaker notlater than ten calendar days prior to the date ofthe proposed engagement. This request shall
.
of the s Ponsorj-ng organization, the
p oposec date, time and location of the meeting,the expected size of the audience and topic of
speech. Any request not acted upon by the head ofthe institution, or his authorized designee, withinlour, days after submission shall be deemed granted:A request made by a recognized organization may bedenied. only if the head of the institution, or his
authorized designee, determines, after properinquiry
,
that the proposed speech will constitute
a clear and present danger to the institution's
orderly operation by the speaker's advocacy of such
actions as:
1. The violent overthrow of the government of
the United States, the State of Mississippi,
or any political subdivision thereof; or’
’
2. The willful damage or destruction, or seizure
and subversion, of the institution's buildings
or other property; or
3. The forcible disruption or impairment of, or
interference with, the institution’s regularly
scheduled classes or other educational func-
tions; or
4. The physical harm, coercion, intimidation, or
other invasion of lav/ful rights, of the
institution’s officials, faculty members or
students; or
5. Other campus disorder of a violent nature.
(The term advocacy as used here, means preparing the
group addressed for imminent action and stealing it
to such action, as opposed to the abstract espousal of
the moral propriety of a course of action by resort to
force; and there must be not only ddvocacy to action
but also a reasonable apprehension of imminent danger
to the essential functions and purposes of the
institution
.
)
In determining the existence of a clear and present
danger, the head of the institution, or his authorized
Ill
designee, may consider all relevant factors, includingwhether such speaker has, within the past five yearsV1 °lence resulting in the destruction of
any state educational institution or has
C
?
USed the forcible disruption of regularly
scheduled. classes or other educational functions atany such institution.
5 . Where the request for an outside speaker is denied,
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ins or&anization thereby aggrieved shall,
upon, written application to the head of theinstitution ,. or his authorized designee, obtain ahearing within two days following the filing ofits appeal before a Campus Review Committee, com-posed of. three faculty members and two students ofthe institution, for de novo consideration of the
request. The Campus Review Committee shall have
power. to grant or deny the request; and its
decision shall.be final, unless judicial review is
sought as hereinafter provided. If such request
is neither granted nor denied within said two-day
pcriod,.it shall be deemed granted, and the speaker's
invitation shall issue. The three faculty members
to serve on the Campus Review Committee shall be
appointed at each institution for a one-year term
beginning September 1 of each calendar year, and
this appointment shall be made by the President
of the Board of Trustees of the Institutions of
Higher Learning. The two student members on the
Campus Review Committee shall be the president
and secretary of the student body of each institu-
tion, and they shall serve only as long as they
hold those student offices.
Any sponsoring organization aggrieved by the action
of the Campus Review Committee in denying the request
may obtain judicial review thereof upon application
to any court of competent jurisdiction, state or
federal, by presenting its verified petition
setting forth the grounds of complaint and giving
adequate notice of such filing to the head of the
institution. Upon a hearing to be conducted as
soon as practicable, and at such time and place as
the court may prescribe, the court shall either
reverse or affirm the decision of the Campus
Review Committee as may be proper under the law
and facts.
6. V/here the request for an outside speaker is granted
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and the speaker accepts the invitation, the spon-
soring organization shall inform the head of theinstitution, or his authorized designee, in
writing immediately of such acceptance. The head
of the institution, or his authorized designee,
may, in his discretion, require that the meeting
be chaired by a member of the administration or
faculty
,
and he may further require a statement
to be made at the meeting that the views presented
are not necessarily those of the institution or of
the . sponsoring group. By his acceptance of the
invitation to speak,
_
the speaker shall assume
full. responsibility for any violation of law
committed by him while he is on campus.
A Test of The Court * s Speaker Regulation
. A year
after Stacy
,
another court case was brought by students of
c ii
the University of Mississippi, asking that the court
order University officials to allow a speech by Tyrone
Gettes, a black student who was President of the student
body at Mississippi Valley State College, an all-^black
college
.
The Court had determined that the Board of Trustees of
the Institutions of Higher Learning had not repealed the
speaker policy as established by the Stacy Court, nor had
they replaced that policy with another. Therefore, the
Stacy speaker policy was in effect for this case.
The students, pursuant to and in accordance with this
speaker policy, presented the Chancellor of the University
of Mississippi, Porter Fortune, a request to invite Gettes
^Molpus v. Fortune , 311 F. Supp. 240 (1970).
113
to speak on the campus. The request complied in all respects
with the Stacy court speaker policy.
Upon receiving the request, Chancellor Fortune
notified the students that he would not approve the request.
The court noted:
The evidence at the hearing developed that ChancellorFortune received a similar request from the students
on February 19
, 1970, for Mr. Gettes to speak on the
campus on February 26, 1970. When Chancellor Fortune
received the first request he investigated Mr. Gettes
and came to the conclusion that his appearance, as aguest speaker on the campus
,
would constitute a clear
and present danger to the institution’s orderly operation,because of the likelihood that Mr. Gettes would advocatedamage to, or destruction of the institution’s buildings
and other property, or seizure of the same; or would
advocate forcible disruption or impairment of, or
interference with the institution’s regularly scheduled
classes or other educational functions, or, would advo-
cate campus disorder of a violent nature. Having
reached this conclusion. Chancellor Fortune entered
his disapproval of the request. The request was later
withdrawn by the students.
When he received the second request for Gettes to
speak. Chancellor Fortune, because of his previous research.
was prepared to again reject the request.
After receiving the rejection, and pursuant to the
s peaker ban regulation, the students requested a review of
the decision by the Campus Review Committee. This Committee
voted 4 to 1 to support the Chancellor’s decision, and denied
the student’s request.
Again, pursuant to the speaker regulation, the students
filed their case with the District Court.
After several motions to dismiss the case. Judge Smith
decreed that the case was proper under the regulations
established by the Stacy Court:
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nt ^ matter which «>e Court
speak on the campus, and allow the speech to
under the sponsorship of the University of MiYoung Democrats. ssissippi
After reviewing Supreme Court decisions regarding
prior restraint" and first amendment rights, and the rules
adopted by the Stacy Court, Judge Smith delivered the
opinion of the court
:
The Court holds that the burden of proof in this case
rests upon defendants to show by clear and convincing
evidence that the speech of Mr. Gettes will constitute
a clear and present danger to the University’s orderly
operation because of the speaker's advocacy of the
willful damage and destruction, or seizure and
subversion, of the buiidj ncrs or other riro r'ert ,r cf the
University; or the forcible disruption or impairment
of, or interference with, the regularly scheduled
classes or other educational functions of the Uni-
versity, or the physical harm, coercion, intimidation,
or other invasion of lawful rights, of the officials,
faculty members or students of the University; or
some other campus disorder of a violent nature.
Nothing less than clear and convincing proof can
suffice to deprive plaintiffs of their first amedment
rights
.
Prior to the disruptions at Mississippi Valley State
College. .. (where Gettes went to school ),... the
enrollment was approximately two thousand students.
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During the months of January and February 1970 thestudent body staged almost continuous demonstrations
numerous demands made by them upon college
oiliciais. It is not necessary to detail the nature
and extent of the demonstrations except to say that
as a result of the student's boycott of classes anddemonstrations the officials closed the college for atime. Lator the college was opened for new registra-
tion. As a result of the action by college officials
a large number of students did not return to school.
in
Mr. Gettes was a leader in the student revolt, and
assumed an active part therein. On one occasion a
faculty meeting at the college was interrupted. Mr.
Gettes is shown to have used abusive language toward
one of the officials. On another occasion, the
students forceably occupied a building on the campus
and held a meeting there. Mr. Gettes is shown to' have
threatened a campus police officer with bodily harm.
Rocks were thrown on occasions. The students stopped
an automobile and tried to turn it over. It is
sufficient to say that there were numerous incidents
of campus disorder and interruption of regularly scheduled
classes and other educational functions. Some of the
college property was damaged, though only to a slight
degree
.
The evidence did not show that Mr. Gettes personally
destroyed or damaged any property, or harmed any
person. It was shown, however, in fact, admitted by
plaintiffs, that Mr. Gettes was one of the leaders
of the demonstrations, and student revolt.
The University of Mississippi has a student body in
piffipejs of* siy thousand s^^de^ts, of which not more
than two hundred are black students.
There has not been a disturbance of major importance
on the University campus since the Meredith incident
in the early sixties. However, a short time before
Chancellor Fortune received the first request from
UMYD for Mr. Gettes to speak on the campus, there were
two or three incidents of a minor nature involving
black students. On one occasion a concert or musical
at the chapel was interrupted by black students.
These students went uninvited upon the stage. At
about that same time a group of black students appeared
on the Chancellor's lawn demanding an audience with
him. Some of the students in the group used profane
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and obscene language,
unrest among the black
These incidents indicated
students on the campus.
When the first request for Mr. Gettes to speak on thecampus was received by Chancellor Fortune, he wasaware of the unrest of the black students, on thecampus. He initiated an investigation of Mr. Gettesin order to determine whether the request should behonored. Newspaper clippings concerning the incidents
t}
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. Mississippi Valley State College were
obtained and reviewed. Chancellor Fortune talked with
college officials about the matter. After reviewingthe evidence received from these sources, ChancellorFortune determined that the proposed speech of Mr.Gettes, would constitute a clear and present danger tothe University’s orderly operation in the particulars
above outlined, especially in view of the black student
unrest
.
Evidence showed that Gettes intended only to speak on
a student’s viewpoint of the problems existing at
Mississippi Valley State College.
This was supported by a UMYD attorney who had talked
with Gettes, as well as by several UMYD students who had
spoken with Gettes, or visited the Mississippi Valley
State College first hand.
The UMYD students supplied two other students, one of
whom was a leader of the black students, and three faculty
members, who testified that they were aware of the
University of Mississippi situation, and that...
the appearance of Mr. Gettes on the campus would not
in any manner constitute a clear and present danger
to the orderly operation of the University.
The University introduced college officials of both
schools, as well as Chancellor Fortune as witnesses. Fortune
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gave his reasons for denying the student’s request. He
had
. .
.
determined that the proposed speech by Mr. Gettes
would constitute a clear and present danger to theUniversity’s orderly operation in the particulars
fJ?°r
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menti °ned * Chancellor Fortune was not fearfulthat Mr. Gettes’ appearance on the campus would
result in disorders such as occurred at MississippiValley
-tate College. He testified that he was fully
cognizant of the fact that the student body at the
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lnvolved a rcuch larger group than did that
at Mississippi Valley State College, and that only afew of the students at the University were black, while
all of the students at the college were black students
.
Chancellor Fortune expressed the opinion that the
University had ample resources to control any disorder
which might occur on the campus. Chancellor Fortune’s
main concern was to avoid a disturbance of any nature
.
Following all of the witnesses, the judge outlined the
problem before the Court:
The Court must consider the evidence in its entirety
and decide whether clear and convincing evidence, has
been introduced to demonstrate that Mr. Gettes speech,
should it occur, will constitute a clear and present
danger to the orderly operation of the University.
The question presented here is whether there is a
reasonable probability that Mr. Gettes would
advocate in his speech the willful damage or destruc-
tion, or seizure and subversion, of the ouiidings or
other property of the University, or the forcible
disruption or impairment of, or interference with,
regularly scheduled classes or other educational
functions of the University, or other campus disorders
of a violent nature. Advocacy, as used here
,
means preparing the group addressed for imminent action
and stealing it to such action, as opposed to the
abstract espousal of the moral propriety of a course
of action by resort to force, and there must be not
only advocacy to action but also a reasonable appre -
hension of imminent danger to the essential functions
and purposes of the University" (emphasis added)
The determination of the Court was short and to the
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point
:
It appears clear to the Court that Mr. Gettes’ appear-
ance on the campus would not present a clear and presentdanger to the orderly operation of the University.
In the first place, Mr. Gettes proposes to limit his
speech to a discussion of the crisis at Mississippi
Valley Sta.te College, as viewed by him as a studentleader. However, should Mr. Gettes extend his remarks
so as to advocate the destruction or damage of Uni-
versity property, or the seizure of its buildings, or
other campus disorder of a violent nature, there does
not appear to be a reasonable probability that such
would happen. This conclusion is especially true when
the probability is viewed in the light of the nature and
racial composition of the student body at the Univer-
sity .
The Court is of the opinion that the Campus Review
Committee erred in disapproving the request by UMYD
for permission to invite Mr. Gettes to speak on the
University campus. The decision of the committee will
be reversed and University officials wTill be directed
to approve the request.
The decision in this case is not to be considered as
critical of Chancellor Fortune or the Campus Review
Committee. The Court is positive that they acted in
good faith and in accord with that which they thought
would be for the best interest of the University.
However, the Court feels that Chancellor Fortune and
the Campus Review Committee were overly cautious in
their actions and that the danger of disorder at the
University resulting from Mr. Gettes' speech, is not
A y) a a
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The students at the University should not be deprived
of the right to hear speakers espousing controversial
matters except in cases where it is clear that the
speakers will constitute a clear and present danger
to the orderly operation of the University. In the
opinion of the Court, the case before this Court is
not such a case.
It is important to note that although these "speaker
ban" cases are factually and .situationaliy different from the
cases previously discussed, they were decided on the basis
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of the same principles of law used to decide Burnside
.
Blackwell, and Tinker
.
Ultimately the chief administrative officer of the
college should retain the authority to decide whether
or not a person should be invited to speak on the campus.
However, this authority should not be abused, and the
decision to invite or not should be made within guidelines
consistent with constitutional law, as it has been dis-
cussed in this section: speech may not be restrained in ad-
vance except where constitutionally reasonable and administra-
tive requirements have not been complied with (such as require-
ments requiring time, place, and manner, see Stacy ) , or where
it reasonably appears that the speaker will advocate the vio-
lent overthrow of the United States Government or any of its
political subdivisions, willful distruction or seizure of the
institutions’ buildings or other property, disruption or im-
pairment of the institution's regularly scheduled classes or
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tion, or other invasion of lawful acts of the institution’s
officers, faculty, or students, or any other campus disorder
of a violent nature.
The State cannot regulate the content of speech to which
students may be exposed. This would be blatant censorship.
However, policies and regulations can be established which set
administrative standards (time, location of speech, limits on
the number of people allowed in a building or room, con. li^t
s
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m scheduling, etc.) and which control conduct, both of the
speaker and the audience. Care should be taken to establish
regulations which restrict only speech which presents a
clear and present danger if resulting in serious substantial
evil, or which would result in material interference with
the normal operation of the college.
As before, anticipated danger, or fear of disruption
is not enough to suppress speech. And, the evil to be
avoided must be of a serious nature.
3.5 Assembly, Demonstrations, and Picketing
The First Amendment, besides upholding the freedom of
speech, actual and symbolic, also allows for the right to
peaceably assemble. The principles involved in protecting
these rights and as applied by the Courts are, as we shall
see, the same as those for other "speech" cases.
Prohibiting Demonstrations Before They Start . Joseph
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Carolina State College, had gathered together to demonstrate
against some rules of the college. The students were well
aware of a college Board of Trustee rule which stated:
Be it resolved that hereafter any student at South
Carolina State College who shall engage in any
public demonstrations without prior approval of
the College administration shall be summarily
expelled.
The rule had been adopted in I960, to protect students
and to "...preserve public peace and order."
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The students claimed that they demonstrated in an
orderly and peaceful fashion, and that this was their
constitutional right.
The college officials, on the other hand, claimed the
demonstration was "noisy and disorderly", and that Hammond
and others be held accountable to the Board of Trustee’s
rule (known as rule # 1 ) as leaders 'of the demonstration.
A hearing was held by the Faculty Discipline Committee,
and the students were found to have violated Rule #1 by having
participated in a demonstration on campus without approval.
The students were suspended for 3h years, and barred from
the campus
.
The students, claiming that their First Amendment
54
rights had been violated, filed suit in District Court.
The question of the nature of the demonstration,
whether it was peaceable or not, was not discussed by the
court. Instead, while confirming the right of the college
officials to nreserve order and discipline or a campus,
the Court took a serious look at rules which forbid all
demonstrations without prior approval:
The controversy here revolves around the school rules
of deportment and discipline. Their obvious purpose
is to protect the authority and administrative
responsibility which is imposed on the officers of the
^Hammond v. South Carolina State College , 272 F.
Supp. 9^7 (1967 )
•
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institution. Unless the officials have authority to
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* they have n0 power to guarantee education.If they caiinot preserve order by rule and regulation,
and insist on obedience to those rules, they will behelpless in the face of the mob, powerless to command,
or rebuke the fanatic, the irritant, the malingerer,
.he rabble rouser. .To be sure, this is a tax suDportedinstitution, but this does not give license to chaos,
or the hope to create chaos. The majority of the tax-
payers who established, through representative
government, the institution, and all the taxpayers who
support this institution, have a vested interest in a
peaceful campus, an academic climate of order and
culture. The power of the president to oversee, to
rule, is an integral part of the mechanism for pro-
viding and promoting education at State Colleges. Be
that as it may, colleges, like all other institutions,
are subject to the Constitution.
The first amendment does not speak equivocally. It
prohibits any law "abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press. It must be taken as a command of the
broadest scope that explicit language, read in the
context of a liberty-loving society, will allows."
Bridges v. State of California
,
31^ U.S. 252, 263.
These rights of the first amendment, including the
right to peaceably assemble, are not to be restricted
except upon the showing of a clear and present danger,
of riot, disorder, or immediate threat to public safety,
peace, or order. (see Dennis v. United States )
I am persuaded that Rule #1 is on its face a prior
restraint on the right to freedom of speech and the
right to assemble. The rule does not purport to
prohibit assemblies which have qualities that arc-
unacceptable to responsible standards of conduct: it
prohibits "parades, celebrations, and demonstrations"
without prior approval without any regard to
limiting its proscription to assemblies involving
misconduct or disruption of government activities
or non-peaceable gatherings. On this ground I do not
feel that it is necessary to make finding as to the
nature of the demonstration.
In no way is it my intention to rule that school
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officials may not make disciplinary rules and enforcethem. Most certainly they may. I am constrained to
rule, however, that the rule under which these students
were suspended was incompatible with the constitutionalguaranties and is invalid.
The Court found in favor of the students, but indicated
that the court’s order did not prohibit the college officials
from instituting proper disciplinary proceedings against
the students for violating other college rules regarding
proper deportment.
Disruptive Demonstrations
. In 1967
,
students at
Blue field State College, located in West Virginia, were
protesting for a greater voice in the administration of the
school
.
Bluefield had been an all Black college, but had been
desegregated following the 195^ Supreme Court school de-
segregation case. (see Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka Kansas ) In 1967 the enrollment was 60% white and
l\0% black.
The case of Barker v. Hardwav . 283 F. Supp. 228 (1968),
involved three demonstrations, taking place over a two-day
period. The court was to view two of these demonstrations
as peaceful expression of opinion, and therefore acceptable
within the limits of the first amendment, and the third
demonstration as action clearly beyond the scope and meaning
of the first amendment.
At a half time show at a home football game on October
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14th, approximately two hundred black students marched up
and down the playing field, carrying signs and chanting
slogans denouncing the college president, Wendell Hardway.
The Court found that this demonstration had been conducted
peacefully and was non-violent, and was therefore protected
by the first amendment. The college officials did not argue
this point, and the court took the opportunity to note that
the school's policy regarding demonstrations, picketing,
etc. was reasonable, and that the college officials had not
had any history of restricting student's rights to freedom
of speech:
The handbook also sets forth the right of students
to assemble, discuss, debate and to disseminate
personal and group opinion; the right to initiate
and conduct organizations and programs consistent
with the institutional program of higher education
and college policy and the right to use college
facilities in accordance with college regulations.
Following the half time demonstration, the students
moved into the stands. After unsuccessfully trying to
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moved to the section where President Hardway and his guests
were sitting, and continued to wave their signs and chant
anti-Hardway slogans.
The demonstrators encircled the college president and
his guests, and prevented them from watching the game by
placing their signs and placards directly in front of their
faces. As the actions of the demonstrators became more
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harassing, several faculty, and others in that section of the
stadium felt compelled to leave. The police, concerned for
the safety of Dr. Hardway, escorted him and his guests to
the visitor's side of the stadium, which was virtually
unoccupied. While this was taking place, one demonstrator
shouted, "Hardway, we're going to get you.", and another
spat into the face of a police officer.
The demonstrators moved to the visitor’s side along
wLth President Hardway and the police, and continued their
menacing conduct. They moved into the stands, and forced
the police to form a protective circle around the college
president, and eventually lead him out of the stadium for
his own safety. The crowd followed the police escort, and
Hardway ’ s car was first blocked from leaving the area, and
then beat upon and rocked back and forth before he managed
to drive away.
During this period, the demonstrators threw rocks and
bottles, two police officers were struck by rocks, and
another policeman was struck in the face by a demonstrator.
After Dr. Hardway ' s exit, the police had to form a
defensive line to protect themselves.
On October 16th, approximately 300 students marched
to Dr. Hardway ' s house and conducted a sing-in on his front
lawn at about 12:30 a.m. The songs were the same that
were chanted during the half-time show.
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harassing, several faculty, and others In that section of the
stadium felt compelled to leave. The police, concerned for
the safety of Dr. Hardway, escorted him and his guests to the
visitor's side of the stadium, which was virtually unoccupied.
While this was taking place, one demonstrator shouted, "Hardway,
we’re going to get you.", and another spat into the face of a
police officer.
The demonstrators moved to the visitor’s side along with
President Hardway and the police, and continued their menacing
conduct. They moved into the stands, and forced the police to
form a protective circle around the college president, and
eventually lead him out of the stadium for his own safety. The
crowd followed the police escort, and Hardway ’s car was first
blocked from leaving the area, and then beat upon and rocked
back and forth before he managed to drive away.
During this period, the demonstrators threw rocks and
bottles, two police officers were struck by rocks, and another
policeman was struck in the face by a demonstrator. After Dr.
Hardway ’ s exit, the police had to form a defensive line to
protect themselves.
On October 16th, approximately 300 students marched to
Dr. Hardway ’ s house and conducted a sing-in on his front lawn
at about 12:30 a.m. The songs were the same that were chanted
during the half-time show.
During all of these proceedings, Dr. Hardway and others
had identified individual students as leaders and participants
in the demonstrations, and following the weekend activities.
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he sought to dismiss these students.
To varying degrees, the students' oases were heard
before a Faculty Committee on Student Affairs. Ten students
brought before this committee, eight were suspended
and two were not. All ten, however, brought suit against
Hardway and other college officials, claiming, among other
things, that their first amendment rights had been violated.
The Court, In arriving at its decision quickly
separated the incident at the football game and the sing-in
on the college president’s front lawn:
It is, therefore, specifically found as a matter of factthat all the suspended students except Alan Tucker did,
o lowing the football game half time, engage in, and
encourage others to engage in, a non-peaceful and violent
?^
0t?nL dem01?Strati0n at Mitchell Field Stadium on October14, 1907
,
which posed an imminent threat of danger to Dr.Hardway and others in lawful attendance at the game, in
violation of the rules and regulations of the Bluefield
State College, and that the degree of their activity and
participation therein was such as to call for the invoca-
tion of disciplinary action against them by the school
administration pursuant to such rules and regulations.
It is further found as a fact that while Alan Tucker, the
other suspended student, was the leader of the "sing in"
after midnight, to-wit, at about 12:30 a.m., October 16,
j-yvi
,
on Di.' . Hardway ’ s lawn, located on the college campus
the exercise itself was unaccompanied by any violent or
non-peaceful activity, and though it was obviously de-
signed to further harass and annoy Dr. Hardway and was in
violation of the rules of the school, it may have been per
missible under the first amendment. Tucker is given the
benefit of 'che doubt and exonerated of blame for this
incident as a matter of fact.
In finding for Dr. Hardway and the college in the matter
of the stadium demonstration, and upholding the suspensions,
the judge recite'd much of the law which we have previously
considered, both historically and in the present:
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0 dlsclose any preconceived policyor Resign by the West Virginia Board of Education
or the administrative or faculty staff of the collegeto ras trict or deny the students or others similarly
situated of their first amendment rights, or any
specific instance where any of the college officials
attempted to do so.
It is, therefore, found as a matter of fact that nonepr the defendants took any action during the year
1967 which denied, or had the effect of denying,
plaintiffs any of their first amendment rights tofreedom of speech, peaceful assembly, or petition
for redress of grievances.
In concluding his decision. District Judge Christie
borrowed from the language of Tinker :
True it is that enrollment in school does not mean
the student surrenders any of his constitutional
rights. But by the same token, that fact does not
give him the right to abuse and harass the administra-
tors of the institution or encage in conduct detri-
mental to its well-being or which may tend to deprive
other students of the right to a peaceful atmosphere
in which to pursue their ambition for an education.
Nor can it be again said that the plaintiffs and
their fellow demonstrators had the right under the
first amendment to bring their grievances to the
attention of Dr. Hardway and other college officials
in attendance at the footbal game, though a more
appropriate time and place could very well have been
chosen, and the evidence is uncontradicted that they
were permitted to freely exercise this right by marching,
chanting, singing, and displaying signs and placards
on and around the field throughout the half time;
but when they entered the stands when the game resumed
and by abusive and disorderly acts and conduct, first
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Restrictions on Demonstrations
. Madison College, in
Harrisonburg, Virginia, promulgated rules and regulations
regarding demonstrations, which, among other things, defined
demonstrations, required that demonstrations
... "be register-
ed with the Office of Student Activities 48 hours in ad-
vance
,
and that the time and place of the demonstration be
disclosed at the time of registration. The rules did
forbid demonstrations "...in the areas of the health center.
inside any buildings and congregating in the locations of
fire hydrants."
On April 23, 1971 there began a series of events that
was to cause several students at the college to question
these regulations in a court of law.
On the 23rd, a group of students gathered to protest
the termination of some teaching personnel. This demonstra-
tion was duly registered in accordance with the college's
policy
.
However, following this protest gathering, a group of
students moved to Wilson Hall, a combination classroom and
administration building, determined to conduct a sleep-in
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at the college president’s office.
After entering the building, the students were advised
by the Dean of Students that they were violating college
policy by demonstrating inside Wilson Hall, and warned them
of sanctions that could be levied against them. Some left
the building, but others remained until a second warning was
given an hour later.
On the 24th a group of students attempted to register
a "vigil" which was to take place inside Wilson Hall. The
Dean of Students refused to register it because it would
constitute a violation of the college policy forbidding
demonstrations inside of a building.
Ignoring this denial, the students conducted a sit-in,
two days later, in Wilson Hall. College officials came to
the building on this occasion, and reminded the students
of the college rules and the consequences of breaking those
rules. While some students left the building, others
entered, and a large crowd gathered outside. While there
was singing and chanting, there was no violence or destruc-
tion of property.
The school officials called the police, and a number
of students were arrested for violating the State's trespass
law. Disciplinary action was also taken by the college
officials against participants in the sit-in.
Three days later, the students who had been arrested,
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and/or against whom disciplinary action was being taken,
and others, held a demonstration on the campus to protest
the arrest of students and disciplinary action, as well
as the termination of some of the faculty (the theme of
the original demonstration). This protest was registered,
and the college authorities made no attempt to control or
limit its purpose.
The students sought an injunction prohibiting any
punishment by the college authorities, and a judgment that
the college’s demonstration regulation was constitutionally
invalid. The District Court found in favor of the students,
and the case was appealed.
Circuit Judge Russell delivered the opinion of the
court in Sword v. Fox
,
446 F.2d 1091 (1971):
It should be recalled at the outset, that, according
to the uncontradicted testimony of the college's presi-
dent, the college, acting under these regulations had
never denied any student group the right to demon-
strate nor were the students involved in the sit-ins
with which this action is concerned ever denied the
r i gh t to d cmo n ^ ^ ra t c. n protest. r\S h^s ^ w
.
lu ^
^
out, these students actually did demonstrate, after
registration of their demonstration, as required
under these regulations, both before and after the
"sit-ins" in Wilson Hall. Nor was any attempt
made to control or even influence the purpose of their
demonstrations or, so far as the record shows, any
other demonstrations on campus; indeed, the form of
registration required to be filed with the Director
of Student Activities, did not request information
with reference to the demonstration's purpose. What
was denied these students—and all that was denied
them—was the right to demonstrate by a "sit-in"
specifically in Wilson Hall . It is thus not the
right to protest but the place of protest that was
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regulated and is involved in this appeal. The 48-hour
registration requirement under the regulations, though
referred to in the briefs filed by the parties, is
similarly not in issue. That regulation was notinvoked against the appellees; in fact, it seems tohave been liberally enforced. The only portion of
the challenged regulations under which the appellees
were threatened with disciplinary action concerned,
not the right generally to demonstrate nor the require-
ment of 48 hour's prior registration of a demonstration,
but specifically the college's denial of the right to
demonstrate within a college building, a building
which housed the administrative offices of the college
and certain classrooms. It is only that regulation
so applied, that appellees have standing to challenge.
To repeat, the basic question presented by the appeal
is whether a state-supported college, while permitting
generally and without discrimination demonstrations
elsewhere on its campus, may, in consonance with the
first amendment, deny students the right to demonstrate
and protest by a way of a "sit-in" within a combination
classroom and administrative building.
Although it may be taken as settled that a college
student, by his enrollment, is not stripped of his
constitutional right to engage in "symbolic" speech
in the form of demonstrations of protest, this does
not mean that the exercise of such right is absolute
and unlimited. While a flat ban on campus demonstra-
tions would be manifestly invalid, it is equally clear,
however, that students do not have an unlimited right
to demonstrate on university property. As in the case
of other public facilities, a university may place
reasonable restrictions on demonstrations to protect
safety and property, maintain normal operations,
facilitate campus traffic, and the like.
In line with this principle, it has been often observed
that, "the rights of free speech and assembly, while
fundamental in our democratic society, still do not
mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express
may address a group at any public place and at any
time." Cox v. Louisiana , 379 U.S. 536 (1965) • It is
clear from the foregoing that a college may adopt and
enforce reasonable, nondiscriminatory rules governing
demonstrations on its campus.
In determining whether a college regulation restricting
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demonstrations is reasonable, the Courts must take
ion "the special characteristics
of the school environment", ( Tinker ) and that the
regulation of student conduct is ordinarily theperrogat ive of the college authorities, with judicialintervention only when the circumstances are such as
to directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional
values. ( Barker v. Hardway ) For these reasons, the
precedents about the meaning of the first amendment
in other areas of life can (not) be indiscriminately
transferred to the university setting. "55
Specifically, the test, for the reasonableness of
college regulations is whether such regulations
’measurably contribute ( s ) to the maintenance of order
and decorum within the educational system" (see
Burnside ) , are calculated to prevent interference with
"the normal activities of the University", (see Burnside)
or the obstruction to its function "to impart learning
and to advance the boundaries of knowledge" (see Gold-
berg), or are important in maintaining "order" and
normal operations". In testing any college regulation
for reasonableness under these criteria, the Courts,
it should be emphasized, are not concerned with
"whether such rules are wise or expedient but merely
whether they are a reasonable exercise of the power and
discretion of the school authorities." ( Burnside )
The regulation involved here, which bans demonstra-
tions in college buildings but not otherwise, tested
by the criteria just stated, is reasonable. As has
been observed, it does not purport to pass on the pur-
pose of the demonstration. Nor has it been used to
deny to students the right to protest on campus, pro-
vid°d 1 T7 ° uc ^ p^ot^st s a^e not carried on within a
college building. Its purpose is manifest. College
buildings are generally dedicated to classrooms, admin-
istrative offices, libraries, health centers, or dorm-
itories. In all of these, order and study are
expected. It can -scarcely be argued that demonstra-
tions in a classroom or administration building during
the day would not create a disruption in the educa-
tional activity of the institution and inconvenience
*^The Court here is quoting Charles Alan Wright
,
J’The
Constitution on Campus", 22 Vanderbilt Law Review , 1027,
1038 .
134
Its normal administrative operations. At night onthe other hand, demonstrations in such bu j ldi nps ’ of fertoo many opportunities for vandalism, and, in someinstances, lawlessness.
In dormitories, where students are entitled to thequiet necessary both for sleep and study, demonstra-tions, which, though not violent, are generally noisy,interfere with that decorum expected in the "normal
operations" of the college. It is plain, therefore, that
a regulation which prohibits demonstrations within
the college buildings "measurably contribute ( s ) to the
maintenance of order and decorum within the educational
system" and represents "a reasonable exercise of the
power and discretion" of the college authorities.
This certainly should be the rule, when, as here,
demonstrations, without any restriction of purpose,
are permitted in other areas of the campus.
In summary, in our opinion, the regulation proscribing
the use of college buildings for demonstrations,
expecially as applied to the particular building involved
here, is a valid and reasonable exercise of the
authority of the college to promulgate and enforce
rules and regulations and does not represent an un-
reasonable limitation upon the first amendment rights
of the appellees and the class they represent.
Summary . Students do not have an unlimited right to
demonstrate on a college campus. The right to peaceably
p <5 <3 esm}} X a Hqp<; not" CSmy with f ho right fO 5b 1.1 S0 Others
^
disrupt the normal operation of a school, or to deny another
person of lawful pursuits (see Barker).
To this extent, college administrators have a
responsibility to develop rules and regulations which will
guarantee the orderly administration and processes of the
school. Such regulations should measurably contribute to
the maintenance of order and decorum, and should be
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calculated to prevent Interference with the normal activities
of the college (see Sword ). It should be remembered, how-
ever, that these regulations should be developed in light
of the constitutional principles previously discussed in
this chapter. College officials can set standards of
individual conduct, as well as administrative standards for
the orderly conduct of the demonstration (registration require-
ments, restrictions as to time and place, etc.). But,
in developing and enforcing these regulations, college
officials should not attempt to 'influence the purpose
or meaning of the demonstration.
3.6 Association and Use of
College Facilities
The first amendment includes the right to freedom of
association
,
although it dues not explicitly say so
.
Just
as much of the legal precedent for first amendment rights
to association were developed during times of war, con-
flict, or fear of communist threat to the United States,
so, many of the cases involving college students, officials,
and campus organizations, came during the Vietnam era and
the rise of questionable and/or possible subsersive campus
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groups
.
Restricting Vi sitors to the Campus
. In 1970, con-
siderable turmoil existed on the Knoxville campus of the
University of Tennessee. A riot had occurred in front of
the administration building in January; a campus meeting
of high school students was disrupted by an unruly crowd
in May; there was a large demonstration following the Kent
State violence; and a meeting, where an Army General was to
speak, was disrupted. In all of these cases, it was
evident that a large number of non-students were involved.
Further, it was determined that many non-students were
involved in criminal acts on the campus; and that the over-
crowding of campus facilities was partly due to use by
non-students
.
In June, 1970, the Board of Trustees of the University
of Tennessee developed a policy which provided that:
...the University campuses and facilities shall
be restricted to students, faculty, staff, guests
ana invitees, except on occasions when all of zhe
campus and buildings are open to the public.
Each of the campuses was to develop its own regulation
to this effect. Knoxville’s policy and guidelines for
implementation were adopted and became effective in
September 1970.
The Knoxville policy consisted of:
...A system of spot checks, instituted by asking
for identification on. a ramdom basis of all those
who appeared on the campus, and if any individual
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was unable to identify himself as a student,faculty or staff member, or to qualify as an
guest
,
he was asked to leave the
campus. In the event he refused, appropriate
legal action can be taken to have him removed.
During testimony, President Bowling of the University
of Tennessee said the purpose of the regulation "...was to
keep the University of Tennessee an educational institution
and to prevent it from being pushed too far by various
groups .
"
Non-students were allowed to use the Knoxville campus
facilities under certain restrictions, and, it was
determined, those doing the spot checks usually accepted the
word of the person asked for identification. The penalty
for being a non-student, without approval to be on the cam-
pus, was to be asked to leave the campus.
The President of the Student Government, and other
students who were officers in or members of student organ-
izations, brought suit in District Court, claiming that
their first amendment rights to association had been vio-
lated .^
District Judge Taylor delivered the opinion of
the Court
:
The student's claim that there is no need for the regu-
lations. We do not agree. A University campus is
5
6
Smith v. Ellington, 33^ F. Supp. 90 (1971).
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primarily for the students, faculty and administrators
and when visitation on the campus of non-studentsinterferes with normal activities of the school, the
officials of the school not only have the right tointercede, but it is their duty. Reasonable regula-
tions of campus activities by University officials is
constitutionally permissible. Tinker v. Des Koines
Indpeendent Community School District. 393 U.S. S03.
11969).
The chief complaint is that the regulations deprive
the students of the University the right of freedom
of association. This complaint is based largely on
the proposition that non-students are not at liberty
to come upon the campus except during public func-
tions without invitation and when they come they may
be checked for identification. This causes embarrass-
ment, say the students, because they never know when
their invitee may be checked. The restriction does
not deprive the students of association with their
friends on the campus, unless their friends object to
coming upon the campus because they may be checked.
The chance of a visitor being called for identification
may incidentally restrict in some small degree freedom
of association, but the University has a vital interest
in the operation of the campus for educational pur-
poses and this justified the regulation both from a
constitutional and educational standpoint.
The complaints of the students that the regulations
involve censorship and are uncertain, unnecessary and
unduly restrict their association are more imaginary
than real. Regulations that regulate the time, place
and manner of trie list; of the campus facilities are con -
sidered reasonable . (emphasis added)
Recognition of Student Organizations . Catherine
Healy and other students at Central Connecticut State College
had applied for official college recognition of a local
chapter of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS).
It was 1969, and the Vietnam War was causing heated
debates across the country, including and especially on
The siezure of buildings, vandalism.college campuses.
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arson, bombings, looting, and violent demonstrations were
not uncommon on some campuses, and the SDS chapters on some
campuses had either taken credit for many of these incidents
or had been a catalytic force behind them.
The students had followed the proper college procedures
for requesting recognition, and the Student Affairs Committee,
composed of four students, three faculty, and the Dean of
Students, met to consider the application.
The students listed three goals for the new organiza-
tion:
1. To provide "...a forum of discussion and self-
education for students developing an analysis of
American society";
2. To serve as "...an agency for integrating thought
with action so as to bring about constructive
changes," and,
3. To endeavor to provide "...a coordinating body
•o-.— "l ~ 1_ n „ j itjji wL/i irmo ui ici oj-oi/ oouu.dtui>
with other interested groups on campus and in
the community.
The Student Affairs Committee stood solidly behind such
goals for a student organization, but was concerned with the
local chapter's relationship with the National SDS. The
students indicated that they would not affiliate with any
national organization, and would operate independently of
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the National SDS.
The Committee asked three questions of the students,
and the response was to have great weight on the ultimate
decision of the college authorities:
"Q. How would you respond to issues of violence as
as other SDS chapters have?
A. Our action would have to be dependent upon each
issue
.
Q. Would you use any means possible?
A. No I can't say that, we would not know until we
know what the issues are.
Q. Could you envision the SDS interrupting a class?
A. Impossible for me to say."
Faced with these answers, the Committee moved to
require an additional filing by the student group, to include
a formal, written statement regarding their affiliation with
the National SDS. The students complied, stating in writing
rcs p urionf p o rinrmvinj|H « Society arc not under
the dictates of any National organization."
The Student Affairs Committee required a second
hearing, and again, raised the question of affiliation with
the National SDS. The students acknowledged that they
accepted certain of the National SDS ' s "ideas' , but not a^l
of the aims and philosophies.
The Committee approved the application, by a vote of
6 to 2, (the two members who voted against the application,
did so because of the possible affiliation with the National
SDS), and recommended official college recognition to the
President of the college. Dr. James.
Within two days, the college President rejected the
Committee's recommendation, and refused to grant recogni-
tion to the local chapter. Essentially, the President gave
three reasons for his refusal:
1. That the organization’s philosophy was antithetical
to the schools' policies;
2. That the group’s independence from the National
SDS, was doubtful, and;
3 • That recognition should not be granted to a group
which "openly repudiates" the school's dedication
to academic freedom.
Denial of official recognition by the college, meant
that the students could not place announcements or notices
^ V* ^ 4- » i v\ 4- %-n />».» ^ Vi • 4— t> /s I v* 4- i « n ^ . . -v* 4- r\ 4 v> ^ i r»
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bulletin boards; and they could not use campus facilities.
Having been denied this recognition, and with it, the
benefits assumed by student organizations, the students
filed suit in Federal District Court, claiming a denial of
the first amendment right of expression and association.
The District Court Judge, ordered the case back to
the campus for further administrative review. Official
1*1
2
hearings were again held on campus, with the same results,
and the case of Healy v. James
, 319 F. Supp. 113 ( 197 0
)
went back to court.
The United States District Court dismissed the case,
concluding
:
First, that the formal requisites of procedural due
process had been complied with, second, that petitioners
had failed to meet their burden of showing that they
could function free from the National organization,
and, third, that the College’s refusal to place its
stamp of approval on an organization whose conduct
it found "likely to cause violent acts of disruption"
did not violate petitioners' associat ional rights."
The students appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, v/here the District Court's opinion was
affirmed
.
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, and
reversed the two lower court opinions, finding for the
57
students. Mr. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of
the Court. Pertinent parts are printed here in their
entirety
:
At the outset we note that state colleges and
universities are not enclaves immune from the
sweep of the first amendment. "It can hardly
be argued that either students or teachers shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District ,
393 U.S. 503 (1969 ) . Of course, as Mr. Justice
Fortas made clear in Tinker, first amendment
•^Healy v. James , 92 S.Ct. 2338 (1972).
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rights must always be applied "in light of the special
characteristics of the ... environment " in the particular
case. And, where state-operated educational institu-tions are involved, this Court has long recognized
the need for affirming the comprehensive authority
°f
the States and of school officials, consistent
with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe
and control conduct in the schools." (Tinker at 507)Yet, the precedents of this Court leave no room for
the view that, because of the acknowledged need for
order, first amendment protections should apply with
less force on college campuses than in the community
at large. Quite to the contrary, "(t)he vigilant
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more
vital than in the community of American schools."
Shelton v. Tucker
, 364 U.S. 479, 487, (I960). The
college classroom with its surrounding environs is
peculiarly the "marketplace of ideas", and we break
no new constitutional ground in reaffirming this
Nation’s dedication to safeguarding academic freedom.
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589. 603.
71967 ).
Among the rights protected by the first amendment is
the right of individuals to associate to further
their personal beliefs. While the freedom of associa-
tion is not explicitly set out in the amendment, it has
long been held to be implicit in the freedoms of
speech, assembly, and petition. See Baird v. State
Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, (1971); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963).
There can be no doubt that denial of official recogni-
tion, without justification, to college organizations
burdens or ^bridges that associption^ right. The
primary impediment to free association flowing from
nonrecognition is the denial of use of campus facilities
for meetings and other appropriate purposes. The
practical effect of nonrecognition was demonstrated
in this case when, several days after the President’s
decision was announced, petitioners were not allowed
to hold a meeting in the campus coffee shop because
they were not an approved group.
The students’ associational interests also were cir-.
cumscribed by the denial of the use of campus bulletin.,
boards and the school newspaper. If an organization is
to remain a viable entity in a campus community in
which new students enter an a regular basis, it must
possess the means of communicating with these students.
Moreover, the organization’s ability to participatein the intellectual give and take of campus debate, and
to pursue its stated purposes, is limited by denial
of access to the customary media for communicating
with the administration, faculty members, and other
students. Such impediments cannot be viewed as
insubstantial
.
The college officials and the lower courts appear to
have taken the view that denial of official recogni-
tion in this case abridged no constitutional rights.
The District Court concluded t.hat
,
"President James' discretionary action
in denying this application cannot be
legitimately magnified and distorted
into a constitutionally cognizable
interference with the personal ideas or
beliefs of any segment of the college
students; neither does his action deter
in any material way the individual ad-
vocacy of their personal beliefs; nor
can his action be reasonably construed
to be an invasion of, or having a chilling
effect on academic freedom." (319 F.
Supp . at 116)
In that court's view all that was denied the students
was the "administrative seal of official college
respectability." A majority of the Court of Appeals
agreed that petitioners had been denied only the
"college’s stamp of approval." 445 F.2d at 1131.
The college officials take that same position here,
arguing that the students still. may meet as a group
orr campus, tnat uney still may distribute written
material off campus, and that they still may meet
together informally on campus—as individuals, but not
as CCSC-SDS
.
We do not agree with the characterization by the lower
courts of the consequences of nonrecognition. We may
concede, as did Mr. Justice Harlan in his opinion for
a unanimous Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson ,
357 U.S. at 46l, that the administration "has taken
no direction action... to restrict the rights of. the
students to associate freely..." But the Constitu-
tion's protection is not limited to direct interference
with fundamental rights.
..^n^his case, the group’s possible ability to existth® ca™Pus community does not ameliorate
action
1 Ca
Wp
1Lthe f i 5abilities imposed by the President'se are "ot free t0 disregard the practical
eaiities. Mr. Justice Stewart has made the salient
P n * reedoms such as these are protected not
only against heavy-handed frontal attack, but alsofrom being stifled by more subtle governmental inter-
,
Dabe
^
v
- City of Little Rock
. 361 U.S.
???» (1960), Watkin s v. United States. 354 U.S.
17 o, ( 1957 ).
The opinions o f the lower courts also assumed that the
students
. had the burden of showing entitlement to
recognition by the College. While the students have
not challenged the procedural requirement that they
file an application in conformity with the rules of
the College, they do question the view of the lower
courts that final rejection could rest on their
failure to convince the administration that their
organization was unaffiliated with the National SDS.
For reasons to be stated later in this opinion, we
do not consider the issue of affiliation to be a
controlling one. But, apart from any particular
issue, once the students had filed an application in
conformity with the requirements, the burden was upon
the College administration to justify its decision
of rejection. See, Lav/ Students Civil Rights Research
Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 162-163.
It is to be remembered that the effect of the College's
denial of recognition was a form of prior restraint,
denying to the student organization the range of
apsociat ional activities described above. While a
1 orrft o o o "1 r* rr* *? f' "1 m o 4- rr* n v^4- onn o f nv-\ ^ v-in'W W — W ^ A AU WV W (—) -A. V/ -X AAAwC \s w ^ -L. i A £_/ X W * A A KS -A- A A
disruption on the campus, which under circumstances
requiring the safeguarding of. that interest may justify
such restraint, a "heavy burden" rests on the college
to demonstrate the appropriateness of that action.
See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697,
713-7157 ( 193m
These fundamental errors—discounting the existence of
a cognizable first amendment interest and misplacing
the burden of proof—require that the judgments of the
lower courts be reversed. But we are unable to conclude
that no basis exists upon which non-recognition might
be appropriate. Indeed, based on a reasonable reading
of the ambiguous facts of this case, there appears to
be at least one potentially acceptable ground for aeniai of recognition. Because of this ambiguous stateof the record we conclude that the case should beremanded and, in an effort to provide guidance to thelower courts upon reconsideration, it is appropriate todiscuss the several bases of President James’ decisionFour possible justifications for nonrecognition, allclosely reiated, might be derived from the record and
fn Three of those grounds are inadeouateto substantiate his decision: a fourth, however, has
From the outset the controversy in this case has cen-tered in large measure around the relationship, if any,between the student’s group and the National SDS.
The Student Affairs Committee meetings, as reflectedin its minutes, focused considerable attention on thisissue;
. the court-ordered hearing also was directed
primarily to this question. Despite assurance from
the students and their counsel that the local group
was in fact independent of the National organization,
it is evident that President James was significantly
influenced by his apprehension that there was a
connection. Aware of the fact that come SDS chapters
had
. been associated with disruptive and violent campus
activity, he apparently considered that affiliation
itself was sufficient justification for denying
recognition
.
Although this precise issue has not come before the
Court heretofore, the Court has consistently disapproved
governmental action imposing criminal sanctions or
denying rights and privileges solely because of a
citizen's association with an unpopular organization.
See United States v. Robed, 389 U.S. 258, (1967);
Keyishian v. Board of Regents
, 385 U.S., at 605-610,
Scales v. United States
, 367 U.S. 203, (196 l). In
these cases it has been established that "guilt by
association alone, without ... (establishing) that an
individual’s association poses the threat feared by
the Government", is an impermissible basis upon which
to deny First Amendment rights. United States v.
Robel
, 389 U.S. at 265. The government has the
burden of establishing a knowing affiliation with an
organization possessing unlawful aims and goals, and
a specific intent to further those illegal aims.
Students for a Democratic Society, as conceded by the
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College and the lower courts, Is loosely organizedVarl
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faCtions *nd promoting a number of
se social and political views only some of which
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lawful actlon< Not only did petitionersp odaim their complete independence from this organiza-tion, but they also indicated that they shared only
some of the beliefs its leaders have expressed. Onthis record it is clear that the relationship was not
an adequate ground for the denial of recognition.
Having concluded that the students were affiliated
with, or at least retained an affinity for. National
SDS, President James attributed what he believed tobe the philosophy of that organization
. to the local
group. He characterized the stucient group as adheirng
to "some of the major tenets of the national organiza-
tion", including a philosophy of violence and
disruption. Understandably, he found that philosophy
abhorrent. In an article signed by President James in
an alumni periodical, ...he announced his unwilling-
ness to "sanction an organization that openly advocates
the destruction of the very ideals and freedoms upon
which the academic life is founded." He further
emphasized that the student’s "philosophies" were
"counter to the official policy" of the college."
The mere disagreement of the President with the
group's philosophy affords no reason to deny it
recognition. As repugnant as these views may have been,
especially to one with Presidents James' responsi-
bility, the mere expression of them would not justify
the denial of first amendment rights. Whether the
students did in fact advocate a philosophy of destruc-
ti nn thus ernes l rnrna t or ial . The College, acting
here as the instrumentality of the State, may not
restrict speech or association simply because it finds
the views expressed by any group to be abhorrent. As
Mr. Justice Black put it most simply and clearly:
"I do not believe that it can be too often
repeated that the freedoms of speech, press,
petition and assembly guaranteed by the
first amendment must be accorded to the
ideas we hate or sooner or later they will
be denied to the ideas we cherish."
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities
Contro-l Board
,
367 U . S~. 137 » ( 1961
)
(dissenting opinion)
.
As the litigation progressed in the District Court, athird rationale for President James' decision—beyond
the questions of affiliation and philosophy
—began to
emerge. His second statement, issued after the"
court-ordered hearing, indicates that he based rejection
on a conclusion that this particular group would be
a "disruptive influence at CCSC." This language was
underscored in the second District Court opinion. In
fact, the court concluded that the President had
determined that CCSC-SDS’ "prospective campus activities
were likely to cause a disruptive influence at CCSC."
(319 P. Supp., at 116).
If this reason, directed at the organization’s
activities rather than its philosophy, were factually
supported by the record, this Court’s prior decisions
would provide a basis for considering the propriety
of nonrecognition. The critical line heretofore drawn
for determining the permissibility of regulation is the
line between mere advocacy and advocacy "directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and...
likely to incite or produce such action." Brandenburg
v. Ohio
, 395 U.S. 444 , 447 , (1969). Scales v. United
States
, 367 U.S., at 230-232; Noto v. United States ,
367 U . S
. , 290, 298, (1961); Yates v. United States ,
354 U.S. 298, (1957). In the context of the "special
characteristics of the school environment," the power
of the government to prohibit "lawless action" is not
limited to acts of a criminal nature. Also prohibit-
able are actions which "materially and substantially
disrupt the work and discipline of the school."
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District
, 393 U.S., at 513- Associational activities
need not be tolerated where they infringe reasonable
^ s-N w « « n -y-n « 1 "1 ^ Q ol lyuo i. ia. -t. 2 xii wwi i O 1.
interfere with the opportunity of other students to
obtain an education.
The "Student Bill of Rights" at CCSC, upon which
great emphasis was placed by the President , draws
precisely this distinction between advocacy and
action. It purports to impose no limitations on the
right cf’college student organizations "to examine and
discuss all questions of interest to them." But it
also states that students have no right (1) "to deprive
others of the opportunity to speak or be heard", (2)
"to invade the privacy of others", (3) "to damage
the property of others", (4) "to disrupt the regular
and essential operation of the college' , or (5)
1^9
interfere with the rights of others." The linebetween permissible speech and impermissible
i?
n
there
a ° kS the c 'on * t:i tut ional requirement, andf were an evidential basis to support theconclusion that CCSC-SDS posed a substantial threat
the Pr^dent-fd^ 0? ln Vl°latlm of that c«ndn resid nt s decision should be affirmed.
h0Wever
’
offers no substantial basis forhat conclusion. The only support for the view ex-
affilial- in
th
?,^
r
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sident
» °ther than the reputed
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Wlth National SD S, is to be found in the
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ered by the group’s representa-
the Student Affairs Committee hearing, during
v^hich they stated that they did not know whether theymight respond to issues of violence" in the same
manner that other SDS chapters had on other campuses.
1 °r would they state unequivocally that they could
never envision ... interrupting a class . " Whateverforce these statements might be thought to have islargely dissipated by the following exchange between
the . student
' s counsel and thaDean of Student Affairsduring the court-ordered hearing:
"Counsel: ...I just read the document that
you're offering (minutes from Student
Affairs Committee meeting) and I can't
see that there's anything in it that
intimates that these students contemplate
any illegal or disruptive practice.
Dean: No. There's no question raised
to that, counselor..."
u'V/Un <J UU.v-4. o x umcxl rv i tai i n luo j lii aCCui a wn-ii uiic
full record, that there was no substantial
evidence that these particular individuals acting
together would constitute a disruptive force on
campus. Therefore, insofar as nonrecognition flowed
from such fears, it constituted little more than
the sort of "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance ... (which ) is not enough to overcome the
right to freedom of expression." Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District, 393
U.S., at 508^
These same references in the record to the group's
equivocation regarding how it might respond to "issues
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of violence" and whether it could ever "envision
class"
, suggest a fourth possible * reasonwhy recognition might have been denied to thesestudents. These remarks might well have been read as
reasonable s!?h
S
'? ude
?
t ’ s unwillingness to be bound by
c ool rules governing conduct. The College’s
of
RiShts, Freedoms, and ResponsibilitiesStudents contains, as we have seen, an explicitstatement with respect to campus disruption. The
carefully differentiating between advocacyand action, is a reasonable one, and the students
n°* ^stl°ned it directly. Yet their statementsaise considerable question whether they intend toabide by the prohibitions contained therein.
As we have
. already stated in Parts B and C, the criticalline for First Amendment purposes must be drawn between
advocacy, which is entitled to full protection, and
action, which is not. The students may, if they so
choose, preach the propriety of amending or evendoing away with any or all campus regulations. They •
may not, however, undertake to flout these rules.
Mr. Justice Blackrcun
,
at the time he was a circuitjudge on the Eighth Circuit, stated:
"We... hold that a college had the inherent
power to promulgate rules and regulations;
that it has the inherent power properly to
discipline; that it has power appropriately
to protect itself and its property; that
it may expect that its students adhere to
generally accepted standards of conduct."
Esteban v. Central Missouri State College,
^15 F.2d 1077, 10b9 (1969).
Just as in the community at large, reasonable regula-
tions with respect to the time, the place, and the
manner in which student groups conduct their speech-
related activities must be respected. A college
administration may impose a requirement, such as may
have been imposed in this case, that a group seeking
official recognition affirm in advance its willingness
to adhere to reasonable campus law. Such a require-
ment does not impose an impermissible condition on the
students’ associat ional rights. Their freedom to speak
out, to assemble, or to petition for changes in school
rules is in no sense infringed. It merely constitutes
an agreement to conform with reasonable standards
respecting conduct. This is a minimal requirement.
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in the interest of the entire academic community, of
any group seeking the privilege of official recogni-
tion.
The students have not challenged in this litigation
the procedural or substantive aspects of the College’s
requirements governing applications for official
recognition. Although the record is unclear on this
point, CCSC may have, among its requirements for
recognition, a rule that prospective groups affirm
that they intend to comply with reasonable campus
regulations. Upon remand it should first be determined
whether the College recognition procedures contemplate
any such requirement. If so, it should then be ascer-
tained whether petitioners intend to comply. Since
we do not have the terms of a specific prior affirmation
rule before us, we are not called on to decide whether
any particular formatulation would or would not prove
constitutionally acceptable. Assuming the existence
of a valid rule, however, we do conclude that the
benefits of participation in the internal life of the
college community may be denied to any group that
reserves the right to violate any valid campus rules
with which it disagrees.
We think the above discussion establishes the appro-
priate framework for consideration of the student’s
request for campus recognition. Because the college
officials failed to accord due recognition to First
Amendment principles, the judgments of the lower
courts approving the college officials denial of recog-
nition must be reversed.
A similar situation had arisen at Florida State
University, where some former students, and staff personnel
sought to form, and receive recognition for, a local chapter
of the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA).
The policies regarding recognition of campus organiza-
tions at Florida State were as follows:
Student organizations may be officially recognized by
the University when approved by student governments
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or appropriate student-faculty committees on campus,provided that an officially recognized organization
must not have as a purpose, either in name or in factthe advocacy of the overthrow of the government byforce or by other unlawful means.
A form must be filled out, and filed with the Univer-
sity, and must specify,
...the name of the organization, date of apolication,
officers of the organization, faculty consultant,
basis of membership, classification of group (by
professional, honorary, departmental, religious or
other classification), local or national affiliation,
purpose of the organization, activities for which
the organization is responsible, means of financial
support of the organization and date of organization.
The application for recognition was tentatively
approved by the Stuent Government, and was under considera-
tion by the Vice President for Student Affairs, when
correspondence was received from D. Burke Kibler, III,
Chairman of the Board of Regents.
Kibler was notifying the campuses of the Florida
system that he had evidence which would indicate that the
YSA should not receive the sanction of a State University
in the State of Florida. In further correspondence with
the campuses, Kibler indicated that this decision had
been reached after considerable research, and discussion
with people who were aware of the objectives of the YSA.
The Vice President for Student Affairs, on the basis
of this correspondence, notified the student government, and
the YSA that the latter would not receive official recogni-
tion and sanction by Florida State University.
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The students brought suit in Federal District Court,
contending, among other things, that their First Amendment
rights had teen denied,
During testimony, Kibler explained how he had come
to call for the ;nonrecognition of the YSA. First, he
became familiar with the YSA constitution, which character-
ized the YSA as "revolutionary", Then he sought to define
the word revolutionary:
Referring to the Oxford English Dictionary,
defendant Kibler concluded that "implicit"
in the term "revolutionary" was the idea
of change or reform accomplished by or
through the use of force."
Following this, he began personal research into the
YSA, which included reading reports on activities of
the YSA, articles and periodicals published and/or circu-
lated by the YSA, reports by the Committee on Un-American
Activities, reports in the Congressional Record, and
articles in the "Boston Labor Forum." And, from remarks
-v> -i ^ ,4 - V- 4- -U ^ L- ^ ... -1 ,_ _ J_ - 1 ... v i >
f'-*- j-i . w ^ j-ii V1J.O nxix vuiiv , lie i uuilU a. a Ua O Cllieil b Uy out;
YSA National Executive Committee which said in part:
The correct, revolutionary strategy is one that
permits the involvement of the student masses.
Meaningful disruption of the functioning of the
university is the work not of handfuls, but of
masses
.
58Merkey v. Board of Regents
344 F. Supp. 1296 0 572)
.
of State of Florida,
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Based, on his own research, and nothing else, Kibler
determined that "...the YSA had as its aim and ultimate
goal, the violent overthrow of the government, accomplished
through disruptive means which necessarily included the use
cf force," and that they "...sought to achieve disruption
on university campuses and deterioration of orderly educa-
tional processes..."
Kibler also disclosed during testimony, that at least
one of the members of the YSA seeking recognition, had been
a member of the SDS
,
and had been involved in prior violent
campus disruption.
Merkey
,
a staff member at the University, and one of
the people who brought this case to court, testified that the
YSA did not advocate revolution by force or violent means.
However
,
"...it was conceded by plaintiff Merkey that he
understood Lenin to recognize that revolutionary
change would rarely be accomplished without the use
of force in as much as there would be resistance to
change by the established institutions. Thus,
irrespective of plaintiffs’ disclaimer of disruption
as a political tactic, the Court finds that when the
mandates of the national Young Socialist Alliance
and its control over the policies and activities of
local units are considered together with findings
herein before made defendants justifiably concluded
that plaintiff organization was predisposed to
initiate and work toward the immediate overthrow of
the government by force or other unlawful means and
would cause disruption of legitimate education pro-
cesses at the Florida State University.
Even without Merkey ’ s testimony, the Court felt that
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the Information considered by Kibler and the college
officials, as well as the prior actions of some of the stu-
dents who claimed to be members of the YSA
,
"...provided
ample justification and a substantial basis... for the
denial of campus recognition..."
Specifically regarding first amendment rights, the
court said:
It is now accepted that student organizations do
not have an unqualified right ot be recognized by a
college administration. See American Civil Liberties
Union v. Radford College
, 315 F. Supp . at 896 .
An equally accepted tenet for first amendment law is
that students and teachers' do not shed their constitu-
tional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
the schoolhouse gate. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District
, 393 U.S.
_
503, 506, (1969).
From this premise it follows that student rights of
free expression may be prohibited only if they
"materially and substantially interfere with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the opera-
tion of the school." Tinker, at 509. "...(But) when
the restriction upon student expression takes the form
of an attempt to predict in advance the content and
consequences of that expression, it is tantamount to
a prior restraint and carries a heavy presumption
against its constitutionality." See Bantam Books ,
Inc. v. Sullivan
,
1963
,
372 U.S. 58 . "To sustain
such censux-ial pi'actices, a University would at- the
very least have to demonstrate a strong probability
of the kind of material disruption spoken of In the
Tinker case." University of Southern Mississippi
M.C.L.U. v. Univer sity of Southern Mississippi7
~1
^52
F . 2d, 566 - 567 .
In addition other recent cases involving challenges
on first amendment grounds to actions of administra-
tors of colleges and universities have clearly held,
that once a public university makes an activity avail-
able to its students, faculty or general public, it
must operate that activity in accord w±th first
amendment principles. This premise has been^made
abundantly clear in the speaker ban cases. ^ ee
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Stacy v * Williams, ^06 F. Sunn 06q nvn /mtrw
affirmed W6 F.23 1366 ( 1971 ); Brooks^! AlburnUniversity 412 F.2d 1171 (1969): — -
In
?th^
a
vq^S “ * ^he colleS e
'
s ) nonrecognition of
...U e YSA ; organizations this Court is merely
recognizing the power of a university to deny recogni-
aims I”3 '"?' of facilities to any organization whose
tion a
mimical to the proper goals of the institu-
p
° r?‘ American Civil Liberties Union v. Radford
ollege
. In acc °rd with this fundamental principle01 law, the federal courts have consistently held that
a college or university has the inherent power to
expect its students to adhere to generally accepted
standards of conduct and to have wide discretion in
andling actual or imminently immediate threats ofdisruption and misconduct and not those which are
merely vaguely predictive. See Universit y of SouthernMissi ssippi M.C.L.U, v
. Universit y of Southern
Mississippi
,
Es taban v. Central Missouri State
College
,
415 F. 2 d 1077
,
10W ( 1969 ) . "
—
Applying these principles to the instant action it
becomes evident that the college officials in denying
university recognition to the student YSA organization
exercised a legitimate right to make a determination
of what would best protect the stated educational
goals of the State of Florida while at the same time
exercising foresight in order to prevent interruption
of the educational processes on the campus of a state
university. The college officials had ample evidence
,
documented and undocumented, direct and indirect
,
general and specific, to support the conclusion that
the student YSA organization would be a disruptive
nairiDllS nrcrani 7aH nn anH f-Via-H j_ -h ^id not Or^SOnt 0
merely "vaguely predictive" threat of mi'sconductT
Therefore, on the basis of the foregoing campus
recognition was denied
.
(emphasis added)
Having considered the evidence and having made pertinent
findings of fact this Court is of the opinion that
there was ample evidence to justify the conclusion of
the college officials that the student YSA organization
sanctions violence or disruption and as such constituted
an imminently present threat of material disruption to
the maintenance of the orderly educational processes
of the university. As in Healy v. James , there has
been a finding that the national organization and its
membership supported a policy of disruption as a means
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of achieving the aims and goals contained in the organ-isation s
. constitution
. Unlike Healy v. James
owever,^is the express finding, supported by a
substantial factual basis, that the student YSA local
organization by its constituency and its admittedpurposes posed more than a mere speculative or con-jectural threat of disruption to the university.
The case, is also dissimilar in respect to treatment
of plaintiffs’ first amendment rights. Defendant
Kibler himself expressed deep concern as to theimpact of his decision relative to the student's
as sociat ional rights but at the same time he could
not discount the countervailing interests of the
universities
.
Thus, it having been found as a matter of lav; that
defendants' actions were supported by a substantial
factual basis this Court's inquiry must cease since
it has been determined that when the findings of
university and state officials are reached by correct
procedures and are supported by substantial evidence
they should be accorded great weight and not lightly
overturned
.
Association and Use of Campus Facilities
. In 1971-72
a Committee on Gay Education was formed at the University
of Georgia, and the student members sought recognition as
a student organization under existing college rules
which required University approval of all student organiza-
tions .
In May of 1972, the Committee, while still seeking
recognition from the school authorities, sought and re-
ceived a temporary restraining order from a State Superior
Court, to allow a dance scheduled for May 10, 1972. During
the next summer, several social events were held by the
Committee, without incident.
In the Fall of 1972, the college officials changed
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their policy from one of "recognition" to "registration", with
a form to be filled out, listing the names of the group, a list
of officers, requirements of membership, etc. The Committee
duly registered as a student organization.
In September 1972, the students requested the use of
University facilities for a regional conference to organize
a Southeastern homosexual organization and a dance.
According to the University’s regulations, facilities are
made available on a "'first come first served basis."
Almost a month later University officials denied the use
of campus facilities in a letter ff’om the Director of Student
Activities
:
Dear Mr. Wood: The requests of the Committee on Gay
Education to use facilities of the University on thedate of November 11, 1972, are denied. The University
recognizes the rights of individual students to express
opinions and assemble peaceably. The University's
primary mission is
. education and strives for this in
the areas of teaching and learning, research, and
service. Activities which dilute this effort or do not
seem to promote the general well being of the University
and its personnel must be considered carefully.
The particular activities for which facilities are request-
ed arc not encompassed m the purpose of die University
and introduce an element which is believed to be not in
the best interest of the University. The activities seem
to be beyond the conflict with the educational purpose
in apparently promoting and encouraging acts contrary to
state law. Sincerely, William D. Powell, Director,
Student Activities/university Union.
The students, after exhausting their administrative
59
appeals, sought relief in the Federal District Court.
59Wood v. Davison, 351 F. Supp. 5^3 (1972)
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tudent organizations and their right to exist on acollege campus. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. q no?^
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^Connecticut had deniedg n t a local chapter of the Students for aemocratic Society (SDS). The court found that denial
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i0n affected first amendment
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members a*d held that recognition coulde o ly under narrowly limited circumstances.
The issue in He_aly was recognition whereas the issuem the present case is access to University
facilities. However, this distinction does notdiminish the applicability and import of Healy to the
case at bar. The Court there determined that denial oflacilities was the primary means by which the organization
member s freedom of expression was infringed as evidencedm the following statement
:
"The primary impediment to free associa-
tion flowing from nonrecognition is the
denial of use of campus facilities for
meetings and other appropriate purposes.”
At this juncture it should be clearly understood that this
ruling is not. designed to and it should not be inter-
preted as limiting the University's control over its campus
and facilities. A college or university has the right to
adopt and enforce reasonable, non-discriminatory rules
and regulations governing the utilization of its
facilities. Bayless v. Martine
,
430 F.2d 873 (
1
97 0 )
;
Estaban v. Central Missouri State College
,
415 F.2d
1077 at 1089 ( 1969 ) . The control exercised by the adminis-
trative officials, though, must conform to the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States. Such conformity
dictates equal application of reasonable and unambiguous
regulations
.
Thus, the issue presented to this Court is upon what
grounds may University officials base a denial of Uni-
versity facilities to an organization which has complied
with all the applicable University regulations.
The first basis for withholding facilities was
enunciated in Healy. The Supreme Court determined
that a University may impose certain "reasonable
standards respecting conduct” on an organization's
activities, and recognition could be denied if that
organization refused to abide by such standards.
In the present case, the University requires any
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1^ dlsruP t the work and discipline of. However, there must be substantialevidence to warrant the conclusion that violence or
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botfn^L
d
^
Ser " ° f
^
lolence before refusal can bed Brandenburg v. Ohio
, 395 U.S. 444,
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ln Heal y Bound that there wasinsufficient evidence to indicate that the SDS would be
a (disruptive influence on campus. The only indication
of impending violence was the unsubstantiated fear of
^?
1
Z
e
r?
lty officials which "constituted little morethat the sort of undifferentiated fear or apprehension
of disturbance (which) is not enough to overcome the
right to freedom of expression." Tinker.
In the case before us, there likewise has been pre-
sented no evidence which indicates violence and
disruption might evolve from the activities proposed
by the Committee. To the contrary, two dances such as
requested here have been sponsored previously with no
violence accompanying them in any way.
The third and final justification that the University
might offer for denial of facilities is that the meet-
ing itself might be unlawful. If a meeting did contem-
plate criminal activity, then the University could
deny facilities. For example, a group organized to
advocate legalization of drugs could meet to discuss
legitimate means of repealing drug laws, but it could
not conduct a "smoke in" or "shoot in". Again the
University requires a statement from the sponsoring
organization that it will comply with all federal and
state laws, and the Committee signed such a statement.
The University stipulated that it had no. evidence
that the meeting for which facilities had been
requested by the Committee would result in any activity
which in itself would be illegal under existing state
or federal law.
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The Invoking of any justification for denial amounts
a Prio
^
res traint on first amendment freedoms that
p aces a heavy burden” on the University to justifydenial. Healy
,
408 U.S. at 184. Should the Uni-
versity choose to deny facilities on these groundsba
S
i
?T
that aPP 1:i-cable rules and regulations have
not been followed, it must inform the requesting
organization of its decision within a reasonabletime prior to the date planned for the activity. It
should also provide the organization with the grounds
upon which the decision was based. If the irregularity
can be cured, the organization should be so informed
and provided an opportunity to eliminate the basis
of the . denial
. There should also be provided some frame-
work within which the organization might be heard
concerning the grounds for denial. This need not be
a constitutional fullblown adversary proceeding with
an elaborate appellate process, but only some
reasonable opportunity for the organization to meet
the University's contentions. "notice and an
opportunity to be heard" should suffice in such an
instance. Dixon v. State Board of Education. 294 F.2d
150 (1961). —
Of course, if after approval, but during the activity
or immediately prior to the activity, it becomes
apparent that one of the above bases for denial will
transpire, the University need not sit idly by while
trying to prepare a notice to the organization deny-
ing access to the facilities. The University can and
should take immediate summary steps to curtail violence
and disruption, criminal activity, or conduce pro-
scribed by applicable University rules and regulations.
Turning brieflv to tbp rpasnns fnr> denial presented by
the University in the present case, it is apparent
that these defendants acted out of a desire to
preserve the integrity of the University as they
know it. The president testified that he considered
such activities as proposed by the Committee to be
not within the best interests of the University com-
munity. It is of course the concern of every college
official to maintain an academic environment on his
campus that is conducive to intellectual pursuits.
However, these officials no longer make decisions that
go unnoticed by citizens outside the college com-
munity or that go unchallenged by those within that
community.. University presidents have the unenviable
task of trying to maintain a precarious balance
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The court in Heal y specifically rejected the notionthat recognition could be denied by campus officialsbecause an organization’s philosophies are "counter
?o°
fflCial P° lic y of the college." 408 U.S.I09
,
lo7
.
Since none of
. the reasons advanced by defendant fordenial
. of facilities to the Committee are con-
stitutionally sufficient, plaintiffs are entitled
to the relief prayed.
In 197*1, another "association" case involving a gay
student organization reached the First Circuit Court of
C. r\
Appeals
.
The Gay Student Organization (GSO) was an officially
Gay Student Organization of the University of New
Hampshire v . Bonner and Gay Student Organization of the
University of New Hamoshire v. Thompson
, 509 F . 2d 652
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recognized student organization at the University of New
Hampshire. In November 1973, the group held a social dance
While there were no incidents at the dance, there was a
lot of news media coverage, and the Governor, Meldrim
Thompson, Jr. criticized the group and the dance. This
media coverage and political criticism caused the Board
of Trustees to reconsider its treatment of the GSO.
The Board issued a statement which indicated that they
would seek to find the "legality and appropriateness of
scheduling social functions by the GSO", and also "directed
that in the interim the University administration would
schedule no further social functions by the GSO until
the matter is legally resolved."
One month after the Board issued its statement, the
GSO requested permission to sponsor a play followed by a
social function. The Administration allowed the play, but
not the social function. The play was held without
incident, and the GSO held a meeting afterward s , Billing
this meeting some "extremist" gay literature was handed out
Following the play and subsequent GSO meeting, the
Governor of New Hampshire issued an open letter to the
Board of Trustees stating that if they did not "take firm,
fair and positive action to rid your campuses of socially
abhorrent activities", he would "stand solidly against the
expenditure of one more cent of taxpayer’s money for your
institutions.
"
The President of the University of New Hampshire, Dr.
Thomas Bonner, following the Governor’s statement, issued
a public statement condemning the distribution of the
homosexual literature at the GSO meeting, and indicated that
if more literature were distributed he would seek to sus-
pend the GSO as a student organization. The GSO claimed
that the literature had been distributed by individuals
that it had no control over.
Bonner also revealed that the Board had ordered the
University of New Hampshire administration to interpret
its current ban on GSO activities more strictly than it
had been.
The students in GSO, following these statements by the
Governor, the Board, and the University of New Hampshire
President, sought an injunction in District Court, to
prevent their suspension as a student organization. The
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Amendment rights had been violated, and on January 1 6,
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the District Court found for the GSO on the grounds
that the GSO members had been denied their First Amendment
rights of association. The court found no violation of the
students more traditional First Amendment rights, such as
speech and assembly.
The case was appealed, and the Court of Appeals took
165
the opportunity to deliver a somewhat detailed opinion,
including the difficult problems which arise when trying to
determine the "values of the community":
Coming to the merits, we are conscious of the
^a
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^
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?
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extrLtinfand
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he traditional legal method of
First tM, ^, P5 yln6 principles from decided cases,tfirst, his case deals with a universitv aft-pmntinc
trad^l
lat\^dent ««vlty-in the Jn'loco parentisdition which most judges, being over thirty
of matriculation^
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"S their years
Campas SrouP sought to be regulated
stands for sexual values in direct conflict withthe deeply imbued moral standards of much of the com-munity whose taxes support the university.
The underlying question, usually not articulated, is
whether, whatever may be Supreme Court precedent in theirst Amendment area, group activity promoting values
so iar beyond the pale of the wider community's valuesis also beyond the boundaries of the First Amendment,
at least to the extent that university facilities
may not be used by the group to fldunt its credo.
If visceral reactions suggest an affirmative answer,
the next task for judges is to devise a standard which,
while damping down the first amendment on a univer-
sity campus, is generally applicable and free from the
dangers of arbitrariness. At this point troubles
arise. How are the deeply felt values of the
community to be identified? On an i rrup such as
permissive abortion, the wider community may well
be divided among those believing in "the right to
life", those believing in "the right to control over
one's body", and those who do not feel deeply either
way. Assuming that "community-wide values" could be
confidently identified, and that a university could
limit the associational activity of groups challenging
those values, such an approach would apply also to
socialists, conscientious objectors, vivisectionists
,
those favoring more oil refineries. As to each
group, there are sectors of the community to whom
its values are anathema. Or, if values be limited to
morals, the barrier would reach those attracted to
pre-marital sex, atheism, the consumption of alcoholic
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beverages, e s°terl c heterosexual activity, violenceon teievrsion, or dirty books. This is not to suggest
, p f
university is powerless to proscribe eitherarmfui activity or incitement of illegal activity,
ahL t^ t0/ay that We are unable t0 devise a toler-ble standard exempting this case at the thresholdfrom general First Amendment precedents.
e address first one of the questions we have alludedto: is there something different about a universitythat makes it an enclave sheltered from the full play
of the first amendment? The Supreme Court's recentdecisions in Healy v. James, '408 U.S. 169
, ( 1972 )and
*
Papish v. Board of Curators
, 4l0 U.S. 667
, (1973)indicate in nouncertain terms that the first
amendment applies with full vigor on the campuses of
state universities. In Healy the Court rejected the
notion that first amendment protections apply with
less force on campus than in the community at large,
and the Papish Court made -it clear that there is
no dual standard" to be applied in scrutinizing
restrictions upon speech. See also Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District
, 393" U.S.
503, 506, (1969), Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
(I960); Thonen v. Jenkins
, 491 F. 2d 722 (1973).
Indeed, the Court has recognized that the "vigilant
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more
vital than in the community of American schools."
Shelton v. Tucker
,
364 U.S. at 487. Thus we proceed
as if the state itself, or one of its instrumentalities
other than a university, had promulgated the regula-
tion at issue.
Given this standard by which a university regulation
should ho inhcroH we now must ask whether
,
even
though GSO was recognized as a campus organization,
its member's right of association was abridged.
Here again, Healy v. James is controlling. It is true
that there the university had refused to recognize the
campus organization altogether rather than denying
it the use of campus facilities for certain
activities. But the Court’s analysis in Healy
focused not on the technical point of recognition
or non-recognition, but on the practicalities of human
interaction. While the Court concluded that the SDS
members’ right to further their personal beliefs had
been impermissibly burdened by nonrecognition, this
conclusion stemmed from a finding that the "primary
impediment to free association flowing from non-
recognition is the denial of use of campus facilities
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y. similar contention was rejected in Healy.
^5® University had pointed out that nonrecognition
affected only on-campus activities, and that there-fore the individuals wishing to form an SDS groupcould meet and distribute literature off campus, and
even meet on campus if they did so informally. TheCourt was thus invited to find that the individuals
were free to associate even though their on-campus
activities were
. restricted
. It held, however, that
the other associational opportunities available tothe individuals did not ameliorate significantly thedisabilities imposed by the university. Once again,its standard was expressed in the clearest of terms—(T)he Constitution's protection is not limited todirect interference with fundamental rights." Healy
v. James
,
408 U.S. at 183. Although the Supreme
Court refused in Healy to characterize as insubstan-
tial the impediments to association resulting from
denial of access to campus bulletin boards and the
school newspaper, that case could conceivably be read
to
^
shelter . only those group efforts at self-promotion
which utilize such conventional approaches.
There are, however, many other ways in which an organ-
ization might wish to go about attracting members
and promoting its point of view. Healy has been
interpreted to extend to the use of campus facilities
for social events in the one case of which we are
aware which has considered the issue. Wood v.
Davison
, 351 F. Supp. 5^3 (1972). We are also led to
this conclusion by the realization that efforts by a
state to restrict groups other than the GSO to gather-
ings that were in no sense "social events" would be
rejected out of hand. Even a lecture or discussion,
which would appear to be the only types of meetings
which the appellants would allow the GSO to hold,
becomes a social event if beer is served beforehand
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conytitute speech" in their own right, we
note the district court’s conclusion, not disputed byppellants, that the GSO is a political action organi-ation
. The GSO’s efforts to organize the homosexual
minority, "educate" the public as to its plight, and
obtain for it better treatment from individuals andirom the government thus represent but another example
of the associational activity unequivocally singled
out for protection in the very "core" of association
cases decided by the Supreme Court. Moreover, the
activity engaged in by the GSO would be protected evenif it were not so intimately bound up with the political
process, for "it is immaterial whether the beliefs
sought to be advanced by association pertain to
political, economic, religious or cultural matters."
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson
, 357 U.S. at 460.
While we accept the district court's conclusion that
the associational rights of GSO members have been im-
permissibly regulated, we cannot agree that their
"more traditional first amendment rights" have not been
abridged as well. Certainly GSO social functions do
not constitute "pure speech", but conduct may have a
thnSblfof
e
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ed ln order to furtherthe interest andare unrelated to the content and subject matter ofthe message communicated.
Thre can be no doubt that expression, assembly andpetition
. constitute signficant aspects of the GSO's
conduct in holding social events. The GSO was created,
as its Statement of Purpose attests, to promote thefree exchange of ideas among homosexuals and betweenhomosexuals and heterosexuals, and to educate the
public about bisexuality and homosexuality. GSO
claims that social events in which discussion and
exchange of ideas can take place in an informal atmos-
phere can play an important part in this communica-
tion.
^
It would seem that these communicative oppor-
tunities are even more important for it than political
teas, coffees, and dinners are for political candidates
and parties, who have much wider access to the media,
beingmore highly organized and socially accepted. And
beyond the specific communications at such events is
the basic "message" GSO seeks to convey—that homo-
sexuals exist, that they feel repressed by existing
laws and attitudes, that they wish to emerge from
their isolation, and the public understanding of their
attitudes and problems is desirable for society.
Perhaps these claims, being self serving, fall short
of establishing the speech-relatedness of GSO social
events. but tney receive the strongest corroboration
from the interpretation placed on these events by the
outside community, as related by the University adminis-
tration and Governor. The University administration
and Governor have relied heavily on their obligation
and right to prevent activities which the people of
New Hampshire find shocking and offensive. In the
brief for President Bonner and the University adminis-
trators we are told that the "activity of the GSO was
variously labelled a spectacle, an abomination and
similar terms of disapprobation" after the GSO dance
on November 8, 1973; that the University has an
obligation to prevent activity which affronts the citi-
zens of the University and the town and which violates
breach of the peace statutes; that the GSO dance
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; that recognltion of theUa"?d a larSe segment of the people of thetate, that the organization cannot be permitted to useIts unpopularity without restriction to undermine
wlthin the state; and that "the ban onsocial functions reflects the distaste with whichhomosexual organizations are regarded in the State.
We do not see how these statements can be interpreted
o avoid the conclusion that the regulation imposed
was based in large measure, if not exclusively, onthe content of the GSO’s expression. It is well
established that "above all else, the First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict ex-pression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
of its content." Police Department v. Mosley,
408 U.S. at 95. Not only do the University administra-
tion and Governors statements indicate that the pro-
hibition reflects a distaste both for the ideas held
and communicated by GSO members and for the larger
message conveyed by the very holding of such public
events, but the fact that the GSO alone was made
subject to the regulation indicates that the ban is
content-related. Nor do the events of November 8th
leave room for the conclusion that the disapproval of
the GSO event was due to the occurrence of violently
disruptive or otherwise illegal activities. The
adverse reaction must be viewed as precipitated by the
GSO’s program and the fact that the organization was
aggressively presenting it to the public.
As is apparent from our discussion above of the extent
to which appellants' policy toward the GSO is content-
related, the curtailing of expression which they find
abhorrent or offensive cannot provide the important
governmental interest upon which impairment of first
amendment freedoms must be predicated. Papish v.
Board of Curators
,
410 U.S. 667
, 679; Healy v. James ,
408 U.S. at 187-188. "Once a forum is opened up to
assembly or speaking by some groups, government may
not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on
the basis of what they intend to say. Selective
exclusions from a public forum may not be based on
content alone, and may not be justified by reference to
content alone." Police Department v. Mosley , 408 U.S.
at 96 .
Another interest asserted by the University officials
and Governor is that in preventing illegal activity,
which may include "deviate" sex acts, "lascivious
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carriage", and breach of the peace. But there has been
at thp
e
p?n
l0n any SUCh illegal acts took placee GoO social events held on November 8 andDecember 7, 1973. Indeed, we emphasize the finding
of the district court that "there were no official
complaints about the dance, and no evidence was adducedto show that improper or illegal activities had takenplace ...at the dance. 367 F. Supp. at 1091. The
oniy activity of even questionable legality discussed
In the record involved the distribution of printed
materials alleged to be obscene, and the district courtfound that no University of New Hampshire students
were responsible fcr the distribution. Mere "undiffer-
entiated fear or apprehension" of illegal conduct,
Tinker v . Des Moines Independent Community School
Pis tr i c t
, 393 U.S. at 50c> is not enough to overcome
first amendment rights, and speculation that individuals
might at some time engage in illegal activity is in-
sufficient to justify regulation by the state.
The University is by no means bereft of power to
regulate conduct on campus. Not only may it act to
prevent criminal conduct by policies focused on real
and established dangers, but it can proscribe advocacy
of illegal activities falling short of conduct, or
conduct in itself noncriminal, if such advocacy or
conduct is directed at producing or is likely to
incite imminent lawless action. Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969).
Finally there is a residual power going beyond the
prevention of criminal conduct and the kind of advocacy
of such conduct we have described. In Healy v. James,
408 U.S. 169, 189, (1971)3 the Supreme Court said that
-f o S C^CC r i.r*cnmc nt)
^
t lie pow6 1* to pjfoliiuit/
action is not limited to acts of a criminal nature:
"Also prohibitable are actions which materially and
substantially disrupt the work and the discipline of
the school." Quoting Tinker
, 393 U.S. at 513. We would
assume that a university, so minded, would not be
powerless to regulate public petting (heterosexual
or otherwise), drinking in university buildings, or
many other noncriminal activities which those responsible
for running the institution rightly or wrongly think
necessary "to assure that the traditional academic
atmosphere is safeguarded." 408 U.S. at 194. Thus, if
a university chose to do so, it might well be able to
regulate overt sexual behavior, short of criminal
activity, which may offend the community’s sense of
propriety, so long as it acts in a fair and equitaole
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or re£ulating such behavior. The University
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Ply because sponsored by that group. The ban was
v 1
St
ioied any evidenc e of misconduct attribut-able to GSO, and it was altogether too sweeping.
The District Court opinion was upheld.
Summary
. This section has considered the related prob-
lems of registration of student organizations and their freedom
to utilize campus facilities. The determining principles of
law are the same as those for other first amendment cases
.
Students have a right to associate to further their
personal beliefs (see Healy ) , and may ask their college
officials for official registration of their organization.
Denial of such registration, without justification, is an
abridgment of the student’s right to freedom of association.
As with previous first amendment cases, the burden rests
on the college officials to justify their reasons for re-
jection of registration.
Such registration cannot be denied because the college
officials feel or fear that the student organization is
associated or affiliated with other organizations whose
purpose(s) are illegal, contrary to the normal operation of
the college, or who may advocate violence, or the overthrow
of the government. Affiliation is not a sufficient justifica-
tion for denying- registration (see Scales ) . Guilt by
association alone, without establishing that an individual’s
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association poses a threat feared by the government is an
impermiss ble basis upon which to deny first amendment rights
(see DeJong_e and Heal*). College officials have the burden
°f £-s
-
t
.
abll shing a knowing affiliation with an organization
possessing unlawful aims and goals, and a specific intent
to further those illegal aims ( Healy ). Recall earlier
discussions on the difference between advocacy of a belief,
and advocacy of an Illegal action, with intent to carry out
that action.
Disagreement with a philosophy of an organization is
also an insufficient reason to justify a denial of registra-
tion. As before, advocacy of an idea, concept, belief,
philosophy, etc. is protected by the first amendment.
However, when advocacy becomes illegal conduct (i.e.,
advocacy to do an illegal act, with intent to carry
out that act), that conduct is not protected by the first
amendment (see Schaefer
,
Whitney
,
Fiske
,
Yates
,
Scales
,
and
Noto )
.
College officials cannot deny registration to a student
organization because of "undifferentiated fear or appre-
hension" of the future activities of the organization.
Those denying the registration must be able to demonstrate
that the organization will or does present a "clear and
present danger" to the normal operation of the college,
and that this "clear and present danger" is of such a
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magnitude as to "materially and substantially" interfere
with the administration of the school. (See Whitney
. Dennis,
Burnside
, and Tinker
.
)
Registration can be denied to student organizations that
are unwilling to abide by reasonable campus regulations
and/or state or federal law. Organizations can be made to
indicate their willingness to abide by such regulations in
advance of their receiving official recognition (Healy).
The Supreme Court, in Healy
, indicated that the
primary impediment to free association is the denial of the
use of campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate
purposes. Even though an organization may have full,
official recognition from the college, school officials may
be abridging the first amendment rights of the students
in that organization, if those officials limit, for the
wrong reasons, that organization’s use of campus facilities.
The first amendment protects against "heavy handed frontal
attacks (non-recognition), as well as more subtle government
interference (limiting the use of campus facilities). See
Healy .
The principles of law are the same as for non-recognition.
The organization cannot be denied a campus facility because
college authorities disagree with the proposed activity
or purpose of the organization. The questions that need to
be answered are the same: will the use of the facility by
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the organization create a clear and present danger to the
college? Is there reason to know that the organization's
activity will materially and substantially interfere with the
operation of the school? Is there reason to know that the
organization, through its activity and use of a campus
facility* will knowingly violate state or federal law, or
deny lawful rights to others?
3.7 Freedom of the Press
With the possible exception' of cases involving pure
or symbolic speech, most court cases involving first
amendment rights in higher education deal with freedom of
the press, i.e., student publications. The following
cases represent court opinion in a number of situations
involving freedom of the press on a college campus. The
reader will note that some of the cases have been cited
earlier in the chapter, as they related to other first
amendment issues. The hndv nf law in the first amendment
area, as was developed in the historical section, and as
cited and developed in subsequent cases and issues in
this chapter, continues to be applied by the courts in this
important area.
Censorship . In 1966-67, Gary Clinton Dickey, an
academically outstanding student, and a member of the
National Honorary Journalist Fraternity, was chosen as
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editor of the Trppolitan, the student newspaper at Troy
State College* in Alabama.
In April of 1967, Mr. Prank Rose, President of the
University of Alabama, came under extreme criticism from the
State legislature for his stand in support of, and refusal
to censor, a student publication called ' Emphasis 67 .
According to testimony in court.
Emphasis 67
_,
as published for the University ofAlabama, served as the program for a series ofguest speakers and panel discussions held in
March at the University of Alabama. The publica-
tion, contained brief biographical sketches of the
participants, which included Secretary of State Dean
Rusk, James Reston of the New York Times, and
Professor
. Robert Scalapino, a leading authority on
Asian politics
. The theme of the Emphasis program
was a "World in Revolution." In carrying out this
theme, Emphas i
s
published excerpts from the speeches
of Bettina Aptheker
,
a Communist who gained notoriety
at the University of California, and Stokely
Carmichael, President of the Student Nonviolent Coor-
dinating Committee and an incendiary advocate of vio-
lent revolatuion. To give a balanced view of a "World
in Revolution," Emphasis carried articles by leading
anti-revolutionaries such as General Earl G. 1/heeler,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Dr. Rose had taken a oublic stand on the right of the
students to publish, under academic freedom, publications such
as Emphasis 67 . Criticism of Rose was intense, and the
whole matter, because of extensive media coverage, became
the subject of public interest statewide.
Dickey, feeling that the student newspaper at Troy
State should be heard on the matter, wrote an editorial
supporting Dr. Rose and admonishing the legislature. He
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took the editorial to his faculty advisor, and was instructed
not to publish the editorial. He then went to the head of
the English Department who approved the publication of the
editorial. However, upon returning to his faculty advisor,
Dickey was told that the editorial could not be printed.
Dickey went directly to the President of Troy State,
Ralph Adams, who also denied the printing of the editorial.
Dickey was told that his editorial, and other editorials
similarly written, could not be published because of a rule
in effect at Troy State which said that there could be no
editorials written in the school newspaper which were
critical of the Governor of Alabama or the Alabama legisla-
ture. The rule did not prevent the publication of editorials
which praised the Governor or legislature.
In seeking to understand this rule, the District Court
said
,
The theory of the rule, as this Court understands it,
is that Troy State College is a public institution
owned by the State of Alabama, that the Governor and
one legislators are acting for the owner and control
the purse strings, and that for that reason neither
the Governor nor the Legislature could be criticized.
Dickey was provided with an alternative editorial on
"raising dogs in North Carolina". Determining that this
substitute editorial was not appropriate, he arranged to
have just the title of his editorial printed — "A Lament
For Dr. Rose" — and in the space ordinarily occupied by
the editorial, he printed, diagonally across the space,
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Censored". Although all parties involved onsidered the
editorial to be well written and in good taste, disciplinary
action, involving suspension from school, was taken against
Dickey for "willful and deliberate insubordination".
The Student Affairs Committee voted not
-to admit
Dickey into Troy State for the next year; in effect a full
year's suspension. This Court case is a result of Dickey’s
attempt to prevent that suspension.
In considering Dickey v. Alabama State Board of Educa-
tion
, 273 F. Supp. 613 ( 1967 ), Chief Judge Johnson of the
District Court said:
It is basic in our law in this country that the
privilege to communicate concerning a matter of public
interest is embraced in the first amendment right
relating to freedom of speech and is constitutionally
protected against infringement by state officials.
The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution protects
these first amendment rights from state infringement,
Thornhill v. State cf Alabama
, 319 U.S. 88, and these
first amendment rights extend to school children and
students insofar as unreasonable rules are concerned.
West Virginia State Board of Educatio n v. Barnette
,
319 U.S. 624. Boards of education, presidents of
colleges, and faculty advisers are net excepted from
the rule that protects students against unreasonable
rules and regulations. This Court recognizes that the
establishment of an educational program requires cer-
tain rules .and regulations necessary for maintaining
an orderly program and operating the institution
in a manner conducive to learning. However, the
school and school officials have always been bound by
the requirement that the rules and regulations must
be reasonable. Courts may only consider whether rules
and regulations that are imposed by school authorities
are a reasonable exercise of the power and discretion
vested in those authorities. Regulations and rules
which are necessary in maintaining order and discipline
are always considered reasonable. In the case now ^before
this Court, it is clear that the maintenance of order
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and discipline of the students attending Troy State
n?
d
i
nothinS to do with the rule that was invokedagainst Dickey . As a matter of fact, the president
of the institution, President Adams, testified thathis general policy of not criticizing the Governor orthe State Legislature under any circumstances, regard-less of how reasonable or justified the criticism mightbe, was not for the purpose of maintaining order anddiscipline among the students. On this point. President
Adams testified that the reason for the rule was that a
newspaper could not criticize its owners, and in the
case of a state institution the owners were to be con-
sidered as the Governor and the members of the
Legislature
.
With these basic constitutional principles in mind, the
conclusion is compelled that the invocation of such
a rule against Gary Clinton Dickey that resulted in
his expulsion and/or suspension from Troy State
College was unreasonable. A state cannot force a
college student to forfeit his constitutionally pro-
tected right of fr eedom of expression as a condition to
his attending a state-supported institution. State
school officials cannot infringe on their student's
right of free and unrestricted expression as guaranteed
by the Constitution of the United States where the
exercise of such right does not "materially and sub-
stantially interfere with requirements of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school." Burnside
v. Byars
, 363 F.2d, 7^4 (1966). The college officials
in this case cannot punish Gary Clinton Dickey for
his exercise of this constitutionally guaranteed right
tjy cloaking his expulsion or suspension in the robe of
"insubordination." The attempt to characterize
Dickey ’ s conduct, and the basis for their action in
expelling him, as "insubordination" requiring rather
severe disciplinary action, does not disguise the basic
fact that Dickey was expelled from Troy State College
for exercising his constitutionally guaranteed right
of academic and/or political expression.
The argument by the college official's counsel that
Dickey was attempting to take over the operation of
the school newspaper ignores the fact that there was
no legal obligation on the school authorities to permit
Dickey to continue as one of its editors. As a matter
of fact, there was no legal obligation on the school
authorities to operate a school newspaper. However,
since this state-supported institution did elect to
operate the Tropolltan and did authorize Dickey to be
1 8 0
one of its editors, they cannot as officials of theState of Alabama, without violating the first andfourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the
United States, suspend or expel Dickey from this
state— support ed institution for his conduct as that
conduct is reflected by the facts presented in this
case
.
The Court found in favor of Dickey, and ordered his
immediate reinstatement.
A case involving censorship of a different sort was
*1
heard in Massachusetts in 1970.
John Antonelli was the editor of the campus newspaper
at Fitchburg State College. Upon his election to this
position, he changed the name of the paper from Kampus Vue
to The Cycle . This change in name was indicative of the
change in style and content of the paper under Antonelli’
s
leadership. While the Kampus Vue reflected on-campus news
and events. The Cycle was to be broader, focusing on "areas
of broader social and political impact."
The Cycle was funded out of student activities fees,
which were under control of the school’s administi dt-Luu,
and in particular the President of the college. Prior to
this dispute, all of the publication and other costs of the
paper had been paid for out of these funds. Without such
funds, the paper could not be published on a regular basis.
In Vol . 1, No. 3 of The Cycle , an article entitled
^Antonelli v. Hammond , 3 0 8 F. Supp. 1329 (1970).
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"Black Moochie" was to appear. The article was by Eldridge
Cleaver, and had been previously printed in Ramparts Wavar.lne .
When the material for publication reached the printer, Mr.
Plante, he refused to print it. Mr. Plante had a daughter
who attended Fitchburg State, and he objected to "the theme
and four letter words" used in the article. Plante made
his feelings known to Fitchburg State College President
James Hammond.
Hammond also questioned the article, calling it
"garbage” and "obscene" and not fit for publication. The
court noted:
"President Hammond had not been pleased with the
change in the focus and format that previous issues
the The Cycle had brought to the campus newspaper.
He stated that publication should provide an
opportunity for students to develop skills in
journalism, should not consist primarily of compila-
tions published previously elsewhere and should
not serve as a vehicle for the dissemination of
obscene material.
Hammond made known to Antonnelli that he would use his
^ LuiUwAiv/ WA U pi CVCiit ± UiiUCS i. 1 VJlli
being spent to publish "trash" like "Black Moochie". He
would refuse to allow future issues of The Cycle to be
published unless he or his representative approved all the
material submitted for publication, before the material
was printed.
Under protest, Antonelli agreed to work with an
"advisory board" made up of two faculty members. The
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"advisory board" was to exercise its judgment as to the
"responsible freedom of the press" in The Cycle
. Again,
the court noted:
on a
7 of the advisory board is to pass
^
e , acceptability of material intended to bein
~
e
v
C ycle
-
and to prevent the printing
l?
s whlch the administration feels are notlit lor the campus newspaper. No guidelines of
acceptabiiity were established and no standards limitthe discretion of the two faculty members as they passjudgment on the material submitted to them. No pro-
cedure was designed whereby the ..reasonableness or
validity of a board decision might be tested
reviewed. or
It should be noted that the issue of The Cycle which
contained the 'Black Moochie" article was printed by another
Pointer; Fitchburg State money was. not used in paying for
this issue.
On November 7, 1969* Antonnelli withdrew his agreement
to cooperate with "The Advisory Board". He and his editorial
staff resigned. Up to this point, the Advisory Board had
neither rejected nor censored any material submitted to it;
and no disciplinary action had h^en taken against Ant oneHi
or any other studen ts . Throughout the dispute, Antonnelli
had the support of the Student Government Association.
Antonelli brought his case to Court, seeking injunctive
relief and declatory judgment that requirements to submit
materials to a faculty advisory board, before their publica-
tion, was unconstitutional.
After considering whether Antonnelli had a continued
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interest in the case. Judge Garrity delivered the opinion
of the District Court:
Turning to the merits of Antonelli's claim to freedom
note fir^h 1 sapervislon the advisory board, we
?hP ^
thG absence of any express .limitation on
of intpnH
P°^^ S 1
° rev
-- ew and approve. All mannere ded publication must be submitted; there isno exception, so there is nothing that does not come
within the censor’s purview. Therefore, the powers
actually conferred could presumably be used, without
change in form or need, for expansion, to achieve
complete control of the content of the newspaper.
However, there is no indication of an intention to gobeyond excising obscenity, and in any event, for pur-poses of this case, we must construe the powers con-ferred upon the advisory board by the defendant in
the narrowest light possible, i.e., censorial only
over the obscene. This is essential because ...(Antonelli) claims freedom from an obligation to
submit anything for prior approval.
No matter how narrow the function of the advisory
board, it constitutes a direct previous restraint of
expression and as such there is a "heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity." Bantam Books,
Inc, v. Sullivan
, (1963), 372 U.S. 58 and cases there
cited. The general rules are clear " . .
.
(L)iberty of
the press, historically considered and taken up by the
Federal Constitution, has meant, principally although
not exclusively, immunity from previous restraints
or censorship." Near v. Minnesota
, (1931), 283 U.S.
697 . Any limitation on the constitutional immunity
g-poTn pr>i nr r ^ s
t
10
a
i n t s "is the exception; it is to be
closely confined so as to preclude what may fairly
be deemed licensing or censorship." Kingsley Books,
Inc , v. Brown
, (1957), 354 U.S. <436.
It is true that the advisory board proposes to suppress
only obscene writings and that obscenity dees not fall
within the area of constitutionally protected speech
or press, see Alberts v. California
,
decLIed with Roth
v. United States (1957), 354 U.S. 476. However, the
manner and means of achieving the proposed suppression
are of crucial importance. Whenever the state takes
any measure to regulate obscenity it must conform to
procedures calculated to avoid the danger that protected
expression will be caught in the regulatory dragnet.
See Marcus v. Search Warrants, (1961), 367 U.S. 717,
Bantam Books, Inc , v. Sullivan.
Such procedures are constitutionally required them-
"T+-
the Very nature of the first amend-
ment rights. It is characteristic of the freedoms
"L?X?reSSlon . ln Seneral that they are vulnerable to
n ?
y damaging yet barely visible encroachments.
Jiv^
nS
^
tenCe
4-
that reSulations of obscenity scrupulously
embody the most rigorous procedural safeguards
. . . is
^
e
r
e
£?
re
^
but a special instance of the larger principletPat t“ e freedoms of expression must be ringed about
with adequate bulwarks." Bantam Books, Inc. v
Sullivan
, 372 U.S. at 66.
2
The type of procedural safeguards required by the first
amendment was indicated in Freedman v. Maryland
, (1965),380 U.S. 51. There the appellant had been convicted
for exhibiting a motion picture without submitting to
to the Maryland State Board of Censors for prior
approval. In sustaining the challenge to the con-
stitutionality of the licensing system because of
procedural inadequacies, the Supreme Court listed
three minimal requirements: first, that the censor
bear the burden of showing the film to be obscene;
second, that the requirement of advance submission not
be so administered as to give an effect of finality
to the censor's adverse determination; and third, that
the procedure ultimately assure a prompt final judicial
determination.
Nothing of the sort is included in the system devised
by the defendant for passing upon the contents of
The Cyble . It lacks even the semblance of any of the
safeguards the Supreme Court has demanded. The advisory
board bears no burden other* than ex^^cising its judg-
ment; there is no appeal within the system from any
particular decision; and there is no provision for
prompt final judicial determination. Indeed, final
responsibility rests with two faculty members, serving
at the pleasure of the defendant, who so far as the
evidence showed are wholly unfamiliar with the complex
tests of obscenity established by the Supreme Court in
cases such as Roth v. United States , (1957), 35^ U.S.
^ 76
,
and the Memoirs
,
Ginzburg and Mishkin cases,
(1966), 383 U.S. 413-518 . Accordingly , the court
concludes that the defendant's establishment of the
advisory board is prima facie an unconstitutional
exercise of, state power.
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^~Cycle is to withstand
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.cSSiSriijss 1 nsstsss^svrepublic university or in the nature o? fnewIpLer
limitation
m
of free
nt activ
J
ty fees that Justified a
exercise ^P1,633 *0? and thereby permits anof state power plainly unwarranted if appliedto the press generally. p-L eo.
Inffh
peech
t°l
S n0t mean wholly unrestricted speech
i fl
C
J
n5tltUti0nal rights of students may be modified
richtf
re* 80n*bl* deslened to adjust theseg s to the
. needs of the school environment. Theexercise of rights by individuals must yield when they
?flin
i
?S°
mpa
S
ible ' Wltb tbe school's obligation to main-ta the order and discipline necessary for the
success of the educational process. However, anyinfringement of individual constitutional freedoms
must be adequately related to this legitimate interest.
L ee Tinker v. Des Moines Schoo l District, (1969) 99SU.S. 503
,
Burn sine v. Byars, (l9bb)
J
F
. 7 ^ 5 ;Brooks v. Auburn University
, (1969), 296 F. Supp. 188.
No such justification has been shown in the instant
case. Obscenity in a campus newspaper is not the type
of occurrence apt to be significantly disruptive of
an orderly and disciplined educational process.
Furthermore, assuming that a college administration has
a sufficient educationally oriented reason to prevent
the circulation of obscenity on campus, there has
been no showing that the harm from obscenity in a
college setting is sc much greater than in the public
forum that it outweighs the danger to free expression
inherent in censorship without procedural safeguards.
If anything . the contrary would sppm to bo true. The
university setting of coilege-age students being exposed
to a wide range of intellectual experience creates a
relatively mature marketplace for the interchange of
ideas sc that the free speech clause of the first
amendment with its underlying assumption that there is
positive social value in an open forum seems
particularly appropriate. See Brooks v. Auburn Univer-
sity
,
296 F. Sup at 192 .
There is an adde , element in the present case: the
expenses of publishing The Cycle are payable by the
college from funds received from compulsory student
activity fees. Does this circumstance significantly
alter either the rights of the students or the powers
of the college president over the campus press? We
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be e*P e™ied as the president of the collegeay direct in furthering/ the activities from which the
dutv on
d
the
CelPt
?'
Wer derived ---" This imposes no
^
President to ratify or to pass judgment on
,,
p ^tTcular activity. The discretion granted is inthe determination whether the funds to be expendedfurther the activities to which they areintended to be applied. Once that determination hasbeen made, the expenditure is mandatory.
Vfeare well beyond the belief that any manner of state
regulation is permissible simply because it involves
an activity which is a part of the university structure
and is financed with funds controlled by the adminis-tration. The state is not necessarily the unrestrained
master of what it creates and fosters. Thus in cases
concerning school-supported publications or the use
of school facilities, the courts have refused to
recognize as permissible any regulations Infringing
free speech when not shown to be necessarily related
to the maintenance of order and discipline within
the educational process. See Dickey v. Alabama State
Board of Education
, (1967), 273 F. Supp.TIJT Snyder v.
Board of Trustees of University of Illinois. (lWBT. '
281) F. Supp. 927.
These decisions do not stand for the proposition that
a state college administration has no more control over
the campus newspaper than it would have over a private
publication disseminated on campus. In the very
prpaflori q f ca n 3ctivl^'y i’n ',ro"'vir ri' mod i ** o r> i /» rv
tion, the state regulates to some degree the form of
expression fostered. But the creation of the form
does not give birth also to the power to mold its
substance. For example, it may be lawful in the inter-
est of providing students with the opportunity to
develop their own writing and journalistic skills, to
restrict publication in a campus newspaper to articles
written by students. Such a restriction might be
reasonably related to the educational process.
But to tell a student what thoughts he may communicate
is another matter. Having fostered a campus newspaper,
the state may not impose arbitrary restrictions on the
matter to be communicated. What was said in Tinker v.
Des Moines School District, where the form of expression
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was the wearing of black armbands, is equally applic-able here. In our system, students may not be re-
instate nhn
Sed~C
i
rCUlt reciP ients of only that which
conflneri
1
f I?68 ° communlcate. They may not be
SSo ^
e exPressi°n of those sentiments thatare officially approved. In the absence of a specificowing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulatetheir speech, students are entitled to freedom of ex-pression of their views." 393 U.S. 511.
Because of the potentially great social value of afree student voice in an age of student awareness and
5 v>oa -*-^ b e inconsistent with basic assumptions
of first amendment freedoms to permit a campus news-paper to be simply a vehicle for ideas the state or
the college administration deems appropriate. Power
to prescribe classroom curricula in state universities
may not be transferred to areas not designed to be part
of the curriculum.
Accordingly, since (a) there is no right to editorial
control by administration officials flowing from the
fact that The Cycle is college sponsored and state
supported
,
and ( b') the college officials have not shown
that circumstances attributable to the school environ-
ment make necessary more restrictive measures than
generally permissible under the first amendment, the
court holds and declares that the prior submission to
the advisory board of material intended to be published
in The Cycle
,
in order that the board may decide
whether it complies with "responsible freedom of the
press" or is obscene, may not be constitutionally
required either by means of withholding funds derived
from student activity fees or otherwise.
Withholding of Campus Funds . Johnnie Edward Joyner,
editor of The Campus Echo
,
the student newspaper at North
Carolina Central University (NCCU), had published in his
first issue, a headline which read "Is NCCU Still A Black
School", and an article entitled "Look and You Shall See".
The article read, in part:
There is a rapidly growing white population on our
campus . .
.
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We want to know why they
here? Why more and more
hundreds ) ?
are here. How many are
come every year (by the
But I think that the reason we will bequickly and so easily is our fault.
taken over so
Black students on this campus have never made it
clear to those people that we are indeed separate fromthem, in so many ways, and wish to remain so. And
until we assume the role of a strong, proud people
we W1
JJ
continue to be co-opted. Until we choose to
make this clear, by any means 'necessary, the samething will continue to happen...
I maintain that we must pick up the cry of Frantz
ranan^who has said, "each generation must discover
its mission, fulfill it or betray it." And the words
of H. Rap Brown, "I do what I must out of the love for
my people. My will is to fight. Resistance is not
enough. Aggression is the order of the day." And
more over that we take nothing from the oppressor, but
only in turn get that which is ours.
Now will you tell me, whose institution is NCCU?
Theirs? Or ours?
The paper also carried an article showing a poll taken
on campus which indicated strong opposition to the
admission of white students.
The President of NCCU Albert Whiting, questioning
tne propriety of the articles, responded by letter to Joyner:
In my view the September 16 issue of the Campus
Echo does not meet standard journalistic criteria
nor does it represent fairly the full spectrum of
views on this campus. Because of this, I am writing
to advise that funds for the publication of additional
issues will be withheld until agreement can be reached
regarding the standards to which further publications
will adhere.
If consensus cannot be established then this University
will not sponsor a campus newspaper. That portion of
remaining funds collected or allocated to the Campus
Echo budget will accrue to the credit of all contributing
189
students for this school year.
Whiting also circulated a longer, explanatory memorandum
to the University community, essentially explaining in
detail to the college community, that which he had stated to
Joyner.
Joyner and the administration met to resolve their
differences, but no agreement could be reached. Relying on
his counsel, Whiting "irrevocably terminated the paper’s
financial support", and refunded the remaining money to the
students
.
Whiting took no action against Joyner or other students.
Nor did he take any steps to prevent the students from
printing and circulating a privately funded paper. Several
issues of the Echo were printed, but it was clear that
continued publication was dependent on college funding through
the student activities fee.
Joyner and the President of the Student Government
A s soc 1 a 1 1 on brought suit in District Court alleging that
their first amendment rights had been violated. The District
Court Judge disagreed, and found for President Whiting.
Joyner appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
where the District Court Judge’s opinion was reversed.
The case of Joyner v. Whiting , 477 F.2d 456 (1973),
was heard before a three judge panel; Circuit Judge Butzner
delivered the opinion of the Court:
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Fortunately, we travel through well charted waters todetermine whether the permanent denial of financial
support to the newspaper because of its editorialpolicy abridged the freedom of the press. The first
amendment is fully applicable to the states. GitlowNew
..
York
,
268 U.S. 652, 666, (1 9 25), and pFiSidFnttablishes that state colleges and universities are
not enclaves immune from (its) sweep." A college,
acting "as the instrumentality of the State, may not
restrict speech ... simply because it finds the views
expressed by any group to be abhorrent." Healy v
James, 408 U.S. 169, 180, 187
, (1972).
It may well be that a college need not establish a
campus newspaper, or, if a paper has been established,
the college may permanently discontinue publication
for reasons wholly unrelated to the first amendment.
But if a college has a student newspaper, its publica-
tion cannot be suppressed because college officials
dislike its editorial comment. This rule is but a
simple extension of the precept that freedom of
expression may not be infringed by denying a privilege.
The principles reaffirmed in Healy have been extensively
applied to strike down every form of censorship of
student publications at state-supported institutions.
Censorship of constitutionally protected expression
cannot be imposed by suspending the editors, suppressing
circulation, requiring imprimatur of controversial
articles, excising repugnant material, withdrawing
financial support, or asserting any other form of
censorial oversight tased on the institution’s power
of the purse.
Rut. hhp f-nppdnni nf fbo pr>occ pnloved V>v °tlldents is
not absolute or unfettered. Students, like all
other citizens, are forbidden advocacy which "is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action."
See Brandenburg v. Ohio
, 395 U.S. 444, 447, (1969).
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District
, 393 U.S. 503, 513, (1969), expressly limits
the free and unrestricted expression of opinion in
schools to instances where it does not "materially
and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school."
We previously considered these limitations in Quart erman
v. Byrd
,
453 F.2a 54, 58, (1971):
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Specifically
,
school authorities may by
appropriate regulation, exercise prior
restraint upon publications distributed
on school premises during school hours
in those special circumstances where they
can reasonably forecast substantial
disruption of or material interference
with school activities on account of the
distribution of such printed material."
In his brief President Whiting acknowledges that
there does not appear to ha/e been any danger of physical
violence . or disruption, at the university because of
the publication of the Echo . The record, of course,
does disclose that the' paper’s message of racial
devisiveness and antagonism was distasteful to the
president, and it may well have offended other members
of the university community. However, no white
faculty members or students complained that the
paper’s editorial policy incited anybody at the uni-
versity to harass or interfere with them. The case,
therefore, does not present a situation that Brandenburg
,
Tinker, and Quart erman recognize as justifying restric-
tion of free expression.
As a foundation for its decree, the district court
fashioned a unique exception to the well established
body of law dealing with censorship of college news-
papers. Describing the Echo as a state agency, the
court upheld the termination of its funding by the
university on the ground that the fourteenth amendment
and Civil Rights Act of 1964 bar a state agency from
spending state funds to discourage racial integration
of the university "by a program of harassment, dis-
nnnnf qpv ^ v-,
^
"’ vidic^a cf uiivjG 1c cno . ”
Censorship of the paper cannot be sustained on the
court’s theory. The record contains no proof that the
editorial policy of the paper incited harassment,
violence, or interference with white students and
faculty. At the most, the editorial comments advocated
racial segregation contrary to the fourteenth amendment
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court’s
rationale disregards the distinction between the
first amendment’s clause prohibiting the establishment
of religion and its clause protecting freedom of the
press. Neither federal nor state governments may
expend funds to establish a religion. The first
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amendment, however, contains no similar ban against
speech or press. Both governments may spend money topublish the positions they take on controversial
subjects. The speeches and publications that originate
in government offices attest to the diversity of views
that are freely expounded. But under the rule that
President Whiting urges us to affirm, no state official
could use his office to criticize, as the editor of
the Echo did, government policy on race relations
with which he disagrees. We need not decide whether
the Echo is a state agency; it is enough to say that
even if it were, it would not be prohibited from ex-
pressing its hostility to racial integration. The
fourteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act proscribe
state action that denies the equal protection of the
laws, not state advocacy. To be sure, the line
between action and advocacy may sometimes be difficult
to draw, but it is clear that nothing written in the
Echo crossed it.
A college newspaper’s freedom from censorship does not
necessarily imply that its facilities are the editor's
private domain. When a college paper receives a sub-
sidy from the state, there are strong arguments for
insisting that its columns be open to the expression
of contrary views and that its publication enhance,
not inhibit, free speech. However, this case provides
no occasion for formulating a principle akin to the
fairness doctrine for the college press. The record
does not disclose that Joyner rejected any articles
that were opposed to his editorial policy, and President
Whiting does not claim the paper refused to publish
his pro-integration plea.
free to
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publish and circulate a newspaper on the campus
without university support, protests that the denial of
financial support cannot be considered censorship
because it is permanent. Permanency, he suggests, does
not link the ebb and flow of funds with disapproval
or approval of editorial policy. Absent this correla-
tion, he claims, there is not censorship. But this
argument overlooks the fact that one of the reasons
for the president's withdrawal of funds was his dis-
pleasure with the paper’s editorial policy. The
abridgement of freedom of the press is nonetheless
real because it is permanent. Freedom of the press
cannot be preserved, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter
noted, by prohibitions calculated "to burn the house
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* ^-tler v * Michigan , 352 U.S. 380,
-503
, U957). The president has failed to carry theheavy burden of showing justification for theimposition of" a prior restraint on expression. Hehas proved only that he considers the paper’s editorial
comment to be abhorrent, contrary to the university’s
policy, and inconsistent with constitutional and
statutory guarantees of equality. This is plainly
insufficient. Healy v. James
,
408 U.S.
.169, 187,
(1-972); Brandenburg v. Ohio
, 395 U.S. 444
, 449, (1969).
Similarly, the district court's permanent injunction
against the university's funding of the paper cannot
stand. The court’s grant of the injunction was intended
to protect the student press by eliminating the
inducement of future financial support "as a possible
method for censorship.” But the proper remedy against
censorship is restraint of the censor, not suppression
of the press. A court, no less than the executive and
the legislature, must defer to the first amendment.
Twice in the history of the nation the Supreme Court
has reviewed injunctions that imposed prior restraints
on the publication of newspapers, and twice the Court
has held the restraints to be unconstitutional. New
York Times Co. v. United States
,
403 U.S. 713, (1971);
Near v. Minnesota
,
283 U.S. 697, (1931). In both
instances the proof was insufficient to overcome the
presumption of unconstitutionality under which prior
restraint of expression labors. Because this case is
marked by the same defect, the injunction must be
dissolved.
Disciplinary Action As A Means of Censorship. William
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that was published in the school newspaper. The editor of
the newspaper, Robert Thonen, was also a student.
The letter was critical of the administration and
parietal hours at the University. It ended with a four letter
word which referred to the University President, Leo Jenkins.
The administration took, disciplinary action against
both Schell and Thonen, dismissing them from school. Both
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students sought relief in Federal District Court.
The District Court found...
disturbances or disorders or interference in
connection with any school or school related
function occurred as a result of the printing; of
the letter
. .
.
and reasoned that the University had violated the student’s
first amendment rights by dismissing them from school for
writing and printing a letter with a "vulgar" word in it.
The school officials appealed the case to the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals.
Reflecting previously cited cases, the Court in
Thonen v. Jenkins
,
491 F . 2d 722 (1973 ) } issued a compara-
tively short opinion, affirming the opinion of the District
Court Judge, and finding for the students:
In Healy v. James
,
408 U.S. 169 (1972), the Court
made clear first amendment rights on college campuses
are coextensive with those in the community at large.
Thus, as to speech related activities, a university
may legitimately "enforce reasonable regulations as
to the time, place and manner of speech and its
dissemination." Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S.
667 (1973).
But, above all else, the first amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content. Brandenburg v. Ohio , 395 U.S. 444 (1969);
Police Department v. Mosley , 408 U.S. at 95-
The record reveals that univeristy officials undertook
to deny these college students the right to continue
their education because one word in an otherwise
unexceptionable letter on a matter of campus interest
was deemed offensive to good taste. On at least one
prior occasion the officials had remonstrated with
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the student editors about the use of vulgarity in thepublication but had made it clear that they did notintend to act in a censorial fashion nor did they
suggest that such vulgarity would not be tolerated in
the future. It was only when the vulgarity was usedin the open letter addressed to President Jenkins
with respect to his dormitory policy that the school
authorities viewed it as totally unacceptable and took
disciplinary action against Thonen and Schell. That
they may not do. The decisions of the Supreme Court
make clear "that the mere dissemination of ideas—no
matter how offensive to good taste— on a state
university campus may not be shut off in the name alone
of "conventions of decency." Papish
,
4l0 U.S. at 670 .
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, the decision
of the district court is affirmed.
Disclaimor of Association
. In 3azaar v. Fortune
,
476
F . 2d 570 (1973) 9 a case similar to Antonelli , the administra-
tion of the University of Mississippi sought to prevent
the publication of a literary magazine called Images . The
magazine, which was a recognized student publication, had
been published several times since its inception in 1969*
It had a circulation of about 500, which cost approximately
$300 to print in 1969 , when done at the University’s dupli-
cating facility. It was understood that proceeds from the
sale of the magazine would go to deferring the cost of the
printing. In any case, the English Department would pay
any outstanding printing costs out of its activities fund.
The magazine was connected with the English Department
in that students in a creative writing class contributed
most, if not all, of the material for Images . The faculty
advisor to the magazine was also the instructor in the
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creative writing class.
In the Spring 1972 issue of Images there was to appear
two stories by a young junior at the University. The two
were about interracial love and Black pride. The
court noted
. .
.
In framing its objections to the stories, the Uni-
versity was careful to disclaim any unhappiness with
the presented themes. Rather,' the University based
its entire objection to both stories solely upon the
grounds of the inclusion .therein of what must be termed
some quite "earthy" language. It appears to be the
University’s position that because of its connection
with this magazine it has the right to prevent publica-
tion ar.d distribution solely because it has
determined that this language Is inappropriate and In
bad taste.
The Court took great pains to consider the context
in which the "four letter words" were used, and concluded:
The language, while admittedly unacceptable in some
quarters, is readily recognized as common-place in
various strata of society, both black and white. The
tendency to use such language would seem more prevalent
among young males In less-favored social groups of
all races. In short, it could well be considered
strained and artificial for these characters to speak
and think in proper prep school diction.
We also note that the language is not used in a manner
which would be termed "pandering". The words are not
used in a sexual sense nor are there vulgar passages
describing such activities.
The Court then raised the question it must decide on:
Thus, the sole question presented in this case is
whether or not a university, under these circumstances,
may prevent publication and distribution of a student
publication solely on grounds of "taste" and "appro-,
priateness" merely because certain words appear therein,
no matter in what context and for what reasons the
words are used.
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Relying on Tinker
,
Healy
, Antonelli
. American
i:L
-
Liberties Union of Virginia v. Radford College
, 315
F. Supp. 893 (1970), Dickey
,
and other cases, the Court
found in favor of the students:
As a final word, we can only reiterate that speech
cannot be stifled by the state merely because it would
perhaps draw an adverse reaction from the majority of
people, be they politicians or ordinary citizens, and
newspapers. To come forth with such a rule would be to
virtually read the first amendment out of the Consti-
tution and, thus, cost this nation one of its
strongest tenets. It would be unthinkable to say that
the University of Mississippi could censor and forbid
publication of an article in its law school journal
on the grounds that the article concerned some sensi-
tive issue, such as forced busing or abortion, which,
because of the resolution reached in the article, the
University determined would create an overwhelmingly
adverse reaction among members of the bar and the
public. The fnrst amendment simply took the power to
make such judgment out of the hands of the state.
The University alleges that it here is acting to
preserve what it considers an acceptable level of
decency in this publication. That statement, however,
illustrates the core issue of this problem—what
level of "decency" and who should decide when it has
been reached. As previously noted, the use of the
language is, at the very least, arguably- justified in
a literary context. It is not used suggestively nor
H r\ o o onnnAO nnnr] on -? ki n ^ ^ ^
forced on an unwilling audience through public display.
There is no chance of violent disruption from their
use. The nature of the language is no longer really
that unusual in current literature, films, and conver-
sation—especially among the young. The trend to its
use, both in spoken and written arts, while not to be
conmoided, certainly must be recognized. "An acceptable
level of decency" is obviously not a static proposi-
tion nor one easily determined. One needs only look
around to see that things considered horribly
"indecent" a few years ago are quite commonplace today.
It is for this reason that, where modes of expression
are involved, the first amendment casts a heavy burden
on any governmental body which seeks to censor on the
grounds of "public decency".
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Thus, we conclude here that the University has not shown
sufficient special circumstances to justify the inter-
ference it is attempting to impose on the full exercise
of first amendment freedoms. As previously noted, we
do not in this opinion mean to say that no language
or conduct short of legal obscenity can be regulated
by a
^
college or university when a student literary
publication is involved. We do not have to reach that
issue here. We are satisfied that on the facts of this
case the University has not demonstrated that the
language used in parts of these stories is so unusual,
so condemnatory, that the requisit special circum-
stances have bpen achieved.
Therefore, we feel it is incumbent on this court to
deny the University the power to restrict what must
be recognized as a legitimate manner of expression...
However, the case was not concluded here. The Court
was petitioned for a rehearing en banc, and the case was
6 2
reheard on December 6, 1973.
After rehearing, the conclusion of the Court remained
the same, but with one important change:
Upon consideration of the record, briefs and oral
argument in this cause en banc, the court concludes
that the opinion and judgment of the panel should
be and the same are hereby affirmed, subject to the
following modification:
un i ver« it v officials may, at their option, place
or stamp on the cover or the format of the magazine
Images the following disclaimer: "This is not an
official publication of the Universtiy."
Affirmed as modified.
It should be noted that the suggestion to attach such
a disclaimor came from the American Civil Liberties Union.
^ 2Bazaar v. Fortune, 489 F.2d 225 (1973).
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In considering "freedom of the press" problems, the
principles of lav/ considered throughout this chapter remain
applicable. College officials cannot interfere with free
expression, when the exercise of that expression does not
materially and substantially interfere with the normal
operation of the school (see Eurnside ) . The State may not
tell a student what thoughts he may communicate (Tinker).
Publications cannot be suppressed simply because college
officials dislike the content of the articles (see Joyner )
.
The courts have consistently refused to recognize as
permissable, any regulations infringing on free speech
when not shown to be necessarily related to the maintenance
of order and discipline on the campus (see Dickey ) . That an
article or publication is offensive is not enough to justify
suppression. The questions to be asked are: Will the
publication of the article cause a "clear and present
danger" to the campus? Will its publication materially and
onh cf onf 1_2.12. T7 r.r 4- V> 4- V* a ts H ew a J. viiv il vi mu u- Ubui u^/ xun w x k/iiu
school?
Freedom of the press, as with other first amendment
rights, is not absolute. As has been discussed before,
c ollege officials can develop reasonable rules and regula-
tions which are necessary in maintaining order and discipline
on the campus. To this extent, rules and regulations may
be developed as to the time, place, and manner of speech,
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or distribution of printed material. As with other first
amendment situations, college officials can restrict
circulation or deny publications of material only when
they can positively forecast substantial disruption of or
a material interference with school activities because of
the distribution or printing of the material.
3.8 Principles of Law and Conclusions
Freedom of speech, press, and association are among
the fundamental personal rights and liberties protected
from impairment by the stat es ... Strongly abusive utterances
or publications, not just merely polished urbane pronounce -
ments of dignified people, enjoy first amendment protections .
First amendment rights are basic to a free society.
Nowhere is the teaching and practice of these rights more
important and vital than in our nation’s schools.
The first amendment is a limitation on government
power. Through the fourteenth amendment, it prevents the
states, and their agencies, from denying to the people,
the rights of freedom of expression.
Such rights of expression encompass, on a college
campus, activities such as demonstrations, assemblies,
public and faculty speakers/lectures, sit-ins, open forums,
student newspapers, picketing, literary magazines, organiza-
tion of student groups, etc.; in general, the first amendment
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applies to anything that communicates or symbolizes an idea.
The
,
liberty of expression can be abridged by state
Q_f
_
fj:eia.ls if their protection of legitimate state interests
necessitates an invasion of free speech .. .There Is nothing
the Constitution or the law which allows for lawlessness
,
violence, or the destruction of property under the guise of
first amendment rights to free speech .
The first amendment does not give one the right to
speak out wherever and whenever one wants. Holmes’
caution about shouting "fire” in a crowded theater is an
example
.
Education is a legitimate state interest, and the
state may act to protect it. It is the responsibility of
school officials, acting for the state, to develop reasonable
rules and regulations to insure the maintenance of an
orderly program of learning, and to prevent conduct which
would materially and substantially obstruct the operation
_ „ . u - - i rm. . A. ^ -a x. j ~ X- r- ^ n
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officials to wait until a disruption occurs, before it can
take action to deal with such disturbances.
It has always been within the province of school
officials to prohibit acts calculated to undermine the
school’s routine. In formulating such rules and regulations,
school officials have wide latitude and discretion, but are
bound by the requirement that the rules and regulations
cannot deny students of their constitutionally protected
rights
.
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It has been said that while a school is a market-place
for ideas, it is not a market-place (see Shanley v. North-
east Independent School District
,
462 F.2d 9 6 0 (1972)).
There is a substantive difference between a school and the
street corner in terms of weighing the competing interests
of a completely free flow of any and all expression with the
requirement that there be order and discipline. What may be
protected speech on the street corner, may be reasonably
restrained in the school. (see Shanley ) A student’s
association with an educational institution, as a student,
requires certain minimum standards of propriety in conduct
.to insure that the educational function of the institution
can be pursued in an orderly manner.
Even though such rules may infringe upon first
amendment rights, it is reasonable within a college
setting to assign students to a particular class; forbid
unnecessary discussions in the classroom; place restrictions
on demonstrations in order to protect safety and property,
or to maintain normal operations and facilitate campus
traffic; or deny students the right to demonstrate in
college buildings. Rules may be established to regulate
the time and place of group meetings, or to regulate the
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conduct of groups; or to set reasonable time and place re-
strictions for the distribution of materials on campus, and the
manner in which the materials may be distributed.
However, college officials are limited in their rule-
making authority. The Supreme Court has said that in our
society, school officials do not possess absolute authority
over their students; students are persons under the Con-
stitution .
The state is not necessarily the unrestrained master
over what it creates. For this reason, college officials
may not create rules which have a "chilling" effect on
legitimate speech or expression of ideas; nor may they
develop regulations that are so overbroad and vague that
they deny all types of activity, even that which is
legitimate. The most difficult task for college officials
is to distinguish between speech or expression that is pro-
hibited, and that which is covered by the first amendment.
rpbo f 0cf ciir,t Q iling in—school exercise of expression
is whether or not the expression materially and substantially
interferes with the activities or discipline of the school.
While rules can be developed to prevent disorderly
conduct, freedom of speech, expression, and communication
cannot be denied because of unsupported fear or apprehension
of such conduct. In order for a state to justify prohibi-
tion of a particular expression of opinion, it must sho_i
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that its actions were caused by something more than a
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that
accompanies an unpopular viewpoint.
Is there a clear and present danger that must be
avoided? In considering this question, the college
administrator must look at both the proximity and the degree
of evil. How remote is the danger? Is it imminent? How
serious is the evil? No danger flowing from free speech
can be deemed clear and present unless the incident of the
evil apprehended is so imminent that it will occur before
there is time for meaningful discussion. Even immediate danger
cannot justify denial of speech, unless the evil apprehended
is relatively serious.
Intent is also important. There is a wide difference
between advocacy of disruption and incitement to disrupt.
While speech advocating a violation of the law may be
morally objectionable, it cannot be denied. Speech which,
on thp other hend. hpcomes Dart, nf thp fnnrp tr violate the
law or steals a group to violate the law, is not covered
by the first amendment. There must be a concrete connection
between advocacy and intent; advocacy must have some
immediate relationship to an unlawful act. There is, for
example, a difference in the manner of demonstrations;
there is a difference between advocacy of an abstract idea.
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and advocacy to action. People must be urged to do some-
thing illegal or violent, not just to believe in an idea.
It falls to the college administrator to prove that
speech was denied, not because of anticipated problems, but
because there was substantial evidence to believe that
there would be severe and immediate violence or substantial
disruption of the operation of the college because of the
speech or expression of ideas.
College officials may not deny freedom of expression
merely because they find the ideas expressed to be
abhorrent, provocative, challenging, critical, or embarrassing
to the college. Speakers should not be controlled, and
.censorship should be avoided.
Once a forum is opened to assembly or speaking by
some groups, the state may not prevent others from
assembling or speaking on the basis of what they have to
say. Selective exclusion from a public forum may not hp
based on content alone, and may not be justified by
reference to content alone .
Once the campus doors are open to speakers, they
must be opened to all speakers, under conditions consistent
with constitutional principles.
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While college authorities have the ultimate responsi-
bility in determining whether a speaker is invited to
campus, they cannot base their determination on the wrong
reasons, or on no reasons at all, i.e., a college president
cannot deny a speaker an opportunity to address the
college community because the president doesn't like the
person, or the subject matter.
College officials have developed regulations for
bringing speakers to campus, as a means of limiting the
appearance of unacceptable people. But the courts
have not accepted these regulations.
The courts will uphold the denial of a speaker where
.there is a clear determination that the speaker will
advocate the violent overthrow of the United States
Government or any of its political subdivisions, willful
distruction or seizure of the institutions' buildings or
other property, disruption or impairment of the institu-
tion's regularly scheduled classes or other educational
functions, physical harm, coercion, intimidation, or
other invasion of lawful acts of the institutions'
officers, faculty or students, or any other campus
disorder of a violent nature. In verifying the danger
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anticipated the courts will consider among other things, the
environment in which the speech will be held, the personality
of the speaker, the nature of the forum, the current
climate of the campus, the content of the speech, and the
composition of the audience; all will be used to determine
whether or not there is a clear and present danger to the
college community.
Speaker regulations can be adopted for procedural and
educational reasons (see Stacy ) , and certain standards can
bet set: speakers must be qualified to speak in the area of
the subject to be considered; requirements for advanced
notice can be set; and administrative information, such as
time, date, location of speech, anticipated size of audience,
and subject matter, can be required. Speakers cannot be
denied because they are associated with people who advocate
dangerous or destructive behavior, or because they have
criminal records, or because their controversial views are
unacceptable to the school.
Regulations which prohibit all or certain kinds of
speakers from campus, or which require some type of approval
cf the speaker or his/her content, before the person can
deliver his/her speech, are, by their very nature, prior
restraints upon speech and assembly, and probably will not
be upheld in a court of law.
Prior restraints are not unconstitutional per se, but
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in order to withstand constitutional attack, they must be
narrowly drafted so as to suppress only speech, or
speakers, which present a clear and present danger of sub-
stantial evil. Since prior restraint is akin to censorship,
it comes to the courts bearing a heavy presumption against
its constitutional validity.
Listeners have rights also. The first amendment right
to peacefully assemble to listen to a speaker of one's
choice may not be impaired by the state, any more than
the right of the speaker may be impaired. The right to re-
ceive the dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing
if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive
and consider them. The state cannot regulate the content
of the ideas that students may hear, nor can peaceful
assembly for lawful discussions be made a crime.
Students do not shed their constitutional rights
at the schoolhouse gate... The state cannot force college
students to forfeit their constitutional rights of
freedom of expression as a condition to attend a state
supported institution .
A students’ rights do not embrace merely the classroom
hours. When they are in the cafeteria, or on the athletic
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field, or anywhere else on campus, they may express their
opinion, just as any other citizen, as long as they do so
without materially and substantially interfering with the
normal operation of the college, or without infringing on
the rights of others.
Symbolic act s are akin to free speech and ar e com-
prehensively covered by the first amendment
.
The first amendment covers not only utterances, but
also symbolic speech (written or printed matter; the wearing
of symbols to express ideas, opinions, or commitments; art;
music; etc.) so long as there is no significant disturbance
raised by the symbolic act. If the classroom program or
other educational activities are materially and substantially
disrupted by a symbolic act, school officials would be acting
within their authority to prevent it. As for other aspects
of expression, suppression of symbolic acts may not be based
on fear or apprehension of problems, and the proximity and
degree of evil to be prevented must be also considered.
Like policies regarding speakers, once the college
authorities have chosen to permit or encourage symbolic ex-
pression, they cannot discriminate against some types of
symbolic expression, nor arbitrarily allow some on campus,
but not others, without sufficient jusit ificat ion . As with
Close v. Lederle
,
422 F.2d 988
,
a college cannot encourage
art exhibitions ,. and then arbitrarily prevent art work
which it does not like.
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Symbolic acts should not be confused with illegal action
In some cases, lawless acts will be claimed as symbolic
speech, as a takeover of a' college building might be
justified as a means of expression. But if symbolic action
is so abused as to incite violence or substantially disrupt
the normal operation of the college, that speech/expression
should be treated as conduct, which has crossed the line
from mere advocacy, to illegal activity, and may be punished.
The right to peaceably assemble is a right cognate
to those of free speech, and is equally fundamental...
Conduct which involves activities such as picketing and
marching are a departure from the exercise of first amend-
ment rights in pristine form and they do not receive the
same degree of freedom .
Students do not have an unlimited right to demonstrate
on university property. College officials may adopt
reasonable, non-discriminatory policies, governing demonstra
tions on the campus, particularly as to places where demon-
strations will not be allowed, and the conduct of demonstra-
tors .
Among the rights protected by the first amendment is
the right of individuals to associate to further their
personal beliefs .
Student groups do not have an unqualified right to be
recognized by the college administration. The benefits
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that may be associated with recognition may be withheld from
a student group that reserves the right to violate reason-
able campus rules with which it disagrees; and recognition
may be denied to a student group that indicates that it is
unwilling to abide by reasonable rules governing conduct.
Student groups may be made to sign a statement indicating
that they will abide by reasonable campus rules and regula-
tions governing conduct, before recognition will be granted
to them. The burden of proof, once again, however, is on
college officials to show why a student group was rejected
recognition.
The courts have consistently disapproved of state
action which denies rights and privileges solely because of
a person’s association with an unpopular organization.
College authorities may not, then, deny recognition of a
local student organization only because it is affiliated
with a larger, national organization which is unpopular
with college or state officials. Guilt by association alone,
without establishing that an individual’s association poses
the threat feared by the state, is an impermissible basis
upon which to deny first, amendment rights.
As was the case in Healy , the state has the burden
of establishing a knowing affiliation with an organization
possessing unlawful aims and goals, and specific intent
to
further those illegal aims and goals
.
In the case of
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student groups with national affiliations
,
such as local
and national SDS chapters, the college officials must
demonstrate that the local group has the same goals and aims
as the unlawful aims and goals of the national group, i.e.,
advocating violence and disruption.
The activities of a student organization need not be
tolerated when they infringe upon reasonable campus rules,
interrupt classes, or interfere with the normal operation of
the school or the rights of other students to an education.
The key again is deciding when advocacy becomes illegal
conduct, and what is the proximity and degree of the evil
to be prevented?
The mere disagreement with a group’s philosophy affords
no reason to deny it recognition. Nor can college officials
deny recognition to a student group just because they fear
that the group will be a disruptive influence on the campus,
or because officials feel that the group might engage in
-m T^rra i_ activities in the future.
Student organizations can be denied recognition for
failing to provide the college with reasonable, pertinent
information, such as a statement of its purpose, the name
of any faculty advisors, its policies regarding membership,
etc
.
College officials must also be cautious about denying
first amendment rights even after recognition has been
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granted to a student group, such as preventing the group
from using campus facilities or campus news media, or pro-
hibiting a group ' s social events. When the Gay Student
Organization at the University of New Hampshrire was pre-
vented from having a dance, the court said that prohibiting
a social event may be a substantial abridgement of rights
of association. While gay social events do not constitute
"pure speech", their conduct may have a communication content
sufficient to bring it under the first amendment.
By the same token, care should be taken not to inter-
fere with first amendment rights in more subtle ways, such
as denying recognition to a student group and justifying
it by saying that they can still associate off campus. The
.courts have said that the primary impediment to free associa-
tion is the denial of the use of campus facilities for meet-
ings and other legitimate purposes. There are circumstances,
however, where facilities can be denied to student groups,
( Wnnd ) .
A statute purporting to regulate expression may not be
so broad in its sweep as to hazard the loss or impairment
of first amendment freedoms, by appearing to cover speec h
that may not be constitutionally regulated .
A regulation which legitimately allows for the suppres-
sion of speech when it is unlawful, could be so vague or
overbroad so as to leave the reader believing that other
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types and forms of speech, normally permitted under the
Constitution, are also restricted or forbidden. The
language of regulations should be such as not to deter by
threat or confusion the practice of free expression of
ideas
.
Liberty of the press, historically considered and taken
up by the courts, has meant,, principally although not ex-
clusively, immunity from censorship and prior restraint...
A college cannot tell its students what ideas to write .
Rules and regulations controlling other forms of
expression also apply to the press; by the same token, the
press is protected just as other forms of expression are
protected. On a college campus the press may cover many
areas: student newspapers, underground newspapers, leaf-
lets, handbills and phamphlets, literary and humor magazines,
academic periodicals, the college yearbook, etc.
Freedom of expression cannot be infringed by denying
a privilege. If college authorities do not likA whet, is hping
printed in the student newspaper, they may not suspend the
editor, require prior approval of controversial articles,
excise repugnant materials, withdraw financial support, or
exercise any other restraints based on the college’s power of
the purse.
Publications can be restricted if there is a clear
and present danger that an article, or the publication as a
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whole, will cause significant disruption of the school’s
activities, if printed. College officials should exercise
extreme caution here. The courts, in such instances, have
consistently ruled in favor of the student. Again, is there
a clear and present danger? Is the danger imminent? Is
the evil serious?
Restriction of a publication may occur for legitimate
educational reasons, as when an editor of a college
newspaper refused to print any material which is not
his/her own or which does not agree with his/her opinions
or philosophy (i.e., the paper is not his/hers alone, and
should reflect other opinions).
Speech and the press cannot be stifled by the state
merely because the speech or printed material would draw
an adverse reaction from the public, or state legislature.
To this extent, an editor of a college newspaper cannot be
considered "insubordinate" because he/she prints an article
attacking the state’s governor, or the president nf the
college.
Underground newspapers are a. valid activity, and may
not be prohibited. Such papers enjoy the same rights as
other publications.
There cannot be blanket regulations prohibiting the
distribution of all handbills, leaflets, and pamphlets.
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However, regulations can be developed to control the
method of distribution, place of distribution, etc. And,
as with other forms of expression, leaflets and pamphlets
passed out on campus, calculated to cause disturbance and
disruption of school activity, are not privileged under
the first amendment
. Do they create a clear and present
danger ?
The situation may arise when a small number of students
attempt to prevent legitimate speech by starting a disturbance.
In such cases, college officials must make a legitimate
attempt to prevent the disruptors from denying others from
exercising their right to speak. If a legitimate attempt
to prevent or remove the disturbance fails, college officials
may have to stop both the speaker and those demonstrating.
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CHAPTER IV
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
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The Right of the People to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
ion
,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be siezed."
4.1 Introduction
In February of 1761, James Otis spoke to other Boston
colonists about the arbitrary and unreasonable searches and
seizures being conducted by British Customs officials.
The English, seeking to find smuggled goods, had
developed "writs of assistance" which allowed British
revenue agents in Boston and other towns to search colonial
homes at will. The colonists were opposed to such unwarranted
searches, and a popular revolt against the "writs of
assistance" soon developed. Ctis was one of its leaders.
Of the search and seizure practice, Otis said, it is
"...the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most
destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental prin-
ciples of law, that was ever found in an English law book."
0
^Boyd v. United States , 116 U.S. 6l6 (1886) at 625.
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Otis' speech was to inaugurate the colonial resistance
against the oppressions of the mother country. John Adams
was to later say of this speech, that "then and there was
the child of Independence born."^
One year later, in England, an English Court was to
test the common law principle that "a man's home is his
castle." This case, Entick v. Carrington and Three Other
King's Messengers
, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1762),
involved English officials who entered a private home and
broke open desks, and boxes, and searched throughout the
house for private papers. The Court was to say that "every
invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a
trespass." An American Court, some 124 years later, was to
say that the "judgment on that occasion is considered to
be one of the landmarks of English liberty."
The principles laid down by that English case were to
become the foundation of the United States Constitution's
TjmriHi Tn 17^6 v i
i
v'1 i a incorporated a search
and seizure clause into its Constitution. While the
inclusion of such a clause represented the strong feelings
of the people of Virginia regarding search and seizure, it
was a clause that was limited in both scope and application
6Sbid, p. 625.
65ibid
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In 1780, however, utilizing much of the phraseology
developed in the Entick case and Otis’ speech, Massachusetts
placed in its constitution, a search and seizure clause
that was to be the forerunner of the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. The court in Boyd was to
indicate that the search and seizure clause in the
Massachusetts Constitution was wide in scope and application.
Since the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
was based on this model, the Court felt that the writers
of the Constitution, and the Congress which accepted it, must
have meant to give wide scope and application to the Fourth
Amendment
.
The Constitution of every state contains a section or
amendment similar to the Fourth Amendment, and often its
precise wording.
Unlike the First Amendment, which, according to Mr.
Justice Black, is written in ’’absolute terms and unqualified
language”, the Fourth Amendment is sub.lect to great extremes
of interpretation. Like the Fourteenth Amendment, still to
be considered, the Courts, in the Fourth Amendment have had
to interpret such ambiguous terms as ’’unreasonable search''
and ’’probable cause”.
While the First Amendment was interpreted in the light
of the times (i.e., war, the Red scare period, etc.), as
well as within the political process of the Court, the
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them. The Supreme Court said, the government may not
"...use knowledge that it has gained..." from an illegal
search and seizure "...to call upon the owners in a more
regular form to produce..." that information.
In 1921, William Howard Taft became the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court. The economy was growing, the National
Government was passive in its laissez-faire policies, and
corporate enterprise was having its way. The Supreme Court
was in the mainstream of a conservative trend, and the Court
itself, being very property and pro-business oriented,
consisted of seven ‘'conservatives" and 'only two "liberals".
Taft himself was said to have, in his own mind, placed prop-
erty rights over personal rights. He was convinced that
those in the business community represented the major American
opinion
.
The Taft court, in two cases in the 1920’s was to
broaden the scope of "probable' cause" and searches.
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Court established a precedent which still endures today.
The Court upheld the search of a bootlegger’s car without a
warrant, because the officers had a "probable cause" to believe
that a crime had been or was being committed, and to require
a warrant in this case would have been tantamount to letting
the evidence get away. The Court emphasized that "where the
securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable it must be
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Fourth Amendment has been interpreted mostly through and by
the political persuasions, conservative or liberal, of the
Justices. A "conservative" Court, has generally decided
Fourth Amendment cases in favor of law enforcement personnel
a "liberal" court has generally found for the individual.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent in Harris v.
United States
,
331 U.S. 145. (1947), explained it this way:
one s views regarding circumstances like those presented,
ultimately depend on one’s understanding of the history and
function of the Fourth Amendment. A decision may turn on
whether one gives that Amendment a place second to none in
the Bill of Rights, or considers it on the whole a kind
of nuisance, or serious impediment in the war against
crime .
"
Most cases decided within the realm of the Fourth
Amendment are criminal in nature. While there is a
distinction between college discipline and disciplinary
procedures, and criminal investigations, we shell see that
the principles derived from the criminal cases are not
only applicable to higher education administration, but
have set the standards by which higher education/Fourth
Amendment cases have been decided.
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4.2 Historical Analysis
In Chapter 6, (Due Process of Law), there is a section
which describes the nationalization of the Bill of Rights:
the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on the States, through its
due process clause, the same restrictions that the Bill of
Rights places on the National Government.
This process, which began with Git low v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925), is important to the understanding of
Fourth Amendment rights. As we shall see, the Fourth
Amendment, as part of the Bill of Rights, restricted only
the Federal Government and its agencies. While the courts
were preventing the Federal Government from abusing the
Fourth Amendment rights of the people, the states and their
agencies, including public college administrators, were free
from such Fourth Amendment restrictions.
Eventually, as the Supreme Court incorporated more
and more of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the same Fourth Amendment restrictions that had
been placed on the Federal Government, were placed on the
states
.
4.2.1 Federal Government Cases:
Restrictions on Federal Officials
In 1886, the Court in Boyd , relying on the English
Entick case, was to establish a principle cf law that was
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to guide future courts to the present day. Considering the
—
1
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.
case where English government officials broke down the
doors of a private residence and "rummaged" through drawers,
the court said
"the principles laid down in this opinion affect the
very essence of constitutional liberty and security.
They reach farther than the concrete form of the case
then before the court...; they apply to all invasions
on the part of the government and its employees of the
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.
It is not the breaking of his doors and the rummaging
of his drawers that constitutes the essence of the
offense, but it is the invasion of his indefensible
right of personal security, personal liberty, and private
property, where that right has never been forfeited
by his conviction of some public offense..."
Under Chief Justice Edward Douglas White
,
the Supreme
Court was to develop other Fourth Amendment rules of
evidence, which were also to have a major impact on Fourth
Amendment cases to the present day.
In Weeks v. United States
,
232 U.S. 383 (191*0, the
Court held... "for the first time" that... "in a federal
prosecution the Fourth Amendment barred the use of evidence
secured through an illegal search and seizure."
And in Silverthorne v. United States , 251 U.S. 385
(1920), the Court developed "the fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine, stating that the ban of the Fourth Amendment
extends to leads furnished by illegally sized evidence as
well as the . use of evidence itself. In this case, books
and documents had been illegally seized by federal agents,
so the federal government gave them back and then subpeoned
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used... In cases where siezure is impossible except without
a warrant the seizing officer acts unlawfully and at his
peril unless he can show the Court "probable cause".
Probable cause exists, the Court said, where
..."the facts
and circumstances within.
.. (the arresting officer’s)
knowledge, and of which... (he) had reasonable trustworthy
informat ion . .
.
(are ) sufficient in themselves to warrant
a man of reasonable caution in the belief that... an
offense has been or is being committed."
In that same year, the Court In Agnello v. United
States
,
269 U.S. 20
.(1925), acknowledged the right to
search a person lawfully arrested, and broadened the scope
of search to places under the person's control. The Court
said, "The right without a search warrant contemporaneously
to search persons lawfully arrested while committing a crime
and to search the place where the arrest is made in order to
find and seize things connected with the crime, as its
•Pm 1 1 +* <2 OT’ o a
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as weapons or other things to effect an escape from custody,
is not to be doubted."
The period from 1937, following Roosevelt's admonition
of the "nine old men of the Court", and his attempts to
pack the Court, to 19^7, has been characterized as a
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revisionist period. 66
'’This was not, however, a creative
judicial period, but simply one in which the Court took
into account the force of history in writing its opinions.” 67
By 1947 the lines dividing a conservative Court from
a liberal one, were unclear. Fred M. Vinson had become
Chief Justice of a usually split and uncertain court. The
Vinson Court is sometimes described as a continuation
of the Stone Court, and sometimes as the forerunner to the
liberal Warren Court. It is certain, however, that the
Vinson Court was to mark the period in which the Supreme
Court was to spend more of its time in the area of civil
liberties
.
66
The Fourth Amendment cases of 1947-48 are indicative
of the strongly divided Vinson Court.
In Harris v. United States
, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), a six
to three decision, the Court took the dictum of the Taft
Court in Agnello
,
and broadened the limited area of search
Viv-»4“*$n 4- nnl 1 o o 4- Vs t ~ —
vw * w — -fc. w> a viUvs.i V-+. O -i-x J. c/ x ± v_ ^ 'Jii X
under his "control." In this case. Federal Bureau of
f
Steamer, Robert J., The Supreme Court in Crisis ,
The University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, MA, 1971,
p. 218 and 227.
67 ibid, p. 218 .
68 ibid
,
p. 237 and 238.
228
Investigation agents searched all of Harris' five—room
apartment for five hours. The Court allowed this because
all of the apartment was under Harris' control.
One year later in Johnson v. United States
. 333 U.S. 10
(1948 ) , the Court in a five to four decision leaned towards
the civil libertarian view and narrowed, sharply, the
scope of a search without a warrant. Federal narcotics
agents, acting without a warrant, went into a hotel
room, from which came the smell of burning opium, arrested
the occupant, and searched the room. The Court concluded
that this case was not similar to the Carroll case, where
the Taft Court had developed the "probable cause" theory,
and indicated that the Federal agents had had plenty of time
to secure a warrant and should have done so.
Two more cases in 1948, narrowing "probable cause"
and helping to strengthen an evolving definition of that
phrase, further indicated the impact that the political
persuasion of the justices had on interpreting the Fourth
Amendment
.
In Trupiano v. United States , 334 U.S. 699 (1948),
federal revenue agents had watched thP construction and
operation of an illegal still for several weeks. They
moved in without a warrant, and arrested only one man who
was at the still, and conducting a search which resulted in
the seizure of evidence. Others, however , were subsequently
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arrested for their involvement. The Court said that the
federal authorities had had plenty of time to get warrants
and noted, "warrants of arrest are designed to meet the
dangers of unlimited and unreasonable arrests of persons
who are not at the moment committing a crime.". It was a
five to four decision, split, basically along liberal/conserva-
tive lines.
In McDonald v. United States
. 335 U.S. h 51 (1948),
police had McDonald’s room under surveillance for two months,
in connection with a numbers racket investigation. They
broke into his room without a warrant. The Court held that
the ensuing search was unreasonable. "A search without a
warrant demands exceptional circumstances." If the police
are not responding to an emergency, they need a warrant.
This was a six to three decision, with all of the dissentors
being "conservatives."
By 1950
,
the United States was in the middle of another
11 r>pr] ic; r> n r> <=> n por>i AT_rror> Uj_eo v. o convicted *
Senator Joseph McCarthy was making allegations about "reds"
in the State Department, the McCarran Internal Security
Act was passed; and Unitod States forces were committed in
Korea
.
Perhaps it was the American people’s concern for
greater internal security and more police power; or maybe
it was the "war ideology" which tends to want to limit
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civil liberties during war time. Whatever the situation,
the Court in 1950, considered Rabinowitz v. United States
.
339 U.S. 56 (1950), and in doing so overruled Trupiano
(decided two years earlier) and brought the Court back in
line with its Harris (1947) and Agne llo (1925) decisions.
To the extent that Trupiano v. United States requires a
search warrant solely upon the basis of the practicability
of procuring it rather than upon reasonableness of the
search after a lawfuL.arrest
,
that case is overruled."
The Court in effect was now saying that a wide-spread
search of a defendent’s property was valid, as long as his
arrest was lawful. The Court noted that the Constitution
only required that a search be "reasonable", and not that
it be made with a warrant, if practicable. This decision
was to make possible a much broader search in conjunction
with a lawful arrest, than would be possible with a search
warrant. In some places in the United States the search
warrant became extinct*
This Court, as well as the Warren Court in the 1960's,
was to decide cases involving tenant's rights with regard
to the Fourth Amendment. In Lus tig v. United States , 3 3
S
U.S. 74 (1949) and United States v. Jeffers , 342 U.S. 48
(1951) the Court held that one in’ a position of a lessor
cannot consent to a police search of a tenant’s premises,
even though the lessor, himself, has a right to enter the
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room or apartment.
By 1959, the Court had changed once more. Earl Warren
had become Chief Justice, and the Court, in its first
years under Warren, leaned towards the liberal side.
In Draper v. United States
, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), which
had its roots in Carroll (1925) the Court considered
probable cause" based on "reliable information". The
Court held that the statement of a reliable informer was
su ^^^- c ^ en ^ justify an arrest and subsequent search,
and noted that suspicion, which is "...far from enough
evidence ... to justify a magistrate in issuing a warrant
"
,
does not amount to "probable cause". Again, the Court
acknowledged that if an arrest is lawful, then a subsequent
search of the person is valid.
4.2.2 The Fourth Amendment And
State Cases
By 1949, the Supreme Cuux-'l was continuing its process
of incorporating the Bill of Rights into the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court, however,
had not yet reached the point where it was willing to
place Fourth Amendment restrictions on the states. In a
case involving the seizing of a doctor’s records without
a warrant,^ the Court ruled that the federal exclusionary
69Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
232
rule the rule that the Fourth Amendment bars the use of
evidence secured through an illegal search and seizure
(see Weeks) joes not apply to the states
. The majority
opinion, written by the conservative justices of the Court,
said "...that in a prosecution in a State Court, for a
state crime, the ... (Fourth Amendment) does not forbid the
admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search
and seizure.”
Iwelve years later, however, the Court was to dramatically
overrule Wolf, and in doing so, was to place on the state
governments, the same restrictions that the Fourth Amend-
ment placed on the Federal Government
.
In Mapp v. Ohio
, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court declared
that 'Che Fourth Amendment rights of privacy were enforceable
against the states through the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Justices said, "we hold that all
evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of
To o Pnn Qf* ILS To 1/ 4“ To oomo o n f n'P 1 "f* Tr -1 noHrni c c oK 1 O
in a state court."
In a case which followed Mapp
,
the Court established
its "plain view rule". In Ker v. California
,
374 U.S. 23
(1963 ), the Court said, "it has long been settled that
objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a
right to be in a position to. have that view, are subject to
seizure and may be introduced as evidence."
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Recalling Lustlg (1949) and Jeffers ( 1951 ) eases
involving federal officers, the Court in 1964
,
reaffirmed
a tenants' rights with regard to the Fourth Amendment. In
Stoner v. Cal iforn ia, 376 U.S. 48 3 (1964), a case in which
a hotel clerk allowed the police to search a. guest's room,
the Court said, "it is important to bear in mind that
it was the.
.. (tenant's) Constitutional right which was at
stake here, and not the night clerk's or the hotel's. It
was a. right, therefore, which only the ... (tenant ) could
waive, by word or deed, either directly or through an agent."
Again, in 1964, five years after Draper and thirty-nine
years after Carroll
,
the Court was still concerning itself
with probable cause" and the need for warrants. In
Aguilar v. Texas
, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), the Court held a
state search warrant invalid on the grounds that it was
based on an affidavit that recited "mere conclusions" and
therefore dad not provide an adequate basis for finding probable
PflllRP .
Although the affidavit may be based on hearsay infor-
mation and need not reflect the direct personal obser-
vations of the affiant . . . the magistrate must be informed
of some of the underlying circumstances from which the
informant concluded that the narcotics were where he
claimed them to be, and some of the underlying cir-
cumstances from which the officer concluded that the in-
formant, whose identity need not be disclosed...
was "credible" or his information "reliable".
The Court developed the. "two pronged test" for deter-
mining whether a warrant shall be issued: the magistrate
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must be given adequate information to demonstrate that ( 1 )
the informant’s past record showed him to be reliable, and
(2) the underlying circumstances supported the informant's
tip in the present case.
Finally, the Court overruled Rabinowit
z
(1950), and in
1969 limited, again, the scope of a search, as it had done
in Trupiano (1948). State courts had upheld the search of
an entire three bedroom house. But in Chime
1
v. California
,
395 U.S. 752 ( 1969 )} the Court took up a major re-examina-
tion of searches incident to a lawful arrest. Mr. Justice
Stewart concluded tnat the broad doctrine set out in
Harr i
s
and Rab inowit
z
. .
.
"Can withstand neither historical
nor rational analysis." He wrote for the majority that the
legitimate scope of a "search incident to an arrest" must
be limited: it was reasonable "to search the person arrested
in order to remove any weapons"; it was reasonable to
"seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to
prevent its concealment or destruction"
;
snd_. it-,
reasonable to "...search the arrestee ' s person and the area
'within his immediate control' — that phrase to mean the
area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon
or destructible evidence.” But this was as far as a law
officer could go. "There is no comparable justification...
for routinely searching rooms other than that in which
an arrest occurs — or, for that matter, for searching
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through all the desk drawers or other clothes or concealed
areas in that room itself. Such searches, in the absence
of well-recognized exceptions, may be made only under the
authority of a search warrant. The 'adherence to judicial
processes' mandated by the Fourth Amendment requires no
less .
"
4.2.3 Administrative Searches
In 1959, the Warren Court was to depart from the
Fourth Amendment as it related to criminal cases, to con-
sider "administrative searches". The Baltimore Health
Department
,
like other similar departments around the
country, was allowed, by state and municipal law to conduct
administrative inspections of buildings if they had
probable cause to believe that local health standards were
being violated. In Frank v. Maryland
, 359 U.S. 360 (1959),
Mr. Frank refused to let the Health Inspector into his
hAma t»t o o o >*> /» v-\ i.r n o w + q inc^ccicn . ion ci niimicn
of reasons, believed that Frank was violating the health
laws, and the State of Maryland claimed it did not need
a warrant because (1) they had "probable cause" 'jo believe
that health laws were being violated, and (2) this was not
a criminal matter.
The Court split five to four and found for the state of
Maryland. The majority said, "inspections without a
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warrant, as an adjunct to a regulatory scheme for the
general welfare of the community, and not as a means of
enforcing the criminal law, has antecedents deep in our
history." Justices Douglas, Black, and Brennan, and
Chief Justice Warren, the "liberal bloc", wrote strong
and stirring dissents. The issue of warrantless administra-
tive searches was by no means settled.
1967 j the Question of administrative searches
a warrant came before the Court again. Overruling
Frank
,
the Court in Camera v. Municiple Court
, 387 U.S. 523
(1967)> determined that the Fourth Amendment prevents
prosecution for refusal to permit a warrantless code
enforcement inspection of a personal residence. "Except in
certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of
private property, without proper consent, is ’unreasonable'
unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant."
A comparison case. See v. Seattle
,
387 U.S. 54l ( 1967 ),
held Camera applicable to inspections of commercial property
As another result of Camera
,
the Court said that the
probable cause requirement for obtaining a search v/arrant,
was less stringent for administrative searches than it
would be for searches in criminal cases.
In 1969, a District Court considered an administrative
search of a different nature. At a Job Corps center, a
search by an administrative officer, of a suitcase of
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a corpsman who had just returned from leave, was held to be
valid because of the administrator’s authority to maintain
proper standards of conduct and discipline at the center. 70
Further, the marijuana discovered in the search was allowed
to be admissable as evidence in the prosecution of the
corpsman. Such a search was held to be constitutionally
permissible as a reasonable exercise of the administrator’s
supervisory duty to maintain order and discipline.
Now we shall consider how the Courts have dealt with
the Fourth Amendment in the context of higher education.
4.3 Warrantless Searches
In 1968, Hofstra University officials were concerned
about the use of marijuana on campus. In coordination with
law enforcement officials, the administration planned to
"survey" the residence halls.
Based on information from an unidentified informant,
room, where, while standing in the hallway outside the room,
they detected an odor emanating from that room.
The police and officials entered the room without
announcing themselves and without a search warrant. The
7
°United States v. Coles , 302 F. Supp . 99 (1969).
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police had no knowledge of whether or not anyone was in
the room.
Once inside the room, the police found four students
and some marijuana. The marijuana was seized as evidence.
In Pe °P le v. Cohen , 292 N.Y.S. 2d 706 (1968), Judge
Beatrice Burstein delivered a strong and well documented
opinion in favor of the Fourth Amendment rights of students.
Writing "as a Judge and... (as a) parent," she said:
The Court expresses no opinion as to whether any of
the boys who were present in the room were and had been
smoking marijuana. The record is entirely silent on
that point. One thing, however
,
is clear: at the time
they entered the room, there was no immediate danger
that the evidence, if any, would be removed and
destroyed, nor was there a lack of time within which
to obtain a search warrant
.
It is palpable that the mainspring of the police action
was a suspicion that a crime was being or had been
committed. Suspicion, however, is not an alternative
to, or a substitute for, probable cause that a crime
was or is being committed.
In the circumstances of a case such as this, an entry
and search is lawful only if there was consent or if
the search was an incident to a lawful arrest. No
claim is made that there was express consent to the
entry
.
Can consent be implied? It has been argued that a
student impliedly consents to entry into his room by
University officials at any time, except at late hours.
This contention is not supportable even though there
may be circumstances under which entry is permissible;
but these circumstances are not present here not does
the Court intend to catalogue the occasions which might
permit entry into the room of a college student.
The police and the Hofstra University officials admitted
that they entered the room in order to make an arrest,
if an arrest was warranted. This was, in essence, a
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xP editi °n calculated to discover narcotics,
t offends reason and logic to suppose that a student
consent to an entry into his room designed to
establish grounds upon which to arrest him. Certainlythere can be no rational claim that a student will
self-consciously waive his Constitutional right to alawful search and seizure. Finally, even if thedoctrine of implied consent were imported into this
case, the consent is given, not to police officials,but to the University and the latter cannot fragmentize,
share or delegate it.
Was the search an incident to a lawful arrest? Obviously,
no. The police had no grounds for a lawful arrest
when they entered the room. Indeed, it was admitted
that if the evidence had not been found when they
entered the room, no arrest could have been made.
Simply stated, the arrest was dependent upon finding
the fruits of the unlawful search.
The practice of some students (and the number is far
less than is generally believed) who use narcotics and
who take trips to the outer world instead of to the
library, is appalling enough. But this egregious
stupidity and callous irresponsibility should not be
matched by the w^anton invasion of Constit itonal
liberties. Once need not indulge in an academic
debate about the harmfulness or supposed benefits of
marijuana and other similar drugs... to be shocked and
disturbed about the use of these drugs by college and
high school students. And the Court does not
denigrate from the contributions made by the police
and the enormous burdens imposed upon them in the
detection and prevention of crime in these disoriented
timec*. We must recognize
,
al the same time, that
there are limits to the use of the police power and that
crime detection must comply and conform with permissible
constitutional sanctions. A frightened and impotent
community cannot ask the police to perform illegal
acts because the task of coping with young people is
beyond either their willingness or ability to real-
istically handle it.
The fact is that the police action here offended the
Constitutional rights of the students. This conclusion
does not rest upon the fact that there was adequate
^
time to secure a search warrant. Trupiano v. Ur.itec_
States, 334 U.S. 699, United States v. Rabirowitz ,
339 U.S. 56. The principle inquiry is not whether
2^0
the search itself was reasonable or unreasonable
ff--
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y_* United. States , 286 U.S. 1 . In Chapman v.United States 3 365 U.S. 610, the police, with the
consent of the defendant's landlord, entered defendant’s
apartment where they conducted a search without a
warrant. It was there held that the search was unlaw-
f*ul because It was not an incident to an arrest.
In Johnson v. United States
, 333 U.S. 10, the police
entered defendant's living quarters and conducted a
search without a warrant after having detected a smell
of burning opium. The search was held to be constitu-
tionally impermissible. Mere suspicion that a crime
is being committed is not sufficient to support a
search. Indeed, consent to enter a room standing
alone, is not sufficient defense to a claim of
Constitutional privilege if the consent was obtained
as a result of the defendant's submission to, and fear
of coercive action by, the authorities. Absent
probable cause for the belief that there was a crime
being committed, a search cannot be sustained.
( People v. Lund
,
271 N.Y.S.2d 164). This is not a
case where a search is permitted by school authorities
in order to maintain discipline over young students.
( People v. Overton , 20 N.Y.S.2d 360. 283 N.Y.S.2d 22).
In a recent, well-reasoned opinion by Chief Judge
Kenison of the New Hampshire Supreme Court, ( State
v. Bradbury, New Hampshire
,
243 A. 2d 302), a warrant
had been issued to search a college woman’s dormitory
room for marijuana. At the time of the entry into the
woman’s dormitory room, a man was present and the
police proceeded to search him. The precise question
involved was whether "a valid search warrant to
search designated premises authorizes the searen Ox any
individual who happens to be in the premises.” This
search was justified by the People on the grounds that
the officers were entitled to "frisk" the defendant
for dangerous weapons. The claim was rejected as being
fanciful
.
Relying upon dictum in United States v. Pi Re , 332 U.S.
581, and a decision by the Idaho courts ( Purkey v.
Maby, 33 Idaho 28l, 193 P.79), the Court held ...that a
warrant to search a certain place "cannot be extended
so as to constitute authority for the officer to .whom
it was issued to search a person, not connected _n any
way with the place being searched, who merely happens
to be upon the premises and who is not mentioned or
described in the affidavit of probable cause upon whichthe warrant was issued..."
The final argument which was advanced by the People was
that in the circumstances of that case "there was
probable cause to arrest the defendant for possession
of marijuana and to search him incident to the
arrest." The court rejected this argument holding that
there was no basis in the facts as adduced at trial
for a finding of probable cause to arrest the defendant
in advance of a search of his person."
The principle is perfectly clear: a search cannot bejustified on the basis that it uncovered facts which
gave rise to probable cause for arresting a person
and then by a process of induction, to sugged; that the
search is justified because it is an incident to an
arrest
.
Recently, the New York Court of Appeals in People v.
Corrado
,
22 N.Y.2d 308, 292 N.Y.S.2d 648, set forth the
tests of probable cause. In that case, two detectives
and two officers in the early evening hours of January
26, 1966, acting on a tip received from an undercover
member of the police department that a pound of marijuana
would be passed on a corner in Brooklyn, sat is a car
to observe the scene. At approximately 9:30 p.m. a
car pulled up and parked across the street from the
officers. Inside the car were three teenagers whom
the officers did not know. Corrado was in the driver’s
seat. One Catalan, who accompanied Corrado, left the
car and walked down the street to another car. He then
remained in the second car for a few seconds and re-
turned to Corrado ’s car where he was observed handing
four envelopes to Corrado. Catalan again left the
car and walked toward Quentin Road in Brooklyn. Corrado
was then observed handing the envelopes to one Mossey
who bent down and moved his hands toward the floor.
Corrado started the car, and, upon hearing this, one
of the detectives blocked Corrado’ s car. Another
detective approached Corrado while the first detective,
(Detective Stoehr), opened the rear door of the car,
entered and seized the four envelopes. These were
sealed. Detective Stoehr opened them and found what
appeared to be marijuana. The envelopes were con-
fiscated and the defendants were arrested.
The case presented a single question, namely, whether
there was probable cause- to arrest. The People conceded
that the fruits of the search could not be used to
Su
~5?r ^ a Proba1:, l e cause, but contended there was
sufficient evidence, independent of the search, to
sustain the arrest.
Relying, on the decision by the United States SuDreme
Court in Henry v. United States
, 361 U.S. 98, the Courtheld that probable cause did not exist. The people arguedthat .probable cause was established by the uncontradicted
testimony of Detective Stoehr that he had never seen loose
marijuana in small quantities passed or sold in envelopes
other than the type which was involved in this case. The
detective’s knowledge justified him in drawing an inference
that the defendants "probably had contraband in their
possession." The court responded:
"The argument is defective because the envelopes
could have contained any number of contraband
items***. We conclude, therefore, that the testi-
mony concerning the use of these common envelopes
for marijuana does not raise the level of inference
from suspicion to probable cause."
In a significant footnote, the court discussed the con-
tention that the tip provided the basis for the arrest.
It was conceded, first, that hearsay evidence may be
employed to establish probable cause for an arrest
without a warrant, Aguilar v. State of Texas
,
378 U.S.
108, bit the court then concluded:
"***the record does not indicate whether the lead
was based on the personal knowledge or observations
of the undercover agent or on information furnished
by an informant, whose reliability had been estab-
lished. Absent such evidence, the tip is entitled
to no weight in determining probable cause."
Aguilar v . State of Texas .
The doctrine is now basic: unless a search is the
incident of a lawful arrest and not the occasion which
gives rise to the arrest, it is unlawful.
It seems self-evident that the dormitory room of a college
student is not open for entry at all times for all pur-
poses. Hence, it must be ruled that the search in this
case was unlawful and the evidence must be suppressed.
University students are adults. The dorm is a home. and
it must be inviolate against unlawful search and seizure.
To suggest that a student who lives off campus in a
boarding house is protected but that one who. occupies
a dormitory room waives his Constitutional liberties
is at war with reason, logic and law.
243
Consent To A Search
Two years after Cohen
,
a Fourth Amendment case of a
different variety was heard in a Federal District Court.
In Keene v. Rogers
,
316 F. Supp . 217 (1970), the administra-
tive assistant to the Commandant of Midshipman, at Maine
Maritime Academy, had observed a Volkswagen camper bus in
a parking lot, with American flags drapped o\c-r 'the windows
.
Suspecting that a desecration of an American flag had occurred,
the administrative assistant reported his observations to
the Assistant Commandant.
After determining that the Volkswagen belonged to
Gary R. Keene, a senior at the academy, the Assistant
Commandant requested that the duty officer investigate
the situation. Upon verifying the report, the duty
officer summoned Keene to his office and "suggested” that
the flags be removed.
The following day, the duty officer noted that some
of the flags had been removed, but some had not. The
Commandant of the aoa.demy wa.s Informed of the situation.
The Commandant, besides being concerned about the
possible desecration of an American flag, also suspected
that one of the flags might be one that was missing from
the academy. He instructed the Assistant Commandant
and the Chief Security Officer to make a search of the
vehicle
.
Keene wras told of the desire to search his vehicle.
He willingly obtained his car keys and accompanied the
Assistant Commandant and Security Officer to his bus; without
protest, Keene unlocked the doors to his Volkswagen.
Inside, the Assistant Commander observed n a can of
beer and a number of frayed American flags." Eecause he
noted a strange odor, he continued his search, eventually
finding, within a card box, a small quantity of marijuana.
Possession of alcohol and/or narcotics, is a Class I
offense at the academy
,
and is punishable by anything from
50 demerits to dismissal. Desecration of the flag, while
not listed as a specific violation of the academy regula-
tions, comes under the general category of "conduct unbe-
coming a midshipman", which may be also punishable as a
Class I offense.
Keene was suspended from the academy, and brought suit,
claiming, amongst other things, that his Fourth Amendment
rights had been violated.
District Judge Gignoux delivered the opinion of the
District Court:
...(Keene’s) first contention is that the search of his
Volkswagen bus was in violation of his Fourth Amendment
right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures,
and that any evidence of the contents of the bus
produced by that search was therefore inadmissible at
the disciplinary hearing under the exclusionary rule
established in Weeks v. United States , 232 U.S. 383 ,
(1914) and Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643 > (1981).
Defendants contend that the evidence was legally
admissible and properly considered by the Trustees on
several grounds: First,, defendants say that...
(Keene) consented to the search; second, they argue
245
that in any event the rule of Week s and Mapp does not
apply to college disciplinary proceedings ;* and
third, defendants urge that the search of ... (Keene ’ s
)
vehicle was a reasonable search not prohibited by
the Fourth Amendment
. The Court does not find it
necessary to pass upon either of the first two issues
thus presented, since it is satisfied that even if...
(Keene) did not consent to the search, and even if the
exclusionary rule is applicable to academic disciplinary
proceedings, the search in this case did not violate
the Fourth Amendment.
Chief Warrant Officer Buss is employed by the academy
as its security officer charged with the responsibility
of protecting academy property and enforcing the
academy’s rules and regulations. He is not a federal
or state law enforcement officer. His search of...
(Keene’s) vehicle in this case was conducted under the
instructions of the Commandant of Midshipmen, Captain
Brennan, who is responsible for the conduct and dis-
cipline of the cadets. The object of the search was
to determine whether ... (Keene ) had desecrated the
American flag and had possibly stolen academy property,
both serious breaches of the academy’s disciplinary
rules. Quote plainly, the search was conducted solely
for the purpose of enforcing the academy rules and
regulations and of insuring proper conduct and
discipline on the part of the cadet.
The present case falls squarely within the rule set
forth by this court a year ago in United States v.
Coles, 302 F. Supp. 99 (1969), where a search by the
administrative officer of a federal Job Corps .Center
of a corpsman’s suitcase was held to be constitu-
tionally permissible as a reasonable exercise of the
administrative officer’s supervisory authority to
maintain proper standards of conduct and discipline at
the Center. In that case, the search had produced
marijuana, and this Court held the marijuana was
admissible in a subsequent criminal proceeding. The
court said, quoting Moore v. Student A ffair s Committee
of Troy State , 284 F. Supp. 725, 730-731 (1968 )
:
”It is settled law that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit reasonable
searches when the search is conducted
by a superior charged with a responsi-
bility of maintaining discipline and
order or of maintaining security."
The court further observed that the result reached
was "entirely consistent with the rationale underlying
the exclusionary rules first formulated by the Supreme
Court in Weeks v. United States
, 232 U.S. 383
,
(1914),"
the objective of which is n"to force law enforcement
officers to observe Fourth Amendment rights * * * that
is, to discourage police misconduct." 302 F. Supp.
at 102-103. See Mapp v. Ohio . The court also pointed
out that no court has yet extended the rule of V/eeks
to exclude evidence obtained by a search in which
there was no participation or instigation by a federal
or state law enforcement officer.
In the present case, as in Coles
,
Buss had neither
the status nor the powers of a law enforcement officer,
and it is not suggested that his search was conducted
in cooperation with any law enforcement officer or in
anticipation of any federal or state criminal prosecu-
tion. As previously indicated, the search was con-
ducted solely for the purpose of determining whether
there had been a breach of an academy disciplinary
rule or regulation.
The Court holds that, in the circumstances of this
case, the search of ...(Keene’s) automobile was a
reasonble exercise of the academy’s supervisory
authority to maintain order and discipline among the
cadets, and therefore did not infringe plaintiff’s
Fourth Amendment rights."
Reasonable Search Of A Locker
In 1971 j a case on appeal from the Superior Court of
Santa Clara County, California, reached the Supreme Court
71
of California.
John Lanthier, a student at Stanford University had
been convicted of possession of marijuana for sale, and
was placed on three year’s probation on the condition
that he serve 60 days in the county jail. He appealed to
"^People v. Lanthier , 97 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1971).
the Supreme Court of California, claiming that his Fourth
Amendment rights had been violated.
In January of 1969, Joseph Riley, a janitor in the
Stanford University library, was notified that there was
an obnoxious odor coming from one of the study rooms in the
library. The same smell had been present in the room the day
before, and the windows and doors had been opened to air out
the room. The odor was reported to smell like that of
sweet apples or sour wine.
Riley first tried to smell in the area of the student
lockers in the room. That did not work, as the smell v/as
so strong, it permeated the entire room. It was part of
Riley’s job to periodically inspect the inside of lockers,
especially to look for overdue library books; at the end
of each quarter, when locker permits expired, he opened the
lockers and cleared out the contents. So on this occasion,
he used his master key to open each locker, one by one,
looking for whatever it was that was causing the obnoxious
odor.
Lanthier’s locker was the last opened. When it was
opened the odor grew noticeably stronger. The smell was
coming from a large briefcase, which virtually took up the
entire inside of the locker. Suspecting that the briefcase
contained some bad food, Riley opened it and found 38
transparant plastic bags, containing what he thought to be
marijuana. The odor was apparently due to a preservative
added to the marijuana.
The briefcase was turned over to the Santa Clara
Sheriff’s department, and Deputy Richard Saldivar was asked
to identify its contents. Saldivar, recognized the sub-
stance in the plastic bags as marijuana, and Lanthier was
subsequently arrested.
Justice Mosk delivered the opinion of the court:
In overruling the defendant’s objections to the
evidence on the ground of illegal search and seizure,
the magistrate at the preliminary examination made
two findings: first, he found that ’’the initial
search by Mr. Riley in this case was a reasonable
search. Mr. Riley was merely seeking to locate the
source of an unpleasant odor in a part of the library
that was under his control and supervision. Ke was not
looking for contraband or illicit or stolen property
or any form of evidence of guilt of any crime or other
offense and, under the law, such a search is not
reasonable and it did not become unreasonable even
when Mr. Riley opened the briefcase from which that
odor apparently was emanating." Secondly, the
magistrate ruled that governmental involvement in
the operations of Stanford University was not so
pervasive as to render that institution subject to the
limitations placed upon "state action" by the
Fourteenth Amendment -
We need not reach the latter issue. Even if Stanford
University were a "public" rather than a "private"
institution, the search here challenged would be
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
It is true the search was conducted without a warrant
,
and the burden therefore rested upon the People to
show justification. Badillo v. Superior Court (1956)
46 Cal. 2d 269, 272, 294 P.2d 23 . But that burden
was sustained in the case at bar by a compelling showing
of facts bringing the search within the "emergency"
exception to the warrant requirement.
In Camara v. Municipal Court , 387 U.S. 523, (1967) > the
United States Supreme Court held that routine
administrative searches of private property for viola-tions of local health or safety codes must be made with
a warrant
; among other objections, the court dismissed
the claim that the delay attendant upon obtaining a
warrant would frustrate the governmental purpose behind
the search. Eut in suthorizing such warrants to bebased on area-wide conditions rather than on probable
cause to bel;..eve that a particular dwelling contains
code violations, the Court recognized that "the public
interest demands that all dangerous conditions be
prevented or abated." Finally, the Court was careful
to emphasize that "since our holding emphasizes the
controlling standard of reasonableness, nothing we
say today is intended to foreclose prompt inspections,
even without a warrant, that the law has traditionally
upheld in emergency situations.
The Court distinguished the routine administrative
searches before it as presenting "no compelling urgency,
and concluded that "warrants should normally be sought
only after entry is refused unless there has been a
citizen complaint or there is other satisfactory-
reason for securing immediate entry."
In the case at bar such a "compelling urgency" was
clearly shewn. There had indeed been a "citizen
complaint" about the malodorous smell permeating the
entire study hall, and the smell was no less notice-
able to Riley when he arrived to investigate. It
was therefore reasonable for him to undertake, in his
capacity of maintenance supervisor, a "prompt
inspection" of the carrel area for the purpose of
discovering and abating the nuisance. And inasmuch
as the students entitled to use the room had already
been distrubed by this offensive odor throughout the
preceding day, rurther delay m suppressing it would
have been unjustifiable.
Once. .
.
(Lanthier ’ s) briefcase was discovered and
opened, its contents were in plain sight. In distinc-
tion to the closed brown paper bag containing the
marijuana seized in People v. Marshall (1966) 69 Cal.
2d 51, 69 Cal. Rptr."TB57“M42 P.2d 665 , here the
contraband was packa.ged only in transparent plastic
bags. An observation from a lawful vantage point of
contraband in plain sight is not, of course, a
"search" in the constitutional sense ( Harris v. Unite d
States (1968) 390 U.S. 234, 236 ) and evidence
_ _
obtained by this means is admissible without offending
the Fourth Amendment
.
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. .
.
(Lanthier) concedes that Riley had the right, acting
on his own initiative and in the discharge of hisduties, to open the locker and remove the offendingbriefcase. He contends, however, that once Riley "hadthus pinpointed the source of the odor he should have
refrained from opening the briefcase and should insteadhave stored it in the utility closet where unclaimed
student belongings are kept. Secondly ,...( Lanthier
)
contends that even if it was reasonable .for Riley to
open the briefcase at that time, he closed it after
doing so and its contents were therefore no longer
in plain sight" when Deputy Saldivar arrived on the
scene.
The emergency permitting a warrantless search of
...( Lanthier ' s ) locker did not end with the discovery
that the noxious odor was emanating from the briefcase
contained therein. To have stored the briefcase,
unopened, in a utility closet would not have eliminated
the odor but would merely have transferred it to
another part of the library building. Having reason-
ably assumed control of the briefcase under the emergency
doctrine, it was equally reasonable for the university
officials to open it and determine the precise cause of
the smell so as to permit a proper disposition of the
offending object. If, as appeared likely from past
experience, the cause had simply been a piece of
rotting food, it could have been removed and disposed
of without further ado; the trial court, indeed, emphasized
this very possibility in ruling that Riley "did what
any normal person would have done under those circum-
stances, having the same duties to perform as he had."
It is true that upon opening the briefcase Riley did
nn"f~ i Hiryiori
i
q +- o iv ne^og^ize the contents, although he
suspected it was marijuana. But it remained a reason-
able course of action for the university officials to
seek to identify the substance thus exposed to view.
If, for example, the substance had presented an immediate
health hazard, its summary destruction might well have
been justified; on the other hand, if the substance
had been wholly innocuous apart from its odor It
would have been proper to return it to the owner, albeit
with directions to store it in a different location.
Such a decision could be made only with knowledge of
the precise nature of the material involved.
In their effort to identify the contents of defendant’s
briefcase, finally, it was reasonable for the univer-
sity officials to secure professional advice by
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enlisting the aid of campus and local police. A single
consultation by such officials with a police expert on
narcotics falls far short, for example, of a generalpolice-instigated exploratory search of student housing
or belongings in the hope of turning up contraband.
Rather, the official’s conduct in the case at bar is
analogous to that of ’’the landlord or bailee who inno-
cently discovers the suspicious circumstances, and
seeks expert advice as to the nature of the use to whichhis premises or facilities are being appropriated. Thelatter would be no more than an extension of tie- plain-
sight rule, by augmenting the observations of the
layman with the expertise of the police.” (People v.
-
Baker (1970) 12 Cal. App. 3d 826, 9 6 Cal. Rptr
.
760
.
)
Viewed in this light
,
the question of who opened or
closed defendant's briefcase pales into insignificance.
What matters here is that until Deputy Saldivar was
asked to examine the briefcase, its contents remained
a mystery to the officials who bore the responsibility
of properly disposing of it. The deputy's inspection
therefore does not require justification over and above
that of the continuing emergency which authorized the
original warrantless search of defendant's locker.
We conclude there was substantial evidence to support
the trial court's ruling that the contraband here in
issue was not the product of an illegal search and
seizure
.
Scope Of A Search Warrant
Another case on appeal, this time in 1974, reached
the Supreme Court of Ohio. In City of Athens v. Wolf , 313
N.E. 2d 405 (1974), Clifford Wolf, a student at Ohio Uni-
versity, had been convicted in trial court of possession of
a hallucinogen. He appealed through the Court of Appeals,
where he lost, and then on up to the Supreme Court of
Ohio, because he felt his fourth amendment rights to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures had been
violated, and therefore, the evidence used against him in
Court was illegally obtained and should be suppressed.
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The Athens police department had conducted a raid,
pursuant to a search warrant, on room 318 of Bromley Hall
at the Ohio University. Three police entered that room,
confiscated drugs and related paraphernalia, and arrested
three people
.
Room 317 and room 318 form a suite, with an adjoining
bathroom. Wolf and a friend were in room 317 at the time
of the raid.
During the course of the raid a patrolman Hutchins was
ordered to check the bathroom. While in the bathroom he
noticed the door to room 317 was open, and he walked in.
Once inside the room, he observed Wolf, concealing something
behind his back. Fearing that Wolf might be concealing a
weapon, he ordered Wolf and his friend to come forward and
while doing so, to drop whatever he had in his hands on the
bed. Wolf did so. Patrolman Hutchins determined the object
to be a pipe containing hashish. Wolf and his friend were
brought into room 318. when they were given their rights,
searched, and arrested.
Justice Stein delivered the opinion of the Supreme
Court of Ohio:
The key question presented by ... (Wolf ' s ) .motion to
suppress is whether Officer Hutchin’s original entry
into room 317 was lawful.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States . Constitute on
insures the right of people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers .and effects, free. from un- .
reasonable searches and seizures. All evidence obtained
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e state carried its burden of showingthat the officer’s search falls within an exceptionto the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of a warrant?
In Ka t
z
v. United States
,
the Supreme Court had occasionto discuss the scope of protection afforded by thefourth amendment as follows:
"...the fourth amendment protects people,
not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection... But what he seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be. con-
stitutionally protected..."
Although few people who have ever resided in a college
obrmitory would favorably compare those living quarters
to the comfort of a private home, a dormitory room
is "home" to large numbers of students who attend
universities in this state. Because of the very nature
of dormitirv life, nriva r> \t i <5 commodity hard to come
by, however much desired. Here, appellant shared his
room with another student, and shared a common bath-
room with other residents of the suite. Officer
Hutchins testified that the door from appellant's
room into the bathroom was open.
Under the circumstances, that fact can hardly be con-
strued as an invitation to the general public 'to
enter unannounced and at will. Appellant is entitled
to more than a modicum of privacy in his dormitory
room. As regards intrusions by law enforcement officials,
we hold that (...Wolf) is entitled to fourth amendment
protection. See Piazzola v. Watkins (1971) > 442 F . 2d
284.
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Throughout its brief the city refrains from character-
izing Officer Hutchin's initial entry into Room 317
as a search. Because the officer’s intrusion did
directly impinge upon appellant’s reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy in his room, and because this in-
trusion culminated in the seizure of evidence later used
to convict appellant, we hold that a warrantless search
and seizure within the ambit of the fourth amendment
did occur. The city argues that, under the "plain-
view” doctrine, Officer Hutchins was justified in
seizing the pipe which appeallant was holding. This
contention misconstrues the legal basis for the plain-
view theory. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 4 0
3
U.S. 443 a the United States Supreme Court said:
"It is well established that under certain
circumstances the police may sieze evidence
an plain view without a warrant. But it is
important to keep in mind that, in the vast
majority of cases, any evidence seized by
police will be in plain view, at least at
the moment of seizure. The problem with
the ’plain view’ doctrine has been to
identify the circumstances in which plain
view has legal significance rather than
being simply the normal concomitant of any
search, legal or illegal."
As stated in Harris v. United States (1968), 390 U.S.
234, 236, "***It has been long settled that objects
falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right
to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be introduced in evidence."
Tn t.hif? ppkp , Of f 1 C0T" Hutchins was unable b. r» rpp nnvnnp
in Room 317 Merely by looking, from the bathroom,
through the open door into that room. It was not
until he was physically within Room 317 that appellant
and his visiting friend were visible. Thus the plain-
view doctrine is inapplicable here, where the lawfulness
of the officer’s intrusion itself is at issue.
That brings us to the third, and most important, of our
preliminary determinations. The city had the burden 01
showing, by at least a preponderance of the evidence,
that the search of appellant's room fits within one
of the defined exceptions
requirement of a warrant
.
395 U.S. 752, 761, Lego v
488. The thrust of the city's
to the fourth amendment ' s
Chimel v
(1972TT
argument is
California
?04 U
that
(196s),
S. 1(77,
Officer
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the oihL 1 S !: easonably to protect himself, andther officers, by securing the immediate area ofa drug raid. Cited as authority for this contention are
Sgs* v ' m° U968), 392 U.S. 1
,
Preston v. UnitedStates
,^
(lgM),, 376 U.S. 36M, United States v. Berry-(1971 ) , 44 5 F . 2d 1189; United States v. Miller,
n97°), ^49 F
.
2d 974; State v7 Toliver~Tl971) .'~5 Wash,
o??*
321 > People v. Pugh (1966), 69 111. App. 2d
112, 217 N . E . 2d 557. To these cases we would add
Halted States v. Looney (1973), 48l F.2d 31 ; UnitedStates v. Briddle (l$70)
, 436 F.2d 4; and United
States v. Broomfield (1972), 336 F. Supp. 1797
—
All the above-cited cases are concerned, to some
degree, with the actions that a law enforcement official
might reasonably take to protect himself from potential
physical harm,
. but none is persuasive authority for the
city’s contention here. Having read the testimony of
Officer Hutchins and Sergeant Beasly at the suppres-
sion hearing, we are convinced that the drug raid on
Room 318 was executed quickly and well. All occupants
in that room were taken by surpirse and offered no
resistance whatsoever / Officer Hutchins entered the
bathroom at Sergeant Beasly’ s direction "to make sure
nothing was disposed of or anybody got into the
bathroom.” The Sergeant was familiar with the layout
of Bromley Hall, and his primary purpose in "securing"
the bathroom was to insure that no drugs would be
covertly disposed of. Officer Hutchins, however, walked
directly through the bathroom without stopping to
examine the sinks, shower, toilet, or medicine
cabinets, and into Room 317. Although we do not
doubt the officer’s good faith in entering room 317,
we cannot say that his motivation for doing so was
4- 1 J- -? . v *5 » “* -P ~j~r
j. x vtu L* O px Oi uiiuocii 'J i o
from an objectively recognizable threat of imminent
harm
.
In its brief, the city suggests the following:
"...Assume that Hutchins is in the bath-
room to execute the search warrant and to
secure the premises, he then looks through
an open door into another room not knowing
if the room is part of room 313 and not
knowing who or what may be in the room
waiting for him."
We respond by saying two things. First, it is reason-
able to expect an officer executing a search warrant
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cumstances to be aware that Room 318
I® °ne of\ two separate, and independent rooms in adormitory suite. Second, since Room 317 is a separaten independent room whose occupants are completely
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ose in Room 313, absent some perceivedand tangible threat emanating from 317
,
an officer'sgeneral fear of the unknown is objectively insufficientto justify intrusion.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court ofAppeals is reversed.
As was indicated in the historical analysis, and pointed
out again in this section, the Fourth Amendment protects
people
,
not places (see Katz ) . Students have a right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures (Cohen), and
college officials cannot compel a student to waive this right
as a condition of attendance, or upon any other condition
(Moore v. Troy State ).
However, the college/student relationship is different
than that of a landlord and tenant; and a college residence
hall atmosphere is different from that of a hotel. College
officials have the right to develop reasonable rules and
regulations to insure a proper educational atmosphere,
both in residence halls and throughout the general campus.
A reasonable right of inspection is necessary for the
normal operation of the college.
Regulations may be developed which allow for the
inspection of rooms for damage or wear and tear to college
owned property and equipment, for the taking of inventory of
college property, for health and safety reasons, or to
257
alleviate an emergency situation.
Reasonable rules, however, should not be unreasonably
applied. College officials, for example, who retain the
right to enter a student’s room for inspection of college
owned property
,
cannot delegate this right of inspection to
law enforcement officials. Nor should such a regulation be
used as a subterfuge for searching rooms, or their contents,
to see what can be found.
While college officials can conduct a search for the
purpose of enforcing college rules and regulations ( Keene )
,
and use evidence obtained in that search in a campus
disciplinary action, federal or state government personnel
(or college officials working with such personnel) are bound
by stricter fourth amendment standards, and cannot conduct
a search of a student’s room or belongings unless 1) they
have a court authorized search warrant, or in very limited
circumstances, are responding to an emergency (see McDonald )
,
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they can only search the person under arrest and the
immediate area under that person's control (see Trupiano and
Chimel ) , or 3) they havr e the freely and intelligently given
consent of the person whose room or belongings are to be
searched.
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4.-4 College Discipline Versus Criminal Prosecution
Search Based On "Reasonable Cause” . Tn February of
1968, the Dean of Men at Troy State University met with
narcotics agents, campus police, and two students. The
subject of the meeting was "the possible use of marijuana
on the campus." On that same day, at a later meeting, the
narcotics agents produced a list of suspected students, and
rooms which the agents desired to search. This information
had been obtained from reliable, but unnamed, sources.
Again on the same day, the agents received information
that some of the students they wished to talk with were
packing to leave the campus. Based on this information, two
narcotics agents, accompanied by the Dean of Men, searched
six rooms in two residence halls.
One of the rooms searched was that of Gregory Gordon
Moore, a student in good standing at Troy State. The
search of Moore’s room was conducted in his presence, but
without his permission. The agents found a matchbox with a
small amount of marijuana in it.
Moore was indefinitely suspended from Troy State,
following two hearings by the Troy State Student Affairs
Committee. During the second hearing, the following stipula-
tion was entered into the record:
That no search warrant was obtained in this case, that
no consent to search was given by the defendant, ^hc-t
the search was not incidential to a legal arreo-',
'
nc~
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no other offense was committed by the defendant in the
arresting officer's presence, that Troy State Univer-
sity had in force and effect at the time of the search
and subsequent arrest of the defendant the following
regulation
,
"The College reserves the right to enter
rooms for inspection purposes. If the
administration deems it necessary the
room may be searched and the occupant
required to open his personal baggage and
any other personal material which is
sealed."
Moore, following his suspension, challenged the validity
of any testimony or evidence presented at his hearings,
claiming that the search of his room was a violation of
his fourth amendment rights, and therefore the evidence was
illegally obtained.
Chief Judge Johnson, of the UkS. District Court, in
writing the Court's opinion, in Moore v. Student Affairs
Committee of Troy State
,
284 F. Supp. 725 (1988), first
outlined the rights of students with regard to the Con-
stitution, and then the responsibility of administrators
t.n maintain nrdpr and discipline on their campuses.
Regarding the fourth amendment challenge, raised by
Moore, the Court said:
College students who reside in dormitories have a
special relationship with the college involved.
.
Insofar
as the fourth amendment affects that relationship, it
does not depend on either a general theory of the
right of privacy or on traditional property concepts.
The college does not stand, strictly speaking, in lo_co
parentis to its students, nor is their relationship
purely contractual in the traditional sense. fhe
relationship grows out of the peculiar^ and sometimes
the seemingly competing interests of college and
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student. A student naturally has the right to be
free of unreasonable search and seizures, and a tax-
supported public college may not compel a "waiver"
of that right as a condition precedent to admission.
The college, on the otherhand, has an "affirmative
obligation" to promulgate and to enforce reasonable
regulations designed to protect campus order and disci-
pline and to promote an environment consistent with the
educational process. The validity of the regulation
authorizing search of dormitories thus does not
depend on whether a student "waives" his right to
fourth amendment protection or on whether he has
"contracted" it away; rather, its validity is deter-
mined by whether the regulation is a reasonable exercise
of the college's supervisory duty. In other words, if
the regulation - or, in the absence of a regulation, the
action of the college authorities - is necessary in
aid of the basic responsibility of the institution
regarding discipline and the maintenance of an "educa-
tional atmosphere", then it will be presumed facially
reasonable despite the fact that it may infringe to some
extent on the outer bounds of the fourth amendment
rights of students.
In Englehart v. Serena, 318 Mo. 263 s 300 S.W. 268
(1927), a civil action for alleged wrongful expulsion,
the Supreme Court of Missouri defined the dormitory
student-college relationship in real property terms
as follows:
"One of the grounds on which appellant
seeks a recovery of damages is that he
was deprived of the 'possession' of the
room he was occupying in the dormitory
before the exDiraticn of the Deriod for
which he had paid 'rent'
.
He was not,
however, a tenant in any sense of the
word. He did not have even the full and
unrestricted rights of a lodger, because
Albert Hall was not an ordinary lodging
house. It was an auxiliary of the
college, and was maintained and conducted
in furtherance of that institution's
general purposes. When appellant took
up residence there, he impliedly agreed
to conform to all reasonable rules and
regulations for its government which
were then in force or which might
thereafter be adopted by the proper
authorities .
"
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That definition is equally apt when measuring the
relationship of this plaintiff and Troy state Univer-
sity by the fourth amendment. The student is subject
only to reasonable rules and regulations, but his rights
must yield to the extent that they would interfere with
the ins t i tu it on ' s fundamental duty to operate the
school as an educational institution. A reasonable
right of inspection is necessary to the institution’s
performance of that duty even though it may infringe
on the outer boundaries of a dormitory student’s
fourth amendment rights. People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.
2d 360, 283 N . Y . S . 2d 22, 229 N.E.2d 596 (1967). The
regulation of Troy State University in issue here is
thus facially reasonable.
The regulation was reasonably applied in this case.
The constititonal boundary line between the right of
the school authorities to search and the right of a
dormitory student to privacy must be based on a reason-
able belief on the part of the college authorities that
a student is using a dormitory room for a purpose which
is illegal or which would otherwise seriously inter-
fere with campus discipline. Upon this submission, it
is clear that such a belief existed in this case.
This standard of ’’reasonable cause to believe” to
justify a search by college administrators—even where
the sole purpose is to seek evidence of suspected
violations of law— is lower than the constitutionally
protected criminal law standard of ’’probable cause."
This is true because of tlx special necessities of the
student-college relationship and because college
disciplinary proceedings are not criminal proceedings
in the constitutional sense. It is clearly settled that
h up nr>nn <=> p c i ^ ppi ipctp h 5 53 ° i 1"1 1 in? ry proceedings d^es
not require full-blown adversary hearings subject to
rules of evidence and all constitutional criminal
guarantees. "Such a hearing, with the attending
publicity and disturbance of college activities, might
be detrimental to the college's educational atmosphere
and impractical to carry out." Dixon v. Alabama
State Board of Education .
Assuming that the fourth amendment applied to college
disciplinary proceedings , the search in this case
would not be in violation of it. It is settled lav;
that the fourth amendment does not prohibit reasonable
searches wTh-en the search is conducted by a superior
charged with a responsibility of maintaining discipline
and order or of maintaining security. A student who
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lives in a dormitory on campus which he "rents" from the
school waives objection to any reasonable searches
conducted pursuant to reasonable and necessary regula-
tions such as this one.
The Court concluded that the college officials had
had reasonable cause to believe that Moore was using his
room for illegal purposes, that the right of the college
officials to "maintain order and discipline" was greater, in
this case, than Moore’s constitutional rights, and that a
search of his room and subsequent seizure of evidence was
within the right of the college authorities. No criminal
action was taken against Moore .
Delegation of Authority . In that same series of
"drug raids", Frank Piazzola and Terrance Marinshaw,
students at Troy State, were arrested, and sentenced to
prison.
Piazzola and Marinshaw were each convicted of possession
of marijuana by the Circuit Court of Pike County, Alabama,
and sentenced to five years in jail. They appealed to the
State Court of Appeals, which confirmed their conviction.
The State Supreme Court did not grant certiorari.
They appealed to the Federal Courts, and finally
their case, Piazzola v. Watkins , 442 F.2d 284 (1971), came
before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The facts of this case are almost identical as
those in Moore. The Dean of Men had been called to the
Office of the Chief of Police of Troy, Alabama, to discuss
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the drug problem at Troy State. Narcotics officers and two
students were present at the meeting. Later that same day
the Dean of Men again went to the Chief of Police’s office,
and this time was told that they now had sufficient evidence
that marijuana was being used at Troy State, and that they
(the police) wanted the cooperation of the college authorities
in searching student rooms. The Dean of Men assured the
police that they would have the complete cooperation of
the school authorities.
Still later on the same day, the police, accompanied
by some of the colleges' officials, searched six or seven
rooms in two separate residence halls.
Piazzola’s room and Marinshaw’s room were separately
searched without their permission and without a search warrant
Present during the search in Marinshaw’s room were a uni-
veristy security officer, two state narcotics agents, and
a counselor from Marinshaw’s residence hall. Present during
thO firSiy U0UX Oil -L l XCl^rLi'Ji.CL O l UUiU Wcr -L O V/ 1 1C O W ^ O l G L' C
narcotics agents and a university official. (No evidence
was found.) During a second search, when incriminating
evidence was found, only the state and city police were
present
.
At the time of the searches, Troy State had the
following regulation in effect (same as Moore):
The college reserves the right to enter rooms for
inspection purposes. If the administration deems
1- _ JU - _ 4 •*- -
it necessary, the room may be searched and the
occupant required to open his personal baggage and
any other' personal material which is sealed.
Circuit Judge Rives delivered the opinion of the
Court
:
The fourth amendment protects "the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
The question is whether in the light of all of the
facts and circumstances, including uhe University
regulation, the search which disclosed the marijuana
was an unreasonable search. The district judge
made reasonableness the touchstone of his opinion as
to the validity of the search. We find ouselves in
agreement with his view that this search was unreason-
able.
In a case where the facts were similar. People v.
Cohen
,
292 N.Y.S.2d 706, Judge Burstein said:
"The police and the Hofstra University
officials admitted that they entered the
room in order to make an arrest, if an
arrest was warranted. This was, in
essence, a fishing expedition calculated
to discover narcotics. It offends reason-
and logic to suppose that a student will
consent to an entry into his room designed
to establish grounds upon which to arrest
him. Certainly, there can be no rational
claim that a student will self-consciously
4 vp v> n ?; ^orst j^’^ional right to ? lawful
search and seizure. Finally, even if the
doctrine of implied consent were imported
into this case, the consent is given, not
to police officials, but to the University
and the latter cannot fragmentize, share
or delegate it."
Another case somewhat in point on the facts is
Commonwealth v. McCloskey , (1970), 217 P- Super.
24
3
2 , 272 A. 2d 271. There the court reversed a
student’s marijuana conviction because the policemen
who entered his dormitory room to execute a search
warrant did. not knock or announce their presence
and purpose before entering. In part, Judge Cercone
speaking for the majority of the court said:
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It was the Commonwealth’s position thatthe fourth amendment protections do not
apply to a search of a college dormitory
room. The test to be used in determining
the applicability of the fourth amendmentprotections is whether or not the particularlocale is one ’ ... in which there was a reason-
able expectation of freedom from governmentalintrusion’... A dormitory room is .analogous
o an apartment or a hotel room. It certainly
offers its occupant a more reasonable expecta-
tion of freedom from governmental intrusion
than does a public telephone booth. The
defendant rented the dormitory room for a
certain period of time, agreeing to abide
by. the rules established by his lessor, the
university. As in most rental situations,
the lessor, Bucknell University, reserved
the right to check the room for damages, we ar
and unauthorized appliances. Such right
of the lessor, however, does not mean
McCloskey was not entitled to have a
’reasonable expectation of freedom from
governmental intrusion' or that he gave
consent to the police search, or gave the
University authority to consent to such
search.
’
In the case of Katz v. United States
, (1967), 389
U.S. 3 ^ 7 ,... the Court commented at some length on
the concept of "constitutionally protected areas"
:
"The Petitioner has strenuously argued that
the ...(telephone) booth was a ’constitutionally
a^pa
,
J fjnvepnmpnt- h pc: maintained
with equal vigor that it was not. But this
effort to decide whether or not a given
’area’, viewed in the abstract, is 'con-
stitutionally protected' deflects attention
from the problem presented by this case.
For the Fourth Amendment protects people ,
not places . (emphasis added) What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his own home or office, is not a subject
of fourth amendment protection. But what
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to. the public, may be con-
stitutionally protected.
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The Government stresses the fact that the
telephone booth from which the petitioner
made his calls was constructed partly of
glass, so that he was as visible after he
entered it as he would have been if he had
remained outside. But v/hat he sought to
exclude when he entered the booth was not
the intruding eye— it was the uninvited ear.
He did not shed his right to do so -simply
because he made his calls from a place where
he might be seen. No less than an individual
in a business office, in a friaid's apartment,
or in a taxicab, a person in a telephone
booth may rely upon the protection of the
fourth amendment ..."
By a similar process of reasoning, we must conclude
that a student who occupies a college dormitory room
enjoys the protection of the fourth amendment. True the
university retains broad supervisory powers which permit
it to adopt the regulation heretofore quoted, provided
that regulation is reasonably construed and is limited
in its application to further the university’s func-
tion as an educational institution. The regulation
cannot be construed or applied so as to give consent
to a search for evidence for the primary purpose of
a criminal prosecution . Otherwise, the regulation
itself would constitute an unconstitutional attempt to
require a student to waive his protection from un-
reasonable searches and seizures as a condition to
his occupancy of a college dormitory room. . . Clearly
the university had no authority to consent to or
join in a police search for evidence or crime.
The x'lghl ou px-ivetcy is " iiu less Impox'tan C them ciny
other right carefully and particularly reserved to the
people." Mapp v. Ohio, (1961), 367 U.S. 643 , 657 .
The results of the search do not prove its reasonable-
ness. This search was an unconstitutional invasion of
the privacy both of these appellees and of the students
in whose rooms no evidence of marijuana was found.
The warrantless search of these students’ dormitory
rooms cannot be justified. The judgment is thereiore
affirmed
.
These two cases raise interesting questions for the
college administrator. When college administrators at
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public institutions act in their official capacity, are
they government officials? Are there different fourth amend-
ment standards for public college officials conducting a
search, the outcome of which will result in campus disci-
plinary proceedings, as opposed to a search, which may lead
to criminal prosecution?
In Moore
,
the student was disciplined by the college
authorities. In Piazzola
,
the student was brought to a
court of law. When Moore appealed his case to the Federal
District Court, the court found for the school authorities
and upheld Moore's suspension, and the search of Moore's
room. When Piazzola appealed his case to a Federal Court,
the court overturned his conviction and declared that the
search of this room was unreasonable. What was the
difference?
As long as college officials are carrying out their
supervisory responsibilities, enforcing reasonable campus
Tiomiicif
i
aho o nH o /% •(- ? n m insure a proper educational
atmosphere, and, as long as they anticipate nothing more
than campus disciplinary action, their standards and
requirements under the fourth amendment are less than if the
anticipated results of the search was to be a criminal
prosecution. "This is true because of the special
necessities of the student-college relationship and because
college disciplinary proceedings are not criminal proceedings
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in the constitutional sense. It is clearly settled that
—
e process in college disciplinary proceedings does not
require full-blown adversary hearings subject to rules of
evidence and all constitutional criminal guarantees .
"
( Moore ) College officials will not be held to the same
standards and strict requirements of due process as required
in criminal law cases, when they are concerned only with
campus disciplinary matters.
However, when the search of a student's room or belong-
ings will result in a criminal prosecution, full fourth
amendment rights must prevail. To have evidence obtained
from a search entered into a criminal case, the search must
have been reasonable, and conducted in complete compliance
with fourth amendment standards. (See Weeks and Mapp )
Hence, the Piazzola conviction was not upheld: no warrant
had been issued, and the college officials did not have the
right to delegate their right to enter student rooms to the
pcOi r*e In a criminal prosecution, the defendant, in this
case Piazzola, is entitled to full constitutional
guarantees, including those of the fourth amendment.
When college officials are acting in their official
capacity, they are, and must be considered government.
officials . This is an important distinction, for he
fourth amendment places restrictions only on gover:
officials, and not private citizens. Evidence odI
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through a search conducted by a private citizen, even though
the search may have been "unreasonable", is admissable in
a criminal prosecution, as long as there was no involvement,
in whatever capacity, by government officials. If college
officials were considered to be private citizens, the effect
would be clear: any evidence secured through a search,
even if thesearch were unreasonable' by fourth amendment
standards, could be received as evidence in a court of law.
*
4.5 Inventory Searches
Deone Stafanie Johnson was a student at Pima Junior
College, in Arizona. Following an evening class, she had
left her pocketbook in the classroom. A college custodian
found the purse and took it to the college’s security office.
A security officer opened the pocketbook and found a wallet,
inside the wallet he found identification which identified
Johnson as the owner.
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a "peace officer", found a closed, inside pocket. Inside
that pocket, he found pills, which were determined to be
amphetamines. The secuiity officer made a complete list of
everything that was in the pocketbook, and the list was
signed by the security officer and the custodian.
The next day, Johnson was asked if the pocketbook
was hers. VJhen she replied that it was
,
she was arrested.
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The Superior Court of Pima County
,
Arizona found her guilty
°f' possession of a dangerous drug. She appealed the
decision, asking that the evidence be suppressed, because the
search of her pocketbook was illegal.
Judge Krucher delivered the opinion of the Court of
Appeals in State v. Johnson
, 530 Pac . Rptr. 2d 910 ( 1975 ):
...(Johnson) contends that the trial court erred in
denying her motion to suppress the introduction of
the amphetamines in evidence which were found in her
lost purse pursuant to an inventory of its contents.
The basic argument put forth by appellant is that
once the security officer found her identification
in the purse, he could not continue to inventory
the purse's contents. She -asserts that inventory
searches only apply to automobiles, citing Coolidge
v. New Hampshire
,
403 U.S. 443, (1971).
For the following reasons we reject Johnson's contention
and affirm the admission of the evidence. In Boulet
v. State
,
109 Ariz. 433, 4ll P.2d 168 (1973),
the Arizona Supreme Court considered the extent to
which a police officer may search an unattended car
which appeared to have been in an accident or abandoned.
The Court, while viewing an inventory as a search,
indicated that there are two essential requirements for
such an inventory search to be valid. First, the police
must have lawful custody; and, second, the police must
have acted in good faith in conducting the inventory
sa a pnf nco it- aa a subterfuge for a warrantless
search. As to the issue of good faith, the court makes
the comment
:
"It is unrealistic to require that in
justifying the inventory search the
police must affirm that they had no
hope or expectation of finding some-
thing incriminating. What makes an
inventory search reasonable under the
requirements of the fourth amendment
is not that the subjective motives of
the police were simplist ically _ pure
,
but whether the facts of the situation
indicate that an inventory search is
reasonable under the circumstances.
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the instant case does not involve an auto-
mobile search, we find the standards previously enunciated
to be reasonable and therefore applicable to generalinventory searches made by police officers of'property
which legitimately falls into their possession.
The second question which arises is to what extent a
police officer may carry his inventory. The plain sight
rule was rejected in Boulet as to inventory searches.
The court therein stated:
,TWe do not agree with the rationale that
while it is reasonable to inventory the
vehicle in the first instance for those
things which are in clear or plain view,
it becomes unreasonable to inventory what
is not in plain view. If one of the
reasons for conducting the inventory is
to safeguard valuables which might be
present, it is illogical to prohibit law
enforcement officials from searching
those areas wherein valuables are most
likely to be placed."
The rationale of allowing an inventory for. the purpose
of safeguarding valuables would appear to be clearly
applicable here.
The fourth amendment guarantees to each citizen a
right of privacy in his affairs and in his possessions.
As unauthorized intrusion into an area wherein privacy
would normally be expected constitutes an illegal
search that is within the proscription of the fourth
amendment. Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 3^7 ,
(]0fi7b However-^ wp say in the i n R 1 8.^ f.
that an inventory search of a lost purse is unreason-
able because as previously indicated, the purse was in
lawful custody and the inventory was conducted in
good faith.
The admissibility cf the evidence is affirmed.
k.6 Notice of Identity and Purpose
A narcotics agent named Garret son and a Pennsylvania
State Trooper contacted the Dean of Men at Bucknell Univer-
sity, Mr. John Dunlop. The agent had a warrant to
search
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the room of Roy Wilson McCloskey, a resident of Swartz Hall
at Bucknell
.
The Dean and two law officers proceded to Swartz Hall
where they met Mr. Skitmoore
, the head resident. All four
proceded to room 373, where McCloskey lived.
During testimony at the trial, narcotics agent Garretson
admitted that there was no knock on McCloskey' s door. All
witnesses agreed that there was no statement of identity or
purpose prior to entering McCloskey 's room.
The four entered the room using a pass key possessed
by Skitmoore. Once inside, McCloskey was told the purpose
of the visit and shown the warrant.
A search of the room uncovered marijuana . McCloskey,
after being advised of his rights, was ahrested. In the
Court of Common Pleas, he was found guilty of possession of
marijuana and sentenced to three years probation and a
fine of $1,000.
r\ Pr\nr>f r\-f* Pcrnc o tt 1 Trom* Q
claiming that the evidence which convicted him was obtained
through an illegal search.
Judge Cereone delivered the finding of the Court in
Commonwealth v. McCloskey
,
272 A. 2d 271 (1970):
...(McCloskey) contends that the entry into his
room was improper and that the fruits of the
resulting search were therefore inadmissible as
evidence against him. Vie believe the defendant
is correct in this claim. Although the evidence pro-
cured indicates illegal conduct, an application of
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the governing rules of law constrains us to hold it
was the result of an improper search. The fourth amend-
ment prohibition against any unreasonable search and
seizure requires that before a police official enters
private premises to conduct a search or to make an
arrest, he must give notice of his identity and purpose,
except when^ exigent circumstances justify the failure
to give notice: Commonwealth v. Newman. 240 A . ?d 7QS
( 1968 ).
Precedent requires us to hold the rule so enunciated in
the Newman case applies where, as here, . .
.
(McCloskey ' s
)
door was unlocked with a passkey without prior annouce-
ment. In Sabbath v. United States
, 391 U.S. 585
,
( 1968 ) (entry made by opening unlocked door), the
Supreme Court commented: "An unannounced instrusion
into a dwelling ... is no less an unannounced intrusion
whether officers break down a door, force open a
chain lock on a partially opened door, open a locked
door by use of a passkey, or, as here, open a closed
but unlocked door."
There is no evidence in this case of any exigent cir-
cumstances justifying entry into McCloskey’ s locked
room without announcement of identity or purpose. The
dormitory room was located on the third floor and there
js no evidence of any other exit than the one into the
hallway where the agents were standing. There is no
evidence that McCloskey had any means inside the room
to dispose of the volume of marijuana (five pounds)
which the officers expected him to possess. Also,
there was no reason to suspect defendant knew of the
officer’s presence and purpose prior to their entry.
It was the Commonwealth’s position that the fourth
amendment protections do not apply to a search of a
college dormitory room. The test to be used in deter-
mining the applicability of the fourth amendment pro-
tections is whether or notthe particular locale is one
"...in which there was a reasonable expectation of free-
dom from governmental intrusion" . Mane u si v. Deforte ,
392 U.S. 364, 368 , (1968), (large office room shared
by the defendant and other union officials). See also
Sabbath v. United State s (apartment); Stoner v.
Ca'lTfornia, 376 U.S. 481, (1964) (hotel room); and
Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, (1967) (telephone
booth). A dormitory room is analogous .to an apartment
or a hotel room. It certainly offers its occupant
a more reasonable expectation of freedom from
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governmental intrusion than does a public telephone
certain periofcf^f rented the ^mttor/ro^or ariod Ox time, agreeing to abide bv the
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does not mean McCloskey wasnot entitled to have a "reasonable expectation offreedom from governmental intrusion", or that he gaveconsent to the police search, or gave the University
authority to consent to such search. (See Stoner v.California) •
The case of Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of TrovUniver sity
,
284 p. Supp. 72~U9bb), relied on by theCommonwealth, is not applicable in that it did notinvolve a criminal prosecution but merely disciplinary
action by the University with penalties imposed on the
student by the Student Affairs Committee.
Since wre hold the search to have been improper, there is
no need to comment on defendant
’ s contentions regarding
the legality of the warrants. Conviction reversed and
sentence vacated.
4.7 Waiver of Fourth Amendment Rights
Mark Wingerd was a student at Ohio University. On
January 26, 1972, the Director of East and College Green, a
residence area at Ohio Uni v<=r»si_t v , received a c?Wl from one
of his staff that Wingerd was offering drugs for sale from
his room. The Director, James Hoffman, and the staff
member, Carl Zaler, proceeded to Wingerd ’s room to
investigate
.
According to testimony, Hoffman knocked on Wingerd’
s
door. When Wingerd opened the door Hoffman asked if they
(he and Zaler) could enter the room. Wingerd said okay.
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Once inside, and after closing the door, Zaler told Wingerd
that he and Hoffman had reason to believe that he had drugs
and would like Wingerd to turn the drugs over to them.
Wingerd gave the drugs to Hoffman and Zaler.
The court placed great weight on the exact testimony
of both Hoffman and Zaler. Their testimony was as follows:
Q. Did you tell Mr. Wingerd you had a search
warrant?*
A. No, I don't think sc. I don't recall.
Q. You took the search warrant?
A. Yes.
Q. You did not show that to Mr. Wingerd?
A. I don't recall, no.
Q. Do you recall whether Mr. Zaler may have?
A. No. I had it on my person, in my pocket.
Q. You did not show it to Mr. Wingerd?
A. I don't actually recall whether I did or didn't.
Well, if it is of any help, we don't automatically
impose the search-and-seizure policy. It's standard
C n 1
1
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not the individual has any and will he, in fact,
cooperate and give it to us, which he did. Other
than that, I don't recall.
Q. Now, you say the defendant gave to you the
materials you v,ere seeking?
A. Yes. He gave to us some, you know, a shoebox
with five bags of what appeared to be marijuana,
and then Carl asked whether or not he had any
#The search warrant referred' to was apparently an administra
tive one, used by the college.
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Q.
Zaler testified as follows:
A. Mark saw me, and Mark had been a resident in Bush
Hall. He did know who I was. We were surprised
to see each other. He let me in the room. I
told Mark that we had reason to believe that he had
drugs in his possession, and we would like for him
to hand them over to us, the other person being,
again, the Greens Director, Jim Hoffman. Mark did
not give us any problem at all, no hassle or
anything. He went immediately to his closet and
brought out a shoe box from the shelf in his
closet and handed it over to me
.
I handed it to Jim Hoffman, and told Mark that it
was my understanding that he had some sopors in
his possession, and he asked him to hand those
over, too. And at that time he handed over some
colored tablets zo me and I put them in the box.
Wingerd was brought to trial in municipal court of the
city of Athens (Ohio) and convicted of possession )Of
marijuana. He appealed, asking that the evidence used to
convict him be suppressed, because of the1 manner in which it
was obtained, i.e., illegal search and seizure.
Judge Gray delivered the opinion of the Court in
State v. Wingerd, 318 N.E. 2d 866 (197*0, which in part
sopors on him. He went into his pocket andgave us four capsules.
So in other words
,
it’s your testimony that you came
o the defendant's room, knocked, he opened thedoor and allowed you to enter. You entered and then
said something to the effect
,
"Do you have anydrugs
,
and, with that question, he responded bygoing to some portion of his room and then ten-dering to you a box that contained marijuana?
That's right.
said
:
We are of the opinion that no prejudicial error
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occurred. The lower court during; the trial 4-v, *.
search
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V/e think it clear from the record that
. .
. ( Wing;erd
)
agreed to the search without a word of complaint or
w1th
C
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*5 a settlng which is not to be equatedi he aura of oppressiveness which oft pervades theprecincts .of a police station. The trial court heldthe physical evidence to be admissible, and we cannotsay it erred in so doing.
The protection afforded by the fourth and fourteenth
amendments, with respect to a search of one’s house may,
oi course, be waived by consent freely and intelli-gently given. Whether such consent exists is usuallv aquestion which is "simply one of fact for the trier’sdetermination." Burge v. United States (1964). 222 F
2d 171, 173.
If the finding is in the affirmative and is supported
by substantial evidence, it is not our privilege on
appeal to revise it. Maxwell v, Stephens (1965),
348 F . 2d 325, 336; B_urge v. United States, 332 F . 2d at
173; Burnsid e v. Nebraska (1965"), 346 F . 2d 88, 90.
We specifically hold that the finding of the trial court
is supported by substantial evidence and no prejudicial
error occurred because of its overruling of the motion
to suppress.
4.8 Principles of Law
find PriKi r> T_t 1 S i <3
The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places .
What a person knowingly exposes to the public is not subject
to Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected .
A student, living in a college-owned residence hall
room has the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
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seizures. Public colleges and universities may not compel
a waiver of this right as a condition of attendance.
A residence hall student is not a tenant in the real
sense of the word, i.e., he/she is not living in a hotel or
a boarding house. The student lives in a residence hall
maintained and conducted in the furtherance of a college's
general purpose, i.e.
,
that of education. The courts have
said, however, that for fourth amendment purposes, dormitory
rooms are analagous to apartments or hotel rooms.
A student's room is not open for entry at all times for
all purposes. Their room is their home, and as such is
inviolate against unlawful searches and seizures. A home, the
courts have said, is a place of repose from the outside
world, including the world of government officials. The
question that has been raised by the courts is: is there a
reasonable expectation that a student's room should be free
frcna government intrusion? The answer, in most cases, has
been "yes", and the demand has been that, for fourth
amendment purposes, college authorities and law enforcement
officials treat a dorm room just as they would the home of
any citizen.
Fourth amendment rights can be waived, if consent is
freely and intelligently given, and if such consent is free
from intimidation an&/or duress (see Wingerd ) . Before
college official's enter a room to conduct a search (or in
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the case of law enforcement personnel, to conduct a search
and possible make an arrest) they should give notice of
their identity and purpose, except where emergency circum-
stances justify not giving any notice. A locked room
cannot be opened with a passkey to allow entrance, without
first notice of identification and purpose.
—
_-U-eSe officials have the authority to maintain
proper standards of conduct and discipline, and may, to this
extent, develop reasonable rules and regulations regarding
searches of a student’s room... The fourth amendment does not
prohibit reasonable searches, when the search conducted is
by a supervisor charged with the responsibility of main -
taining discipline and order, or of maintaining security...
The validity of campus regulations authorizing the search
of student rooms, depends on whether the regulation is a
reasonable exercise of the college's supervisory duty,
even though it may infringe on the outer boundaries of the
fourth amer dTren t. rights,
- - —
University officials must provide for an environment
that is conducive to the educational process. To this end,
a reasonable right to inspection of student rooms is necessary,
and students living in college dorm rooms must waive objec-
tion to reasonable inspections.
When is a search of a student's room reasonable?
Basically, when the search is legitimately related to school
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discipline or control needs. This could encompass checking
a room for damages, wear and tear, or unauthorized appli-
ances, taking inventory of college-owned furnishing, and
responding to complaints regarding health and safety viola-
tions. College authorities could also search a room, if
such authorities had reason to believe that a room was being
used for illegal purposes,. or for activity that would
materially or substantially interfere with the operation of
the school.
A search or inspection regu 1.ation must be reasonably
construed, and limited in its application, to further the
university’s function as an educational institution. And,
even though a rule may meet this criteria, and be facially
reasonable, it cannot be unreasonably applied. A reason-
able regulation is one that does not allow for "fishing
expeditions", i.e., general searches of rooms to see
what can be found.
Student’s rooms may be subject to search bv univer-
sity officials under conditions that do not satisfy the
rights afforded by the fourth amendment. Evidence secured
thereby may only be used in campus disciplinary proceeding
,
and not in any criminal process. In order for evidence
to be admissable in a court of law, it must have been
secured in a fashion completely consistent with the
requirements of the fourth amendment ... The relationship
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between a student and the college officials Is dlfferert than
the relationship between a citizen and law enforcement
personnel
.
When a search takes on the possibilities of criminal
involvement or could, result in a criminal prosecution,
then it has left the realm of campus discipline, and
complete fourth amendment rights prevail. There is a broad
e between a student’s fourth amendment rights as
they pertain to college officials, and the same rights as
they pertain to police: college officials have neither the
status or powers of law enforcement personnel; due process
on campus is not the same as criminal due process; and,
while college officials contemplating only campus disci-
plinary proceedings need only a reasonable cause to believe
that a dorm room is being illegally used in order to
effect a search, law enforcement officials or college
authorities anticipating a criminal prosecution must apply
o ^QrioH
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The latter is much more restrictive than the former.
Police or college officials acting on behalf of the
police cannot suspect , they must have reasonable cause to
know ; one standard is lower than the other.
University officials cannot share or delegate their
authority to the police. If the university reserves the
right to inspect a student’s room for a limited number of
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purposes, this right cannot be transferred to police for
the same purposes or other reasons, so that police can
search a room without a warrant.
Officials at tax—support ed colleges are agents for the
state. This important distinction must be considered in
light of the circumstances of a search. Are the college
officials acting on their own to further the objectives of
the college, and contemplating no more than campus discipline?
Then no distinction is necessary. Are they acting with the
advice or consent of law enforcement personnel? Are they
in collusion with them? Are they involved in a search that
could ultimately lead to a criminal investigation, charge,
or conviction? Under these circumstances the student
deserves the right to have the college officials considered
as state agents, and full fourth amendment rights must
be upheld.
Whv is the distinction important? The conduct of
a person not acting under the authority of a state is not
proscribed by the fourth amendment. No court has excluded
evidence obtained by a search in which there was no
participation or investigation by federal or state law
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enforcement personnel; when evidence is obtained by a private
citizen, without the knowledge or participation of any
government agency, it is admissable in a criminal prosecu-
tion, even though the evidence may have been illegally
obtained, by fourth amendment standards. The difference
is clear. if college officials are government agents, and
they obtain criminal evidence through a search bound by the
less stringent campus regulations which may infringe on
fourth amendment rights, then the evidence cannot be ad-
mitted in a court of law. On the other hand, if they are
private citizens, then evidence illegally obtained, again
through less stringent campus policies, may be turned over
to police, and used to prosecute the student.
The college administrator would do well to study the
basic difference, in this area, as they appear in Moore
and Piazzola .
In a federal prosecution, the fourth amendment bars
the use of evidence secured through an illegal search con-
ducted by federal law enforcement personnel ... The ban of
the fourth amendment extends to leads furnished by
illegally seized evidence ... All evidence obtained by a
search in violation of the Constitution, is, by the same
authority, inadmis sable in a state court .
When any seizure of things is unreasonable in the sense
of the fourth amendment, such things, may not, under the
28H
fifth amendment, be received by any court in evidence
against the person from whom they were seized. Also,
knowledge gained from an illegal search and seizure cannot
be used against an individual in a court of law, and, by
the same token, in the opinion of the author, should not be
used in a college disciplinary hearing.
A search without a warrant demands exceptional cir-
cumstance s. . .Except in certain carefully defined classes of
case s, a search of private property, without proper consent
,
is unreasonable, unless it has been authorized by a valid
search warrant ... A search without a warrant can be con-
ducted if there is probable cause to believe that a crime
has been, or is being committed, and the circumstances
are such that there is not time to obtain a search warrant .
A search should be made with a valid warrant, if at
all possible, unless officials are responding to an
emergency. The author believes that, with the exception of
reasonable camDus rules mentioned above, college officials
when contemplating criminal action should be governed by
this same principle. Fourth amendment rights are so basic
that the minor inconvenience in obtaining a warrant is a
small matter when weighed against the student’s right to
personal security and privacy.
What is probable cause? The courts say it exists
when the facts, circumstances, and reasonably trustworthy
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information, are sufficient to warrant a person to believe
that an offense has been or is being committed. While college
officials only need to have a reasonable suspicion to
effect a search, if involved with possible criminal pro-
ceedings, they must meet the stricter constitutional
standard of probable cause
. Suspicion, which is far from
enough evidence to justify a magistrate in issuing a
warrant, does not amount to probable cause.
Warrants cannot be based on mere conclusions. If an
informer is involved in the obtainment of a warrant, for
example, the informer must be credible and reliable, and
the circumstances behind the informant's conclusions
must be considered. One important consideration is
whether the informant's information is sufficiently recent
so as to justify probable cause at the time of the issuing
of the warrant. (See State v. Boudreaux
,
304 S.2d 3^3,
1974).
If an arrest is lawful, then a subsequent search of the
person, and the immediate area under the person's control ,
is valid .
There is no justification for routinely searching
rooms (other than that in which an arrest occurs, if a cri-
minal matter), nor for that matter, freely searching through
desk drawers, or clothes, or concealed areas within the
rooms
.
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An inventory of personal property is also a search, and
can only be conducted under two circumstances, both of
which have to be met: the police or college officials must
have lawful custody of the property, and, the police or college
officials must have acted in good faith in conducting the
inventory
,
so as not to use it as a subterfuge for a warrant-
less search. The question must be asked, do the facts in
the situation indicate that an inventory search was reason-
able? (see Johnson )
College officials may run into this situation when a
person turns in a lost handbag or wallet
. It may be
necessary to look through the item for some identification, .
and to secure or safeguard any valuables. VJhat if, in the
course of this inventory search, college officials find
illegal drugs? Or, stolen objects? Since the above two
criteria have been met, the evidence of such a search can
be used in both criminal and campus proceedings. An indis-
criminate or random Search Oi hanuoags, a^ a college
activity, for example, would not warrant the same conclusions.
It has long been established that objects falling
within the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in
a position to have that view, are subject to seizure and
may be introduced as evidence.
An observation from a lawful vantage point, oi an
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illegal substance in plain sight. Is not a search in the
constitutional sense, and evidence obtained by this means
is admis sable without offending the fourth amendment.
(see Sgeake v. Grantham
, 317 F. Supp. 1253 (1970)).
One in a posit ion of a lessor cannot consent to a
police search of a t enant’s premises, even though the
lessor
?
—him/herself, has a. right to enter the room or
apartment
.
Fourth amendment rights are rights which only a lessee
(tenant) can waive, by word or deed, or through an agent.
The college cannot grant permission to law enforcement
personnel for searches of student rooms.
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THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: EQUAL PROTECTION
The Fourteenth Amendment
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of lav:; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdication the equal protection
of the laws .
"
5.1 Introduction
"Throughout the original Constitution and Eill of
Rights ... (the words) ’power* and ’right’ appear frequently,
but until the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment the
word ’ equal ’... (only appeared in) two sections, and both
refer to the equality of the states in the Union."''' 2
The fourteenth amendment was first proposed by Congress
in 1866, and was finally ratified by the states in 1868,
72Steamer, op. cit., p. 2 66.
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77 years after the adoption of the first and fourth amend-
ments. It was to contain two "clauses", the one we deal
with here, and another which dealt with due process of the
law. While the latter was to be used by the courts almost
from its inception, the equal protection clause was to have
a slower start, not being fully utilized until the late
19^0* s. Mr. Justice Holmes was to- characterize the equal
protection clause, as "the usual last resort of constitu-
tional arguments
.
" 73
Like the fourth amendment, the fourteenth poses prob-
lems of interpretation
; the meaning of "equal protection",
and 'similarly situated" among other terms and phrases,
have been cause for great argument, and consternation. As
the Harvard Law Review points out, there have been over
2,000 years of conflict among philosophers and political
7 Mtheorists, over just what "equality" means. Are all men
equal, or must they just be treated equally?
On its face, "the fourteenth amendment., does not
speak of equality generally, but of a special kind of
equality, equality of protection under the law. Further,
it does not .. .require state government to ensure even this
73Buck v. Bell
,
27^ U.S. 200 (1927)
"Development s in the Law - Equal Protection 1 ’, 82
Harvard Law Review, 1065 (1969) at 1160.
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kind of equality; it merely forbids their denying it." 75
From its inception as a proposal, the fourteenth amend-
ment contained some type of clause embodying the concept
of equal protection. Many who supported the amendment,
did so with the intent that it would allow the federal
government the constitutional right to deny states any
power to discriminate against emancipated blacks and that
it would compliment the Civil Rights Bill of 1366 (which
attempted to give blacks the same civil rights as white
7 f)
persons). Radicals within the Congress, however, also
favored a much broader coverage that could expand with
77
changing circumstances. '
"We now know that the equal protection clause was
designed to impose upon the States a positive duty to supply
protection to all persons in the enjoyment of their
natural and inaliable rights - especially life, liberty,
7 8
and property - and to do so equally."
HowpveT1 beginning with.the Civil Rights cases of 1883,
75 ibid, at p. Il6l
7
^Mason and Beany, American Constitutional Law , 4th
Edition, Prentice-Hall, 1968, p . 38T.
_
77
"Deve lopment s in the Law - Equal Protection", op.
cit
.
,
p
.
1069
.
7
^Tussman, Joseph, and Tenbroek, Jacobus, "The Equal-
Protection of the Laws", 37 California Law Review 341 (1949)-
a series of Supreme Court decisions was to sap much of the
force of this amendment. The Court was to approve such
devices as poll taxes and literacy tests as legitimate
voting regulations, when, in fact, these were employed to
disenfranchise the black voter.
It was not until the middle of the 20th century that
the equal protection clause was to become a major judicial
tool of the courts. By 1953 the Court had begun to estab-
lish ...a period in which the ’Constitution of Powers’
would be transformed into a ’ Constitution- of Equalities’,
or more precisely, a constitution in wThich national power
would be used to emphasize equality.
The Egalitarian Revolution was forming, and the Warren
Court was to give crucial support to both it and the
equal protection clause. "After 1958, the Court wove the
equality theme into the entire fabric of 'bonst itutional
8 0liberty” — reapportionment, racial equality, prayer in
schools, criminal procedure, housing, jury selection,
sedition/subversion and many other areas.
The command that no state ’’shall deny the equal pro-
tection of laws” appears to call for simple fairness in
government; that justice should be allowed without regard
"^Steamer, op. cit., p. 226.
80 ibid, p.- 226.
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to color, race, wealth, standing, etc. The fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause has become this, and more
"
. .
.
(E)arly in its career, the equal protection clause
received a formulation which strongly suggested that it
was to become more than a demand for equal enforcement of
the laws; it was to express the demand that the law itself
81be ’equal’." The importance here, is that legislation as
well as administration comes under the scrutiny of the
equal protection clause.
The reader should understand, then, that this clause
js similar to an iceberg, the top of which appears to be
uncomplicated on its face, but, where, under the water, there
has been developed a mass of legal decisions, doctrines, and
old and new applications
. A look at what is "under the
water", therefore, is necessary.
Originally, the courts gave wide leeway to the states;
legislation was presumed to be valid on its face. The
ground rules for application of the equal protection clause
were simple: "the classification must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relationship to the object of
the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced
O p
shall be treated alike. This concept, which has come to
Q “i
^Tussman and Tenbroek, . op . cit., p. 3*42.
^ 2
F. S. Royster Guano Co ., v. Virginia , 253 U.S. 412
( 1920 ).
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be known as ’’old equal protection", or formal equality,
allowed for little judicial scrutiny of legislation.
States were called upon to make only rational classifica-
tion, and the courts were usually easily satisfied that the
means of the legislation rationally related to the plausable
ends of the legislation. In essence, under old equal
protection, the courts deferred to legislative judgment.
Thus, under the old equal protection concept, a state
could pass a poll tax to encourage only serious voters to
vote, and the courts would uphold it, even though such a
tax might discriminate against the poor or minorities, or
deprive an individual of the right to vote.^^ Or a literacy
test for voting might be upheld, because the states said
that only those that could read, could intelligently use a
ballot
.
There evolved, over a number of years, a series of
doctrines that became associated with the "new equal pro-
tection" . Under the new equal protection there would be
stricter judicial scrutiny where fundamental liberties or
rights were threatened by legislation or administration.
States would be required to show a greater need than the
mere rationality of their law.
83Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937)-
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One of the doctrines under the new equal protection was
that of "compelling interest". A classification which was
based on a suspect criteria , such as race or sex, or which
affected a fundamental right
, such as voting, would be
deemed violative of the equal protection clause, unless the
state could show a compelling state need for, or interest
in, the classification.
Also a part of the new equal protection was the
doctrine of Suspect Classification
. This is a milder form
of "forbidden classification", which calls for rigid court
scrutiny, whenever a classification is based on a "suspect"
trait or characteristic, such as race or sex.
The doctrine of Invidious Discrimination calls for
protection against discriminatory legislation. As already
noted, the courts have previously asked for the purpose of
a law, but under the old equal protection, did not question
that purpose. The court would now question not only the pur-
nosp but also tbs motive,, of the legislation.
The final doctrine developed, and the most recent, is
substantive equal protection or " irrefutable presumptions ."
This doctrine falls somewhere between the equal protection
and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment and can
be considered as a hybrid of the two. This doctrine holds
violative of the equal protection clause legislation that
establishes a permanent, irrefutable presumption; the court
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invalidates the elassifieation by relyine on due pro-
cess grounds.
While under the old equal protection, a poll tax could
be upheld, such a tax could not stand up under the new
equal protection. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections .
383 U.S. 663 (1966), such a poll tax was struck down
because it involved both "invidious discrimination" and
the denial of a "fundamental right".
It should be noted that the demand for equal protection
of the laws in the fourteenth amendment is directed at the
state ("no State shall deny ..."). ^ State involvement
must be determined in each case, but it is fair to point
out that the courts have seldom not found a way to find some
type of "state action" when they needed to. What constitutes
state action or involvement? The Courts have looked to the
participation or involvement of one of the following:
1 . The formal operation of a state agency;
2 . The activity of 3 usually pp!fy?te p s rt v , where the
state directly, or indirectly exercises control
(i.e., substantial state financing, or significant
state regulatory powers);
3 . Private parties that carry on what would normally
cit
.
^"Developments in the Law - Equal Protection", op.
,
p. IO69.
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be a government function (i.e., the running of
primary elections by political parties; company
towns that maintain public thoroughfares);
4. The sum of the various indicia of state involve-
. 85
ment
.
It has been within the last 15 years that the equal
protection clause has entered its most significant period
of its history. While it has branched out, as noted, from
its original impact for discrimination, to include many and
varied areas of civil rights and liberties, and other as-
pects of the law, nowhere has it had as much personal,
public, and institutional impact, both on the people and
the courts, as in the area of education.
Consider the number of pieces of legislation passed
within the past few years which also bear on this point:
the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the Equal Pay Act of 1963;
Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 (prohibits
discrimination against, subdents on the basis of sex);
Title VII and VIII of Public Health Service Act (prohibits
sex discrimination in admission of students); to name a
few
.
85 ibid, p
.
' 1070-1071
•
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Within the realm of higher education, cases regarding
the equal protection clause have, for the most part, fallen
within one of the following general categories: race, sex,
dress and appearance, housing, residency requirements, and
athletics
.
5.2 Historical Analysis
The thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments
to the United States Constitution and the federal Civil
Rights legislation of 1866, 1870, 1871
,
and 1875 are all
related in history. Taken together, they were to eliminate
slavery and defend the newly emancipated blacks from re-
strictive and oppressive state codes and laws which would
have eliminated their rights as free citizens.
"At the close of the Civil War it seemed clear that
without the intervention of the federal government, the
Southern states would, by legislative restrictions strip
thp npwly freed ... (black) of most of the ordinary rights
and immunities of free citizens. To place the civil rights
of the ...(black) upon a firm basis. Congress proposed the
fourteenth amendment authorizing the national government to
step in and protect the ... (black) against actions by his
8 6
own State Government."
86 Cushman, op. cit., p. 185-1S6.
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The first test of the fourteenth amendment came in
1873 with the Slaughter-House cases
, 83 U.S. 36 ( 1873 ),
which had little to do with the rights of freed men.
In a landmark decision for the time, the Court considered
the complaint of butchers in New Orleans, that the Louisiana
carpetbag legislature had granted a monopoly of the
slaughterhouse business to a single company, effectively
preventing thousands of others in the slaughterhouse business
from pursuing that type of business.
The Court distinguished "...between State citizenship
and national citizenship..." and emphasized "...that the
rights and privileges of federal citizenship do not include
the protection of ordinary civil liberties such as freedom
of speech and press, religion, etc., but only the privileges
O rj
which one enjoys by virtue of his federal citizenship..."
In other words, the State had the responsibility for pro-
tecting civil rights.
The majority of the Court dismissed the possible use of
the equal protection clause in this case, noting that
this clause would probably not be used, except to protect
..
,
88
the black race.
^Cushman, op. cit., p. 186.
88 ibid, 187.
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This concept was to be upheld in Stradder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), when West Virginia laws
which prevented the selection of black men to juries was
struck down by the Court.
Ihe concept that the fourteenth amendment was only for
the black race was to change, however, by 1886. In that
year the case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins
,
118 U.S. 356 ( 1886 ),
was to reach the Supreme Court. In San Fransciso, an
ordinance had been legislated which prevented the operation
of a laundry without the permission of the city government,
unless it was in a brick or stone building. Approximately
310 out of 320 laundries were in wooden buildings, and of
the 310, approximately 240 were operated by Chinese.
While about 150 Chinese had been arrested for violating
the ordinance, about 80 non-Chinese, operating ’’under
similar conditions (were) left unmolested.”
The Court found that the Chinese had been discriminated
a era Inci-
t-j— '
’’...the cases present the ordinances in actual operation,
and the facts shown establish an administration directed
so exclusively against a particular class of persons as
to warrant and require the conclusion that whatever may
have been the intent of the ordinances adopted, they
are applied by the public authorities charged with
their administration, and thus representing the state
itself, with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to
amount to a practical denial by the State oi that
equal protection of the laws which is secured to the
...(Chinese), as to all. other persons , by the broad
and benign provisions of the fourteenth amendment ...
.
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial
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£ ^?fanC^ yet > if *s applied and administered
hanH
bl± authority with an evil eye and an unequald, so as practically to make unjust and illegaldiscriminations between persons in similar circum-stances
,
^
mat erj al to their rights, the deni.a] of eaualjustice is still within the prohibition of theConstitution..."
During the period following the passage of the
fourteenth amendment, the states were not inactive in their
determination to protect their (State’s) rights; and they
had sought to have a legal principle which would allow them
to keep the blacks in "their place."
The answer for these States came in 1896, when the
Supreme Court in another landmark decision formally
developed and approved the doctrine of "separate but equal",
in Plessy v. Ferguson
, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
The Court, in what was later to be called "the equal,
but different, protection of the laws", upheld a Louisiana
lav; requiring "equal but separate accommodations" for blacks
and whites on railway coaches. Relying on the fact that
O V-> T 7 A V) 4- V's O O 4“ O 4* A Vs VJ tt a v> ri v> ATT "I a ri a / ,vs rs *vo a 4- a a a U a a 1 a
*•*'-'* * J s/ ^ s/ ± CXVU. w j U.X k-/ p* s^1 V J.UWU u L- uUx U O Owii^/vs-i-O
for whites and blacks, and that Congress itself had done
the same in the school system of the District of Columbia,
the Court allowed that to provide two or more passenger
coaches, one for whites and one for blacks, or by building
partitions on a single coach, did not offend the fourteenth
amendment equal protection clause, as long as the
facilities provided to each race were equal.
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The impact of this decision is not to be taken lightly,
for the courts, for almost sixty years, were to accept this
concept of "separate but equal", and its greatest impact
was felt in education'.
.
Public education was also to be the battleground
where the equal rights protection of the fourteenth amend-
ment was to be tested. In a series of cases involving
segregation in state universities, the Supreme Court laid
down the foundations for its landmark decision in Brown v.
Board of Education of Topeka
. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
In Berea College v. Kentucky
.
211 U.S. 45 (1908), the
Court held that the State could validly forbid a college,
even though a private institution, from teaching whites
and blacks at the same time and place. This left no doubt
of the validity of the southern (and other) laws requiring
the education of white and black children in separate tax-
supported schools.
The erosion of Plessy
,
and a consequent tougher attitude
towards "equality” was made clear thirty years after the
Berea case, when the Court heard Missouri ex rel Gaines v.
Canada
, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
Gaines, a black, a graduate of Lincoln University, and
a citizen of Missouri, was turned down for admission to the
University of Missouri Law School solely because he was
black. The State agreed to pay his tuition at any law
school of an adjacent state which would accept him, pendine
such time that Missouri would itself build its own black
law school.
The Supreme Court ruled that Gaines had been denied
the equal protection of the law, and said "...(Gaines) was
entitled to be admitted to the Law School of the State
University in the absence of other and proper provision
for his legal training within the State. The basic con-
sideration is not as to what sort of opportunities other
states provide, or whether they are as good as those in
Missouri, but what opportunities Missouri itself furnishes
to white students and denies to negroes solely upon the
grounds of color...".
When a black graduate student was admitted to the
University of Oklahoma, he was required to sit in a class-
room seat reserved for blacks, at a library table set aside
for blacks, and at a special table in the cafeteria. He
took his case to court, and in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents
, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), the Supreme Court held that
under the equal protection clause, the black student must
be given the same treatment by the state as students of
other races.
In the same year as McLaurin , the Supreme Court
reached the threshold of overturning its "separate but
equal" doctrine. In Sweat
t
v. Painter
, 339 U.S. 629 (1950),
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the petitioner had applied to the University of Texas Law
School, and was refused admittance because he was black.
Texas had no all black law school.
The State Court postponed any action in order to give
the State of Texas a chance to build a black law school
facility. That court finally denied the petitioner because
such a law school was to be built.'
The petitioner refused to enroll in the new black law
school, and continued to seek admission to the University
of Texas Law School. The State Court and Texas Court of
Appeals agreed to act on a comparison of the facilities
(the Plessy standard of "separate but equal"), and found
..."privileges, advantages, and opportunities for the
study of law substantially equivalent to those offered by
the State to white students at the University of Texas."
The Supreme Court upon hearing the case, found, however,
that the University of Texas Law School was superior in a
numhp-p of ar^as, Including qualities which are difficult to
objectively measure (reputation of faculty, expenses of
administration, position and influence of alumni, traditions,
and prestige), and that a substantial segment of the
Texas population, namely whites, was excluded from the black
law school. Since most of the lawyers, witnesses, judges,
jurors, and other officials would come from this white
population, the petitioner would be denied the opportunity
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of dealing and interacting with these people.
In asking the question,
..."To what extent does the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment limit
the power of the State to distinguish between students of
different races in professional and graduate education in
a state university?", the Court, holding in favor of the
plaintiff, and ordering that the petitioner be admitted to
the University of Texas Law School, stated, "Equal pro-
tection of the laws is not achieved through indiscriminate
imposition of inequalities", and set the stage for its
landmark Brown decision on equal protection in education.
By 195^ the climate of the country had changed.
Because of World War II, there had been important departures
from discrimination in employment and the armed services;
politicians on the state and federal level now recognized
the potential votes in large black voting blocks; the
emergence of American foreign relations with African and
Asian nations forced the country to consider and re-examine
its treatment of blacks; and Earl Warren was now the Chief
Justice of a Supreme Court which leaned to the liberal
side
.
In this climate. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka ,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), was heard. "After nearly 60 years the
Court again had squarely before it the question of the
constitutionality of segregation per se - the question
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whether the doctrine of Ples^ v. Ferguson should be
affirmed or reversed." ^
The Br^wn case was actually a group of cases which
raised the same legal question. Blacks from different
states had sought to be enrolled in the public schools of
their community.
"...They were
... (denied ) admission to
schools attended by white children under laws requiring
or permitting segregation according to race.”
The blacks alleged that this deprived them of the
equal protection of the laws. The lower courts each invoked
the Plessy doctrine, and found in favor of the school boards.
Considering "...public education in the light of its
full development and its present place in American life
throughout the nation", the court issued its unanamous
opinion through Chief Justice Warren.
The Court asked: "Does segregation of children in
public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the
physcial facilities and other ’tangible’ factors may be
equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal
educational opportunities?” The Court was convinced
that it does.
Citing Me Lauren and Sweat
t
,
the court said.
To separate ... (blacks ) from others of similar age and
89Cushman, op. cit., p. 485.
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deprived of theii t f the laws guaranteed by thefourteenth amendment." *
The principles of equal protection continued to be
raised in areas other than public education.
The wartime treatment of American citizens of
Japanese ancestory, posed equal protection questions
90the Court. In 1942 a "curfew order" had been issued
for
that
...subjected all persons of Japanese ancestry in pre-
scribed west coast military areas to remain in their
residence from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m." And, a subsequent
"exclusion order" was issued requiring that all persons of
Japanese ancestry be required to move out of pr>psr*r»-i h^r!
west coast areas, and into assembly or relocation camps.
While acknowledging that "...all legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect", the Court in Korematsu pointed out
^Hirabayashi v. United States
, 320, U.S. 8l (1943).
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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that we were at war with Japan. '
. .
. (H)ardships are part
of war
,
and war is an aggregate of hardships. All citizens
alike, both in and out of uniform, feel the impact of war
in greater or lessor measure. Citizenship has its
responsibilities as well as its privileges, and in time
of war the burden is always heavier." (Recall how the
Court was also more restrictive with free speech during
periods of war
.
)
In both Hirabayashi and Korematus
,
therefore, the
Court upheld the "curfew order" and "exclusionary order",
and indicated that neither violated the fourteenth amendment
rights of the Japanese-Americans affected.
In Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners
,
330 U.S. 552 (19^7), the administration of the system for
awarding pilots licenses was attacked asviolative of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Louisiana's pilotage laws required that only state approved
pilots guide ships going through the Mississippi River
approaches to New Orleans. The Governor appointed all new
pilots, after individuals were certified by a board con-
sisting only of pilots. Only those who served a six month
apprenticeship under a state pilot were eligible for
certification. It was argued, however, that the Board
certified only relatives and friends of the board members.
The Court rejected the equal protection argument in a
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five to four decision. Justice Black, considering the role
of the river pilot in the history of Louisiana, said, that
the object of the system "is to secure... the safest and
most efficient operated pilotage system practicable. We
cannot say that the method adopted... is unrelated to this
objective.’ (An example of "old equal protection".)
In the area of interstate commerce, the Court, four
years prior to its Brown decision, said in Henderson v.
United States
, 339 U.S. 8l6 (1950), that segregating
blacks in dining cars of the Southern Railway Company by
reserving ten tables exclusively for white passengers, and
only one for blacks, or, by cutting the blacks off from the.
w hites by placing a curtain or partition between their
tables, subjected the black passenger to undue prejudice
and disadvantages.
In welfare assistance, the Court struck down laws which
denied "...welfare assistance to residents of the State
p 70 F|t c f ^n 1 nmK n n V* tta Wi ^ h iL Y1 1^x 10112?
jurisdiction for at least one year immediately preceding
91
their applications for such assistance."' The Court
concluded "...that the statutory prohibition of benefits
to residents of less than a year creates a classification
which constitutes an invidious discrimination denying
^Shapiro v. Thompson , 39^ U.S. 6l8 (1969)*
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them equal protection of the laws."
Two cases heard the same day in 1969
,
Kramer v. Union
Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 ( 1969 ) and
C iprlano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 ( 1969 ), point out
that the Court will use the "new equal protection" rigid
scrutiny test when a basic right such as voting is con-
cerned. In Kramer
,
the Court indicated that a state can-
not exclude otherwise qualified voters from limited purpose
elections unless "the exclusions are necessary to promote
a compelling state interest." In Cipriano
,
the Court
said, "the challenged statute contains a classification
which excludes otherwise qualified voters who are as sub-
stantially affected and directly interested in the matter
voted upon as are those who are permitted to vote."
In Reed v. Reed
,
404 U.S. 71 (1971)> the question of
sex as a suspect classification came under the scrutiny of
the equal protection clause. The appellant, Ms. Reed
Vjonf orl tO t ^ ^ p(Jrm* 2^ Y1 3,^’ y, i v O ^ V} c» /-> vi 1 a a o +* o
However, the father was appointed because of an Idaho probate
code which gave preference to men over women: "of several
persons claiming and equally entitled to administer, males
must be preferred to females." Chief Justice Burger
indicated that this "arbitrary preference established in
favor of males" violated the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. "To give a mandatory preference
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to members of either sex over members of the other... is to
make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice for-
bidden by... (equal protection)."
Two years after Reed
,
in Frontiero v. Richardson
. 4ll
U.S. 677 (1973) a majority of the Supreme Court was to
state that sex was a suspect classification, just as was
race, alienage, and national origin. The question before
the Court was, can a female member of the armed services
claim her husband as a dependent, in order to obtain in-
creased quarters allowances and medical benefits, just as
males may do? Concluding that females under tte military
statute should enjoy the same benefits as males, the
Court said, "...that classifications based upon sex are
inherently invidious." This opinion, in which four justices
agreed that classifications based on sex were inherently
suspect and must be subject to close judicial scrutiny,
and one justice found that sex discrimination was in-
vidious, also noted that Congress, a coequal branch of
government had "...itself concluded that classifications
based upon sex are inherently invidious." Following the
Frontiero decision, the court in United States v. Reiser ,
394 F. Supp. 1060 (1975), flatly declared that "sex is a
suspect classification".
313
Housing 5,3 Sex Discrimination
In Mollere v. Southeastern Louisiana College
. 304 P.
Supp. 826 ( 1969 ), several women undergraduates brought
suit because all women under 21 were requir ed to live in
on-campus residence halls, while only freshmen males were
required to live on campus. Concerned that the college
would not be able to make its principle and interest pay-
menos on the bonds for the residence halls, the State Board
of Education required that Southeastern Louisiana College
establish rules requiring that a sufficient number of
students live on campus, to insure bond payments.
The college responded by requiring all women, 21 or
under
,
who were not living with their parents or close
relatives, to live on campus. The same rule held for only
freshmen males. The Dean of Women testified that the sole
reason for the rule was to guarantee that financial obliga-
tiosn would be met, and that the sum of the number' cf
women under 21 and freshmen males, was the precise number
needed to fill the residence halls.
District Judge Cassibry delivered the opinion of
the Court
:
The sole issue in this case... is whether the college
may require a certain group of students to live on
campus, not for the welfare of the students them-
selves but simply to increase the revenue of the
housing system. More specifically, can the college
require girls under 21 to live on campus while
allowing others to live off campus simply to meet
314
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v< Louisiana
, 391 U.S. 68, (1968):
v. Tatum
, 300 P Supp. 60, (1969), Breen v.
— F. Supp. 702 (1969). Absent the special
educational considerations previously mentioned the
support of the housing system is an obligation which
should fall on all students equally just as does, for
example, tuition. Since the obligation is essentially
monetary, then all must pay or none. To select a groupless-than-all
,
to fulfill an obligation which shouldfall equally on all, is a violation of equal protection
no matter how the group is selected."
Athletics
Peggy Brenden ano Antoinette St. Pierre were students
at different public high schools in Minnesota. Together
they brought suit to prevent the Minnesota State High
School League from barring females from participating with
males in high school interscholastic athletics.
Specifically, the rule which they challenged, states:
Girls shall be prohibited from participation in
the boy's interschclastic athletic program either
as a member of the boy's team or a member of the
girl's team playing the boy's team.
The girl's team shall not accept male members.
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Peggy Brenden desired to play tennis; Antoinette St.
Pierre wished to compete in cross-country skiing and running.
The respective high schools had no women's teams in these
sports, but did provide teams for men.
The trial court in Brenden v. Independent School District
142 et. al. , 3*»2 F. Suppl 122-4 (1972), found that the
girls probably would have qualified for positions on the
male teams, were excellent athletes, and would not be
damaged in any way by non-contact competition with males.
The court concluded that the only thing which prevented
Brenden and St. Pierre from playing on the male teams, was
the above stated rule, and therefore ruled in favor of the
two girls:
In summary, the court is confronted with a situation
where two high school girls wish to take part in
certain interscholastic boys' athletics; where it is
shown that the girls could compete effectively on those
teams; and where there are no alternative competitive
programs sponsored by their schools which would pro-
vide an equal opportunity for competition for these
girls; and where the rule, in its application, becomes
imr’oagnnchl o 1 i ^h of f" W g '^b^°C^"i,rQ S ^ C^ + Vi cs
rule seeks to promote. Brought to its base, then,
Peggy Brenden and Tony St. Pierre are being prevented
from participating on the boy's interscholastic teams
in tennis, cross-country, and cross-country skiing
solely on the basis of the fact of sex and sex alone.
The court is thus of the opinion that in these factual
circumstances, the application of the league rules to
Peggy Brenden and Tony St. Pierre is arbitrary and
unreasonable, in violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. For this
reason, the application of the rule to these girls
cannot stand..."
The case was appealed, and Circuit Judge Heaney
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delivered the opinion of the Appeals Court : 92
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.P J uddces and outmoded customs act as barriers toth
? f^} 1 realization of women's basic rights "estabiished the President's Commission on the Status
mL?°p en *. Executive Order 10980 (December 1 *1
,
1961 )That Commission, the President's Task Forcencoiueau B K onWomen s Rights and Responsibilities, congressionalearings and critical studies have confirmed theserious nature of discrimination on account of
s ex .
In recent years. Congress and the Executive have actedto eliminate discrimination based on "stereotyped
characterizations of the sexes", (see, Title VII ofCi
!J
1 Act ° f 19611
5
the E3ual Pay Act, andline ix of the Education Amendments of 1972 ). Thejurisdiction of the Civil Rights Commission has been
extended to include discrimination on the basis of
sex. Finally, Congress has passed the Equal Rights
Amendment and transmitted it to the states.
Ir recent vo ar s
^
courts . too jn q tt- o hcnorm s c^ ° ^ ^
^
to the problems of sex-based discrimination. In
1963, the Presidential Commission on the Status of
Women recommended that
:
"Early and definitive court pronouncement,
particularly by the United States Supreme
Court, is urgently needed with regard to
the validity under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments of laws and official practices
92 477 F . 2d 1292 (1973).
317
fK
S
J
r
?I
nlnatlng aSai nst women, to the end
fr l he P^«jiPle of equality becomesi m y established in constitutionaldoctrine .
"
There is no longer any doubt that sex-based classifica-
^re subject to scrutiny by the courts under theEqual Protection Clause and will be struck down whenthey provide dissimilar treatment for men and women
of°the
e
olfl
mi
^
ly
?
ituated with respect to the object
n ^
c as sification. Reed v. Reed
,
*104 U.S. 71, 77,(1971). Furthermore, discrimination on the basis
?S
X
<_
C
?
n
.
no lon
§
e
£ be justified by reliance onoutdated images * of women as peculiarly delicate
and impressionable creatures in need of protectionfrom the rough and tumble of unvarnished humanity.”
S.eidenber g v. McSorleys’ Old Ale House, Inc.. 117 PSupp. 593, 606TWO)- ^
In Sail * er Inn v. Kirby
, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 at 340 ,485 P.2d 529, at 5^0- 5^1 (1971) (en banc), the
unanimous California Supreme Court succinctly
summarized the nature of sex-based discrimination:
"Sex, like race and lineage, is an immutable
trait, a status into which the class
members are locked by the accident of
birth. What differentiates sex from
nonsuspect statuses, such as intelligence
or physical disability, and aligns it with
the recognized suspect classifications is
that the characteristic frequently bears
no relation to ability to perform or
contribute to society. * * # The result is
t Q O O d c c tq arro f arl 4“ r\ ov-»
inferior legal status without regard to
the capabilities or characteristics of its
individual members. * * * Where the rela-
tion between characteristic and evil to
be prevented is so tenuous, courts must
look closely at classifications based
on that characteristic lest outdated sccial
stereotypes result in invidious laws or
practices
.
Another characteristic which underlies all
suspect classifications is the stigma of
inferiority and second class citizenship
associated with them. * * * Women, like
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negroes, aliens, and the poor havehistorically labored under severe lemal
and social disabilities. Like black
citizens, they were, for many years,denied the right to vote, and until’
recently, the right to serve on juries in
many states. They are excluded from ^rdiscriminated against in employment and
educational opportunities. Married women inparticular have been treated as inferior
persons in numerous laws relating to property
and independent business ownership and the
right to make contracts.,
Laws which disable women from full partici-
pation in the political, business and eco-
nomic arenas are often characterized as
’protective’ and beneficial. Those same
laws applied to racial or ethnic
minorities wTould readily be recognized
as invidious and impermissible. The
pedestal upon which women have been
placed has all too often, upon closer
inspection, been revealed as a cage."
In this case, it is unnecessary for this court to
determine whether classifications based on sex
are suspect and, thus can be justified only by a
compelling state interest because the High School
League’s rule cannot be justified even under the
standard applied to test non-suspect classification.
The High School League contends that relief under
the Civil Rights Act is inappropriate because
participation in interscholastic sports is a
px'ivilege arid nuL a x*ight . We uisagx-ee. The
Supreme Court has rejected "the concept that con-
stitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental
benefit is characterized as a ’right' or as a
’privilege’. * * *". Graham v. Richardson
,
M 0 3 U.S.
365, 37?, (1971). The question in this case is not
whether Brenden and St. Pierre have an absolute
right to participate in interscholastic athletics,
but whether Brenden and St. Pierre can be denied
the benefits of activities provided by the state
for male students. See, Reed v. The Nebraska School
Activities Association, 3^1 F . Supp . at 262.
Discrimination in education has been recognized as a
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matter °f the utmost importance. The Supreme Courthas pointed out that:
Today
,
education is perhaps the mostimportant function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school
attendance lav/s and the great expenditures
for education both demonstrate our recogni-
tion of the importance of education in our
democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the
armed forces. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principal
instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him
to adjust normally to his environment.
In these days, it is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an
opportunity, where the state has undertaken
to provide it
,
is a right which must be
made available to all on equal terms.”
Erown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 3^7
U.S. 483, '“493, (195*0.
In particular, ” (D) iscrimination in education is one
of the most damaging injustices women suffer. It
denies them equal education and equal employment
opportunity ,. contributing to a second class self
image." A Matter of Simple Justice
,
The Report on
the Women’s Rights and Responsibilities (April, 1970)
•
The President’s Task Force also concluded that
n s pr> j m i n a
t
‘von based on sex in public education
should be prohibited by the fourteenth amendment."
Congress has also recognized the importance of all
aspects of education for women by declaring:
"No person in the United States shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance,
# * *." Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 197.2.
Discrimination in high school interscholastic athletics
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constitutes discrimination in educationCourt of Minnesota has stated that:
The Supreme
/ I)nterscholastic activities(are) today recognized * * *
as an important and integral facet
of the * * * education process..."
Furthermore, the High School League recognizes thatint erscholastic sports are just as valuable forfemales as for males. See, Haas v. South Bend Com-
munity School Corporation
. 289 N.E. 2d 495, 500(19T2)
.
The importance of interscholastic athletics for
femau.es as part of the total educational process hasbeen recently emphasized by the Minnesota State Board
of Education. Its recent statement of policy and
proposed action, Eliminating Sex Bias in Education
(September 1972), states that: “
"...(O)ur educational system has helped
perpetuate the division of the sexes
into predetermined roles and has failed
to provide freedom from discrimination
because of sex.
The practice of stereotyping and
socializing men and women into 'mascu-
line’ ’feminine’ roles has resulted in
prejudice, dominance, discrimination
and segregation harmful to the human
development of both sexes.
The State Board of Education is concerned
about four areas in particular: dis-
crimination in hiring and promoting,
sex requirements for boys and girls to
participate in sports and extra-
curricular activities
,
sex bias in
curricular and teaching materials,
and providing in-service training for
administrators and teachers to overcome
the habits and practices of teaching
stereotyped social roles."
In view of these circumstances, we must conclude that
at the very least, the Brenden and St. Pierre's
interest in participating in interscholastic sports
is a substantial and cognizable one.
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Because the defendant high schools have not providedteams for females in tennis and cross-country skiingand running, the effect of the High School League's
rule Is to completely bar Brenden and St. Pierre from
competition in these non-contact interscholastic
sports, despite their being fully qualified. The Hit^hSchool League argues, however, that its rule isjustified in order to assure that persons with
similar qualifications compete among themselves.
They state that physiological differences between
males and females make it impossible for the latter
to equitably compete with males in athletic competi-
tion.
In evaluating the High School League’s justification
for their rule, we will, as we have indicated, apply
the equal protection standard for evaluating non-
suspect classifications. That standard is set forth
in Reed v. Reed
,
404 U.S. at 76,
n * * * A classification ’must be
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial rela-
tion to the object of the legislation,
so that all persons in similar circum-
stances shall be treated alike. ’ * * *”
We recognize that because sex-based classifications
may be based on outdated stereotypes of the nature
of males and females, courts must be particularly
sensitive to the possibility of invidious discrimina-
tion in evaluating them, and must be particularly
demanding in ascertaining whether the state has
demonstrated a substantial rational basis for the
r\ H o eg "f* "1 n of ^ v*» rpv^ *ir» n q» "1 t r f a t.tIa 0 Zf*0 I"! O
classification involves the interest of females in
securing an education.
We believe that in view of the nature of the
classification and the important interests of the
plaintiffs involved, the High School League has
failed to demonstrate that the sex-based classifica-
tion fairly and substantially promotes the purposes
of the League's rule.
First, we do not believe the High School League has
demonstrated a sufficient rational basis for the
conclusion that women are incapable of competing with
men in non-contact sports. The trial court
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specifically found that the plaintiffs were capable
of such competition and the evidence indicates thatthe class of women, like the class of men, includesindividuals with widely different athletic abilities.
As the .Fifth Circuit has recognized in activities
requiring physical strength, technique may be just
as important as physical capacity. Weeks v. Southern
Bell Telephone Company
, 408 F. 2d 228
,
236 (5th Cir.
19691^ And, "(t)echnique is hardly a function of
sex." Ibid, at 236. Furthermore, the record indicates
that in non—contact sports, such as those involved
here, factors such as coordination, concentration,
agility and timing play a large role in achieving
success. No objective evidence Was introduced compar-
ing males and females with respect to these factors.
Essentially, the testimony of those witnesses who
concluded that females were wholly incapable of
competing with men in interscholastic athletics was
based on subjective conclusions drawn from the
physiological difference between the sexes by
individuals who were not themselves familiar with
mixed competition. This subjective testimony is
particularly susceptible to discrimination based on
stereotyped notions about the nature of the sexes.
Furthermore, the High School League failed to show
that it had established any objective nondiscrimina-
tory minimum standards for evaluating qualifications
for non-contact interscholastic athletics. The
record indicates, in fact, that the schools had
adopted "no cut" policies allowing male students, no
matter how untalented
,
to participate in the non-
contact interscholastic sports involved here.
We note that there is at least one systematic study of
mixed competition in non-contact sports. In 1969, a
rule of the New York State Department of Education
prohibiting competition between males and females in
non-contact sports was challenged. The Department
reports :
"Faced with the need for valid supporting
data, the Education Department gathered all
the evidence it could find on the matter
.
Very little was reported in professional
literature. In the limited number of
experiences that came to its attention
wherein girls competed on boys’ teams
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(primarily at the college level), the
only negative factor reported was that it wasnot yec socially acceptable for a girl todefeat a boy in athletic competition.
Discussion with various medical personnel
elicited a unanimous expression that there
are no medical reasons to prohibit girlsfrom competing on boys’ teams in selected
non-contact sports. Thus, it became clear
that the Department had little or nothing
to support its traditional position. It
was then
. suggested that a moratorium be declared
on a decision until some evidence could be
gathered through experience. Thus, the
experimental project came into being."
University of the State of New York, the
State Department of Education and
Recreation, Report on Experiment: Girls
on Boys Interscholastic Athletic Teams,
I*larch 1969-June 1970, 1 (February,
1972).
The Department then conducted an experiment in which
one hundred schools over a sixteen-month period
maintained athletic teams on which both males and
females participated. The results of the experi-
ment were overwhelmingly favorable to continuing
mixed competition:
"Should the practice of allowing girls to
compete on boys’ athletic teams be con-
tinued? Eighty percent of the principles,
directors, women physical educators, coaches,
and physicians involved in the experiment
voted in favor of continuing the practice,
either as an experiment or as legal policy.
Slightly more than 90 percent of the boy
team members, girl participants, parents,
coaches, and opposing coaches also favored
continuation of the practice..."
As a result of the experiment. New York amended
its rules to allow females to compete with males.
Second, even if we assume, arguendo, that, on the
whole, females are unlikely to be able to compete with
males in non-contact interscholastic sports, this
fact alone would not justify precluding qualified
females like Brenden and St. Pierre from such
competition
.
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Idaho Probate code which granted males apreference over females in competing for the
administer an estate without regard for the
ndivioual qualifications of the female applicant.One oi the reasons which the Idaho Supreme Courtgave for upholding the statute was that the "legisla-ture when it enacted the statute evidently concludedthat in general men are better qualified to act as
an administrator than are women." Reed v. Reed 46s
P.2d 6 3b, (1970). Because of this, “in the IdahoSupreme Court’s opinion, eliminating females from
consideration is neither an. illogical or arbitrary
method devised by the legislature to resolve anissue that would otherwise require a hearing as to the
relative merits * * * of the two or more petitioning
relatives.” Reed at 638 .
The .United States Supreme Court did not discuss the
validity of the assumption that women are less
qualified than men to be administrators of estates.
Nonetheless, it concluded that the preference for
men was arbitrary:
”* * * To give a mandatory preference
to members of either sex over members
of the other, merely to accomplish the
elimination of hearings on the merits,
is to make the very kind of arbitrary
legislative choice forbidden by the
equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendments; * * *
By providing dissimilar treatment for
men and women who are * * * similarly
situabeu, the challenged section vio-
lates the equal protection clause. * * *"
Reed v. Reed
,
404 U.S. at 76-77.
In our view, Reed precludes a state from using
assumptions about the nature of females as a class,
to deny to females an individualized determination
of their qualifications for a benefit provided by
the state.
In the present case, the underlying purpose of the
High School League’s rule is, as we have indicated,
to insure that persons- with similar qualifications will
compete with each other. Yet, females, whatever their
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ar“cuarly in view of the recent statementt e Minnesota State Baord of Education calling on
for
bQard ® to provide equal education opportunityfemales, and the League's own stated commitmentto interscholastic athletics for females. This argu-
ment certainly cannot be used to deprive Brenden
and St. Pierre of their rights to equal protection ofthe law. With respect to these two females, the recordis clear. Their schools have failed to provide them
with opportunities for interscholastic competition
equal to those provided for males with similar
athletic qualifications. Accordingly, they are entitled
to relief.
Safety And Rules Of Conduct
In 197 3 j a women’s curfew case reached the sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals. 93 Ruth Robinson, a student at
Eastern Kentucky University, alleged that she had been
denied the equal protection of the laws because she was
subject to a curfew, while, at no time
,
were male students
at the same school subject to a curfew. The Eastern Kentucky
University regulations required that during their freshman
year, women were required to be in their residence hall
qqJRobinson v. Beard of Regents of Eastern Kentucky
University, 475 F.2d 707 (1973).
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by 10:30 p.m. from Monday through Thursday; 1 a.m. on Friday
and Saturday
; and midnight on Sunday
.
In their sophomore year, women could have no curfews,
provided that they met certain criteria:
1. The woman was required to have a "C" average, and
not be on social or academic probation;
2. She was required to pay a $15 fee per semester
(used to defray costs of security guards); and
3. If under 21, she was required to obtain the
permission of her parents.
During the hearing of this case Eastern Kentucky
University announced new regulations, somewhat more liberal
than those above. But still, there was a curfew system
for women, and none for men.
The Trial Court dismissed the case. The Circuit Court
of Appeals upheld the dismissal; Chief Judge Phillips
delivered the opinion of the- Appeals Court, which, in
part, said:
The equal protection clause does not require identical
treatment for all people. The states retain, under
the fourteenth amendment, the power to treat
different classes of persons in different ways. Heed
v. Reed
,
404 U.S. 71, 75-76, (1971); McDonald v. Board
of Election Commissioners , 39^ U.S. 802 , Cl9"S"9) •
This is a well-established doctrine, dating from
soon after the ratification of the fourteenth . amend-
ment. Courts often have upheld state classifications
based on sex. Therefore, the appellant has not
overcome the presumptive validity of the state regula-
tions involved, merely by shewing that one set of
rules applied to men and another to women students
at Eastern Kentucky.
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Before addressing the question of whether there has been
a deprivation of the right of appellant to equalprotection of the law, we must determine which
standard of review will be applicable. Two separate
and distinct standards of review under the equal
protection clause have emerged. The first, which ’as
a much longer history, is the traditional or rationalbasis test. It requires that a state classification
be upheld unless there is no rational relationship
between the classification imposed by the state and the
state’s reasonable goals. Under this standard, "(a)
statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any
state of facts reasonably may .be conceived to justify
it.” McGowan v. Maryland
, 366 U.S. 420, 426, (1961).
The second alternative standard, the compelling
state interest test, is relatively recent in formula-
tion and provides a greater burda-. for the state to meet
in justifying a classification in its statutes or regula-
tions. This test, which becomes applicable when a
fundamental right of the achieved party is at issue or
a suspect classification, such as race, is used,
requires that to justify the classification, the state
must demonstrate a compelling state interest. Funda-
mental interests which have triggered the application
of the compelling state interest test have included
the right to vote, Dunn v. Blumstein
,
4 0 5 U.S. 330,
337 (1972); the right to interstate travel, Shapiro
v. Thompson
,
39^ U.S. 6l8, (1969); the right to pro-
create, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel: Williamson,
316 U.S. 535, 541, (1942); and the right to fair
treatment in criminal appeals, Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12, (1956).
In its most recent case involving discrimination on
the basis of sex, the Supreme Court;, although srrixing
down the Idaho statue in question, did not apply the
compelling state interest standard. Instead, in
Reed, 404 U.S. at 76, the Court carefully framed
the issue as "whether a difference in the sex of
competing applicants for letters of administration
bears a rational relationship to a state objective..."
By the holding, the Court impliedly denied the
contention of the appellant in that case that sex
is a "suspect classification," capable of triggering
the application of the compelling state interest
standard. The most recent case in this circuit concern-
ing discrimination on the basis of sex also imposed
the rational relationship test and refused to find that
discrimination by sex was a suspect classification.
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°r traditional standard of equal protection revi
applicable here.
and are physically less capable of defending themselvesthan men. It concludes that the safety of women willbe protected by having them in their dormitories at
certain hours of the night. The goal of safety is alegitimate concern of the Board of Regents and this
court cannot say that the regulations in question are
not rationally related to the effectuation of this
reasonable goal.
...(Robinson) claims that the safety justification is
undermined by the shifting curfew for different nights
of the week asserting that the streets are no safer
at 12:30 a.m. on Saturday than they are at 12:30 a.m.
on Wednesday. We hold, howrever, that the State could
properly take into consideration the fact that on
weekend nights many coeds have dates and ought to be
permitted to stay out later than on weekday nights.
A classification having some reasonable basis does
not offend the equal protection clause merely
because it is not drawn with mathematical nicety.
It should be noted that Robinson was decided two months
before Front lero . Had Robinson been decided on the stricter
standard of the compelling state interest test (sex is a
suspect classification), the outcome of the case might
have been different.
Like many other institutions, Texas Women's University
had constructed residence hall facilities to house its
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students. It had, however, not anticipated ever having to
house male students, and consequently, did not construct
housing to accommodate them.
Also, like other single sex institutions, Texas
Women’s University began to admit members of the male
sex
.
Not having the space to build new residence halls, nor
the finances, the University developed rules which required
only women to live in residence halls, and allowed the
men to live off campus.
Two female students filed suit in the Denton County
District Court. That court ruled that the University's
regulation was invalid. The University appealed the
case to the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. 914
Chief Justice Massey delivered the opinion of the
State Court:
By way of preliminary remark it is to be observed
as was anticipated that uur courts are about to
embark upon tasks like unto that made necessary
by the litigation over racial discrimination.
Hopefully it will be neither as extended nor
as bitter.
94Texas Women's University v. Chay Klintaste, 521 S.W.
2d 9^9 (1975).
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The constitutional question arisen in the instant
case is not because of the admission or denial of
admission of a. student or student-group to a state
supported institution of higher learning because
of sex, but rather because of the denial—because of
sex—of some right or privilege to a student or
student group already admitted; and, further by way of
clarification, because—by parietal rule or regulation
—
of the denial of right or privilege td a student or
student group '(carved from a part of the sexual group
which comprises the greater majority of students) to
live. in. off-campus housing, while at the same time
permitting such privilege to other students because
there was a difference in their sex.
The rule was not and would not have become discrimina-
tory except for the admission of men, the minority
group, as students at Texas Women’s University.
However, under the law as quoted from Missouri ex rel.
Gaines v. Canada
,
Texas Women’s University is fore-
closed from acting in the exercise of good business
judgment in the interest of the State of Texas or
its own unit. Having provided housing facilities for
women it is unconstitutionally discriminating
against its male students when it does not provide
substantially equivalent and equal housing facilities
for men.
And, as a necessary corollary, it is unconstitutionally
discriminating against its female students when it
permits male students to live in off-campus private
housing facilities, but by its parietal rule denies
its female students the same right or privilege. It
is in this that there is invasion and denial of the
constitutional privilege possessed by members of the
class of persons bringing suit in the instant case.
We quote in abbreviated from the judgment (of the trial
court )
:
"IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that Defendant’s Parietal rule,
which requires every adult undergraduate
331
woman student to live in a unit of the
residential system... be, and the same
is hereby declared invalid, void, and
unenforceable as ... prohibited by the
equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment
. . .
.
"
This case was appealed to the Texas Supreme Court.
However, during litigation the college dropped the sex
classification, requiring only that students of both sexes
under the age of 23, live in college owned residence halls.
Classifications must be reasonable, not arbitrary
and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation
or regulation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike ( Reed ) . This is the rational relation
test by which some sex-based classifications have been
tested. Under this criteria, as long as the sex-based
classification was reasonable not arbitrary, or not
developed for administrative convenience, and as long as the
state could show that the classification was reasonably
related to a legitimate state purpose, the4-Vnq ^ w oiX u O v.
uphold the classification.
The author believes that the courts will now consider
sex-based classifications as suspect , and will require those
authorities who create such classifications to demonstrate
a compelling or overriding state interest and need for the
regulation. "What differentiates sex from non-suspect
statuses such as intelligence or physical disability , and
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aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that
sex characteristics frequently bear no relation to ability
to perform or contribute to society." (Fronteiro )
The author also believes that it is this compelling
—
-
e
-
rest test which will be applied when affirmative action
programs, as such program effect women, are tested in the
courts (see section 5.4 Racial Discrimination ).
College administrators should also note that the
Supreme Court has rejected the concept that constitutional
rights turn upon whether a government benefit is characterized
as a right or a privilege (see Graham v. Richardson
, 403 U.S.
365) . A se x—based classification cannot be based on the
premise that a constitutional right is not involved, only
a privilege (see Brenden )
.
5.4 Racial Discrimination
The modern question in racial discrimination is that
of "Affirmative Action" . While having the support and
backing of the Federal Government, as well as some popular
support, the concept of affirmative action has not been
resolved in the Courts. The con±Ltutional questions, however,
were raised to the public’s attention in DeFunis v. Odegaard
,
507 P . 2d 1169 (1973).
"The Law School of the University of Washington denied
admission to Marco DeFunis. The admission screening pro-
cedure for first year applicants consisted of an extensive
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procedure in which a predicted first year average (P.F.Y.A.)
was computed on the basis of college grades and the Law
School Aptitude Test (L.S.A.T.) scores. In addition,
recommendation forms and ethnic background were considered.
Ethnic minority students were compared with other minority
students and not with non-minority students during the
screening process. There was, however, no quota established
in accepting applications of minority students but less
weight was applied to the P.F.Y.A. of minority applicants.
Several minority students were admitted to the first year
class who, if they had been white, would have been denied
95
admission
.
DeFunis brought suit in the Superior Court of King
County, Washington, claiming that his fourteenth amendment
rights to equal protection had been violated by the law
school’s admission policy. That Court found in favor or
DeFunis, and the law school subsequently appealed the case.
The Supreme Court of Washington, hearing the case en
banc, and realizing the importance and impact of, and
popular interest in this case, delivered a detailed opinion,
which, in part stated:
Broadly phrased, the major question presented herein
^Young, D. Parker and Gehring, Donald D., The College^
Student and The Courts , College Administration Publications,
Inc., Asheville, N.C., 1 9 7
3
3 P* 106.
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Is whether the law school may, in consonance with the
equal protection provisions of the state and federal
constitutions, consider the racial or ethnic background
of applicants as one factor in the selection of
students
.
The essence of . .
.
(DePunis T ) fourteenth amendment
argument is that the law school violated his right to
equal protection of the laws by denying him admission,
yet accepting certain minority applicants with lower
PFYAs than ...(DePunis) who, but for their minority
status, would not have been admitted.
To answer this contention we consider three Implicit,
subordinate questions: (A) whether race can ever be
considered as one factor in the admissions policy of
a state law school or whether racial classifications
are per se unconstitutional because the equal pro-
tection of the laws requires that law school admissions
be "color-blind"; (B) if consideration of race is not
per se unconstitutional, what is the appropriate
standard of review to be applied in determining the
constitutionality of such a classification; and (C)
when the appropriate standard is applied does the
specific minority admissions policy employed by the
law school pass constitutional muster?
Relying solely on Brown v. Board of Education , 347 U.S.
483, (1954), the trial court held that a state law
school can never consider race as one criterion in its
selection of first year students. In holding that
all such racial classifications are per se unconstitu-
tional, the trial court stated in its oral opinion:
"Since no more than 150 applicants were
to be admitted the admission of less
qualified resulted in a denial of places
to those otherwise qualified. The
plaintiff and others in this group have
not, in my opinion, been accorded
equal protection of the laws guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment.
In 1954 the United States Supreme Court
decided that public education must be
equally available to all regardless of
race
.
After that decision the fourteenth amend-
ment could no longer be stretched to
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accommodate the needs of any race.
Policies of discrimination will inevit-
ably lead to reprisals. In my opinion
the only safe rule is to treat all races
alike 5 and I feel that is what is required
under the equal protection clause."
In _>rown v . Board of Education
,
the Supreme Court
addressed a question of primary importance at
page 493> 74 S.Ct. at page 691:
"Does segregation of children in public
schools solely on the basis of race,
even though the physical facilities and
other 'tangible' factors may be equal,
deprive the children of the majority
group of equal educational opportunities?
We believe that it does."
The court in Brown held the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment prohibits state law
from requiring the operation of racially segregated,
dual school systems of public education and requires
that the system be converted into a unitary, non-
racially segregated system. In so holding, the
Court noted that segregation inevitably stigmatises
black children:
To separate them from others of similar
age and qualifications solely because of
their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone. (Brown at 494).
Brown did not hold that all racial classifications
are per se unconstitutional; rather, it held that
invidious racial classifications— i.e., those that
stigmatize a racial group with the stamp of
inferiority—are unconstitutional. Even viewed in
a light most favorable to plaintiff, the
"preferential" minority admissions policy administered
by the law school is clearly not a form of
invidious discrimination. The goal of this policy
is not to separate the races , but to bring them
together. And, as has been observed,
"Preferential admissions do not represent
a covert attempt to stigmative the majority
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race as inferior; nor is it reasonable
to expect that a possible effect of the
extension of educational preferences to
certain disadvantaged racial minorities
will be to stigmatize whites." O’Neil,
Preferential Admissions: Equalizing
the Access of Minority Groups to Higher
Education, 80 Yale L.J . 699, 713 (1971).
While Brown v. Board of Education certainly provides
a starting point for our analysis of the instant case,
we do not agree with the trial court that Brown is
dispositive here. Subsequent decisions of the United
States Supreme Court have made it clear that in some
circumstances a racial criterion may be used--and
indeed in some circumstances must be used—by public
educational institutions in bringing about racial
balance. School systems which were formerly segre-
gated dejure now have an affirmative duty to remedy
racial imbalance.
Thus, the Constitution is color conscious to prevent
the perpetuation of discrimination and to undo the
effects of past segregation. In holding invalid North
Carolina’s anti-bussing law, which flatly forbade
assignment of any student on account of race or for the
purpose of creating a racial balance or ratio in the
schools and which prohibited bussing for such purposes,
the Court stated:
” (T)he statute exploits an apparently
neutral form to control school assignment
plans by directing that they be 'color
blind'; that requirement, against the
background of segregation, would render
illusory tne promise of brown v. Board
of Education. Just as the race of
students must be considered in deter-
mining whether a constitutional viola-
tion has occurred, so also must race be
considered in formulating a remedy.
North Carolina State Board of Education
v . SwanrT^ 402 U . S . 43 , 45 , (1971) •
Clearly, consideration of race by school authorities
does not violate the fourteenth amendment where the
purpose is to bring together, rather than separate,
the races. The "minority" admissions policy of the
law school,' aimed at insuring a reasonable representa-
tion of minority persons in the student body, is
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not invidious. Consideration of race is permissibleto carry out the mandate of Drown and a ,been required in some circumstances?.
. '
C °
* has
It is questionable whether
...(the law school}
-:- (DeFunls ) of a legal education by denyinghim admission. But even accepting this contention
E
arguendo the denial of a "benefit" on the basis
’
necessarily a per se violation of
ulj < amendment, if the racial classificationsee in a compensatory way to promote integration.
For example, in Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F. 2d 1254 a
of whdte teachers alleged that the school board
ad bypassed them in abolishing the regular promotion
schedule and procedure for selecting principals and
vice principals
,
and had given priority to black
candidates in order to increase the integration of the
system s faculty. In upholding the board's judgmentto suspend the ordinary promotion system upon racial
considerations, the court stated:
’ State action based partly on considerations
of color, when color is not used per se
,
and in furtherance of a proper governmental
objective, is not necessarily a violation
of the fourteenth amendment."
We conclude that the consideration of race as a
factor in the admissions policy of a state law school
is not a per se violation of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. We proceed, thaefore
,
to
the question of what standard of review is appropriate
to determine the constitutionality of such a classifica-
tion .
Generally, when reviewing a state-created classification
alleged to be in violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, the question is
whether the classification is reasonably related to a
legitimate public purpose. And, in applying this
"rational basis" test "(A) discrimination will not
be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 426, (1961).
However, where the classification is based upon race,
a heavier burden of justification is imposed upon the
state. In ’overturning Virginia's antimiscegenation
law, the Supreme Court explained this stricter
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standard of review:
The clear and central purpose of the
fourteenth amendment was to eliminate
official state sources of invidious
racial discrimination in the States...
...At the very least, the equal protection
clause demands that racial classifications,
especially suspect in criminal statutes,
be subjected to the 'most rigid scrutiny,'
...and, if they are ever to be upheld, they
must be shown to be necessary to the
accomplishment of some permissible state
objective, independent of the racial
discrimination which it was the object
of the fourteenth amendment to eliminate...
There is patently no legitimate overriding
purpose independent of invidious racial
discrimination which justifies this
classification." Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 10-11, (1967)
.
It has been suggested that the less strict "rational
basis" test should be applied to the consideration
of race here, since the racial distinction is being
used to redress the effects of past discrimination;
thus, because the persons normally stigmatized by
racial classifications are being benefited, the
action complained of should be considered "benign"
and reviewed under the more permissive standard.
However
,
the minority admissions policy is certainly
not benign with respect to non-minority students
who are displaced by it.
The burden is upon the law school to show that its
consideration of race in admitting students is
necessary to the accomplishment of a compelling state
interest
.
It can hardly be gainsaid that the minorities have
been, and are, grossly underrepresented in the law
schools—and consequently in the legal profession
—
of this state and this nation. We believe the state
has an overriding interest in promoting integration
in public education. In light of the serious under-
representation of minority groups in the law schools,
and considering that minority groups participate on
an equal basis in the tax support of the law
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school, we find the state interest in eliminating
racial imbalance within public legal education to be
compelling.
DePunis contends, however, that any discrimination in
this case has been* facto, rather than de jure.
Thus, reasons DePunis, since the law school itself
has not actively discriminated against minority
applicants, it may not attempt to remedy racial
imbalance in the law school student body, and, conse-
quently, throughout the legal profession. We
disagree
.
State ex rel. Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v
.
Brooks, «0 Wash. 2d 121, 128, 492 P.2d 536, 541
"(1972), we held that whether the nature of segregation
is de jure or de facto is of no consequence where a
voluntary plan of eliminating racial imbalance is
adopted by school officials.
Significantly, this case does not present for review a
court order imposing a program of desegregation.
Rather, the minority admissions policy is a voluntary
plan initiated by school authorities. Therefore, the
question before us is not whether the fourteenth
amendment requires the law school to take affirmative
action to eliminate the continuing effects of de
facto segregation; the question is whether the Con-
stitution permits the law school to remedy racial
imbalance through its minority admissions policy.
The de jure—de facto distinction is not controlling
in determining the constitutionality of the minority
admissions policy voluntarily adopted by the law
school. Further, we see no reason why the state
interest in ei-adicating the continuing effects of
past racial discrimination is less merely because the
law school itself may have previously been neutral in
the matter.
The state also has an overriding interest in providing
all law students with a legal education that.wili
adequately prepare them to deal with the society-
problems which will confront them upon graduation.
^
As the Supreme Court has observed, this cannot
through books alone:
" (A) lthough the law is a highly learned
profession, we are well aware that it
is an intensely practical one. The law
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school, the proving ground for legal
learning and practice, cannot be
effective in isolation from the
individuals and institutions with
which the law interacts. Pew students
and no one who has practiced law
wouid choose to study in an academic
vacuum, removed from the interplay
of ideas and the exhcange of views
with which the law is concerned."
Sweat t v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629. 634
TT950).
The legal profession plays a critical role in the
policy making sector of our society, whether decisions
be public or private, state or local. That lawyers,
in making and influencing these decisions, should
be cognizant of the views, needs and demands of all
segments of society is a principle beyond dispute.
The educational interest of the state in producing a
racially balanced student body at the law school is
compelling
.
Finally, the shortage of minority attorneys—and,
consequently, minority prosecutors, judges and public
officials— constitutes an undeniably compelling state
interest . If minorities are to live within the rule
of lav;, they must enjoy equal representation within
our legal system.
Once a constitutionally valid state interest has been
established, it remains for the state to show the
requisite connection between the racial classification
employed and that interest. The consideration of race
in the law school admissions policy meets the test of
necessity nere oeca.ut>t; racial imbalance in the lav;
school and the legal profession is the evil to be
corrected, and it can only be corrected by providing
legal education to those minority groups which have
been previously deprived.
It has been suggested that the minority admissions
policy is not necessary, since the same objective
could be accomplished by improving the elementary and
secondary education of minority students to a point
where they could secure equal representation in lav;
schools through direct competition with nonminority
applicants on the basis of the same academic criteria.
This would-be highly desirable, but 18 years have
passed since the decision in Brown v. Board ol nduce.--i. cn_,
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and groups are still grossly under-representedin law schools. If the law school Is forbidden fromtaking affirmative action, this under-representation
may be perpetuated indefinitely. No less restrictive
means would serve the governmental interest here- webelieve the minority admissions policy of the law
school to be the only feasible "plan that promises
realistically to work, and promises realistically to
work now." Green v. County School Board. 391 U.S. at
page 439.
'
We conclude that defendants have shown the necessity
of the racial classification herein to the accomplish-
ment of an overriding state interest, and have thus
sustained the heavy burden imposed upon them under the
equal protection provision of the fourteenth amendment.
There remains a further question as to the scope of
the classification. A validly drawn classification is
one "which includes all (and only those) persons
who are similarly si tuat ed . with respect to the purpose
of the law." Tussman & Tenbroek, "The Equal Pro-
tection of the Laws", 37 California Law Review
, 3m,
346 (1949). The classification used by defendants
does not include all racial minorities, but only four
(blacks, chicanos
,
indians and Philippine americans).
However, the purpose of the racial classification here
is to give special consideration to those racial
minority groups which are underrepresented in the law
schools and legal profession, and which cannot secure
proportionate representation if strictly subjected
to the standardized mathematical criteria for admission
to the law school.
In selecting minority groups for special consideration,
the law school sought to identify those groups most
in need of help. The chairman of the admissions com-
mittee testified that Asian-Americans were not treated
as minority applicants for admissions purposes since a
significant number could be admitted on the same
basis as general applicants. In light of the purpose
of the minority admissions policy, the racial classifica-
tion need not include all racial minority groups.
The state may identify and correct the most serious
examples of racial imbalance, even though in so doing
it does not provide an immediate solution to the entire
problem of equal representation within the legal
system.
We hold that' the minority admissions policy of the law
3^2
school
,
and the denial by the law school of admission
3
nis)
-*- (does not) violate... the equal nro-
States
n
constitution^
f°Urteenth amer,drasnt to the United
In a vigorous dissent. Chief
Justice Hunter, expressed his
were
:
Justice Hale, joined by
concerns, which, in part.
"Racial bigotry, prejudice and intolerance
will never be ended by exalting the political
rights of one group or class over that of
another. The circle of inequality cannot bebroken by shifting the inequities from one
man to his neighbor. To aggrandize the
first will, to the extent of the aggrandize-
ment, diminish the latter. There is no remedy
at law except to abolish all class distinc-
tions heretofore existing in law. For that
reason, the constitutions are, and ever ought
to be, color blind. Now the court says it
would hold the constitutions color conscious
that they may stay color blind. I do not see
how they can be both color blind and color
conscious at the same time toward the same
persons and on the same issues, so I dissent.
The court, as I see it, upholds palpably
discriminatory law school admission practices
of the state university mainly because they
were initiated for the laudable purpose of
enhancing the opportunities of members of
what are described as ’ethnic minorities’.
It thus suggests a new rule of constitutional
interpretation to be applied here that, if
ohe adiruLiiis trative intentions arc adequately
noble in purpose, Mr. DeFunis may be deprived
of equal protection of the laws and certain
special immunities and privileges may be
granted to others which, on the same terms,
are denied to him. One should keep in mind
the wisdom of the old saying thsb the road to
perdition is paved with good intentions.
The discriminatory character of the admissions
policy is, I think, well epitomized by the
trail court in its oral decision:
'The applications of the black
students were senarated from all
3^3
others and assigned for review
a b
}
ack student and a professor
who had worked closely with theCLEO program.
Some minority students were admitted
whose college grades and aptitude
test scores were so low that hadthey been whites their applications
would have been summarily denied
Excluding the Asians, only one
minority student out of 31 admitted
among the applicants had a predictedfirst year average above the
plaintiff's
.
Since no more than 150 applicants
were to be admitted the admission
of less qualified resulted in a
denial of places to those otherwise
qualified.
’
This method of selection operated to deprive
Mi
. DeFunis of his position in the entering
law classes both in 1570 and again in 1971.
Not being a member of a preferred ethnic
minority, he found his place taken by
others who not only possessed far lower
credentials and qualifications but among
whom were some who on the face of their
records were unqualified. He was the victim
of what in current parlance has come to be
described as ’affirmative action’, which
includes preferential treatment for the sake
of creating a more equitable racial balance
—
a process which the court now finds constitu-
tional .
If this be constitutional, then, of course, the
constitutions are not color blind; one racial
group may be given political or economic
preferment over another solely because of
race or ethnic origin. Yet, this was the
very thing that the fourteenth amendment
was designed to prevent. Ail races, and all
individuals, are entitled to equal opportunity
to enter the law school. To admit some solely
because of race or ethnic origin is to deny
others that privilege solely for the same
reasons, which in law amounts to a denial of
equal protection to the one while granting
special privileges and immunities to the
other
.
The United States District Court, Northern
District of California, recently stated what
I perceive to be the controlling principle
here when it said in its findings of fact
in Anderson v. San Francisco Unified Schoo l
District: "
'No one race or ethnic group
should ever be accorded preferen-
tial treatment over another. No
race or ethnic group should ever
be granted privileges or preroga-
tives not given to every other
race. There is no place for race
or ethnic groupings in America.
Only in individual accomplishment
can equality be achieved.’
With the possible exception of administering
justice, I accept the dicta in Brown v. Boa.rd
of Education, that education is probably the
most important function of state and local
government. It should not be forgotten,
however, that in striking down decisively the
separate but equal concept of segregated
schools, the rationale of that decision
rested on equality of opportunity and the
premise that segregation based on race or
color amounted categorically to an unconstitu-
tional denial of that equality. In speaking
of equality of educational opportunity, the
court there said. "Such an opportunity,
where the state has undertaken to provide it
,
is a right which must be made available to
all on equal terms.
...If the fourteenth amendment stands for any-
thing at all, it should be clear that it
stands for the principle that all discrimina-
tion based on race, religion, creed, color
or ethnic background by any state, its con-
stitutions, its subdividions , or its agencies,
is prohibited.
The rationale of Anderson , I think, expresses
the principles which should govern the
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DeEunl_s ease That court held unconstitutional
school district’s plan to give preferencein employment: and promotions to members of
ethnic
. minorities in administrative and
supervisory positions, such as principals,
assistant principals, deans and heads ofdepartments a plan designed to increase the
numerical representation of ethnic minoritiesin the administration of the schools. That
court, in holding the scheme unconstitutional
said that 'The key issue in this case is
whether cr not a classification which is based
on race is valid,' and answered it with a
statement of principles which ought to
control here:
’Preferential treatment under the
guise of "affirmative action" is the
imposition of one form of racial
discrimination in place of another.
The questions that must be asked in
this regard are: must an individual
sacrifice his right to be judged on
his own merit by accepting discrimina-
tion based solely on the color of his
skin? How can we achieve the goal of
equal opportunity for all if, in the
process, we deny equal opportunity
to some?’
Mr. DePunis came before the bar of the Superior
Court much as did petitioners, parents of
school children, in Brown v. Board of Education
,
347 U.S. 483, (1954), asking that he not be
denied admission to the university law school
because of race or ethnic origin. The trial
court properly ordered his admission. So,
too, would I, and, therefore, I would affirm."
The rigorous majority opinion, coupled with an
equally eloquent dissent, left the affirmative action
question, in the minds of many people, still unresolved.
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, and the nation,
particularly educators and leaders of minority groups
waited for a ruling by the high court.
3^6
DeFunis, who had been allowed to attend classes and
work towards his law degree while his case was being litigated,
had, in the time that it took to appeal the case to the
Supreme Court, completed his courseowrk, and was scheduled
to graduate when the Court met to deliberate on a decision.
In a 5 to 4 decision the Court held that because DeFunis
was about to graduate, he no longer had standing to bring
his case to court, and therefore the case was declared moot.
The constitution does not change, only reality. We
have seen examples of this in previous chapters, and here
we see how the attitude of the Court, and that of the
country, has changed in 80 years: the equal protection
clause which was used to develop separate but equal facilities
for whites and blacks on railway coaches (see Plessy ) , in
essence discriminating against blacks, is now used to allow
ameliorative programs to educate and benefit minorities; the
equal protection clause that was designed to protect the
black, now has been enlarged to protect all minorities,
women, the aged, and all historically oppressed groups.
The controversy that affirmative action and preferential
treatment programs has created, has been sensitive,
devisive, and widespread. While the Supreme Court rarely
receives more than one or two "friend of the court briefs
when considering a question of great importance, in the
DeFunis case, it received more than 30. This was an indication
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of the concern and interest in the decision of the Court.
Those that oppose such affirmative action and
preferential treatment programs contend that the constitu-
tion must be "color blind", that it should not be stretched
to accommodate the needs of any racial group (see the
trial court decision in DeFunis ) , and that preferential
treatment under the guise of affirmative action is simply
the imposition of one form of racial discrimination in place
of another. In essence, they take the equal protection clause
for what it says: everyone should have equal opportunity
and be judged on his/her own merits.
Those that favor affirmative action programs claim
that the constitution must be, and has been, "color
conscious" in order to prevent discrimination. They point
out that the Supreme Court, in its landmak Brown decision
gave strong consideration to racial c lassificatons
,
and
that several federal and state courts, as well as
legislatures, have considered the question of racial
classifications when attempting to racially balance public
school systems. Further, they indicate that the Supreme
Court ruled that the equal protection clause only prevents
invidious discrimination, and that affirmative action is
not invidious. These proponents of preferential programs
hold to the popular notion that minorities, discriminated
against in the past, should have special help to overcome
the effect of past inferior treatment.
Supreme Court, if
There is reason to believe that the
faced with a decision in the DeFunis case, might have
supported the preferential admissions program at the Univer-
sity of Washington. The Court has held, since the wartime
Japanese relocation cases (see Hirabayashi and Korematsu )
.
that racial classifications are highly suspect, and that
classifications which discriminate against or harm a race
are unconstitutional. 90 But the Court has left open the
possibility that it could sustain a racial classification
if it was for ameliorative purposes and necessary to
satisfy an overriding or compelling state interest. 97 (see
McLaughlin v. Florida
, 379 U.S. 184 (1964)).
"...The power to classify on the basis of race is
always dangerous...", no matter how good the intentions. 9 ^
To this extent
,
and consistent with the two—tier approach
to testing classifications, the Court would require
any public college or university, which is employing
an affirmative action program, to prove an overriding
need for, or compelling state interest in such a
program. Racial classifications are inherently suspect
9 O’Neil, Robert M., "Preferential Admissions:
Equalizing The Access of Minority Groups to Higher Education"
80 Yale Law Journal 699 (1971) at 707.
97 ibid at 708.
9
^ibid at 710.
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and must be tested against the compelling interest or new
equal protection test. The burden of proof that such
affirmative action programs are necesary will rest on the
college officials.
In order to satisfy the court, and the requirements
of the equal protection clause, the college officials
must prove, 1) that the racial classifications employed
are not invidious; 2) that such classifications are related
to an overriding or compelling state interest, i.e., proof
that the racial classification seeks to remedy the effects
of past racial discrimination; 3) that the use of race is a
rational means of implementing that state interest, i.e.,
proof that the primary goal and probable effect of the
preferential policy will be the equalization of access for
disadvantaged minority groups; and 4) that there are no
QO
other alternatives. Are there other non-racial options?
The author believes that there are three possible
directions that the courts will take when considering
preferential treatment questions in the future:
1. The courts, continuing to apply the compelling
state interest test, will give judicial sanction
to programs which help minorities to overcome
the effects past inferior treatment, and will
99 ibid at 711 ar.d 741.
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expand the protections of the equal protection
clause to include all oppressed groups, or groups
which have, for whatever the reason, received
inferior treatment in the past (women, the aged,
etc.). This approach has its drawbacks (today’s
oppressed could be tomorrow’s oppressor, and
vice-versa), and a more conservative climate in
this country, along with a conservative court, may
call for the abolishment of such an interpreta-
tion (the Constitution does not change, only
reality)
;
2. Once there ceases to be a compelling state interest,
such as seeking to remedy the past effects of
discrimination, the courts will no longer uphold
preferential treatment programs which are based on
race or other "suspect criteria". It may be
years in the future, and a utopian idea, but
improved education for all minorities in the
elementary and secondary schools, may lead to
equal opportunities for all minorities; all
people. In essence, when society reaches the
point where it feels that it has done all that
it can to remedy the effects of past discrimination,
there will no longer be a compelling need for
preferential programs. (see chapter 2, section
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2.1); and/or,
3. The Courts will return to a more "middle of the
road policy
,
disallowing "suspect critieria" classi-
fications in preferential programs, such as those
based on race, sex, alienage, etc., but will
allow such programs to exist for the benefit of
such non-suspect groups as "the disadvantaged".
Such a change from the suspect to non-suspect
criteria for the preferential treatment of a
group, will allow the courts to test that
classification’s constitutionality by the less
stringent "rational relation" test, i.e., that
such preferential programs are reasonably related
to a legitimate state interest.
5.5 Resident Classificat ion/Out
Of State Tuition
The State of Ohio, like other states, had authorized
the Boards of Trustees of its State Universities to charge
a reasonable tuition for non-resident students. Under this
authority, the Trustees of the University of Toledo adopted
policies for classifying non-resident students. Rules
four and five read as follows:
#4. A student who enters the State of Ohio from
another state for the primary purpose of enrolling
in an Ohio- institution of higher education shall
be considered to be a nonresident student during
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the period of continuous enrollment as a full-time
student in an Ohio institution of higher education.
#5 A student classified
. -
as a nonresident student maybe reclassified as a resident of Ohio for
education subsidy purposes if:
higher
a. the parents of a student under 21 years of age
take up residence in Ohio and one of the parents is
gainfully employed on a full-time basis in Ohio;
b. the student over 21 years of age presents a clear
and convincing evidence to an administrative officer
or administrative panel of the institution and there is
a finding of exceptional circumstances justifying a
change in classification because of having established
a separate residence in Ohio for 12 months or more
preceding the request for reclassification and because
of having made definite commitments to enter into
gainful employment in Ohio upon completion of a degree
program.
Russell Kelm, a graduate of the University of Toledo
Law School, brought suit in Federal District Court seeking
to recover out-of-state tuition fees he had paid, and
claiming that the regulation classifying non-resident
students at the University of Toledo violated his fourteenth
amendment rights of equal protection of the laws by creating
an arbitrary and unreasonable classification. The District
Court dismissed the case, and Kelm appealed to the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals. 100
The trial Court determined the following:
The court finds as fact that Kelm assumed residence
in Toledo, Ohio, on or about June 1, 1968. He
worked full time until October, 1968. He was
100Kelm v. Carlson, 473 F . 2d 1267 (1973)*
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married in the interim, his wife entering upon full-time employment as a teacher under a Toledo Board ofEducation contract. He enrolled in the University ofToledo College of Law in October of 1968.
Initiai enrollment was as a non-resident student asdefined in Rule 1 of the 1968 University of Toledo
Rules.
• .
.
(Kelm) enrolled in an R.O.T.C. Program because
of a 1-A draft classification.
He has resided in Toledo and has been continuously
enrolled in the College of Law except for a required
period of active duty. He has had some interim employ
ment and has been self-supporting.
One year later (October, 1969), without seeking the
reclassification as provided for in Rule 6 of 1968
rules and Rule 5 of 1969 rules, ...(Kelm) unilaterally
classified himself and registered as an Ohio resident
student, paying the lower student fees allowed thereby
On January 22
,
1971
,
the bursar of the University,
denied ...(Helm’s) resident status claim retroactive
to October, 1969, and billed ...(Helm) for five
quarters of non-resident surcharge fees. ...(Helm)
was required to register as a non-resident. The
deposited fees represent the total due the University
for non-residence classification.
Thereafter, an appeal was taken to the Residency
Committee in writing by and with supporting documents.
On February 26
,
1971
,
Kelm was notified that his
reclassificaticr. was denied, and there was no
further appeal provided ... (Kelm) was finally notified
on March 8
,
1971
,
that a requested oral hearing or
re-hearing was and will be denied.
In stating its reasons for denying Kelm’s application
for exemption from the non-resident rule, the "Residence
Committee” of the University of Toledo said,
The Committee finds that Mr. Kelm did not present
adequate evidence pursuant to Rule 5 b of Rules
Governing Ohio Resident Qualifications of the
University of Toledo or has made definite commitments
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to enter into gainful employment in Ohio upon comple-tion of his degree program in the absence cf any evidencepresented to the Committee upon which it could determine
that Mr. Kelm had an opportunity for employment in theform of an available position in Ohio for his accept-
ance .
It is this reasoning of the Residence Committee that
concerned the Court.
Circuit Judge Edwards declared the opinion of the
court, which said, in part:
As we have indicated, we recognize that Ohio and its
universities have a right to charge different fees
to out-of-state residents than to its own citizens.
We also recognize that it is neither arbitrary nor
unreasonable for it to place a strong burden of
proof as to change of residence on a former out-of-
state student who claims Ohio residency lest such
claim be founded only upon the student’s desire to
escape the tuition surcharge. We also recognize the
reasonableness of the one-year residency requirement
before application for residency status for tuition
purposes can be filed.
We likewise agree with appellees that the regulation
we deal with herein is not concerned with one of the
fundamental rights like voting or welfare so to be
tested against the ’compelling state interest
'
standard
.
The heavy burdens the challenger in this case has to
bear have been desci iucu onus j.n one Ox the j.eao.j.iig
cases dealing with the application of the equal
protection clause of a state regulation:
"In the area of economics and social
welfare, a State does not violate the
equal protection clause merely because the
classifications made by its laws are
imperfect. If the classification has
some 'reasonable basis', it does not
offend the Constitution simply because
the classification 'is not made with
mathematical nicety or because in
practice it results in some inequality.'
Llndsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co .
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220 U.S. 6l, 78. 'The problems of government
are practical ones and may justify, if they
do not require, rough accommodations— illogi-
cal, it may be, and unscientific.'
Metropolis Theatre Co . v. City of
Chicago
,
228 U.S. 6 1
,
69-70. 'A statutory
discrimination will not be set aside
if any state of facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify it.' McGowan v.
Maryland
, 366 U.S. 420, 426, (1961')
.
Even more recently the Supreme Court has set forth
a minimum equal protection test:
The tests to determine the validity of
state statutes under the equal pro-
tection clause have been vigorously
expressed, but this Court requires, at
a minimum, that a statutory classifica-
tion bear some rational relationship to
a legitimate state purpose. Morey v.
Doud, 354 U.S. 457, (1957); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, (1886^
The word "resident" has many meanings in the law,
largely determined by the statutory context in which
it is used. Obviously, however, when an Ohio statute
and an Ohio school regulation seek to distinguish
between temporary sojourners in Ohio who reside
there only for school purposes and Ohio residents,
the intention of the party and what he has done to
evidence that intent becomes critical. But here
the regulation has imposed a condition completely
beyond the control of the applicant . As we have
pointed out..., the condition can act as an
impassable barrier to many students who in utter
good faith intend to and, for all other purposes,
have succeeded in establishing residency in Ohio.
Of course, if Ohio made the actual possession of
a job a general condition of Ohio residency for
purposes say of welfare or voting, such a condition
would be struck down forthwith. Shapiro v. Thompson
,
394 U.S. 618, (1969). With lesser interests than
these at stake, it is still relevant to note that
every legitimate state concern with weeding out
fictitious claims of residency by out-of-state ^
students can be served with "more precise tests
than the test which is attacked herein.
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reasons we have outlined above, we hold thatthe University ol Toledo to require proof that alaw student has actually secured post-graduation
employment in Ohio as a condition precedent to grant-ing him residence status represents a violation ofthe equal protection clause of the Federal Constitu-tion.
In a short, terse statement. Circuit Judge McCree
dissented from the majority opinion. In part, he said.
In this appeal, the State of Ohio permits a change
in status, but only in certain limited circumstances.
A student over 21 years of age, or an emancipated
minor, may be reclassified a resident for purposes
of tuition if he presents "clear and convincing
evidence" that he has established a separate residence
in Ohio for at least one year preceding the request
for reclassification and that he has made "definite
commitments to enter into gainful employment in
Ohio" upon his graduation. The chairman of the
University of Toledo’s Residence Committee indicated
that the Committee considers the requirements of this
rule to be satisfied only if the applicant submits
"a letter from the prospective employer indicating
that a definite employment agreement has been
reached .
"
We test the constitutionality of this university-
regulation by the traditional equal protection test:
does the regulation bear a rational relationship to
a legitimate state interest? Ohio has a legitimate
interest in seeing that nonresident students who want
to enjoy the resident tuition rate are reasonably
likely to remain in the state for some appreciable
period following completion of their studies. I
believe that there is a reasonable relationship between
the certainty of gainful employment and the likeli-
hood of remaining in the state.
Our role is not to substitute our judgment for that of
the state but merely to determine if the relationship
posited by the state is unreasonable. Especially in
view of the great importance to many of cur nation’s
finest institutions of higher education of this
question of residency for tuition purposes, we
should be careful in evaluating the permissibility
of legislative judgments relating to purely
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economic matters.
In Jagnanden v. Giles
, 379 P. Supp. 1178 ( 197/4 ) , the
court faced a similar problem. Edward and Leonard
Jagnandan and their father William were citizens of the
Republic of Guyana. They entered the United States in
July of 1969, and were classified as permanent residents by
the Immigration Service. In September 1969
,
this family
moved to Mississippi, where they have since lived, and
where William was employed as a minister, and paid state
taxes. All three hold Mississippi driver’s licenses.
Edward and Leonard enrolled as full-time students
at Mississippi State University in the fall of 1970 .
William entered the same school, as a Master’s degree
candidate, in the spring of 1972.
William, seeking to establish his family’s eligibility
as state residents for tuition purposes, applied to the
Director of Admissions and Registrar for residence status.
He was denied resident status by the Registrar, and this
was upheld by the Residency Appeals Committee, and later
by the President of the University. The Jagnandans felt
that they should be classified as in-state students, and
charged that the only reason they were denied this status
was because of a rule which stated "all aliens are
classified as non-residents." They sought no further
appeal from the University, but filed suit in Federal
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District Court. District Judge Ready delivered the opinion
of the court, which, in part, siad:
Addressing the merits of plaintiff’s individual claims,
their most compelling argument is that the present
case falls squarely within the holding of the
Supreme Court in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, (1971).
In Graham
,
it was held that state statutes of
Arizona and Pennsylvania denying welfare benefits
to resident aliens or aliens, who had not resided
within the United States for a specified period
of years were unconstitutional, as violative of
the equal protection clause. In reaching this
conclusion, the court re-affirmed that an alien
is a "person" within the meaning of the equal
protection clause, and stated that classification
based on alienage are "inherently suspect" and subject
to "close judicial scrutiny". The Court, speaking
through Justice Blackmun, declared:
" (C ) lassifications based on alienage, like
those based on nationality or race, are
inherently suspect and subject to close
scrutiny. Aliens as a class are a prime
example of a ’discrete and insular’
minority ... for whom such heightened judicial
solicitude is appropriate." 403 U.S. at
372.
Thus, ...(the Jagnanden’s) submit that the rationale
of Graham and its progeny are directly applicable to
the statute under critical review. We are in full
accord with ...(the Jagnanaen : s) contentions. The
classification created by the statute indisputably
imposes greater financial burden on alien students,
who are bona fide residents of the State , to attend a
Mississippi institution of higher learning solely
because they are not citizens of the United States.
Such a distinction is inherently suspect as violative
of the Equal Protection Clause. Absent a compelling
state interest to justify classificati on based—on
alienage, the statute must fail . (emphasis added)
We are unpersuaded by defendant's suggestion that
since education is not a fundamental crbasic constitu-
tional right, the standard of strict judicial
359
by
r
set?Ld
iS
doct??ner
b
for- a *?
*•«>“*«*
to strict scrutiny where such classmeat <on iTllll*on a suspect criterion like race na n based
!L
be
I!k
a
i
lenage \ lrreSpectlve °f whether the
’
°^r lfl^
ti0n
J-
mP lnGes upon a fundamental or basicright. It remains for us to examine crJticallv
substantialitj. of the state’s purpose of interests
TT
n
c
th
?
an
^£?™ent of statute. Griffiths.
,
7
u
(1
? /3) was Pul te explicit regarding thestate s burden to justify the use of a suspect
classification, viz: p 1
The Court has consistently emphasized
that a State which adopts a suspect
classification 'bears a heavy burden
of justification', McLaughlin v. Florida
379 U.S. 184, (1964), a burden which
,
*
though variously formulated, requires the
State to meet certain standards of
proof. In order to justify the use of
a suspect classification, a State must
show that its purpose or interest is
both constitutionally permissible and
substantial, and that its use of the
classification is 'necessary to the
accomplishment' of its purpose or the
safeguarding of its interest." at
413 U.S. 721.
We perceive that defendants have, by no means, met
the burden of justifying the classification of all
aliens residing in Mississippi as nonresidents for
college tuition purposes. The strongest proffer
of compelling state purpose is the notion that the
statute represents a reasonable exerc. is? of sound
state economic policy, which has a direct bearing
upon the allocation of limited funds for educational
purposes. This proposition is the substantial
equivalent of the "special public interest" plea
which Graham rejected. Although not precisely
articulated as such in the case sub judice,
defendant’s claim is that a state enjoys a
"special public interest" in favoring its own
citizens over aliens in the distribution of the
benefits of higher education where economic
resources to support a program of higher education
are limited.
The Supreme Court in Graham emphasized that whatever
3 6 0
interest a state may have to limit or condition
expenditures or preserve the fiscal integrity of Itsprograms, such considerations are inadequate to justifyinvidious discrimination against aliens.
Hence, although defendants may be concerned with the
strain of educational financing and budget balancing
—
concededly such considerations do bear a rational
relationship between the classification and a
legitimate state purpose—they nevertheless fall short
of constituting compelling need for the State tojustify the classification created by the statute.
Most assuredly, this is not to say that aliens may
not be subjected to any residency requirement
whatever for tuition purposes, but only that
Mississippi cannot permissibly draw a distinction
between residency requirements imposed on the student
who is a United States citizen and one who is a
lawfully admitted alien. By state statute,
Mississippi permits a citizen to be admitted as a
resident and become eligible for residency tuition
rates at an institution of higher learning after he
has continuously resided in Mississippi for a minimum
of twelve months Just prior to admission. It is
precisely because the statute mandates that lawfully
admitted aliens may not be entitled to the same con-
sideration after one year's uninterrupted Mississippi
residency that the statute, on its face, creates an
invidious discrimination and offends the equal pro-
tection clause.
Here, two out-of-state tuition cases are considered.
In the first, Kelm , no "suspect criteria" was used in
creating the uut-oi-state classification, so the court
utilized the "rational relation test" to determine if there
had been any violation of the equal protection clause.
A statutory classification must bear some rational
relationship to a legitimate state purpose (see Ylck Wo ) ,
and such a classification will not be set aside of any
set if facts may be conceived to justify it (see McGov/en
v. Maryland
,
366 U.S. 420).
361
Kelm had applied for in-state status, but was turned
down because he "...did not present adequate evidence...
that he had made definite commitments to enter into
gainful employment in Ohio upon completion of his degree
program." The court found that such a requirement, the basis
for classifying Kelm as an out-of-state student, was not
rationally related to the legitimate state interest of
requiring out-of-state students to pay a higher tuition
fee
.
The Jagnanden case was different. He had been
classified as an out-of-state student because he was an
alien, and only for that reason. Classifications based
on alienage (or any othe suspect criteria) are subject
to close judicial scrutiny. (See Graham v Richardson , 403
U.S. 365 (1971))* The stricter compelling state interest
test was applied by the court, and the college could not
justify such a classification.
5 . 6 Alhie tics
Eleven student athletes were admitted to California
State University at Sacramento (CSUS) under the "four percent
rule". This rule allowed that students admitted under
the program need not take standard achievement tests, such
as SAT’s or ACT’s, but could be admitted because of
such factors as economics, motivation, and maturity. In
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this case, each of the students, because of their educa-
tional background, would not have been admitted to CSUS
,
under the usual admission criteria.
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
has as one of its goals, to ensure that the student-
athlete is an integral part of the student body. Pursuant
to this, the NCAA has adopted the following rule:
(b) A member institution shall not be eligibleto enter a team or individual competitors in anNCAA sponsored meet, unless the institution in the
conduct of all of its intercollegiate athletic pro-™ limits ... eligibility for participation in
athletics or in organized athletic practice sessionsduring the first year in residence to student-
athletes who have a predicted minimum grade point
average of at least 1.600 (based on a maximum of
4.000) as determined by the Association’s national
prediction tables or Association-approved conference
or institutional tables. ”101
An official interpretation of the ”1.600 rule" by
the NCAA reads, in part:
A student-athlete who practices or participates
while ineligible under the provisions of (the
1.600 rule), shall be charged with the loss of one
year of practice and varsity eligibility by his
4 ^ r* 4- 4 4-,, 4- 4 -
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shall be the next year the student is in attendance
If a student takes neither the SAT nor the ACT
test, it is impossible, under NCAA rules, to predict a
1.600 grade point average (or higher), regardless of his
This rule was amended in 1973, and as of the
1974-75 academic year, will require that the student
graduate from high school with a 2.00 academic average.
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class in high school.
At least one of the students had taken the ACT test,
but did not receive a score high enough to predict a
1.600 average. The other students either did not take the
SAT or ACT tests, or took one or both, and did not score
high enough to predict a 1.600 grade point average.
Regardless of the fact that none of the student-
athletes could predict a 1.600 average, as required by the
NCAA, the University, through error, oversight, and mis-
understanding, admitted the students and certified their
eligibility, under NCAA regulations, to participate in
athletic competition.
During their freshman year, each student participated
on a college athletic team, and each received an academic
average of 1.600 or higher.
When CSUS had determined that it erred in allowing
the students to compete in athletics, it immediately notified
the NCAA. The NCAA required that the University declare
these students ineligible for one year, and this the
University did.
The students brought suit in Federal District Court,
alleging that the NCAA "1.600 rule" violated their
fourteenth amendment rights to equal protection of the
The trial court decided for the students, and thelaws
.
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NCAA appealed the case.’*'^
The Court, after determining that the NCAA involve-
ment did constitute "state action", delivered its opinion,
which, in part, states:
Assuming that in the circumstances of this case the
• .
.
(students) claimed rights or privileges are protected
by the Constitution, we do not believe that the 1.600
Rule, as interpreted, results in an unreasonable
classification in violation of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
The standard which must be applied in reviewing this
case is whether the classification system of the
NCAA is shown to bear some reasonable relationship
to its legitimate purposes. In Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71, (1971), the Supreme Court stated:
"In applying that clause, this Court
has consistently recognized that the
fourteenth amendment does not deny to
States the power to treat different
classes of persons in different ways.
The equal protection clause of that
amendment does, however, deny to
States the power to legislate that
different treatment be accorded to
persons placed by a statute into
different classes on the basis of
criteria wholly unrelated to the
objective of that statute. A
classification ’must be reasonable,
net arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a
fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that
all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike.’ Royster
Guano Co., v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,
415, (1920).
The evidence of NCAA reveals that NCAA adopted, the
1.600 Rule in order to reduce the possibility of
1(
^Associated Students Tnc. , Etc , v. National ^
Collegiate Athletic Association , 493 ~F . 2d 1251 (1974).
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exploiting young athletes by recruiting those
who would not be representative of an institution's
student body and probably would be unable to meet thenecessary academic requirements for a degree; and alsoto foster and preserve the concept of college
athletics as a sport engaged in by athletes^who werefirst and primarily college students, and to recognizethe probability that any student who could not meetthe requirements of the Rule should not engage in
athletics during his freshman year, but shoulddevote his full time to study.
The trial court stated: "Without deciding the
question, it appears that this classification is
reasonably related to the purposes of the 1.600
Rule." However, the court concluded that the
1.600 Rule, as interpreted, created a classification
which did not conform to equal protection requirements.
We are unable to agree with this conclusion.
We believe that the 1.600 Rule's classification is
reasonably related to the purposes of the rule for
which it was enacted. All persons in a similar
class or in similar circumstances are intended to be
treated alike. It may be that in the application
of the Rule unreasonable results may be produced in
certain situations, which is not unusual in the
application of a generalized rule such as the one here.
We further believe that the Rule, as interpreted,
announcing the penalty for non-compliance, is reason-
ably related to the purposes for which the Rule was
enacted. The ...( students ) argue that it is this
official interpretation of the Rule which creates
a classification which does not conform to equal
protection requirements. It is contended that once a
student lias earned a grade point; average over a
period of time, then it is unreasonable, in light of
the purposes of the Rule, to impose sanctions against
the student-athlete because he failed for some
unknown reason to take the test or to predict the
1.600 grade point. It is urged that any sanctions
imposed should be predicated on the actual grade
point average of the student attained during his
freshman year while competing in intercollegiate
athletics during his first year. It is the contention
of the ...( students ) that since the sutdent-athletes
in this action earned at least a 1.600 grade point
average at the end of their freshman year at CSUS,
the 1.600' Rule of the NCAA, as interpreted, is in
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violation of the equal protection clause and istherefore unconstitutional as far as it seeks todeclare those student-athletes ineligible for
participation in intercollegiate athletics for aperiod of time, in this instance one year, for the
reason that they had failed to predict a 1.600
grade point average prior to entrance to CSUS, and
practiced for and competed in intercollegiate
athletics during their first year at CSUS.
Although the district court agreed with the theory
of plaintiffs, we are unable to do so... In our
opinion, NCAA's official interpretation of its 1.600
Rule does not create a classification which violates
the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
5.7 Dress and Appearance
Cases involving dress and appearance are sometimes
difficult to categorize. At times, appearance has been
argued as a declaration of one's opinions, and therefore
covered by the first amendment (symbolic speech); at other
times, dress and appearance cases have been decided on
"due process" issues. Presented here are two cases where
dress and appearance codes raised questions of equal
protection
.
In Zachx\y v. Bruwfl
,
299 7". Supp. 13^0 ( 1.9 )
,
two
students were administratively withdrawn from Jefferson
State Junior College, in Alabama, because they failed to
conform to rules pertaining to permissable hair styles
for male students.
As members of a local rock band, the students had let
their hair grow long, in v;hat the court referred to as a
"page boy" haircut.
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One of the students, Zachry, was an Eagle Scout, and
had acted as an assistant scoutmaster in the community.
Neither student had ever been a disciplinary problem;
and each was considered to be outstanding academically;
in addition, Zachry was a- candidate for president of his
freshman class.
The college officials admitted that the only reason
for withdrawing the two students was their dislike for
"exotic hair styles." The Court noted that "there is no
suggestion that the page-boy haircuts .. .had any effect
upon the health, discipline, or decorum of the
institution .
"
Chief Judge Lynne, after reviewing the right of
colleges and universities to develop reasonable rules and
regulations to govern the conduct of members of the college
community, delivered the opinion of the District Court,
which in part, said;
The wide latitude permitted legislatures of the
states and therefore the administrators of public
colleges to classify students with respect to dress,
appearance and behavior must be respected and pre-
served by the courts. However, the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits
classification upon an unreasonable basis. This
court is of the firm opinion that tbe classification
of male students attending Jefferson State Junior
College by their hair style is unreasonable and fails
to pass constitutional muster.
It needs to be emphasized that the college officials
have not sought to justify such classification for
moral and social reasons. The only reason stated
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e was their understandablel e o long hair on men students. Therequirement that these students cut their hair to con-form to normal or conventional styles is just as
unreasonable as would palpably be a requirement thatall male students of the college wear their hairdown over their ears and collars.
In Calbillo v. San Jacinto Junior College
, 305 F. Supp.
857 (1969), Carlos Calbillo was indefinitely suspended
because ge grew a beard. This was in direct violation of
the college’s regulation, which read:
Male students at San Jacinto Junior College are
required to wear reasonable hair styles and to
have no beards or excessively long sideburns.
Calbillo was a student in good standing, and the
only reason given for his suspension was his violation of
the above rule.
District Judge Singleton delivered the opinion of the
Court
:
The establishment of an educational program requires
the formulation of rules and regulations necessary
for the maintenance of an orderly program of
classroom learning. In formulating regulations,
including those pertinent to the discipline of
students, school officials have a wide latitude of
discretion, but these officials are always bound by
the requirement that the rules and regulations must
be reasonable. Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School
District, 392 F.2d 697' "(1968); Griffin v
."
Tatum
,
300 F. Supp. 60 (1969); Breen v. Kahl , 296 F. Supp.
702 (1969); Zachry V. Brown , 299 F. Supp. 1360
(1967). It is not for this Court to consider whether
such rules and regulations are wise or expedient,
but merely whether they constitute a reasonable
exercise of power and ' discretion on the part of school
authorities. Regulations which are essential to
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on school property are reasonable...
} officials are under a burden to justify thiseiiort to regulate personal appearance whether thatattempted justification be in terms of disciplinehealth, morals, physical danger to others, ordistraction" of others from their school work.Breen v. Kah l, at 706. It must be demonstrated
that the exercise of the forbidden rights would
materially and substantially interfere with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation
of the school." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Communit y School District
, 393 U.S. at 509, quotingBurnside v. Byars
, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966).
In an attempt to justify the regulation in question,
school officials set forth several reasons for its
promulgation. The rule was first adopted and enforced
in the Fall of 1967 . According to school officials
several things happened in the Spring and Summer of
1967 which led the Board of Regents to believe that the
adoption of such a rule was advisable. First, a few
people called "hippies" enrolled in the school and
one female student was heard to protest that their
odor and appearance was distracting. Second, the
Board of Regents visited several California campuses
and observed at first hand what the campus atmosphere
was like where "those people" (presumably "hippies")
were in school in large numbers. Third, school
officials received a report from the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation which pointed out
that riots and demonstrations on college campuses
were being carried out by students who were moving
from one campus to another. He advised college
administrators to look over their student bodies.
The administrators of San Jacinto Junior College
observed aneir student body and found that some of
their "hippies" were from Berkeley. And, finally,
the school officials observed that long hair and
beards are the "badge of hippies". So they adopted
a rule which would keep "these people" off their
campus
.
It is interesting to note that none of the reasons
given in justification of the rule relate to any
disruptions on tbs San Jacinto Junior College campus.
And, in fact, this record is completely devoid of
evidence that any type of disruption has been
occasioned by the wearing of beards on campus.
370
...there is not even the suggestion that beards wouldmaterially and substantially" interfere with theoperation of the school. The only evidence of anyadverse campus reaction whatsoever was the testimony ofa school official that an unidentified girl had
complained of the odor and appearance of severalhippies. It must be noted that
. .
.
(Calbillo) was
not one of these students. It should be furthe? notedthat
. .. (Calbillo' s) appearance in the courtroom wasthat oi a well-groomed
,
although bearded, student.
Regardless, as pointed out in Gri f fin
,
any problem ofhygiene could be resolved by a rule directed to thatproblem rather than to the- length of hair. As to the
girl s objection to the appearance of the "hippies",
this amounts to nothing more than a personal distaste.
If in the Zachry case the court refused to allow
school administrators to impose their personal taste
in hair styles upon the students, this Court can
hardly accept as a justification for the present rule
that one student expressed some distaste for another
student’s appearance.
With regard to the other justifications offered for
the rule, they can be resolved into the contention
that beards and hair styles are a sufficient indica-
tor of potential campus trouble-makers. Not only is
this contention not supported by the record, it is not
supported by logic and common sense ... Unless there is
a showing that a hair style or a manner of dress has
a reasonable relationship to the health, welfare,
morals, and discipline of students, a sweeping prohibi-
tion regarding some cannot in this Court’s opinion
be sustained. Each case must really stand upon its
own factual basis. Here, we have no testimony of a
relationship to the health, welfare, morals, or
discipline of any student, and absent such, a broad
regulation like the one we are concerned with is
unreasonable and cannot be sustained.
From the record before the Court, it can come to no
other conclusion than that the regulation in question
constitutes an unreasonable classification in
violation of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. There was no evidence of any
material and substantial disruption of the school
functions and the justifications offered by the
school officials do not support the rule. The
regulation was basically enacted to implement the
personal distaste of certain school officials fcr
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beards and certain hair styles and for the beliefs
and attitudes which they thought these beards andhair styles represented.
5-8 Discrimination Against
Married Students
Dennis O’Neill, a midshipman at the United States
Merchant Marine Academy, was dismissed from that school
because it was discovered that he was married. O’Neill's
marriage, which took place after he entered the academy,
violated the academy’s regulation that prohibited marriage
of a cadet before graduation.
After being dismissed, O'Neill brought suit in
Federal District Court, alleging, among other things that
his fourteenth amendment rights to equal protection had
been violated in that the academy rule treated "...all
married men as a class differently from all others
similarly situated...
District Judge 3artels delivered the opinion of the
court, in O’Neill v. Dent , 364 F. Supp. 565 (1973), which
in pertinent part, said:
The United States Supreme Court has made it
abundantly clear that the right to marry underlies
the purposes of the Constitution, although not
mentioned therein, and is a fundamental right afforded
protection by the first, fifth, ninth, and four-
_
teenth amendments of the United States . Constitution
.
As far back as 1923 the Supreme Court recognized the
right to marry as a liberty guaranteed by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. . '.c}, e_._
v. Nebraska , 262 U.S. 390, (1923).
Turning to the regulation of student conduct in the
context of marriage, it is relevant to recdl tha
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lowing of some misconduct or
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immorality, and without a clear and convincingdemonstration that the welfare or discipline of theother pupils or the school is injuriously affectedby the presence of married students.
The fatal vice of these anti-marriage school regula-
determination tbit
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in ltS sweeP inS> advanceha every married student, regardless
°f the circumstances" must be expelled from the
schools. Board of Education of Harrodsburg v.Bentley
, 3«3 S.W.2d' at 680 7
^
Although the Government concedes that the right to
marry is both favored by public policy and premised
on the Constitution, it argues that ... public schools
are not governed by the same rigid disciplinary
standards inherent in the military academies. It
asserts that the opportunity to attend the Merchant
Marine Academy is merely a privilege bestowed by
the Government on cadets, and that the no-marriage
rule is only a minor, partial or temporary restraint
on a person's access to that privilege and consequently
no denial of the fundamental right to marry. The
corrollary of such a contention is that absent a
constitutional right to attend the Academy, O’Neill’s
access to the Academy may be conditioned upon a
waiver of his right to marry during the school period.
Similar contentions in one form or another have often
been rejected by the Supreme Court in the past.
The guiding principle was elucidated by Mr. Justice
Stewart in Perry v. Sindermann
,
408 U.S. 593, (1972),
where he said:
* I? *iO «*> 4— "1 o r r» 4— r> m < < a v* 4- i--» —^ . 4— * - — ? 4- U -? <~± ^ -LOi-too a ^uai Oci o tii u ui j 3 o i i o
Court has made clear that even though
a person has no ’right’ to a valuable
governmental benefit and even though
the government may deny him the benefit
for any number of reasons, there are
some reasons upon which the government
may not act. It may not deny a
benefit to a person on a basis that
infringes his constitutionally pro-
tected interests—especially, his
interest in freedom of speech."
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arry* Not only do the regulations preventa midshipman from marrying for four years, but they
expressly bar all married men as a class from ever
entering the Academy. Indeed, they go further andbar all those who, while no longer married, may have
once been married.
0 Neill premises his complaint upon a purported vio-
lation of his constitutional equal protection rights.
With this in mind, the Court notes that recently the
Supreme Court has developed a so-called "two-tiered"
approach to the fourteenth amendment eoual protection
clause, one known as the "strict scrutiny" or the
"compelling state interest" test, and the other-
known as the "minimal scrutiny" or "rational rela-
tionship" test. The "strict scrutiny" test is
applied when rights properly classified as "fundamental",
such as the right to travel, the right to vote, and
the right to essential facilities for prosecution of
a criminal appeal, are involved; or when the
classification is predicated upon certain "suspect"
classifications, such as race, alienage, and national
origin . .
.
On the other hand, if neither a fundamental right nor
a suspect classification is involved, the statute or
regulation is presumptively valid and will not be
disturbed unless without a reasonable relation to
a valid state purpose. In McGowan v. Maryland
,
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U.S. at 426, Chief Justice Warren enunciated the
"minimal scrutiny" test in these words: "A
statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify
it." Mr. Justice Frankfurter in a concurring
opinion observed: "Neither the Due Process nor the
Equal Protection Clause demands logical tidiness."
Metropolis Theatre Co . v. City of Chicago
,
228 U.S.
6l . No finicky or exact conformity to abstract
correlation is required of legislation. The Con-
stitution is satisfied if a legislature responds
to the practical living facts with which it deals."
366 U.S. at 524.
Although the Supreme Court has hesitated to expand
the list of fundamental rights, it has repeatedly
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held the right to marry to be fundamental. Recently
the Supreme Court has moved away from a rigid dichotomybetween the ''compelling state interest" test and the
minimal scrutiny" test, adopting, at least in some
cases, "a more flexible and equitable approach, which
permits consideration to be given to evidence of the
nature of the unequal classification under attack,
the nature of the rights adversely affected, and the
governmental interest urged in support of it. Under
this approach the test for application of the equal
protection clause is whether the legislative classifica
tion is in fact ^substantaillv related to the object
of the statute." Boraas
,
et
.
-al. v. Village of Eelle
Terre, et . al
.
, 476"F.2d 806, 814 (1973). Perhaps
the clearest exposition of this approach is found in
v. Reed
,
4 04 U.S. 71> (1971)> where Chief Justice
Burger stated for a unanimous Court that
"A classifcation ’must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground
of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation,
so that all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike.' Royster Guano Co.
v. Virgin ia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
The question presented by this case, then,
is whethe r a difference in the sex of compet-
ing applicants for letters of administration
bears a rational relationship to a state
objective that is sought to be advanced...
The crucial question, however, is whether the
law advances that objective in a manner
consistent with the command of the equal
protection clause. We hold that it does
not. "
If this Court applies the "strict scrutiny" test, the
burden is placed upon the Academy to demonstrate that
the regulations are necessary to promote a compelling
governmental interest and that there is no reasonable
way to achieve these goals with a lesser burden on
this constitutionally protected activity. In view
of the fundamental nature of the right , the Court has
no alternative but to apply the "strict scrutiny"
test and to require the Government to demonstrate a
compelling necessity for the regulations.
.
(M)easured by the "strict scrutiny" test or the
"substantial relation" test, the Court xinds no
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concrete evidence which factually relates t-heprohibition to the academic and disciplinary necessitiesAcademy or the performance of its cadets
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easonable way to achieve its
™lb a lesser burden on this constitutionallyprotected activity. The fatal vice of the regula-tions is the sweeping, advance determination thatevery married student, regardless of age, maturity orcircumstance, cannot be accepted or if unwittingly
accepted, must be expelled from the Academy simplybecause he is married. The conclusive presumption
.at all married cadets will perform more poorly thansingle cadets cannot be accepted upon the record beforethe Court. Nor is the Government saved under thistest by a claim of administrative inconvenience. As
stated by Mr. Justice Brennan in Prontiero v
Richardson, 93 S. Ct . at 1772, if“Twe enter the realm
sbri ct judicial scrutiny’, there can be no doubt
that administrative convenience’ is not a shibboleth,
the mere recitation of which dictates constitutionality.”
Nor can the Government by contract require a cadet to
surrender his constitutional right to marry...
5.9 Housing
Fred Cooper and other students at Southeastern
Louisana University (SLU), challenged that school’s housing
regulation in Federal District Court.
Specifically, the students challenged the portion of
the rules which allowed 23 year-old students to live off
campus, but requiring 21 and 22 year-olds to live on
campus, and the exemption which allowed members of social
fraternities to live off campus, in fraternity houses,
103 Cooper v. Nix, 3^3 F. Supp. 1101 (1972).
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regardless of age or class standing.
The reason for the age 23 cut-off date, as given by
the college officials, was that usually a person of that
age is not an undergraduate. The rule, then, effectively was
established to require all undergraduates to live on campus,
with the exception of the fraternity members.
The conflict posed by the fraternity exemption
centered around Cardinal Newman Hall, a modern, 90-bed
dormitory. This building is located across the street
from the university. It was built in 196H, because of a
housing shortage at that time. It is privately operated by
a nun and two priests.
Cardinal Newman Hall once housed many students from
the school. But, when the college built more residence
halls
. ..Newman Hall was no longer afforded an exemption,
as were the two fraternities", even though Newman Hall is
much closer to the campus than either fraternity.
Chief Judge Dawkins delivered the opinion of the Court:
Under the facts of this case, the Court need not look
beyond the question of whether there exist equal
protection deprivations in disposing of the issues
presented here.
It is net for the Court to consider whether the rules
challenged here are wise or expedient but merely
whether they are a reasonable exercise of the power
and discretion of school authority. See Burnside v.
Byars
, 363 F.2d 7^4 (1966).
Chief Justice Eurger recently has outlined the basic
principles governing application of the equal
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a^ike. F. S. Royster Guano Co . v. Virginia,
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The Court recently has summarized the method of analysis
employed in determining whether State actions are
violative of the equal protection clause:
"To decide whether a law violates the equal
protection clause, we look, in essence,
to three things: the character of the
classification in question, the individual
interests affected by the classification;
and the governmental interest asserted in
support of the classification." Dunn v.
Blumstein
, 405 U.S. 330, (1972).
The "character of the individual interest affected"
is critical in determining the standard against which
the classification will be tested. If the individual
interest is characterized as a "fundamental right"
the State must have a compelling interest to support
the classification. Shapiro v. Thomoson, 394 U.S.
618, (1969); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701,
(1969).
On the other hand, if a "fundamental right" is not
affected by the classifications, the State need only
show a rational nexus or reasonable connexity between
the legitimate governmental interest and the
classification. See Reed v. Reed.
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Defendants are classifying plaintiffs in releventpart here based upon their age and whether or not theyare members of social fraternities. One class of
students, those over 23 years old, are allowed to liveoff campus, while those under 23 are denied that
rxght unless otherwise specially exempted. One class
ol students, those who are members of the two fraternities
are allowed
. to live off campus, while another class
otherwise similarly situated who desire to reside inCardinal Newman Hall are denied that right.
fraternity Cardinal Newman Hall classification is
clearly unreasonable and must be held to amount to
systematic invidious discrimination which is prohibited
by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Based upon the evidence presented and our
findings, there is no rational basis for allowing
students at SLU to live off campus in social fraternity
houses and denying them the right to live in Cardinal
Newman Hall.
The Court therefore holds that the college authorities
are depriving students who desire to live in Cardinal
Newman Hall equal protection of the law.
With respect to the age classification outlined above,
even applying the less stringent reasonable classifica-
tion test, we find such classification constitutionally
infirm as implemented. The only governmental interest
asserted in support of the classification is to
further the students' education by exposing them to
the "give and take" of dormitory life. The college
authorities consistently have denied here, that
financial interests are a primary reason or justifica-
tion for the University’s parietal rules. We do not
find it necessary to question that position but
accept it arguendo and test the reasonableness of
the age classification against the proclaimed
interest of furthering the students’ education.
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duca ionally from dormitory life. There wq<?no serious attempt to justify on educational groundsthe reasons for requiring their on-campus residencyThe only purported "justification" was that thesestudents might contribute to the education of othery unger students. We think this contribution theoryis wholly irrelevant to the issues presented. Thequestion is whether the requirement that studentsuch as plaintiffs here, might reasonably benefit*
educationaliy to such a substantial extent as tojustify infringing upon their right to choose theirown place of residence.
We find that the college authorities have not
established a reasonable relationship between requiringthe 21 and 22 year-old plaintiffs to live on campus
and the University educational process. Defendants
utterly have failed to show that requiring all 21
and 22 year old single undergraduates live on campus,
as implemented at SLU is fairly and substantially
related to the educational process. Defendants have
further- failed to show that all students in simialr
circumstnaces—who would reasonably benefit from
dormitory life educationally— are treated alike.
Financial Justification
uail Prostrollo and Lynn Severson brought suit in
Federal District Court, challenging the constitutionality
of a rule at the University of South Dakota (USD) which
provides that
:
"All single freshman and sophomore students are
required to live in University residence halls."
Chief Judge Nichol reviewed the facts in the case of
Prostrollo v. University of South Dakota
, 3^9 F. Supp. 778
380
(197H), and determined that the reason for the above rule
is financial. The object which the regulation seeks to
promote is the retirement of bond indebtedness incurred in
construction of the dormitories." He also noted that
while he believed that there were "...valid educational
reasons behind the construction of dormitories”, the
assertion, by the college officials, that the purpose
behind the rule was an educational one, was merely an
afterthought
.
Further evidence that the purpose behind the regula-tion in question is not educational is the fact that
exemptions are granted on a financial basis, not on
any grounds that those students exempted would standto benefit less from any "broadening and enriching"
educational experience than plaintiffs."
In his decision. Chief Judge Nichol said, in part.
Plaintiffs have the burden of showing that no
rational connection exists between the class estab-
lished by the regulation (freshmen and sophomores
not exempted) and the purpose behind the regulation
(retirement of bond indebtedness). This showing has
been made since the record contains clear evidence that
the objective sought to be accomplished by the
regulation is primarily financial rather than educa-
tional. And, even assuming, that the purpose behind
the regulation were educational, there is not one
shred of evidence that the particular class of freshman
and sophomore students would benefit educationally
any more than those students who are not required
to live in dorms. Such irrational classification
is at the heart of all equal protection decisions.
In order to pass constitutional muster, a
classification
"must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must-
rest upon some ground of difference having
a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be
381
treated alike.” Reed v. Reed
(1971)
,
citing F. s. Royster
Virginia
, 253 U7s. *112
,
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concludes that the object of the contestedregulation is to insure retirement of the bondindebtedness, and that making only certain freshmen
and sophomores pay by living in the dorms is arbitrary
and unreasonable, contrary to equal protection man-dates. As the Court said in MoHere ct . al. v. South-
ff^rn Loulsl an a College et. al ,.3oi F. Sunn. 825
"Absent the special educational considera-
tions previously mentioned the support of
the housing system is an obligation which
should fall on all students equally just
as does, for example, tuition. Since the
obligation is essentially monetary, then
al 1 must pay or none. To select a group
less-than-all, to fulfill an obligation
which should fall equally on all, is a
violation of equal protection no matter
how the group is selected."
If the University wishes to maintain high dormitory
occupancy, perhaps the answer lies in making dorm
living more attractive to students so that there are
adequate volunteer residents. Whatever their course
may be, it cannot include forcing one group of students
to bear the financial burden of paying off dormitories
which were built for the benefit of all students and
Indeed, the entire University.
1 04However, on appeal. Circuit Judge Fay, reviewing
the same facts found in the trial court, came to a different
conclusion
:
The overall evidence demonstrates that these University
officials believe that dormitory living provides an
educational atmosphere which assists younger students,
as unde-rc las smen
,
in adjusting to college life. The
^^Prostrollo v. The University o f South Dakota , 507
F . 2d 775 (197*0'.
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dis ric court s error, we believe, was in decidingthe reasonableness of the classification on the basisof a single primary" purpose in the face of evidence
reveaiing multiple purposes; This is a misapplication
of the standards governing the equal protection clause.In discussing equal protection principles, the SupremeCourt recently observed:
(0)ur decisions do not authorize courts
to pick and choose among legitimate
legislative aims to determine which is
primary and which subordinate. Rather,
legislative solutions must be respected
if the 'distinctions drawn have some basis
in practical experience,' South Carolina
v. Katzenbach
, 383 U.S. 301“,' 331, (1966)
,
or if some legitimate state interest is
advanced, Danaridge v. Williams
, 397 U.S.
at 486. So long as the state purpose
upholding a statutory class is legitimate
and nonillusory, its lack of primacy is
not disqualifying."
"...The search for legislative purpose is
often elusive enough. Palmer v. Thompson
,
403 U.S. 217, (1971), without a require-
ment that primacy be ascertained. Legisla-
tion is frequently multi-purposes: the
removal of even a 'subordinate' purpose
may shift altogether the consensus of
legislative judgment supporting the
statute. Permitting nullification of
383
o^
U
nonyima?fleg”?ative Sed rationaUy
ceedinEs
U
f
tS
S1]hi^
s 0
^
subtle emphases supporting
The
J
equai
e
nror
e
f
Si0nS and Pyrenees.
~ l p otection clause does not
purposes^? a^ Speculative Probing into thef co°rdinate branch. We have
for tM^
n
? J
maginary bas *s or puroose
refuse to
Ut7 scheme, but we likewise
another
"“^the cou^t^elow^erceived
^10 u.s. 26 s! “77; (Wjfr1 v ‘ S2Z5£^
The district court concluded that the challengedclassification (freshmen and sophomores) had norataonal connection to the purpose y ™fthe bonds. We would agree. However, ?here is no
J^
nce on the recor>d that the classification inq^ ti£rV WaS ever lntendeb to have any connection
dis tr i o
t
t purP° se
;
In M°Iiere, relied upon by the
shrnnk *
cour
^
where a similar regulation was
Pi =
down
1!
the 9Hll reason women under the age of21 and freshmen men were required to live in theormitories was because as a group they approximated
S
Um
o
er neede
g
po fil1 the dormitory vacancies.
8 F
Zu
SUPP
n
at 827, To the contrary in the presentcase the only evidence of why the classification
ate
^
WaS the testimony of University officialsthat they felt that freshman and sophomore studentsbenefited more directly from the educational values
of dormitory living.
When no suspect classification is involved or funda-
mental right infringed, any "rational basis" mayjustify classifications which have been made. We
find there exists a rational connection between one of
the permissible purpose for the regulation and the
classification made.
5.10 Discipline
The University of Texas system had a rule which required
automatic suspension for two years of any university student
"placed on probation for or finally convicted of the
illegal use, possession and/or sale of a drug or narcotic."
Paine and Roberts, two students who are on probation or have
just been released from probation, following a 1971 convic-
tion for possession of marijuana, faced suspension from
school under the above provisions. They brought suit in
Federal District Court. 10 ^
District Judge Roberts, after addressing himself to
the questions of "double jeopardy" and "due process",
considered the student's claim that their fourteenth amend-
ment, equal protection rights would be violated under the
Texas rule:
As previously noted, with the exception of students
finally convicted or placed on probation for drug or
narcotics offenses, Chapter 6 of the Rules of the
Regents of the University of Texas System accords to
all students committing infranctions of the Rules a
full dress hearing at which evidence in extenuation
and mitigation may be presented and a flexible range
of penalties imposed at the discretion of the
disciplinary tribunal. Students of the excepted
class are denied these procedural rights. Thus a
student guilty of murder, whether convicted or not,
would be "subject to discipline" persuant to
Section 3.(20), accorded a hearing with full procedural
safeguards pursuant to Section 3*10, afforded the
opportunity to present evidence in mitigation, and
subjected to a range of discretionary penalties; a
student placed on probation for simple possession of
a single marijuana cigarette would receive none of
these procedural safeguards and would automatically
be suspended for two years. Stranger still, since
Subsections 3
.
3b and 3- 3c of the rule are triggered
by final conviction or probation, two students guilty
1Q ^ Paine v.’ Board of Regents of University of Texas
System
,
355 F. Supp. 199 (1972).
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drUg °r narcotl c offenses could receivegrossly disparate penalties if one were finally orr"
:*
d °r ?Laoed Probation by the cLKtLru'ies
Court ifnnt
her escaPed civil prosecution. Thiss no so unwise in the ways of prosecutingattorneys and grand juries in Texas as to supposf thatsuch a hypothetical situation could not, or indeed
*11
ln faCt occurred
- It is enough that theRegents have accorded "bedrock procedural rights tosome, ^but not to^all similarly situated." Stanley
v. I llinois
,
at 658 of *105 U.S. The above describedfeatures^ of the Regents’ regulatory scheme violatethe equa± protection clause.
5.11 Principles of Law and
Conclusions
The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal
clas sifications. It forbids only that which is arbitrary
unreasonable, irrational, irrelevent, and invidious ... The
equal protection clause does not create fictitious equality
where there is a real difference .. .The demand for equal
protection of the laws is directed at the state and its
agencies ... the fourteenth amendment expresses more than a
demand for equal protection of the laws, it expresses the
demand that the law itself be equal .
In order for there to be a violation of the equal
protection cluase, "state action" is necesary. What is
state action? Generally it is the participation or involve-
ment of a state agency; a private party over whom the
state has some control; or a private party that carries on
what would normally be considered a public or governmental
function. The fact that a tax-supported college or
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university is an agency of the state is enough to cause
all actions of the school to be considered as state action.
It should be clearly understood by the college
administrator, that all classifications are not forbidden.
In education, more than in other areas of our society,
classification is a widely used tool. The state does have
the power to treat different classes of people in different
ways. We use IQ test scores to categorize people for un-
equal treatment; we charge in-state students a different
tuition than out-of-state students; we create different
classes of students, such as freshmen, sophomore, etc.,
and in some cases we restrict the use of automobiles to
upperclass students. What the college administrator should
guard against is the creation of unreasonable, arbitrary,
or discriminatory regulations, or ones which are totally
irrelevent to the purposes and functions of the school.
The courts even offer some leeway, for they will not
strike down a classification which has some reasonable
basis, merely because it is not drawn with mathematical
nicety
.
The equal protection clause covers not only rules and
regulations, but also the manner in which the rules and
regulations are administered, and the motives behind the
rules. Thus, the rule itself may be fair on its face, and
impartial in its appearance, yet applied and administered
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with an "evil eye" and an "unequal hand", resulting in
unjust and illegal discrimination.
Classifications must be reasonab le, net arbitrary, and
must rest upon some ground of difference, having a fair and
substantial relationship to the objective of the legisla-
t ion, so that
__
all persons s imilarly circumstanced shall
be, treated alike. .The equal protection clause emphasises
the disparity of treatment by a state between classes of
individuals
.
,
The courts have developed a two tier approach to
questions of equal protection. The "old equal protection",
known as the rational relation, or minimal scrutiny test,
allows for little judicial scrutiny of "legislation".
A statute will be upheld if any set of facts reasonably
may be conceived to justify it. The classification must
bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state
purpose
.
The courts will not put themselves in a position where
they must question what is and what is not a legitimate
state purpose; they will defer to the judgment of state
legislatures (see Frostrollo ) . But the courts will deter-
mine if the relationship of a statute to the state purpose
is unreasonable, or if tte means of the legislation is
rationally related to the plausable ends of the legislation
The "new equal protection", known as the strict
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scrutiny, or compelling interest test, allows for strict
judicial scrutiny when fundamental rights or liberties
are threatened by legislation or administration.
A classification based on a suspect criteria (race,
sex, national origin, etc.), or one which affects a funda-
mental right (marriage, voting, travel, procreation,
etc.), would be violative of the equal protection clause
unless the state can show a compelling need for, or
interest in, the classification. A state or state agency
which adopts rules, regulations, or policies, based on
suspect criteria will have a heavy burden of justification
for such classification, in a court of law.
A sliding scale, in effect, has been developed by
the courts for applying the appropriate test for equal
protection: as the level of a non-constitutional interest
moves up, by degrees, to a fundamental interest, and then
up to a fundamental right, and finally to a constitutional
guarantee, the degree of judicial scrutiny is adjusted
accordingly from little to strict; from the old equal
protection to the new.
In determining whether a rule or regulation violates
the equal protection clause, the courts will consider three
things
:
1. The character of the classification. Does it
affect a fundamental or constitutional right?
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Does it involve a suspect criteria? Does it
involve a forbidden trait? The answers to these
questions will determine the standard, old or
new equal protection, by which the classification
should be tested.
2
- gje Individual Interes t affected by the classlfira -
ti°n. Is the individual discriminated against?
Is the individual denied a privilege given to
others similarly situated?
^ * The government al interests asserted in support
of the classification
. The purpose of the
legislation; is it legitimate? Is it based on
convenience? Is there a legitimate relationship
between the legislation and a legitimate state
interest?
The question then posed for the college administrator,
when considering how the courts will treat specific
legislation, is, which standard of review under the equal
protection clause should be applied: the traditional,
rational relationship test
,
or the compelling state
interest test?
The answers may not be easily arrived at. For
example, in Robinson
,
the Court, relying on the 1971 Reed
case, and another 1973 case, based its decision on the
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fact that sex was not a suspect criteria for a classifica-
tion. The Court, therefore relied only on the less
stringent rational relationship test: safety was a
legitimate objective of the state, and a curfew for women
was reasonably related to that objective.
But a majority of the Supreme Court, just two months
after Robinson was decided, said in Frontlero that sex was
a suspect classification, and the author believes that
were the Rob inson case heard today, the court would apply
the compelling state interest test. While the outcome
might well be the same, the school would bear a heavier
burden to justify the purpose of the rule.
The clear
_
and critical purpose of the equal protection
clause was to eliminate all offic i al state sources of
invidious racial discrimination.
. .A state action based
partly
—
on race, and in furtherance of a proper governmental
objective
,
is not necessarily a violation of the fourteenth
amendment .
What of Affirmative Action? Doesn't the fourteenth
amendment protect us from one racial or ethnic group getting
a preference over another? Or, one sex getting preference
over the other? Strict scrutiny has and will be used in
court cases involving a.uestions of Affirmative Action.
But this does not mean that Affirmative Action policies
are illegal; the fourteenth amendment does not ban all
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discrimination. Race was a consideration in the Brown
case; race has been a consideration in school bussing
oases; and in balancing public school systems, racial
criteria have teen used. The fourteenth amendment does,
however, ban invidious discrimination; racial classifications
which stigmatize a group with the stamp of inferiority.
Affirmative action, the promotion of a group of people
that has been denied certain privileges in the past, is
not invidious discrimination. It is worth noting again,
that a policy, such as affirmative action, may be facially
fair and impartial, but has the potential tc be improperly
administered, resulting in a violation of the equal
protection clause.
The reader would do well to read some of the early
Supreme Cour- 1 voter registration cases and compare them
to the Washington Supreme Court decision in Defunis
.
In the author’s opinion, the difference between the cases
is an example of how the courts interoret the Constitution
to fit to the standards of society. In the former, the
Supreme Court allowed poll taxes and illiteracy tests in
the southern states, to the detriment of the black people,
because voting was a fundamental right, and the states
could show a compelling interest in and need for such
policies to make sure that the vote was used intelligently.
or exercised by people who caned enough to pay for it
.
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In the Defunis case, a more liberal court said that a
policy based on a suspect classification, race, can be
allowed because the state could show a compelling state
interest in and need for such a policy to obtain its
objective of integrating more minorities into both the
study and profession of law.
Sc as to affirmative action, the state must show that
it is necessary to accomplish a compelling state interest.
This compelling interest, to date, has been an overriding
interest in promoting integration in our schools, at all
levels. Once a valid state interest has been established,
it remains for the state to show the connection between the
policy employed and the interest.
I_n the field of public higher education, the doctrine
of separate but equal has no place... To give a mandatory
preference to members of either sex over members of the
other sex is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative
choice forbidden by the equal protection clause...
T
o jselect
a group less than all, to fulfill an obligation which
should fall equally on all, is a violation of the equal
protection clause, no matter how the group is s e lected .
State imposed restrictions which produce arbitrary
and/or unreasonable inequalities will not be sustained by
the courts. Thus, while a college can set certain academic
standards for admission, they can’t set different standards
393
for the men's and women's athletic program, when there is
no rational reason for the difference; nor can the women's
athletic program be inferior, in any capacity, without
just cause. While the college can set different tuition
rates for in-state and out-of-state students, it cannot
require only that freshmen and sophomores, as an example,
pay fees to retire the bond debts on a campus facility that
is for the benefit of all.
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CHAPTER VI
The Fourteenth Amendment: Due Process of Law
The Fourteenth Amendment
All persons born or naturalized In the United States,
and subject to the Jurisdiction thereof, are' citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life
,
liberty
f
or property, without due process of lav: ; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
6.1 Introduction
The words "Due Process of Law” appear in two places
in our Constitution: the fifth amendment, where it is a
limitation on the powers of the federal government; and the
fourteenth amendment
,
where it is a limitation on the powers
of the State. It is the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment which we are concerned with in this
chapter
.
Historically, due process has been synonymous with
"the law of the land": fundamental rights which men have
always recognized as basic to liberty.
Such a concept was to be found in an edict of Conrad II,
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an emperor of the Holy Roman Empire (1037). In 1215, the
English barrens forced King John to incorporate the
-'law
of the land" into the Magna Charta
. One hundred and
thirty nine years after the Magna Charter, in 1354, the
phrase "due process of law" was first used in the Statute
of Westminster o f th e Liberties of London : and in the third
year of the reign of Charles I, the Petition of Right
included the comment "that free men be imprisoned or
detained only by the law of the land, or by due process of
law, and not by the King's special command without charge." 10 ^
Due process in England has been used only to restrict
the King. It was never intended to be a restraint on the
English Parliament. The historical development of the
United States, however, is different from that of England,
and the American colonists, wary of a repressive government,
sought greater protections for the people, and wrote these
protections into their constitutions. Due Process was
incorporated into our Bill of Rights.
The due process clause has been called "a catch-all
protection"... "the fact that it has always evaded
definition is perhaps the strongest evidence that the
107protection secured is general rather than specific."
''^Guthrie
,
William D., "Of Due Proces of Law", Lectures
on the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States
,
Da Capo Press, New York, 1970, p". 69
.
10
^Mott, op. cit., p. 592-593-
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It has, through history, been uspri in a ^* 9 u ed a wide variety of
situations:
"in 121s N .•••( t was) invoked against judgments
without trial; m 1628, against arrests without indict-
ment, and m 1868, against class legislation." 108 in 1925>
the due process clause was used to impose on the States,
the same limitations which the Bill of Rights imposes on the
national government.
In 1215
,
due process rights pertained only to a
specific class of people, that of "free men." its use is
so widespread today, however, that there has been more
litigation involving due process of law, than any other
area of individual rights in our constitution. 109
Due process litigation falls within four principle
groupings: (1) the police (2) the power of eminent
domain, or the taking of private property for public use;
( 3 ) the power of taxation, and (1)) procedure, civil and
•
. no
criminal. It is this last category, procedures, that
will most concern college administrators.
Administrators must concern themselves, also, with
two aspects of due process: substantive and procedural.
Substantive due process relates to the quality of
and motives behind rules and regulations. It is the
108 ibid, p. 590.
109 ibid, p. iii (preface)
110Guthrie
,
' op . cit., p. 73.
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substance of the rule Itself which violates due process, as
when a rule prohibits legal and reasonable activity or con-
duct, or Is Itself arbitrary, discriminatory, unreasonable.
or vague.
Procedural due process refers to the quality of the
process in making decisions or determinations; the fairness
of the rules of procedure. In an educational context, it
is the fairness of the method used in disciplinary pro-
ceedings. While the end result of such proceedings may be
valid, it is the arbitrary, unreasonab le
, discriminatory
procedure (or lack of procedure) used in the disciplinary
process which violates the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.
The most elaborate procedural protections are found
in criminal proceedings. It is from the precedents estab-
lished in these cases, that the courts have arrived at
due process procedure for students. V/hile some feel that
the student should be afforded t he same procedural rights
as criminally charged defendants, 111 it is clear that the
courts have distinguished criminal cases from college
disciplinary cases; the latter remains in the realm of
civil law. The analogies between the two, are, however.
111See Van Alstyne, William, "Procedural Due Process
and State University Students," 10 UCLA Law Review, 368
( 1963 ).
*101
worth the consideration of the college administrator.
In criminal cases, the due process requirements in a
case involving a capitol offense, differ from a case involv-
ing only a misdemeanor; in turn, the due process require-
ments of the latter differ from those of a civil case. 112
The amount of due process required is directly proportionate
to the severity of the crime or the penalty for the crime.
For example, a man on trial for his life, not only
has a right to legal counsel, but must be provided with
counsel if he cannot afford it; a man on trial for less
than his life, doesn’t necessarily have to have counsel
provided for him, but can have counsel should he wish it;
when the worst that can result from an administrative
hearing is some social stigma, the fourteenth amendment does
not guarantee a right to counsel. 11 -1
The analogy is a clear one: "the degree of protection
to which a student is entitled in the process of determining
his guilt and punishment is in direct proportion to the
114harm which could result to him from such determinations."
A college student who is facing expulsion or suspension
should be afforded a greater amount of due process than one
IIP
Guthrie, op. cit., p. 102.
111Van Alstyne, op. cit., p. 381.
llij ibid, p, 381 .
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who faces an oral reprimand, or probation.
Brubacher notes that "dismissing a student used to be
a simple matter within the autonomous discretion of a dean
or faculty disciplinary committee." 115 Why is it that
students were denied any due process rights in the past?
Several reasons have been suggested: (l) The concept of
—
n lQC0 P ar,entis" . Parents do not provide procedural or
substantive due process in the home to their children, why
should the college? (2) Attendance at college was con sidered
t o
,
be a privilege granted by the school
. What was granted
by the school could be taken away by the school; (3) Due
pro c e s s
—
was unnecessary
. Very few students deny the
misconduct with which they are charged, or take exception
to the discipline imposed. So why make things difficult
with notices, hearings, etc.; (4) Economics . Written
notices, transcripts of hearings, legal counsel, etc.,
cost too much in both money and time; (5) College officials
lacked the author ity to jimpose due ^process „ They had no
power to subpeona witnesses, and they could not require
1 1 6
witnesses to undergo cross examinations.
As late as 1963
,
some students were still being denied
due process rights in discipline cases. In a study involving
115Brubacher, op. cit.,. p. xii.
11
^Van Alstyne, op. cit., p. 370 and 371.
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72 state universities. Van Alstyne reported the following
statistics on disciplinary proceedings:
- 43# did not provide students with a clear and
specific list which describes the misconduct alleged
to have veen violated;
53$ did not provide for a hearing in cases where a
student takes exception to charges made against him;
47$ allowed students or administrators, who appear
as witnesses to the misconduct, to also sit as members
of the hearing board, if they are members of the
board
;
- 30% did not allow students to have an advisor during
disciplinary hearings;
- 26 % did not allow students to question witnesses;
- 85$ allowed hearing boards to consider statements
by witnesses not available for cross-examination.^^
In a positive sense, the above statistics do reflect
that in 1963, some colleges were at least providing some
due process rights to students. This is probably a
result of a dramatic change in students rights which took
place in 1961. In that year, a Federal Court of Appeals,
in deciding Dixon v. Alabama , 294 F . 2d 150 (1961),
disregarded the prevailing precedents and declared that
117 ibid, p. 369.
students deserved at least minimal due process procedures
in disciplinary cases. Why is it that such a drastic
change in a legal principle would take place?
While the- reasons noted in Chapter l, 118 outlining
the obtaining of constitutional rights for college students,
would serve as general background for the answer to the
above question, there are some specific reasons focusing
around the Dixon time frame: (1) the relationship between
the col lege and the student had changed
. Denying due
process to students under the "in loco parentis" doctrine
was viable. This was perhaps even true under the contract
theory of relationship. But as these theories or doctrines
were systematically struck down by the courts, and as a
more community" styled student/college relationship
developed, the student was seen as a citizen, who deserved
at least the same protections as a petty thief; (2) the
Warren Court’s continuous expansion of civil liberties
and individual rights, particularly in the area of fourteenth
amendment rights associated with criminal and civil law and
procedures ; (3) continuous judicial determination of the
meaning of due process, particularly in the area of property
rights and liberty; " and (4) the climate, mood, and
See footnote 7*
119Was a public college education a right? While the
courts would not go this far, some would concede that once
a student had matriculated, he developed "property rights"
va lues of the country were changing
. By the time Dixon
was being litigated, the country was into civil rights
demonstrations, and major civil rights legislation had
already been passed by Congress; 120 the Warren Court was
setting a liberal directionfor all federal courts; the
American educational system was under attack (a direct
result of Russia’s space success); a new liberalness had
swept the country with the election of John Kennedy; and,
also with his election, students, already an economic
bloc, had emerged as a viable force to be reckoned with.
While not directly related to the pre-Dixon or post-
Dixon evolution of due process, there has been, in the
author's research, an emerging use of and reliance on the
concept of "irrebuttable presumptions" and "arbitrary con-
clusiveness" .
"Irributtable presumption" is a hybrid between equal
protection and due process. One’s due process rights
119
to his education at that school. What is liberty?
Some Courts have felt that "liberty" included "a persons
good name, reputation, honor, and integrity" Wisconsin v.
Constant ineau
,
400 U.S. 433 (1971) and Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). If "liberty" is in any way
going to be damaged by disciplinary proceedings, the minimum
requirements of due process must be satisfied.
120 Indeed, Dixon
,
which started out as a case involving
the civil rights of some black students, became a landmark
decision for all students.
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we have arrived at our present legal doctrine; that the
fourteenth amendment imposes on the States, through its
due process clause, the same restrictions that the Bill
of Rights placed on the National Government?
The process of incorporating individual rights into
the fourteenth amendment has been one of judicial inclusion
and exclusion, as noted; testing what should be included
and what should not. It has been a process highlighted
by politics, shaped by the economic growth of the country,
and determined by class struggle.
In the approximately 30 years from the passing of
the fourteenth amendment to the turn of the century,
the character of the United States changed drastically.
The population had more than doubled; half the population
lived in cities; and industry and business were growing
at incredible speed. V/e had been transformed from an
agrarian society to a capitalistic society. And therein
lies the class struggle that was to dominate politics
and the Supreme Court for years to come: the worker
versus the business man; the farmer versus big business
corporations
.
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are denied if a conclusive and unchangeable presumption is
-de in establishing a rule or regulation, and there is no
opportunity to challenge and/or refute it. The courts will
strike down this type of legislation, rule, or regulation
when the presumption is not necessarily, 0r universally
In essence, the courts can invalidate a question of
equal protection, by relying on due process; they can
invalidate the method of implementing a preference, for
example, rather than claiming the preference to be violative
Of the equal protection clause. '
Today, due process as it applies to the college
student, has become a complicated series of questions of
scope, degree, and intent, and, "...so numerous have the
cases on due process become that it is all too easy to lose
oneself in the forest of details and miss completely the
principles which lie behind the decisions ." 121 In the
next sections of this Chapter, the author will identify
the principles of due process from an historical context,
and isolate, for clearer determination, the concerns of
college administrators in discipline matters.
121
Mott
,
op. cit., p. iii.
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6.2 Historical Analysis
6.2.1 Due Process and Students:
The Early Years
Having only been a part of the United States Constitution
since 1868, the fourteenth amendment had not, as of 1891,
been tested by the courts to the point where its due
process clause could be defined as to content or applicability.
The Supreme Court had indicated that such a definition would
come about through a judicial process of inclusion and
exclusion, and it would be years before such a process
would make the amendment applicable to the States.
To this end, then, state courts did not yet visualize
the fourteenth amendment as part of their deliberations in
cases dealing with higher education and student discipline.
Almost without exception, in cases involving the
disciplining of students, in the period between the incor-
poration of the amendment into the constitution, and the 1940' s,
the courts invariably found for the colleges. It is also
significant to note that all of these cases were heard in
state courts.
In North v. Illinois
, 137 111. 296, 27 N.E. 54 (1891),
the court said that colleges and universities could make
reasonable rules and regulations for the government and
discipline of students. Consequently a student at the
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University of Illinois was dismissed for refusing to attend
religious exercises.
Incorporating the historical doctrine of "in loco
parentis", the judge said, "the will of the student is
subserviant to that of those who are at the time being his
masters. By voluntarily entering the University, or by
being placed there by those having the right to control
him, he necessarily surrenders very many of his individual
rights." In a statement just as profound, the court noted
that if it were not for the fact that North was a student,
he would have found adequate protection under the Illinois
state constitution.
This theme ("in loco parentis", the lack of substantial
student rights, and judicial support of college authorities)
was to be the principle upon which the cases of this early
period were based:
.-..in determining whether a student has been guilty
of improper conduct... it is not necessary that the
professors should go through the formality of a trial.
They should give the student ... every fair opportunity
of showing his innocence. They should be careful in
receiving evidence against him; they should weigh
it ; determine whether it comes from a source
frighted with prejudice; determine the likelihood...
as to who is right, and then act upon it as jurors,
with calmness, consideration and fair minds. When
they have done this and reached a conclusion, they
have done all that the law requires them to do."
Koblitz v. Western Reserve University, 21 Ohio Cir.
Ct. 144 (1901).
Whether the rules or regulations are wise or their
aims worthy, is a matter left solely to the
discretion of the authorities ... and in the exercise
4lO
(1913).
p cy> bott v. Berea
, 161 S.W. 204
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ltary Institute v * Bramblett, 164 S.W.
(A) student may be suspended by a president ... withoutthe necessity of a hearing as formal as a court pro-ceeding, especially since there is no power vestedin the president to compell attendance of witnesses,
or to force them to testify. State ex. rel Tn^nii
v. Clapp
, 263 Pac. 433 (1928). — ~
?er5Ql1
There are two notable exceptions to this broad theme
of judicial non-interference. While the two decisiors noted
below would appear to be as modern as today, neither has
been cited by federal courts in present day litigation; yet
neither has been overturned by a higher court.
In Baltimore University v. Colton, 57 A. 14 (1904)
a,M student, duly enrolled and matriculated at the
college, had been served notice that he would not be
allowed to register for future classes. At the time of the
notice, no specific reasons were given for his dismissal.
In asking the question, "has he a right to be
restored to the rights and privileges of membership of the
law school, to which... he was once entitled, and of which
he has... been deprived without notice?", the court responded
with a definite "yes".
The judge in Glea v * State University
. H6 N.W.
650 (1908), was more explicit: "a college cannot dismiss
a student except on a hearing in accordance with a lawful
form of procedure, giving him notice of the charge and
an opportunity to hear the testimony against him, to
question witnesses and to rebutt the evidence."
There is an important distinction, however, between
these two cases, and more modern discipline cases, even
though the results of the litigation appear to be similar.
The disc tine tion is in the method by which the cases were
determined
.
In each of these cases, the judge issued a "writ of
mandamus", ordering the colleges to readmit the students.
Mandamus is issued by one court to an inferior tribunal
(in this case, from the State Court to the Board of Regents
or Trustees), ordering the latter to do or take some
specific action.
It is the author’s contention that since the state
courts were not yet bound to uphold the Bill of Rights
through the fourteenth amendment, and since the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment had not yet been
interpreted to include individual rights, the only
action available to the state court judge was "mandamus".
In Baltimore
,
the judge concluded: "Want of a notice has
always been regarded as sufficient ground for Invoking the
aid of mandamus in cases of membership in corporations
organized for the purpose of business or profit." And in
Gleason, the judge said, "...but if... (the college) refuses
to perform any of the duties enjoined upon it by law, or
arbitrarily refused any person entitled thereto the
privileges of the University, mandamus will lie to compel
the board to act .
"
But it is in a portion of the definition of "writ
of mandamus" that the author bases his contention. A
writ is issued when the aggrieved has a right to something,
but has no other legal means of obtaining it. In Gleason
the judge specifically indicates that the writ must be
served because, in addition to all else, "...it is clear
that the plaintiff has no other adequate remedy at law."
The fourteenth amendment and due process clause did not
apply, and this leads us to our next consideration.
6.2.2 The Nationalization of
The Bill of Rights
If the early college discipline cases were not
decided on Federal constitutional grounds, how is it that
12 2
Words and Phrases
,
permanent edition, Vol. 26,
p. 403, West Publishing Co., St. Faul, Minnesota, 1953-
*U3
Having already determined that the process "due" not
only referred to "judicial" process, but also procedures
which had been of long established custom (Murray’s Lessee
v. Hoboken Land
_
and Improvement Company
. 18 How. 272 ( 1856 )),
and that due process was not a set, established list of
procedures (Davidson v. New Orleans
. 96 U.S. 97 ( 1878 )
)
the Supreme Court faced the major questions of the
fourteenth amendment: if long established customs were
covered by the due process clause, then why not the basic
rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights? If they were, why
wasn't the Bill of Rights guaranteed by the due process
clause in state court cases?
It has taken over 80 years for tba Court to fully
answer these questions.
In Hurtado v. California
, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), the
Court flatly rejected that the Bill of Rights was included
under the due process clause. But, by 1897, the court had
decided that a state could not seize private property
without compensation: since this was a right "founded
in natural equity" and "laid down as a principle of
universal lav/", it was covered by the due process clause.
128 See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago,
226 (1897).
166 U.S.
By 1907, the Court was considering the definition of
liberty”, as it appeared in the fourteenth amendment.
In a dissent that was to be a clue to the future, Mr.
Justice Harlan, in Patterson v. Colorado
, 205 U.S. 145/1
(1907) said: "I hold that the privileges of free speech,
belonging to every citizen of the United States, constitute
essential parts of every man’s liberty, and are protected
against violation by that clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment forbidding a state to deprive any person of his liberty
without due process of law.”
By 1925, a judicial revolution had taken place. The
Court, in Git low v. New York
,
268 U.S. 652 (1925) declared
that some first amendment rights were protected by the due
process clause. ”For present purposes we may and do
assume that freedom of speech and of the press... are among
the fundamental personal rights and ’liberties’ protected
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment from
impairment bv the States.”
The door was opened, and other first amendment liberties
124
soon came under the due process clause. By 1932, the
Court had indicated that some rights of the criminally
accused were protected by the due process clause. And
12i|
Freedom of Religion, Hamilton v. University of
California (1934); Freedom of Assembly, DeJcnge v. Oregon
(1937); All of the first amendment, Everson v. Board of
Education (1947).
^
^Right to Counsel, Powell v. Alabama , 287 U.S. 45 (19s2).
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by the end of the 1960's, mostly due to the liberal Warren
Court, the
into the fourteenth amendment
.
Rights had been incorporated
126
6.2.3 The Growth of Procedural Rights
As the due process clause was being defined the Supreme
Court was developing the procedural rights as they pertain
to the criminally accused.
In Baldwin v. Hale
,
68 U.S. 223 (1863), the Court
indicated that parties whose rights are to be affected are
entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that
right, they must first be notified. Common justice requires
that no man shall be condemned in his person or property
without notice and opportunity to make his defense."
Thirty-two years later, the Court established the
right of the accused to face those accusing him. (see
Mattox v. United States
,
156 U.S. 237 ( 1895 ). This was
126
search and seizure; Mapp op. cit
. ( 1961 ); cruel
and unusual punishment, Robinson v. California
,
370 U.S.
660 (1962); fifth amendment, Malloy v. Hogan , 378 U.S. 1
(1964); right to confront one’s accusers. Pointer v. Texas ,
380 U.S. 400 (1965); right to a speedy trial, Klopfer v.
North Carolina
,
386 U.S. 213 (1967); right to a jury trial
in a criminal case, Duncan v. Louisiana
,
391 U.S. 145
(1968); protection against double jeopardy, Benton v.
Maryland
, 395 U.S. 784 ( 1969 ); right to present defense
witnesses, Washington v. Texas
,
388 U.S. 14 ( 1967 ); right to
notice of charges. In Re Oliver , 333 U.S. 257 (1948)
and Cole v. Arkansas
,
333 U.S. 196 (1948).
4 l 6
upheld in
where Mr.
assume that
—
-
yder
-
v
- Massachusetts
. 291 U.S. 97 (19314 )
,
Justice Cardozo said: "For present purposes
the privilege.
.. (to confront one's accusers
we
and
cross-examine them)... is reinforced by the fourteenth
amendment". This principle was upheld once again in
Pointer v. Texas
, 380 U.S.
-400 ( 1965 ).
In 1902, the principles set forth in Baldwin were
upheld in The Japanese Immigrant Case . 189 U.S. 86 (1902):
'This Court has never held... that administrative officers,
when executing the provisions of a statute involving the
liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental
principles that inher in due process of law... one of these
principles is that no person shall be deprived of his
liberty without opportunity, at some time, to be heard."
Following this same principle, Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
in his concurring opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee v. McGrath
, 341 U.S. 123 (1951), said "...no
better instrument has been devised for arriving at the truth,
than to give a person in jeopardy of a serious loss, notice
of the case against him and opportunity to meet it." In this
same case. Frankfurter points out that procedural safeguards
make up a major portion of our Bill of Rights, and advances
the principle that "whether any procedural protections
are due depends on the extent to which an individual will
be 'condemned to suffer a grievous loss'."
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While a hearing was necessary in cases where a person
might suffer a serious loss, a 1937 decision, Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), made it clear that "the
hearing... raust be a real one, not a shame or a pretense",
and a 1915 case, Coe v. Armour Fertilizer ferh 237 U-S-
1,1 3 (1915) > left no doubt that notice and hearing are
prerequisites to due process in civil procedures also.
The Warren Court developed the overbreadth doctrine
which strikes down lesis la t i nr& on ...i\hich sweep, unnecessarily,
broadly, and thereby invade the area of protected free-
127doms ; " while by 1926 the Court had developed the "void
for vagueness" doctrine: legislation that uses terms
.so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.
.
." violates due process.
The vagueness doctrine was raised in slightly
different terms in Musser v. Utah
, 333 U.S. 95 (1948):
Legislation may run afoul of the due process clause
because it fails to give adequate guidance to those who
would be law abiding, to advise defendants of the nature of
offense with which they are charged, or to guide courts in
trying those who are charged." The Court raised the
question, "...(Does) the statute attempt to cover so much
127NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
that it effectively covers nothing?" Again, in Jordan v.
DeGeorge
,
3*tl U.S. 223 (1951) the Court noted that "the test
is whether the language.
.. (of the law) ... conveys sufficiently
definite warnings as to prescribed conduct when measured
by common understanding and practices."
In 1943
,
in Tot v. United States
. 319 U.S. 463, the
doctrine of "irrebutable presumptions" was raised by the
Court, and it was noted that an important function of the
due process clause was to be a limitation upon the creation
of statutory presumptions: "Under our decisions a
statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no
rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate
fact presumed, if the inference of the one from proof of the
other is arbitrary because of lack of connection between the
two in common experience."
This principle was upheld in United States v. Romano,
382 U.S. 136 (1965), again in Leary v. United States
, 395
U.S. 6 (1969):
A criminal statutory presumption must be regarded
as "irrational" or "arbitrary", and hence uncon-
stitutional, unless it can at least be said with
substantial assurance that the presumed fact is
more likely than not to flow from the Droved
fact on which it is made to depend.
and finally in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur , 4 l 4
U.S. 632 ( 197*0 > a case involving the mandatory maternity
leave of pregnant school teachers five months before the
expected birth of the child. The leave policy was based on
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the need to keep "physically unfit teachers out of the
classroom". The Court said, "the provisions amount to a
conclusive presumption that every pregnant teacher who
reaches the fifth.
. .month of pregnancy is physically incap-
able of continuing. There is no individual determination...
The Court, while allowing that the Board of Education was
making a good faith attempt to achieve a laudable goal,
struck down the regulation under the due process clause,
because it employed an irrebuttable presumption.
6.2.4 Due Process and Students:
1940 to I960
By 1940, the Supreme Court/F. D. Roosevelt "New Deal"
conflict had been resolved. While Roosevelt had not "won",
there had been a shift in the political persuasion of the
Court due partly to the resignation of some of the con-
servatives, and a change in attitude by some of the other
justices
.
Harlon Fiske Stone was appointed Chief Justice in
1941, and the Court entered a "revisionist period" character
ized by a greater interest in civil liberties and a sharp
recognition that the United States was truly a "Nation",
and therefore, the doctrine of "states rights" made little
128
sense
.
128Steamer, op cit, p. 218
Fred Vinson became Chief Justice in 19*16. Under
Vinson, the Court was "lazy”, deciding fewer cases than the
Court under Stone. It can be said, however, that the
Vinson Court had picked up where the Stone Court had left
off, in the area of civil liberties, and set the stage for
the extension of civil liberties in the Warren era. To
this extent, the period from 19*17-1953 was a time of
transition for the Court. Of major importance during this
period were the decision of the Court in the area of equal
protection rights in higher education, which set the stage
129.for the 195^ Brown decision.
Earl Warren became Chief Justice in 1953, and the
"Warren Court" was to have a major impact on public policy,
the Constitution, and the future of the United States.
"In the 1950's the Supreme Court had become almost a day-
to-day defender of individual liberty when it vigorously
assumed its new role of guarantor to the individual of
human dignity, equality of opportunity, freedom from
oppressive majorities and/or selfish minorities, freedom
from arbitrary and capricious actions by public officials,
130
and freedom to express a broad variety of ideas."'
129 lbid, p. 236, 238, 240.
13
°ibid, p. 257.
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By 19i)2, the state courts were still hearing college
discipline cases, with generally the same results as reported
earlier. But one can sense a difference: the growth of
procedural rights was beginning to have an impact.
In
—
-
at e ex rel Sherman v. Hyman
. 171 s.W. 2d 822
(1992), a case involving medical students expelled from
school for selling final exams, the Court indicated that
all legal authorities had agreed "that students may not
be dismissed or suspended or deprived of any right
without notice and a fair hearing." And as with earlier
decisions, made it clear that "courts will not interfere...
unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion or when action
has been arbitrary or unlawful." But there were some
differences now. "...students should be informed of the
nature of the charges, as well as the names of at least
the principle witnesses against him when requested, and given
a fair opportunity to make his defense. He cannot claim
the privilege of cross-examination as a matter of right."
To this last point, the court added, "...honorable students
do not like to be known as snoopers and informers against their
fellows ... they should not be subject to a cross-examination
...It would be subversive to the best interests of the
school, as vie 11 as harmful to the community."
As to testimony at hearings, the court said it could
be oral or written, but didn't have to be under oath, and
b22
that "students should not be compelled to give evidence
incriminating themselves."
3y 1956, the principles had not changed.
A state court, in Bluett v. Board of Trustees
, 134
N.E. 2d 635 (1956), another medical school dismissal
case, cited Ingersoll and Sherman and held that the student
was "...not entitled to a formal charge or formal hearing..."
nor could she confront her accuser or cross-examine them.
Two years later a public college discipline case,
Steir v. N.Y.S. Education Committee
,
l6l P. Supp
.
5^9
(1958), was heard by a Federal Court. The student, sus-
pended twice from school, (1955 and 1956) was finally
dismissed in 1956. He was present at his dismissal hearing,
run by the Faculty Committee on Orientation and Guidance,
and allowed to present his defense. He received a dismissal
notice, and was advised of the appeal procedure.
In New York, there had been established a hierarchical
appeal procedure. Steir brought his appeal to the first
level, the Board of Education, and was given a copy of the
Faculty Committee’s report on his dismissal for his use
in his defense. Both he and his mother were present at
the appeal proceedings.
He was turned down on this appeal, and generated a
third appeal to the next higher authority. His appeal
was denied, and "he brought suit in Federal District Court,
H23
claiming a denial of his fourteenth amendment rights,
deprivation of his liberty, and denial of due process.
The Court decided for the college, noting that Steir
had been informed of the charges against him, given a
hearing, and given ample opportunity to defend himself.
But, the court based its decision on the fact that Steir
had not exhausted all appeal remedies at the state level!
Steir appealed his case to the Circuit Court of Appeals. "^l
The appeals court said the trial court was wrong to
have even heard the case. "We prefer to place our decision
squarely on the ground that the complete and uncontroverted
facts clearly demonstrate there was no jurisdiction in the
United States District Court ... education is a field of life
reserved to the individual states. " (emphasis added)
Quoting Judge Wyzanski in Cranny v. Trustees of Boston
University
,
the court said,
to expand the civil rights statute so as to embrace
every constitutional claim. . .would in fact bring
within the initial jurisdiction of the United
stales District courts that vast array of contro-
versies which have heretofore been raised in the
state tribuanals, by challenges upon the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
It would be arrogating to the United States
District Courts that which is purely a state court
function. Conceivably, every college student,
upon dismissal from such a college, could rush to
a federal judge seeking remedy of the dismissal.
131271 F • 2d 13 (1959).
For students and due process, the stage was now set
for a major change in the thinking of the Federal courts:
a complete turnabout from the litigation of the previous
90 years. The case was Dixon v. Alabama
. 186 P. Supp. 945
(I960), 294 F. 2d 150 (1961), and a landmark decision was to
be made that was to take the cause for civil liberties out
of the confines of the black civil rights movement, and
extend it to all other areas of our society, to include
students
.
The Federal District Court was to take the first
significant action. Black students from Alabama State
College had demonstrated at a white lunch counter in the
county court building. They wished to be served at the lunch
counter, like others, specifically, white people. The
counter was closed, and the students brought their demonstra-
tion to the corridors of the court house itself. Police
were called, and the student demonstrators dispersed.
There occurred, during the next several days, other,
similar, demonstrations, and the president of Alabama
State College said that these "...demonstrations were dis-
rupting the orderly conduct of business at the college...
and was affecting the work of other students." The
students were warned against having any further
demonstrations, but these warnings were ignored. The
demonstrations were investigated by state authorities,
including the State Attorney General and the Governor's
Office. A full report of the several demonstrations was
made to the Board of Education, which took up the question
of what to do with the so-called student "ring leaders"
of the demonstrations.
The Governor of Alabama reported on the results of
investigations into these demonstrations, and, as Chairman
of the Board, recommended expulsion of the students. The
Board acted unanimously to carry out the Governor’s recom-
mendation, and directed the State College President to
carry out its decision.
The students were officially notified of their
dismissal. No formal charges were placed against them,
and no hearing was granted prior to their expulsion.
Departing from Steir
,
the trial Court said that
Federal Courts do have jurisdiction over such cases, and based
this jurisdiction on the Federal Civil Rights Act, which
allows any person, "to redress the deprivation, under color
of any state law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any right, privilege, or immunity, secured by
the Constitution of the United States or by an act of
Congress ..."
The students had claimed that their fourteenth amend-
ment due process rights had been violated. But, after
reviewing the right of college officials to develop rules
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and regulations for the governing of the school, the court
found against the students, citing a history of legal
authority, much of which has been outlined above. Intro-
ducing a new twist to its decision, the Court said.
Where there is no statute or rule that requires formal
charges and/or hearing, as is the case in Alabama, the
prevailing law does not require the presentation of formal
charges or a hearing- prior to expulsion by the school
authorities.
. .The expulsion by the Board was done in good
faith and was not an arbitrary action. Such action did not
operate to deprive (the students) of their constitutional
rights .
"
The case was appealed, and it was the appeals court
which was to take the second, and most significant step,
re-interpreting precedent.
The Court, through Circuit Judge Rives, said, in
part
,
The question presented by the pleadings and evidence,
and decisive of this appeal, is whether due process
requires notice and some opportunity for hearing
before students at a tax-supported college are expelled
for misconduct. We answer that question in the
affirmative
.
The misconduct for which the students were expelled
has never been definitely specified.
The notice of expulsion which Dr. Trenholm mailed to
each of the plaintiffs assigned no specific ground
for expulsion, but referred in general terms to
"this problem of Alabama State College".
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The District Court wrote at some length on thatquestion, as appears frcm its opinion. Afteroareful study and consideration, we find ourselves
oourt%hei-
aSree
l'.
th the 00nclusl °n °f the districtc that no notice or opportunity for any kind of
expelled
”33 required before these students were
It is true, as the district court said, that "# * #there is no statute or rule that requires formal charp-esand/0r a hearing* * but the evidence is withoutdispute that che usual practice at Alabama StateCoilege had been to give a hearing and opDortunityto offer defenses before expelling a student.
Whenever a governmental body acts so as to injure
an individual, the Constitution requires that the
act be consonant with due process of law. The
minimum procedural requirements necessary to satisfydue process depend upon the circumstances and theinterests of the parties involved. As stated by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring in Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath
,
"Whether the ex parte procedure to which
the petitioners were subjected duly
observed ’the rudiments of fair play’,
* * * cannot * * * be tested by mere
generalities or sentiments abstractly
appealing. The precise nature of the
interest that has been adversely
affected, the manner in which this was
done, the reasons for doing it, the
available alternatives to the procedure
that was followed, the protection
implicit in the office of the function-
ary whose conduct is challenged, the
balance of hurt complained of and
good accomplished—these are some of
the considerations that must enter
into the judicial judgment."
It is not enough to say, as did the district court in
the present case, "The right to attend a public
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That argument wa - emphaticallyswered by the Supreme Court in the Cafeteria and
l!^aid
a
th y°^
ers
-JM°a case. (8l S.cF. 17K8) when
d
‘ ‘he question of whether "* * * summarilyenying Rachel Brawner access to the site of her
'
1 ormer employment violates the requirements of thedue process clause of the fifth amendment * * *
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^ be answer(fd by easy assertion that, becauseshe had no constitutional right to be there in theurst place, she was not deprived of liberty orproperty by the Superintendent's action. "One may
not have a constitutional right to go to Bagdad, butthe Government may not prohibit one from going there
unless by means consonant with due process of law."
As in that case, so here, it is necessary to consider
. the nature both of the private interest which has beenimpaired and the governmental power which has been
exercised .
"
The Board 01 Education and college officials urge upon
us that under a provision of the Board of Education’s
regulations the students waived any right to notice
and a hearing before being expelled for misconduct.
We do not read this provision to clearly indicate
an intent on the part of the student to waive notice
and a hearing before expulsion. If, however, we
should so assume, it nonetheless remains true that
the State cannot condition the granting of even a
privilege upon the renunciation of the constitutional
right to procedural due process. Only private
associations have the right to obtain a waiver of
notice and hearing before depriving a member of a
Trn 1 11 1 v-> -?
-f- l\ U « X- ‘U ^ -? X- X- ^ X- J ^
V
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and a hearing is so fundamental to the conduct of
our society that the waiver must be clear and
explicit. In the absence of such an explicit waiver,
Alabama has required that even private associations
must provide notice and a hearing before expulsion.
The precise nature of the private interest involved
in this case is the right to remain at a public
institution of higher learning in which the plaintiffs
were students in good standing. It requires no
argument to demonstrate that education is vital and,
indeed, basic to civilized society. Without
sufficient - education the plaintiffs would not be
able to earn an adequate livelihood, to enjoy life
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to the fullest
the duties and
,
or to fulfill as
responsibilities
completely as possible
of good citizens.
There was no offer to prove that other colleges areopen to the plaintiffs. If so, the plaintiffs
their ^°
netnelass be injured by the interruption ofcourse of studies in mid-term. It is most
eylel?
1
^
& public colle ge would accept a studentxp led from another public college of the same
^
abe \ -fndeed} expulsion may well prejudice thestudent in completing his education at any otherinstitution.
.Surely no one can question that the
froS
ht bo re
^
iai
? at the college in which the plaintiffswere students m good standing is an interest of
extremely great value.
Turning then to the nature of the governmental powerto expel the plaintiffs, it must be conceded, as
was held by the district court, that that power is
not unlimited and cannot be arbitrarily exercised.
Admittedly, there must be some reasonable
and constitutional ground for expulsion or the courts
would have a duty to require reinstatement. The
possibility of arbitrary action is not excluded by
the existence of reasonable regulations. There may
be artibrary application of the rule to the facts of
a particular case. Indeed, that result is well nigh
inevitable when the Board hears only one side of the
issue. In the disciplining of college students there
are no considerations of immediate danger to the
public, or of peril to the national security, which
should prevent the Board from exercising at least the
fundamental principles of fairness by giving the
accused students notice of the charges and an
opportunity to be heard in their own defense.
The district court, however, felt that it was
governed by precedent, and stated that, "the courts have
consistently upheld the validity of regulations that
have the effect of reserving to the college the
right to dismiss students at any time for any reason
without divulging its reason other than its being
for the general benefit of the institution." With
deference, we must hold that the district court has
simply misinterpreted the precedents.
We are confident that precedent as well as a most
fundamental constitutional principle support our
holding that due process requires notice and some
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a formal interview with an administrativeu ity of the college. By its nature, a charge ofmisconduct, as opposed to a failure to meet the
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S ° f the collese, depends upon acollection of the facts concerning the charged mis-
conduct, easily colored by the point of view of the
witnesses. In such circumstances, a hearing whichgives the Board or the administrative authorities ofthe college an opportunity to hear both sides in
considerable detail is best suited to protect the
rights of all involved. This is not to imply that a
i ull-dress judicial hearing, with the right to cross-
examine witnesses, is required. Such a hearing,
with the attending publicity and disturbance of college
activities, might be detrimental to the college's
educational atmosphere and impractical to carry out.
Nevertheless, the rudiments of an adversary proceeding
may be preserved without encroaching upon the inter-
ests of the.college. In the instant case, the student
should be given the names of the witnesses against
him and an oral or written report on the facts to
which each witness testifies. Ke should also be given
the opportunity to present to the Board, or at least
to an administrative official of the college, his
own defense against the charges and to produce either
oral testimony or written affidavits or witnesses
in his behalf. If the hearing should be presented
in a report open to the 'student's inspection. If
these rudimentary elements of fair play are followed
in a case of misconduct of this particular type, we
feel that the requirements of due process of law will
have been fulfilled.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed...
H31
The federal courts had come to the campus.
While the Supreme Court has never decided a specific
student dismissal case. It should be noted that It has not
overturned Dixon, and has, on several occasions, cited
it
.
The door was opened, and federal courts began to hear
student discipline cases covering all aspects of due
process. The cases covered in the next section are categorized
by major subject area. To avoid confusion, however, it
should be noted that discipline cases may cover several
subject areas.
6.3 exhausting Administrative Remedies
Michael Becker was a student in good standing at
Pennsylvania State University. He was arrested on
February 23, 1973 at the college for possession of marijuana,
and barbiturates. After reading about the arrest in local
newspapers, the director of the University’s Office of
Conduct and Standards, Dr. Suit, began a disciplinary
folder on Becker, for violation of University rules and
regulations
.
On April 5th and 9th, 1973, Dr. Suit met with Becker
and gave him a copy of the charge against him, and copies
of excerpts from the University handbook of policies and
rules relating to discipline hearing procedures, sanctions
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and appeal procedures.
Following a hearing, which Becker attended, the Uni-
versity Hearing Board concluded that he should be dismissed
from the University. He could apply to the President of
the University for readmission after one year, and, he could
appeal the Hearing Board's decision to the University
Appeals Board.
Rather than appeal, he brought his case to Federal
District Court. 122
District Judge Muir, in considering the question of
whether or not a plaintiff must exhaust all reasonable appeals
before resorting to the courts, said in part:
In several civil rights suits for injunctive
relief, the Supreme Court has stated that exhaustion
of state administrative remedies was net a pre-
requisite to the suit. Despite the broad language
in those cases, and even though the Supreme Court has
not required such exhaustion in any case yet
decided, the majority of the Courts of Appeals
which have interpreted these cases has held that
failure to exhaust is excused if the administrative
remedy is inadequate or futile. The Court of Appeals
for this circuit has not set forth such a rule of
general application, out: nas neia mat; a state
prisoner must exhaust his administrative remedies
before he will be heard to contest in a civil rights
suit his prison classification which resulted in his
inability to earn remission time. In its opinion, the
court noted the desirability of avoiding potentially
voluminous and frequently unnecessary litigation.
As other courts have noted, the exhaustion requirement
also flushes out unconstitutional reasons, for the
state’s action and gives state bodies the
132Becker v. Oswald, 360 F. Supp. 1131 (1973)
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opportunity to review their own decisions. These
salutary effects counsel adoption by this court ofthe majority rule : failure to exhaust state administra-tive remedies bars a civil rights suit for injuctive
relief unless the remedies are inadeauate or resortto them would be futile.
Given this rule, Becker's case turns on whether the
administrative remedies open to him were adequate andif so, whether he exhausted them.
The University proved at trial that, on its face, an
appeal was a fair remedy whic.h could have provided
Becker the relief he now requests.
Because Becker maintained at trial that he had un-
successfully attempted to appeal the Board's
decision, he did not offer any evidence that taking
an appeal would have been futile. For example, there
was no evidence that the defendant President of the
University, who has ultimate authority to decide
appeals, would have approved his dismissal regardless
of the recommendation of the Appeals Board.
The University’s Handbook of Policies and Rules for
Students, a copy of which was given to Becker prior
to his hearing before the University Hearing Board,
provides that a student who wishes to appeal from
the findings or recommendation of the Board must submit
a written request for an appeal within five days of
the date of the original hearing. Becker clearly
did not comply with this requirement.
On April 16, 1973, Becker was orally notified of the
Board’s decision, and was advised that he had five
days wiunin wmcn to me an appeal therefrom. He
did n6t do so. On April 23, 1973, Dr. Suit, Director
of the Office of Conduct Standards at the University,
sent Becker a letter advising him that a written
request for an appeal would have to be submitted
within five days of receipt of the letter.
The court concludes that . . . (Becker) deliberately
and knowingly failed to take advantage of a reasonable
opportunity to appeal administratively from the
Hearing Board's findings of guilt and recommendation
of dismissal. ...(Becker) has not proved that the
appeal procedure was inadequate or that an appeal would
have been futile. His right to appeal may no longer
be available to him, since the President of the
University has approved the dismissal; neverthelesshis knowing failure to appeal precludes him from ob-taining from this court the relief which might havebeen afforded him by the University. To hold thathe is not barred because his administrative remedies
are no longer available to him would contravene thepolicies in favor of exhaustion, such as averting
unnecessary
. litigation and providing state bodies
an opportunity to review their own decisions. Nojustification for such a result appears in the
record of this case.
In the student discipline process, there should be
some system of appeal to a higher campus authority, should
it be appropriate. The extent of the appeals process
should be governed by the extent of the loss suffered by
the student.
The appeal process must be a valid one, not inadequate
or futile. The burden will be on the college officials
to show that the appeals process offers the student a fair
opportunity to gain the relief sought (see Palko )
.
Appeal procedures should be written, and made avail-
able to all students. It may also be a good practice to
give a copy of the appeals procedure to students who face
disciplinary action.
If the college officials have satisfied the above
conditions, and if a student knowingly fails to follow the
appeals procedure and seeks relief in the courts, the
courts will probably not consider his grievance.
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6.^ Dismissal and Suspension
Procedures
Dixon had served as a change agent. Following that
1960-61 decision, college and university officials across
the country began reviewing, and changing their discipline
codes and procedures, courts began to apply the due
process principles set out in Dixon
,
and legal scholars,
most notably Van Alstyne, added due process on campus as
a legitimate subject area for Law Reviews and other legal
j ournals
.
Procedure in discipline cases goes to the heart of
due process, as it relates to students and administrators.
Four "procedure" cases, spanning seven years, are outlined
below.
In November of 1968, several incidents took place on
the campus of Wisconsin State University - Oshkosh, in-
volving a number of black students and a few non-students.
Included among these incidents were tne "taxing over" of
the president's office, and the general distruction of
property and papers in other administrative offices, to
include the president's reception area, the business
office, and the fianancial aid office. All events were
tied to the "Black Student Union's" demands for changes
in university personnel, curriculum and programs.
The students were ordered out of the building, first
436
by college authorities, and then by police. After three
such warnings by the police, arrests were made.
On the day following the disturbances, the president
decided to suspend certain students temporarily, and a
letter was sent by certified mall to these students.
The letter read, as follows:
Please take notice that deeming it in the bestinterests of the university and pursuant to the
authority of sec. 7.01, ch. VII of the by-laws ofthe Board of Regents of State Universities you aresuspended from the Wisconsin State University -Oshkosh for engaging in conduct contrary to theprovisions of sec. 37.11 Wis. Stats., and for
engaging in conduct prohibited by said sec. 7.01 ofthe By-laws to-wit, did on' November 21, 1968:
"a) interfere with the administrative
functions and activities of the university
and with its educational and service
programs by breaking the peace through
physical obstruction, coercion, noise,
tumult and physical damage to state
property
.
b) without authority occupy university
facilities and block access to the following
described areas in Dempsey Hall; executive
suite, including the office of the
president, business office and financial
aids office.
c) infringe upon the rights of students,
faculty, staff and authorized persons to
gain access to university facilities for
the purpose of university activities.
You may appeal this order of suspension by filing
written notice in the office of the president, R.
E. Guiles, Wisconsin State University - Oshkosh,
Oshkosh, Wisconsin 5^901 requesting a hearing.
Written notice requesting a hearing must be
received within ten days of receipt of this
notice. Failure to request a hearing within
^37
the ten (10) day period will be deemed a waiver
versity^
lnS &nd Y°U Wl11 be exPelled from the uni-
You are further advised that
decision you may not attend
facilities
.
pending an appeal and
classes or use unviersity
Dated
/s/ R. E. Guiles
President
Section 37.11 of the Wisconsin Statutes say, in
pertinent part:
a. Interference with accepted functions or activities
of the university or with its educational or
service programs, either by breach of the Deace,
physical obstruction or coercion, or by noise,
tumult or other disturbance.
b. Unauthorized occupancy of university facilities
or blocking access to or from such areas.
c. Interference with approved university traffic
(pedestrian or motor vehicle).
d. Infringement of the rights of students, faculty,
staff, and/or other authorized persons to gain
access to any university facility for the purpose
of attending classes, participating in interviews,
university conferences and/or other university
^ 4 .! 4- .? _ ^a
-L. _1_ c o •
e. Picketing, or demonstrating, with the use of
obscene or indecent language, or with signs or
banners containing such language or of such
size, material or construction as to create a
hazard to persons or property.
Section 7.01 of the Board of Regents By-laws contains
the following information:
Power is hereby conferred upon the president of each
state university to suspend or expel students for
misconduct, and for such other causes as may be
'138
prescribed from time to time in these by-laws.
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ny case the president shall determinethat the best interests of the university or of theother students require it, the president may suspendthe accused student temporarily, pending prompt deter-
mination as to his guilt.
The students had been suspended on November 22 and were
not allowed to attend classes or to use university facilities.
On December 6, the Board of Regents met, and decided
that the president, who had been a witness to the events,
could not, as the by-laws required, act as an impartial
judge as to penalties. They decided to retain a hearing
agent, "to hear all disputed charges of misconduct ... to
make findings
. . . and to report his findings and recommenda-
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his duties on December 9.
The question posed by the students was, is it lawful
to suspend them, without a hearing or charges, for such
a long period of time, i.e., November 22nd to at least
December 9th? The students believed that they should be
reinstated pending their hearing. The University officials
said no, and the students brought suit in Federal District
Court
.
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District Judge James E. Doyle delive.ed the opinion of
the Court, which said, in part:
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ver Law JounulL 582, 593-59^ (1963)
"(a) the student charges with an infrac-tion
...(should be) furnished with a
wi itten statement of the charged adequatelyin advance of a hearing to enable him toprepare (e.g.
,
10 days);
(b) the student thus charged ’...(should)
be permitted to inspect in 'advance of suchhearing any atiidavits or exhibits which
the college intends to submit at the
nearing
’
;
(c) the student ... (can be) ’permitted to
have counsel present at the hearing to
advise.
.
.
(him)
’
;
(d) the student ...(should be) ’permitted
to hear the evidence presented against
(him),’ or at least the student should be
given the names of the witnesses against
him and an oral or written report on the
29^ F. Supp. 562 (1968).
facts to which each witness testifies;
( e
)
tne student or his attorney may
Kives^vljf the hearins any witness whog es evidence against him;
(f
)
those who hear the case '
.
.
(should) determine the facts of*each
H Sfu SOi ely °n the evidenc e presentedat the hearing
'
;
(g) .'the results and findings of thehearing should be presented in a
report open to the student's inspection'; ‘
(h) 'either side may, at its own
expense, make a record of the events
at the hearing.'"
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eded that none of said safeguards has as yetbeen met here except insofar as they are met bythe notices of suspension. Liberally construed, thatnotice might be considered an adequate specification
o charges. Whether the device of providing a hearing
on y upon request meets constitutional requirements
s a question with respect to which no authority hasbeen cited, .nor has any been found by the court inthis short interval; I believe that the device mayfairly be described as unusual.
But the central issue here concerns the status of
these students pending final action in disciplinary
proceedings
.
The Association of American Colleges, the American
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Student Association, the National Association of
Student Personnel Administrators, the National
Association of Women Deans and Counselors, and the
American Association of Higha? Education have
recently approved a "Joint Statement on Rights and
Freedoms of Students", one of the provisions of
which is as follows:
"C. Status of Student Pending Final Action
Pending action on the charges, the status
of a student should not be altered, or
his right to be present on the campus and
to attend classes suspended, except for
weii-oeing of students, faculty
university property."
ical or
ing, or
°'’'p
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preserve the competing values and interests to a
maximum degree.
Accordingly
,
upon the basis of the entire record
herein, it is hereby ordered:
That the students suspended by reason of the events
of November 21, 1968, be reinstated as students at
Wisconsin State University - Oshkosh, effective at
6:00 p.m., December 11, 1968, with the same rights,
privileges and immunities which attached to their
status as students prior to their suspension, and
that such reinstatement continue until such time as
aC terminations arc made within the university
with respect to the imposition or non-imposition
of sanctions by reason of the events of November 21,
1968: provided, however, that none of the said stu-
dents need be so reinstated if, prior to said day and
hour, notice is served (by means of placing said
notice in the mails addressed to his or her last known
address) upon him or her of a hearing to be held not
later than December 16, 1968, either upon the
charges heretofore set forth in the notice of sus-
pension, or upon newly drawn and stated charges; and
provided, further, that a final determination is
made within the university no later than December 20,
1968, witbrrespect to said charges.
One year later, Judge Doyle heard another dismissal
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case, involving the Madison campus of the same college,
the University of Wisconsin, operating under the same
Board of Regents as in the Marzette case.
With the exception of a few differences, the facts of
this case are substantially the same as the previous case.
Disruption of University-run or University-authorized
activities had occurred on February 27, 1969 . It was
decided that the three students involved would be suspended
immediately, pending a hearing on charges to be brought by
University officials.
Within 24 to 48 hours each of the three students was
notified of the charges, and suspension, and of a March 19th
hearing date.
On March 4, 1969
,
the Vice Chancellor for Student
Affairs contacted each of the students by phone, and read
the following statement:
I should like a few minutes to read a statement to
yuu. Yuu are James M. Stricklin? (He answered:
Yes.) May I proceed? (He answered: Yes.)
This is to inform you that allegations have been
made against you involving intentional conduct that
seriously damages or destroys University property
or attempts to seriously damage or destroy University
property, and involving intentional conduct that
^Stricklin v. Regents of the University of Wisconsin ,
297 F. Supp. 4 16 “(1969T
Indicates a serious danger to the personal safetv rfother members of the University community.
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Discipline and Faculty Document 226, both of which
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Se procedures are av^ilable in Room 123
Please understand that you need not resDond duringthis phone call nor when you come to see me nor make
any response or statement which you believe might tendto incriminate you. Should you decide to respond, whatyou say will be used by the administration in deciding
whether or not to file charges. Should you decide
not to respond, the administration will decide aboutfiling charges on the basis of information available
to it
.
The Board of Regents met on March 6, 1969, and formally
acted to suspend the students. None of the students was
notified that the Regents would meet on March 6th, nor were
they furnished with any specification of charges to be
considered by the Regents; and none was given an opportunity
to oe neara Dy tne Regents.
There was no intention on the part of the University
officials to reinstate any of the students between this
March 6th Regents meeting, and the March 19th discipline
hearing
.
Judge Doyle’s opinion stated, in part:
University officials do not contend that the suspension
of 13 days (March 6-19), and probably more,
represents a disciplinary sanction imposed upon any
ao waxen a decision is reached in hishearing
.
case following a
In this .opinion I will deal only with universitydisciplinary situations in which it is realistic that
serious sanctions, such as expulsion or suspension for
a significant period of time, may ultimately be imposed.
I will employ the terms "preliminary hearing" and "fullhearing to designate two types of hearings in discipli-
nary cases.
.1 will apply the term "interim suspension"
to a suspension imposed upon a student pending adecision in his case following a "full hearing", as
distinguished from a suspension for a fixed period
of time which may be imposed as the ultimate sanction.
This case thus involves an "interim suspension", in
the absence of a "preliminary hearing", pending the
holding of a "full hearing" to be followed by a decision
whether to impose a serious ultimate sanction.
A "Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students"
includes this provision:
"C. Status of Student Pending Final Action
Pending action on the charges, the status
of a student should not be altered, o^ his
right to be present on the campus and to
attend classes suspended, except for
reasons relating to his physical or emotional
safety and well-being, or for reasons relating
to the safety and well-being of students,
faculty, or university property."
In an interim opinion and order entered March lb,
1969, I concluded that these students had discharged
pended ^ for^a^substantiafperlolfof^time^lt-h
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a falr and reasonable standard,i to recognition as an essential ingredient ifth- procedural due process guaranteed by the four-teenth) amendment. The difficulty lies in a properimplementation of ths standapd.
The standard involves two distinct elements: dangerand timing. 6
Unless the element of danger to persons or propertyis present, suspension should not occur without
specification of charges, notice of hearing, and
hearing. The preliminaries to the hearing and the hear-ing itself
. should constitute what I have called afull hearing
,
that is, a procedure which affords
all of
. the elements of due process which must con-
stitutionally precede the imposition of the sanction
of expulsion or the imposition of the sanction of
suspension for a substantial period of time.
When the appropriate university authority has reasonable
cause to believe that danger will be present if a
student is permitted to remain on the campus pending
a decision following a full hearing, an interim
suspension may be imposed. But the question persists
whether such an interim suspension may be imposed
without a prior "preliminary hearing" of any kind.
The constitutional answer is inescapable. An interim
suspension may not be imposed without a prior prelim-
inary hearing, unless it can be shown that it is
impossible or unreasonably difficult to accord it
prior to an interim suspension. Moreover, even when
it is impossible or unreasonably difficult to accord
the student a preliminary hearing prior to an interim
suspension, procedural due process requires that hepraSe time° h «"he^rUe.t
„
1
:
In the absence of such a requirementa student may be suspended in an ex parte proceedingfor as much as 13 and probably about 18 days (as in
br ? p5
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cases )» without any opportunity, however
e
d
t°wever limited, to persuade the suspending
or that fh
hat there is a case of mistaken identityt ere was extreme provocaton or that there" i-some other compelling justification for withholdingor terminating the interim suspension.
The Regents have recognized the justice and
of such a rule. Their By-laws, provide:
necessity
"
9D The administration may, in those
cases where there is a strong indication
that a student’s misconduct will be re-
peated or continued or where the
administration believes it is necessary
to permit the University to carry on its
functions, impose immediate suspension
with resultant loss of all student
rights and privileges, pending hearing
before the all-faculty disciplinary
committee. The student has a right to
immediate hearing on the limited
question of whether suspension should
remain in effect until the full hearing
is completed.
( 2 ) In all situations other than set
out in (1) above, the administration,
after adequate investigation and notice
and opportunity to be heard to the
student, is empowered to impose any
disciplinary punishment less severe than
suspension. In any such case a student
may appeal and request a hearing before
the all-faculty disciplinary committee.”
Here the Regents, exercising their reserved power
to deal directly with a disciplinary case, have
withheld from these plaintiffs a "right" which the
Regents have conferred upon students whose
disciplinary cases are dealt with by the administration
namely, the "right to immediate hearing on the
limited question of whether suspension should
remain in effect until the full hearing is completed.
...there has been no showing whatever that it wasimpossible or unreasonably difficult for theRegents, or an agent designated by them for the
purpose, to provide a preliminary hearing prior tothe March 6 interim suspension order (the most recent
conduct complained of occurred February 27 ). Andthere has been no showing whatever that it has beenimpossible or unreasonably difficult for the
Regents, or an agent designated by them for thepurpose, to provide a preliminary hearing since March
b on whether the interim suspension should continue
until the time at which a decision has been reachedfollowing a full hearing.
This court is clearly not the forum for an initial
adversary proceeding on the question whether a
particular student is guilty of a particular act or
omission justifying disciplinary action within the
university
. Had a reasonably adequate preliminary
hearing been furnished to each of the ...(students)
within the university, and had a showing been made
there comparable to that now attempted here, and had
the Regents concluded that interim suspension was
warranted, and had the ...(students) then attacked the
interim suspensions in this court as a denial of
procedural due process, the issue would have lent
itself to rather ready disposition.
A similar situation to Marzette and Stricklin occurred
in 1974 in Marin v. University of Puerto Rico
, 377 F. Supp.
613 (197*0- Two students had been suspended, summarily,
from the university because of an incident in the
university library. The suspension was for three weeks.
A few days before this suspension was to end, the
students were involved in another incident, and the suspen-
sion was extended for another 64 days. There were other
incidents involving the two students, which involved
questions of freedom of speech.
A full hearing was held, prior to the end of the ex-
tended suspension, before the Board of Trustees. While
all charges were not upheld, the Dean of the College,
acting on those charges where the students were found
guilty, suspended the students for one academic year.
This case raised several fourteenth amendment
questions, some of which will be considered later in this
chapter. With respect to due process. District Judge
Toledo, after documenting the legal questions involved,
jurisdictional considerations, and rights of students at
public colleges and universities, said, in part, about
the student's due process rights:
In considering the merits of plaintiffs' due process
arguments, we must first determine whether due process
protections apply to suspension of students by public
educational institutions. The relevent inquiry is
whether plaintiffs' interests affected here are
within the concepts of "liberty" or "property" protected
by the due process clause. Board of Regents v. Roth
,
408 U.S. 564
,
571
, ( 1972 ). That interest has been
described in the seminal case as "the right to
remain at a public institution of higher learning in
which the plaintiff s ... (are ) students in good
standing." Dixon v. Aiapama Srate boara of Eaucation
,
294 F.2d 150
,
157 ( 1961 ) . The enormous importance of
education has been repeatedly reaffirmed. See Brown
v. Board of Education
,
347 U.S. 483
, ( 1954 ). "It
is a principal instrument in awakening the . .
.
(individual) to cultural values ... (and) in preparing
him for later professional training", Brown, 347 U.S.
at 493. As the Court has recently stated, the term
liberty includes "the right... to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge,
and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized,
as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men." Roth , 408 U.S. at 572 . The right _ to
engage in a chosen occupation is meaningless if one is
unable to obtain the training it requires; similarly,
the right to acquire useful knowledge implies a rightof access to institutions dispensing such knowledge.It is too late in the day, now that the right-orivilegedistinction is dead and buried to argue that the
right to attend a public educational institution to
which one is admitted or attending as a student ingood standing is not within the "liberty" protectedby the due process clause. See Dixon.
Due process protection is particularly necessary when,
as here, the governmental action may damage the
visual s standing in the community
,
academic or
general, or may impose "a stigma or other disability
that forecloses his freedom to take advantage" of
other educational or future employment opportunities.
Roth_, 408 U.S. at 573. Suspension from a public
college is a mark on one’s record that may well
preclude further study at any public and many private
institutions and limit the positions one can qualify
for after termination of one’s studies. For all of
these reasons
,
we hold that the due process clause
applies to educational suspensions.
The more difficult question is what procedural protec-
tion is due. The students' general interest has been
articulated above. It includes specifically the
opportunity to attend class, consult faculty, utilize
university facilities, participate in extra-curricular
activities, and generally partake in the academic
community. The state’s interests are important and
numerous: protection of life, limb, and property
(both public and private) preservation of order guaran-
teeing the educational opportunities of others, and,
in circumstances not present here, vindication of the
integrity to the academic process. But no sound
x.tcxooxx a.ppca.x.‘o why
,
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significant interest, these state goals, however
important, need be vindicated in the normal case
without (1) adequate advance notice to the student of
(a) the charges, (b) the specific, previously promul-
gated regulations under which the charges are brought,
and (c) the evidexice against the student; (2) a full,
expedited evidentiary hearing (a) presided over by an
impartial, previously uninvolved officials, (b) the
proceedings of which are transcribed, at which the
student (c) can present evidence and (d) cross-
examine opposing witnesses, (e) with the assistance
of retained counsel; and (3) a written decision by
the presiding official encompassing (a) finding of
fact, (b) the substantial evidence on which the
450
findings rest, and (c) reasons for the conclusion.
There will, however, be occasions when the stateinterests are so urgent that they cannot abide detentionth® ?tatus pending this full hearing. Promntthough temporary, suspension in advance of a full
*
hearing must be permissible when the university hasreasonable cause to believe that imminent danger topersons or property will exist if the student is per-
rem| in on the campus pending the full hearingStricklin v . Regents of University of Wisconsin
. 297F. Supp. 4l6 ( 1969 ) • Of course, the ability todeprive temporarily is not unrestricted by due process.
ather, there must, absent unusual circumstances, be
a preliminary hearing at which that reasonable causeis established. The exact nature of that hearing is
more difficult to describe generally, giventhe
numerous variations of time, place, numbers and
danger. However, it should suffice to say that a
prompt, informal preliminary hearing must be held
at which the student is provided with notice of the
charges, the specific, previously promulgated regula-
tions under which the charges are brought, the issue
for decision at that preliminary hearing, and his
right to a prompt, full hearing later and at which
both the student and the accusing univeristy officials
and witnesses should be allowed to present whatever
evidence they have which can be promptly heard, with
retained counsel to be permitted if his or her
attendance does not unduly delay the hearing.
The need for such a preliminary inquiry is exemplified
by the facts of this case. On November 17, plaintiff
Bosque was summarily suspended for 20 days for the
library incident as to which the Disciplinary Board
found no violations. As to the events of November
29 and 30, the Board only found a violation in his
participation in university affairs while under a sus-
pension it found improper. Thus, there was in fact no
basis for the suspension of this plaintiff for the
period between November 17 and December 2, the date
of the meeting interruption incident. Had a prelimin-
ary hearing of the nature just described occurred on
November 17, this unlawful suspension, with its
temporary deprivation of educational opportunities,
permanent record stigma, and possible provocative effect
on this plaintiff, would probably never have taken
place
.
Clearly, even such an informal preliminary hearing
*<51
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6 e *lgencies occur the preliminary hearingouid, of course, be held at the first time afterthe circumstances rendering it impossible disappears.
SL C °!f S6\’ ?UP difinitlon of the minimum standards ofprocedural due process is not designed as the
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he °nly salutapy standards. . .our decisionerely establishes the minimum protection constitu-tionally required.
In 1972, several students at Grambling College, a
Louisiana State Institution, were suspended and then dis-
missed for their actions which involved questions of
freedom of speech.
1
^
The students were notified on November 7 , 1972, that
because of their actions
,
they would be suspended until
proper arrangements could be made for a disciplinary
hearing
.
A hearing was set for November 15th and 16 th. Two
days before, each the stud ents r^cieved notices
You are to answer to questions pertaining to the
following charges that have been brought against
you
:
1. Inciting to riot.
2. Disturbing the peace.
3. Criminal damage to public property.
135Jenkins
F.2d 992 (1975).
V . Louisiana State Board of Education, 506
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At the hearing, each student was handed a document
entitled "Information for Disciplinary Hearing Board".
The document advised the students of the specific Grambling
College and Louisiana State Board of Education rules and
regulations that they were alleged to have violated.
After the hearing, all of the students were sus-
pended, and a suit, initiated by the students, was brought
to Federal District Court.
The District Court found that the students had not
been given adequate procedural due process, and ordered
the discipline board to conduct new hearings.
A new hearing was held on November 30th, and the
same charges were heard. The students were once again
suspended. The District Court stayed these suspensions,
pending an appeal to the Louisiana State Board of Education.
The State Board, after a full hearing, with counsel
representing both sides, presentation of witnesses, cross-
examination, and confrontation, upheld the suspensions.
The District Court upheld the sanction, and an appeal was
generated to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Circuit Judge Roney, in rendering the appeals court
decision, said in part:
The classic starting point for an inquiry into the
rights of students at state educational institutions
of higher learning is Dixon v. Alabama State Board
of Education
,
a case in which students were
discipline-d without being provided any notice or
opportunity for hearing. It was in this context
that Judge Rives said that
...due process requires notice and some
opportunity for hearing before a student
at a tax-supported college is expelled
xor misconduct
... The notice should
contain a statement of the specific
charges and grounds which, if proven
would justify expulsion under the
regulations of the Board of Education.
The
any
court
notice
was very much aware of the distinction between
and sufficient notice:
The evidence clearly shows that the
question for decision does not concern
the sufficiency of the notice or the
adequacy of the hearing, but is whether
the^ students had a right to any notice
or hearing whatever before being
expelled.
Commenting on this case in his article "The Constitu-
tion on the Campus", 22 Vand. L. Rev
. 1027, 1072,
(1969), Professor Charles A. Wright stated that
"no court
. since Dixon has denied that the student
must be given prior notice on the grounds on which
the charge is based." In this case we do not
depart from these precedents, since the question for
our decision concerns sufficiency of notice rather than
the question in Dixon whether notice need be given
at all.
We realize that the oft-quoted dictum in Dixon says
that the notice should contain a statement of
"specific charges and grounds" ana that a "student
cannot be punished on the basis of some ground other
than that stated in the written charge." 22 Vand. L.
Rev. 1027, 1072 (1969), citing Hammond v. South
Carolina State College
,
272 F. Supp. 9^7, 950 (1967)
and Woody v. Burns
,
1F8 So . 2d 56
, 57 ( 1 9 6
6
). Judge
Rives also recognized, however, that " (t)he minimum
procedural requirements necessary to satisfy due
process depend upon the circumstances and the interest
of the parties involved." The standards of procedural
due process are not absolutes. Due process in the
context of this case is not to be equated with that
essential to a criminal trial and the notice of
charges need not be drawn with the precision of a
criminal indictment. ('emphasis added)
College administrators should not be held to th*requirements of criminal law relating to giving noticeof conspiracy. Although here the notice given tS
...(the students) could undoubtedly have been drafted
allegat ion^of
1
o-
1°n
’
the Charses do delude numerousions o group or concerted actions. The
Rno
U
I?»
nt
i
ent
i
tled "Information of Disciplinary Hearing
in the
sets forth the type of conduct includedm Board s finding of conspiracy.
...(the student-')were referred to as "organizers," "leader^", and
’
instigators
. The November 7 letter advised the
students that they were charged with the violation of
to. riot"
.
Again it is important to notethe distinction between a college disciplinary pro-
ceeding and a criminal trial. The judicial glossgiven to the word "conspiracy" in the field of criminallaw should not carry into another area where
laymen operate in an altogether different context.
The charges, the hearing, and the findings all evidence
the fact that the "conspiracy" here involved was the
group activity, and the individual participation
in that group action. There is no doubt in our minds
that . the notice given to ...(the students) was in
sufficient detail to fairly enable them to present
a defense at the Disciplinary Board hearing.
A reading of the record clearly reveals that . .
.
(the
students) understood the nature of the charges against
them. Their counsel was quite prepared to refute those
charges at the hearing and conducted ardent cross-
examination of the college’s witnesses. Assuming the
written charges were deficient, the appellants had more
than two weeks between their November 15-16 hearing and
the later hearing ordered by the district court in
which to prepare a defense to the charge of conspirarcy.
Under uhe particular circumstances of this case, we
believe that appellants had sufficient notice of the
specific charges and grounds' (i.e., conspiracy)
developed at the Disciplinary Board hearing to
support their suspensions.
The students claim that the Disciplinary Hearing
Board was predisposed against them and was not an
impartial trier of facts, thus denying them due process
of the law. There is no question but that a student
charged with misconduct has a right to an impartial
tribunal. This Court, however, has previously declined
to establish a per se rule that would disqualify
members of a hearing body, such as the Disciplinary
Hearing Board, solely because they are employees of
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th e Goll eg e or because they might have participated inan initial investigation of the incident which
necessitates the hearing. Duke v. North Texps
grr£ S» y ,/£ 9 P : 2d 829 ‘ ^allST-that the Boardhearing in this case made more than aninitial investigation, actually imposing susoensions
on appellants. We are also aware that the members ofthe Board were appointed by President Jones, one ofthe main witnesses against the students.
We are asked to infer that because the Board had
already had one hearing and because its members
were appointed by the college president (who had also
employed many of them)
,
the members must have been
partial to the college's position. We have not been
shown any evidence of bias or prejudice of the
Board members, and our own examination of the record
has not uncovered any. "Alleged prejudice of uni-
versity hearing bodies must be based on more than
mere speculation and tenuous inferences." Duke v.
North Texas State University
, 46 9 F.2d at 8 3 4 . We do
not believe that, under the facts of this case, these
students were denied a fair and impartial hearing.
In student discipline cases involving the possible
imposition of serious sanctions, such as expulsion, due
process requires that the student be given a hearing,
furnished with a written statement of a specific charge
adequately in advance of the hearing to enable him to
prepare a defense (usually 10 days), allowed to inspect any
documents which the college plans to submit at the
hearing, allowed to hear evidence presented against him,
allowed to question witnesses (if there are any present),
and be given a copy of the findings of the hearing board
or officer. (See Marzette and Jenkins .
)
"Pending action on the charges, the status of a student
campus
should not be altered, or his right to be on the
and to attend classes suspended, except for reasons relating
to the safety and well being of students, faculty, or
university property .
" (see Mar zet te )
If college authorities have reasonable cause to
believe that imminent danger to persons or property will
exist if a student remains on the campus during the
period before his hearing, then an interim suspension
(i * e
•
j
suspension until the nearing) may be necessary.
inter im suspension may not be imposed without a
preliminary hearing
,
unless it can be shown that it is
impossible or unreasonably difficult to accord a prelimin-
ary hearing prior to an interim suspension. Even when it
is impossible or unreasonable to hold such a hearing
prior to an interim suspension, it should be held at the
earliest practical time ( Stricklin )
.
Preliminary hearings should be run along basic due
process guidelines. The student should be given notice
of the charges against him, the specific college regula-
tions under which the charges are brought
,
and the notifica-
tion of the date and time of a full hearing. The question
to be considered and answered at the preliminary hearing
is not the guilt or innocense as to the charges, but
whether the continuation of the student on the campus will
affect, physically or emotionally, the safety and well-
being of others on the campus, or the campus property
457
(see Marin)
.
6.5 The Impartial Judge
In 1927
,
the Supreme Court heard an Ohio case 1^
which challenged a law that gave mayors jurisdiction to
try bootlegging cases; the law allowed that half of the
fines collected went into municipal treasuries. In this
particular case
,
a village ordinance allowed the mayor to
collect the costs paid by the defendant in cases of
conviction
.
Chief Justice Taft, in the opinion of the court,
said, "...it certainly violates the fourteenth amendment
and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process
of law to subject his liberty or property to the judgment
of a court, the judge of which has a direct, personal,
substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion
against him in his case.'
While college disciplinary hearings do not usually
involve "judges" who have a pecuniary interest in the
outcome, the question is raised regarding a student’s right
to a hearing by an impartial hearing officer.
Such a question was raised in Winnick v. Manning ,
136
Turney v. Ohio , 273 U.S. 570 (1927).
^58
460 F.2d 545 (1972). Glen Winnie, was a student in good
standing at the University of Connecticut
. During the
events surrounding the invasion of Cambodia and the
shootings at Kent State, he was demonstrating with another
group of students, rather than taking a final examination.
He and other students entered a classroom, where he was to
be taking a test, and tried to talk to those students who
were taking the test. There were approximately 60 to 80
students who entered that classroom.
Dean of Students Robert Hewes was summoned to the
scene. He indicated that he recognized several students,
including Winnick, and after appraising the situation,
cancelled the exam.
On May 15th, Dean Hewes, acting under instructions
from the University President, began a series of suspension
hearings
,
involving a number of students who had allegedly
participated in the exam disruption. Winnick was among
those who were temporarily suspended pending a full
disciplinary hearing.
Because of the late date, the Student Conduct Committee
had disbanded for the year. Winnick was informed that his
hearing would be conducted on June 2nd by the Student
Affairs Office, with Associate Dean of Students John
Manning conducting the hearing. Wrinnick was given a copy
of the charge against him and a statement of Student
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Disciplinary Rights. He was also given a copy of the
statements of two witnesses who would testify against
him. Dean Hewes arid a student. The charge against Winnick
was based on the accounts of these two witnesses.
During the hearing, Associate Dean Manning denied
Winnick* s request to cross-examine Dean Hewes regarding his
statement that Winnick was one of the active leaders of
the disruption. Manning maintained that this aspect of
Hewes’ statement had no bearing on his final decision.
Following the hearing. Associate Dean Manning wrote
to Winnick informing him that he would be suspended for
one semester. Winnick brought suit in Federal District
Court claiming that his hearing before Associate Dean
Manning was invalid because Manning was a biased decision
maker. The District Court disagreed, and so did the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Judge Timbers of the
Appeals Court said, in part:
While there remain many vexing questions as to what
due process requires m scnool disciplinary proceed-
ings, a fundamental requirement is that a hearing
must be accorded before an impartial decision
maker. Wasson v. Trowbridge
,
382 F.2d 807, 813,
(1967). In the instant case, however, Winnick has
failed to show that he was denied this right.
Winnick makes only unsubstantiated assertions that
Dean Manning was biased. He presents no evidence
which shows that Dean Manning was incapable of apply-
ing stated University policies and regulations
impartially. Furthermore, there is nothing in the
record which indicates that Dean Manning observed,
investigated or made any prehearing decisions
about Winriick’s conduct at the disruption of the
examination. In short. Dean Manning did not have
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such. prior official contact with Winnieto give rise to a presumption of bias.
k s case as
Absent such overt bias or prior involvement therpwas no reason for Dean Manning to disqualify himself
n?f?
y ?°^US ?
° f his Posltion as a member' of the
initiated th"
S Affalrs
> the office which formally
to arme that
ausP?nsl0n
.
Proceedings. Winnick seemsgu Manning, simply by virtue of his
"ordei"
tr
and
Ve
hv°f S^t? VSSted lnterest in upholdingr
,
, by implication, m finding Winnickhad violdted University regulations. However.
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^
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of the University must be concernedb u he well-being of the institution, this obliga-tion also involves major concern for the fair treat-
ment of individuals agianst whom charges are brought
.ere is no reason to believe that Dean Manning’s
0
interest in doing justice to accused students is not
every bit as strong as his interest in maintaining
order. it may well be that having an administrator
as the sole judge in student disciplinary proceedings
is undesirable. In fact, the University’s regula-
tions recognize that a tribunal composed of students
and faculty is preferable. Nevertheless, the mere
fact that the decision maker in a disciplinary hearing
Is also an administrative officer of the University
does not in itself violate the dictates of due
process
.
Winnick also contends that his preliminary suspension
on May 15 was invalid, because Dean Hewes, the chief
complaining witness, was also the judge and the jury.
While such comingling of functions is certainly not
to be encouraged, we fail to see how it prejudiced
Winnick in this case, as the crucial fact of his
nr»QC onn n o v\ ^ r* -r-x -x ^ Vx rx 4- 4- "U -v J -? — x—• _ £ ^ j ^ . j *
r - ~ — X-*.* yuo uxOi uyu±Uli KJ .L U ilCJ cr Ad.liiJ.llCL OlUi
was admitted by Winnick himself. Furthermore, any
procedural irregularities in the preliminary suspension
hearing were cured by the full disciplinary hearing
on June 2, which in effect was a trial de novo.
Bi strick v. University of South Carolina
,
324 F. Supp.
942
, 952 (1971 ) ; Zanders v. Louisiana State Board
of Education
,
281 F. Supp. 7^7, 767-68 (196B).
Winnick further contends that Dean Manning’s refusal
to permit him to cross-examine Dean Hewes deprived
him of his right to due process. This claim also
is without merit.
The right to cross-examine witnesses generally has
not been considered an essential requirement of dueprocess in school disciplinary proceedings. Dixon v.Alabama State Board of Education
, 29^ F.2d 150 TsqA s we noted in Farrell v. Joel
, 437 F . 2d 160, 162(1971), a case involving a fifteen-day suspension of
a high school student who was not accorded a hearinr
or the
. opportunity to confront adverse witnesses after
an admitted sit-in" outside the school's administra-
tive office:
"Due process does not invariably
require the procedural safeguards
accorded in a criminal proceeding.
Rather, '(t)he very nature of due
process negates any concept of inflexible
procedures universally applicable to
every imaginable situation.' Cafeteria
and Restaurant Workers, Local 473 AFL-
CIO~v. McElroy
, 367 U.S. . 895...
( 1961 )
Moreover, even assuming that the right to confront
witnesses may be essential in some disciplinary
hearings, there are cogent reasons why due process
did not require cross-examination in this case.
First, Winnick stated that he wanted to question Dean
Hewes with respect to the Dean's characterization of
him as a "ringleader" of the disruption. As Dean
Manning indicated, however, this aspect of Dean
Hewes’ statement had no bearing on the outcome of
the hearing. Furthermore, since co-plaintiff Gacek
was not characterized as a "ringleader" and yet
received the same discipline as Winnick it does not
seem that Hewes ' characterization of Winnick affected
uuc O^VOX VJX one ^UiiXOlUUCllV/ W 1 1 _L i ! UCaU L'iCUiii-l.J.igj
imposed. Under the circumstances, no useful purpose
would have been served by permitting Winnick to
cross-examine Dean Hewes with respect to that one
aspect of his statement.
Secondly, if this case had resolved itself into a
problem of credibility, cross-examination of witnesses
might have been essential to a fair hearing. This
was not a case, however, where the decision maker
had to choose to believe either the accused or
his accuser. Rather, as the district court points
out. Dean Hewes' credibility was not at issue. The
critical fact about Hewes' statement was that he
witnessed appellant's presence and conduct in the
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vicinity of the disturbance. Since this crucialfact .was .admitted by Winnick himself, cross-
examination would have been a fruitless exercise
Winnick's other
... (claim)
brief mention.
of error deserve(s) only
... (He ). contends that the University's failure tofollow its own procedural guidelines deprived him ofhis right to due process. However, we" are not inclinedto hold. that every deviation from a university's
regulations constitutes a deprivation of due process.
Here the alleged
. deviations did not rise to consti-"
tutional proportions and did not constitute in them-
selves a denial of due process. Furthermore, the
alleged deviations were minor ones and did not affect
the fundamental fairness of the hearing. Under all
of the circumstances, we not not believe appellant
was deprived of due process.
One fundamental requirement of due process is that a
hearing must be accorded before an impartial decision
maker (see Wasson v. Trowbridge
,
382 F.2d 8 07 (1967)).
The mere fact that the decision maker in a
disciplinary hearing is also an administrative officer of
the university does not in itself violate the dictates of
due process ( Winnick ) . "Alleged prejudice of university
hearing bodies must be based on more than mere speculation
and tenuous inferences" (see Jenkins and Duke v. North
Texas State University , 469 F . 2d at 834). Students must
show that the hearing officer (or Board) was incapable of
applying stated university policies and regulations
impartially
.
Regarding the questioner impartiality, the author
recommends that the hearing officer in discipline cases
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be someone who has had no official contact with the case.
It will be helpful also if there were a tribunal of faculty
and students sitting as a hearing board, rather than a
single hearing officer.
6.6 Failure To Follow Written Procedure
V/hat happens when procedure is circumvented; or as in
Winnie
k
above, the written policies of a college or
university are not followed? In 1966
,
a case reached the
District Court of Appeals of Florida in which a
faculty committee in an academic department, responsible
only for enforcing academic or scholastic standards,
reached beyond that responsibility and based its decision
on charges of misconduct. Such disciplinary matters
were the responsibility of only the Faculty Discipline
Committee. Oscar Woody, Jr. brought suit in Florida
Circuit Court, alleging that his fourteenth amendment due
process rights had been violated because of the failure of
the University of Florida to follow proper procedures
and its own rules and regulations, in hearing his case.
His case was dismissed, and he appealed. Judge
Rawls, responding to this issue said in part:
At the outset we note that the decision of the
faculty committee of the College of Architecture
^•^Woody v. Burns
,
188 So. 2d 56 (1966) .
^ineA
^
ts ls tantamount to expulsion. It wasbased solely upon misconduct and not upon failureto maintain the required academic standard. The deci-sion. for exclusion was made without notice andearing to
... (Woody ) , was based upon matters con-cerning which he had never had an opportunity tobe heard
,
and in spite of these deficiences it wasapproved by the President of the University, theBoard of Regents, and the State Board of Education.
It has been held
to
. e
that constitutional due process
requires notice and opportunity for hearing before a
student at a tax-supported college or university canbe expelled for misconduct. This court is compelledto follow these decisions, the basis of which is
that a charge of misconduct, as opposed to failure
meet the scholastic standards of the college,
depends upon a collection of the facts which are
easily colored by the point of view7 of the witness.
The minimum criteria of due process governing
disciplinary bodies of tax-supported institutions
are set forth in Due v . Florida A. & M. University.
Briefly they include: 1
~
Notice containing a state-
ment of the specific charges and grounds which if
proven would justify expulsion under duly established
regulations, 2. A hearing which gives the disciplinary
body opportunity to hear both sides in considerable
detail and allows the student to produce his own
defense either by oral testimony or written
affidavits of witnesses, 3« The action to be taken
only by an authorized duly established disciplinary
body organized and operated by well-defined procedures,
and 4 . The results and findings of the hearing to be
presented in a report
Not one of these four
mv * -* - -s , • — J- — x- i_ _ __ _• ^ _
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reiterates that a full-dress
open to the
elements is
student's inspection,
present here,
set forth in Due
,
and
judicial hearing is not
required. However, the principles of fair play
require that before a student may be denied the
right to continue his studies at a state-supported
university due to misconduct he shall be advised of
all the charges against him and be given an opportunity
to refute same. When these requirements are met,
the judgment of a duly constituted disciplinary com-
mittee functioning in a normal manner by well-
defined procedures will not be lightly disturbed
although it is not required to operate by a systanof
rigid procedure.
Unlike the Due case, the action here is invalid on its
°nly because Woody was never confronted withthe charges against him and was not given an o o !
excluded°him
eS
but
S
°h
SQ before the c°™Httee that
instead of ^
30 because the faculty commits
,bringing open charges of misconduct in theusuai manner before the disciplinary commi ttep
circumvented that duly authorized committee andarrogated unto itself the authority of imposing itsown penalty for
...(Woody's) misconduct. In this
respect the 1962-63 University of Florida catalog
charges each college with the responsibility of en-forcing only its academic standards
, in the following
Any college of the University may enforce
additional academic standards and each
student is responsible to his college for
observing the regulations relating to
such additional standards."
Those charged with the administration of the state's
institutions of higher learning are vested with
broad discretion in determining the scholastic and
moral standards students must meet to obtain
admission to the various colleges of the university
system. They likewise must determine the standard
of behavior r.ecesary to maintain discipline and
general good conduct of the members of the student
body as is essential to preserve high public regard
for the graduates and alumni of our state-supported
universities and to properly utilize the facilities
and services which the universities are intended to
provide. However, there the essence of the
decision ordering exclusion is that Woody's conduct
and behavior was of a standard which would not pre-
clude nis attendance at tne University of Florida,
but was such as would exclude his attendance in the
College of Architecture and Fine Arts solely
because the faculty of that college "did not wish
Mr. Woody to continue as a student." There was no
determination that Woody's conduct did not meet the
behavior standard required of University of Florida
students as set by those who are authorized to
exercise their discretion in determining what shall
be considered unacceptable conduct warranting
expulsion. ...(Woody's) conduct relative to his
failure to register in the appropriate courses was
determined by the duly constituted Discipline
Committee by a split vote to warrant only probation...
*166
This reeord pres ent s an incongruous situation whereinthe University of Florida says this student’s conductis not acceptable to the faculty members of one collegebut that the same conduct does not make him ineligiblefor acceptance by othor1 colleges of the university
complex. We are not aware of the delegation by thelegislature or the State Board of Education or the
Board of Regents to the faculty members of any college
of the higher education system of this state to ar-
bitrarily or capriciously decide who they desire to
teach, and should such delegation be attempted it
would amount to creating a hierarchy contrary to all
of the fundamental concepts of a democratic society.
This is not to say that those
' charged with the
responsibility of operating our universities are not
responsible for establishing basic standards of con-
duct and enforcing same on the campuses of our state-
supported colleges and universities. On the contrary
it is their duty to take affimative action to exclude
from the student body those individuals not conforming
to the established standards. However the manner of
enforcement must be by a duly authorized body in
accordance with procedures which permit the student
an opportunity to vindicate himself, if he can and so
desires
.
Different from those cases where a college fails to
follow its written procedures regarding discipline cases,
and therefore denies due process in its procedures, are the
situations where a college or university, for whatever the
reasons, deviates from its written procedures, but still
ensures that due process has been guaranteed to the
student
.
In a situation where a University did deviate from its
normal processes, and appointed an "outside" Board (i.e.,
the Woodside Commission) to deliberate, hear discipline
cases, and make recommendations to the University President,
*<67
the Court said, in part:"^^
The students also contend that the action nf
Panel ou
whateVer with the University, to serve as a fact-
panel, after the acts charged had occurred with no
toereon^V*" 5 ?r faCUlty 011 adminlstratorshereon a panel of non-University peoplerom which the most severe penalties resulted.'’
ore specifically, the students complain that theTemporary Umversity Judicial Board, consisting oftwo facuity members, one administrator and three
students, was in existence both before and after theincidents of April 15, and would, in the normal course
ol events, hear all disciplinary charges, and the
abrogation of this regularly established procedure
constituted a denial of that fundamental fairness
which due process requires. On the other hand, PennState asserts that "(t)he Woodside Commission was
appointed in the sincere belief that the Temporary
Judicial Board established by resolution of the
University Senate on August 3, 1969, * * * which wasin existence at the time the offenses in question
were commited, was not capable of conducting
efficient hearings which would protect the rights of
all parties concerned and accord due process to the
students charged." To support this assertion, Penn
State points to the extraordinary wrongs that had
been committed; the possibility that over one hundred
students could be charged; the need for impartiality,
which could be expected from a commission whose memoers
were not present on campus when the disturbances
occurred; the desirability of' special legal expertise
inasmuch as it was anticipated that many students
would be represented by able and trained counsel, and
the concern that, from past experience with a similar
tribunal, the hearings would be exceedingly long
in duration. It is undisputed that the Board of
Trustees had the power to revise all regulations
promulgated by any University body or committee. In
138Sill v
608 (1970)7
Pennsylvania State University
,
318 F. Supp.
addition
...(the students) make no claim of unfairnes-
pLf? ni? 1 +-°f Procedural da e process by the Woodsideinsist that the abrupt departure from theestabiished procedure by appointing a different panelitself, was a breach of due orocess.in
I hold that the appointment of this distinguishedpanel, consisting of highly respected and legally-trained members, for the purpose of making factuallindings and disciplinary recommendations to the
President did not offend ...(the students) constitu-
tional rights to procedural due process.
The oft-quoted case of Dixon v. Alabama State Eoard
of Education
, . . . in reviewing the area of students'
rights
,
applied the standard that the minimum pro-
cedural requirements necessary to satisfy due
process depends upon the circumstances and the inter-
ests of the parties involved. After weighing these
factors, the court concluded "* * * that due process
requires notice and some opportunity for hearing
before a student at a tax-supported college is
expelled for misconduct." Professor Wright,
treating the problem on a wider scale, suggests that
"...The due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment does not impose on universities any
particualr procedural model, whether it be derived
from criminal, civil, or administrat ive proceedings.
Instead the courts should accept any institutional
procedure so long as it is reasonably calculated to
be fair to the student involved and to lead to a
reliable determination of the issues." Wright,
"The Constitution on the Campus" 22 Vanderbilt Lav;
Review at 1060 ( 1 9 6 9 ) - The Commission on Campus
Government and Student Dissent of the American Bar
Association analyzed this issue ana recommended pro-
cedures that would facilitate a reasonable determination
of the truth or falsity of the charges and provide
fundamental fairness to the parties. Specifically,
the Commission endorsed the following:
"d . Impartiality of the Trier of Fact .
The truth or falsity of the charges of
specific acts of misconduct should be
determined by an impartial person or
group. Fundamental fairness does not
require any particular kind of tribunal
or heading committee, nor does it
necessarily require that the finder
*J69
of fact comes from or (in the case
of a group) be composed of any
particular segments of the University
community."
Penn State also points out that a special Ad HocCommittee was named to hear charges of campus disrup-tion in Goldberg v. Regents of University o f California
fyf?
Zette V ‘ j 'lc ?hee
.
and Stricklin v. Regents of theUniversity of Wisconsin
. In Stricklin
.
r
lt was notedthat a distinguished former member of the SupremeCourt °f Wisconsin was appointed as a hearing agentto make findings of fact and to report his findings
and recommendations to the Board of Regents.
While I can appreciate that the students in this action
would prefer having the facts determined and recom-
mendations made by a panel of three students, twofaculty members, and one administrator, I oerceive
no harm, in the constitutional sense, by a* denial of
such a preference. The fact that the Woodside
Panel was appointed after the acts charged had taken
place does not alter the fundamental fairness of the
procedure followed. In short, plaintiffs have submitted -
no authority to persuasive reason for their proposi-
tion that, in the circumstances of this case, they had
a constitutionally protected right to have the
hearings held before the Temporary University Judicial
Board. Moreover, I am impressed by the reasons given
by Penn State for the decision to appoint a special,
legally-skilled panel. Consequently, considering
all the relevant circumstances, the practicalities
involved in dealing with and fairly resolving the
unfortunate occurrence of April 4 and 15, 1970, weigh
heavily in favor of the action taken by the Board of
Trustees. The student's contention with regard to the
appointment of the Woodside Panel is without merit.
Essentially, these two cases point out that, even
though a college may have a well-defined discipline procedure,
there may be circumstances when it may be necessary to
depart from those procedures (see Woody and Sill ) . These
two cases indicate the principle clearly: due process does
ow a particular procedural
not require that a college foil
model, only that it follow procedures that meet due process
standards and grant the student fair and equitable treat-
ment (see Charles A. Wright, "The Constitution on the
Campus", 22 Vanderbilt Law Review at 1060).
6.7 Written Report of Hearing
The 1969 case of French v. Bashful, 3 0 3 F. Supp
.
1333 (1969), is important because of principles developed
later in this chapter. It is used here, however, to
support that part of Dixon which said that students given
a discipline hearing should be allowed to inspect a report
of the hearing committee or officer.
Several students had been expelled or suspended from
Southern University in New Orleans (SUNO), because of their
participation in campus disturbances.
SUNO conducted one set of hearings for six students
on May 9, 1969, and considered charges concerning the
alleged takeover of administrative offices. All six
students had retained legal counsel, and had requested
that they be allowed to be represented by these attorneys
at the hearings. This request was denied, and the students
defended themselves. Four of the students were placed on
probation for at least six months, but not less than one
year. Two were cleared of any charges.
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More campus disturbances followed shortly after this
first hearing, and the four students placed on probation,
being involved in these new disturbances, were expelled
from school.
Because other students were involved in these latter
disturbances, another discipline hearing was held, again
involving six students. Some were suspended, and some
were expelled; all were denied an opportunity to be
represented by legal counsel.
In each case, the discipline committee which held
the hearing was advised by a senior law students, who
also conducted the prosecution, and, no report of the
findings of the discipline committee was made available
to the students.
Regarding this last point, District Judge Comisky
said
:
. . .we find an additional infirmity in the proceedings
conducted by the Discipline Committee. We find
nothing in the record to indicate that the
Discipline Commit lee pul its findings into a report
open to the student’s inspection. In Dixon v.
Alabama State Board of Education
,
the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals said, "If the hearing is not
before the Board directly, the results and findings
of the hearing should be presented in a report open
to the student's inspection." In Wright v. Texas
Southern University
,
392 F.2d 728, 729 (1968), the
same court said that after the hearing "the
findings of the disciplinary body should be
presented in a report available for his... (the
student defendant’s) inspection."
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6.8 Right To Counsel
The question of whether or not a student is entitled
to be represented by legal or other counsel was not raised
by the Dixon court. Subsequent judicial action, however,
has required the courts to consider this question and pro-
pose some guidelines.
Robert Wasson, Jr. was a third year cadet at the
Merchant Marine Academy. A discipline hearing was instituted
against him for engaging in an unauthorized activity, the
object of which was to throw a cadet officer into the
ocean. This was a Class II offense, punishable by no more
than 100 demerits. He was found guilty, and given 75
demerits. Since he already had 148 demerits, the additional
75 placed him over the 200 demerit point, the maximum
allowance, and subjected him to dismissal from the academy.
Wasson brought suit in U.S. District Court, complaining,
among other things, that he had been denied the assistance
of counsel at his hearings. He noted that the amount
and nature of due process safeguards depends on the
type of offense: Class III offenses are least serious;
Class I offenses are most serious, and may be punished by
immediate suspension. At hearings involving Class I
offenses, a cadet may be represented by counsel, of his
choosing, although only officers on the academy staff are
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eligible to act as counsel.
The District Court judge denied without hearing, the
cadet’s complaint, and Wasson appealed to the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals. Responding to the question of right to
counsel, Circuit Judge Moore, in Wasson v. Trowbridge
, 382
F.2d 807 (1967), said:
...To determine in any given case what procedures
due process requires, the court must carefully deter-
mine and balance the nature of the private interest
affected and of the government interest involved,
taking account of history and the precise circum-
stances surrounding the case at hand...
Wasson most strenuously has urged that he was
entitled to representation by counsel at one or both
of the challenged hearings. We disagree. The require-
ment of counsel as an ingredient of fairness is a
function of all of the other aspects of the hearing.
Where the proceeding is non-criminal in nature, where
the hearing is investigative and non adversarial and
the government does not proceed through counsel, where
the individual concerned is mature and echcated, where
his knowledge of the events of March 30th should
enable him to develop the facts adequately through
available sources, and where the other aspects of the
hearing taken as a whole are fair, due process does
not require representation by counsel. It is
significant that in the Dixon case where the balancing
of government and private interests favored the
individual far more than here, the court did not
suggest that a student must be represented by counsel
in an expulsion proceeding.
In Barker v. Hardway , reported in Chapter 3, at 3*5,
the Court had this to say about the right to counsel:
Dixon was explicit, in pointing out that a student
disciplinary hearing need not be a full-dress
judicial hearing and interpretations thereof have
also clearly negated such a concept. Due v
.
.
Florida A. & M. Univeristy ; Wasson v. Trowbridge ,
Madera v. Board of Education, 386'~F.2d 778 (1967);
Zanders v. Louisiana State Board of Education. And
as was pointed out in Madera
, the right to p.nnnsoi ± s
not an essential ingredient to a fair hearing in all"types of proceedings, citing as authority for the
statement Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s concurring
opinion in re Groban
, 352 U.S. 330, where he commented,
M * * * The utmost devotion to one's
profession and the fullest recognition
of the great role of lawyers in the
evolution of a free society cannot
lead one to erect as a constitutional
principle that no administrative inquiry
can be had in camera unless a lawyer be
allowed to attend."
Thus the touchstones of the application of due process
are reasonableness and fairness in view of all the
facts and circumstances of the particular case. And
it may be noted in passing that the law indulges the
presumption that school authorities act reasonably
and fairly and in good faith in exercising the
authority with which it clothes them, and casts the
burden on him who calls their conduct into question
to show that they have not been actuated by proper
motives
.
While it is true that Gideon v. Wainwright
,
372 U.S.
335» in re Gault , 387 U.S. 1, (1967) and Mempa v.
Rhay
, 389 U.S. 128 ( 1967 ), have expanded the sixth
amendment's guarantee of right to counsel in criminal
and semi-criminal cases, all Involving the right of
liberty, they have no application to matters purely
of a civil nature, and the sense of the cases cited
by counsel for the plaintiffs are not in point for
that reason. It must be kept in mind that; this is a
civil proceeding and unless the right in such a
proceeding can be read into the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment or found in some Act of
Congress or administrative rule or regulation, it
does not exist. I have been cited to no decision by
the Supreme Court or any other court expressly ex-
tending the right of counsel to a student at a school
disciplinary hearing and my own extensive research^
has failed to reveal one. Dixon significantly failed
to include it as a required safeguard in its
enumeration of recommended minimum requirements;
Wasson expressly declined to grant it under the^faCos
and circumstances of that case. Madera and ----- - ^
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although envisioning possible situations where theright might be required, avoided a definitive rulingon the point. There is a well-recognized rule of
construction that where reasonable doubt exists as tothe meaning of any law, or the relief sought isquestionable, courts must act in view of their fore-
sight of consequences. Thus courts must carefullydetermine and balance the nature of the privateinterest affected against the public interest in-
volved, and this rationalization has undoubtedly
influenced the judiciary in its reluctance to grant
adversary judicial status to student disciplinary
hearings. I share that reluctance.
I conclude, therefore, that in the circumstances of
this case, the Committee did not deny the six
aggrieved students due process by refusing their
request for counsel. And this is true for still
another reason. The Supreme Court recognized in
Hannah v
. Larche
,
a case dealing with the validity
of certain rules of procedure adopted by the Commission
on Civil Rights forbidding the presence of counsel,
that the determinative factor there was whether the
proceeding was "investigative" or "adjudicative".
If investigative only, the right does not obtain; if
adjudicative, it does. Applying this criterion to
the facts of the instant case, it is clear the
aggrieved students were not entitled to counsel
before the Faculty Committee on Student Affairs,
since it unmistakably appears from the evidence
and the handbook that its only function was to gather
facts and make recommendations to the president and
faculty who could accept or reject them as they might
choose. The adjudicative authority at the college
rested at all times with the president and faculty and
was never delegated to the Committee, as indeed it
could not lawfully have been under state law.
Needless to say, the disposition thus made of the
question does not mean that the six students are
remediless in the oremises. It simply means that
in the circumstances of the case, they were not and
are not entitled to legal representation before the
Faculty Committee on Student Affairs by reason of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In French v. Bashful , 303 F. Supp. 1333 (1969)>
reported at section 6.7
,
the situation was somewhat
different, as the prosecution was handled by a senior law
student. In that case. Judge Comiskey said.
a*denLfnf
ef S ralSe another important issue: was itf
.
du
f process to refuse to permit theplaintiffs to have the assistance of their retainedlegal counsel at the hearings? There is little juris-
on this point. The right to counsel was nothe court in Dixon as one of the necessary
of procedural due process which must be
to the student at a tax-supported univeristy
are no appellate cases in this circuit which
prudence
listed by
elements
afforded
and there
deal directly with this point. The Second Circuit
has held that the student does not have the right tobe represented by counsel in disciplinary proceedings.
Madera v. Board of Education of City o f New York,
3|86 F.2d 77b (1967); Wasson v. Trowbridge
,
382' F.2d
o07 ( 1967 ). On the other hand, two district courts
have ordered colleges to hold hearings before ex-
pelling or suspending students and have further
ordered such colleges to permit the student to be
represented by legal counsel at such hearings.
Zanders v. Louisiana State Board of Education; Esteban
Charles
to
v. Central Missouri State College
. Professor
Alan Wright takes the position that the right
counsel should be recognized in "major disciplinary
proceedings" in colleges and universities. Wright,
"The Constitution on the Campus", 22 Vand
. L. Rev .
1027, 1075 (1969). Professor Arthur Sherry is of
the opinion that at a university disciplinary pro-
ceeding the student's "right to counsel, should
the matter appear to him to be of sufficient gravity
to make legal assistance desirable, should receive un-
grudging recognition * * #". Sherry, "Governance of
the university: Rules, Rights, and Responsibilities,"
54 Calif. L. Rev. 23, 37 (1966).
The students in this case are faced with the loss of
an extremely valuable right. "It is trite, at the
least, to say that the obtainment of a college degree
in this country has gained tremendous stature and
personal importance in the last twenty-five
to fifty years." Zanders v. Louisiana State Board
of Education . Although this is not a criminal pro-
ceeding so as to require counsel under the sixth
amendment, nevertheless, the right to an education
has become so vital in our present-day society that
the procedure whereby one may lose this right
should be heavily stocked with procedural safeguards.
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’ s cause
.
In spite of the invaluable assistance to a defendantin a university discipline proceeding, it may well" be
Tny CaS6S the Student wil1 ^ot be at such adisadvantage so as to require the assistance of
counsel. But here there is more reason for counselthan in most cases. The prosecution of these cases
was conducted by a senior law school student, who isnow a memboi- of the Louisiana State Bar Association.
A member of the Discipline Committee testified thatthis law student was chosen to prosecute these casesbecause of his iamiliarity with legal proceedings.
Even in Wasson
,
where the Second Circuit held that
the student did not have the right to be represented
by counsel in expulsion proceedings, the court
qualified its holding by saying:
"The requirement of counsel as an
ingredient of fairness is a function
of all of the other aspects of the
hearing. Where the proceeding, is
non-criminal in nature, where the
hearing is investigative and not
adversarial and the government does
not proceed through counsel
,
where
the individual concerned is mature
and educated, where his knowledge of
the events of March 30th should
enable him to develop the facts
adequately through available
sources, and where' the other aspects
of the hearing taken as a whole are
fair, due process does not require
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representation by counsel."
Professor Wright noted the above-emphasizedin the Wasson case and said:
language
It is worth noting that a leading caseholding that counsel need not be allowed
qualified this by saying that this is
true so long as 'the government does not
proceed through counsel.' * * * if'
universities * * provide their own
lawyer to assist a tribunal, in those
cases at least the student can hardly
be denied the right to his own counsel,
even if, as I doubt, there is no
right to counsel generally in disciplinary
proceedings." 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027.
1075 - 1076 .
Of course, the senior law student was not a lawyer
at the time of the hearings. But he had nearly
completed his studies and was to be admitted to the
Louisiana State Bar Association in a very few
months. Surely, it cannot be doubted that his ability'
to conduct himself in a proceeding of this sort was
likely to be far superior to that of the defendants
who, as far as can be ascertained from the record,
had no legal education or experience whatsoever.
In view of the particular and special circumstances
of this case, we therefore hold that procedural due
process requires that these students be permitted
to be represented by their retained legal counsel
at the hearings. In holding as we do, we want to make
it clear that we are limiting this holding to retained
legal counsel as opposed to appointed counsel.
When the right to retained counsel is involved, we
feel that any burden which such a right places on
the university is inconsequential compared to the
vital interest of the student in being represented
by counsel. But a similar holding as to appointed
counsel would have a far greater effect on the
university. If a college administration were forced
to provide counsel for defendant students at every
disciplinary proceeding, the cost to the school would
be considerable. It is no secret that the univer-
sities are not unlimited in their funds. It is
therefore this Court's opinion that this would be
too high a price for a college to pay for the
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privilege of enforcing discipline among its students.
The judiciary has been reluctant to grant adversary
status to student disciplinary hearings (see Barker )
.
The courts have said that student disciplinary hearings
need not be full dress judicial hearings ( Dixon ) , and
that the right to counsel is not an essential ingredient
to a fair hearing ( Madera v. Board of Education
. 386 F . 2d
778 ( 1967 )).
The author, however, is in agreement with the court in
Wasson which said that the requirement of counsel as an
ingredient of fairness is a function of all of the other
aspects of the hearing: If the university is using counsel
to prepare its case, or even to handle the prosecution, the
student should be allowed to retain his own counsel; if
the university is conducting a trial-type hearing, where the
possible sanctions to be imposed include expulsion, again
the student should be allowed to retain counsel; or if the
university is conducting a hearing, the results of which
may be moderately serious (i.e., a suspension of a semester),
then perhaps some thought ought to be given to allowing the
student to have an advisor present at the hearing.
It is important to note that although counsel may be
retained by the student, the university does not have to
appoint or provide counsel for the student, or bear the
cost of the counsel.
6.9 Specificity of Rules
Vague or over-broad rules have continually been struck
down by the courts as unconstitutional: they deny a person
of notice. The college campus, with its "handbooks” and
"catalogs" of rules and regulations, and listings of Stu-
dent Codes of Conduct are treated no different: rules
and regulations must be specific or face being invalidated
by the courts.
In Soglin v. Kauffman
, 295 F. Supp. 978 ( 1968 ), 4i8
F.2d I 63 (1969), ten students were suspended from the
Madison campus of the University of Wisconsin for engaging
in demonstrations which blocked access to a building and
prevented others from interviewing with the Dow Chemical
Corporation. A specific copy of the charges was given to the
students, the sum of which constituted misconduct, as well
as the violation of Chapter 11.02 and 11.15 of the
Unviersity Policies on Use of Facilities and Outside
Speakers . Chpater 11.02 reads as follows:
Scope of Student Freedom. Students have the right,
accorded to all persons by the Constitution, to
freedom of speech, peaceable assembly, petition and
association. Students and student organisations
may examine and discuss all questions of interest
to them, and express opinions publicly as well
as privately. They may support causes by lawful
means which do not disrupt the operations of the
University, or organisations accorded the use
of University facilities.
The students, in bringing suit, contend that the term
misconduct", as a standard for discipline, and that
Chapter 11.02 as written, violates the fourteenth amendment
because of vagueness and over-breadth.
District Judge James E. Doyle, in the opinion of the
Court, said, in part:
If the term "misconduct", without more, may serve as
a standard for disciplinary action, it is not essen-
tial to the University’s position that Chapter 11.02
be vindicated as a prohibitory regulation. For
reasons which will be explained herein, I turn initially
to the broader contention of the University’s: "chat
the term "misconduct" may serve as a standard for
disciplinary action, and that no more specific or
definite substantive rules' are required as a pre-
requisite for disciplinary action.
With respect to the imposition of criminal sanctions
in the non-university society, such a regime would
grossly violate the Constitution of the United States.
"(A) statue which either forbids or re-
quires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application violates
the first essential of due process of
law." Cbnmlly v. General Construc tion
Co.
,
269 U.S. 385, 391.
A federal, state or local statue, ordinance, regula-
tion, order or rule, subjecting one to imprisonment
or fine or other serious sanction for "misconduct"
would surely fall as unconstitutionally vague.
University officials here contend that, given the
opportunity, they can prove that with respect to the
events of October 18, those students who were
subsequently subjected to disciplinary action had
received prior warnings from certain university^
administrators that they would be punished 11 they
performed the acts which they are alleged to have
proceeded nevertheless to perform. It is nor
contended that defendants could prove that those
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administrators who issued the warnings were themselvpc!empowered to promulgate generally applicable rulesof conduct for university students. Nor could it bp
^
hat the term "misconduct" itself prescribe-
standards or criteria by which theseadministrators might exercise discretion to issuea specific warning or order in a specific case" 'inthe non-univeristy society, in the absence of a
eate^hv
1
?! i
Ule °r standard or criterion promul-g ted by those duly empowered to promulgate them
one. may not be punished for violating the order of an
373
1
u!s?
r
284
r,
291-292
S & P ° liceman
- ^ri Sht v * Georgia ,
...the issue is. reached whether admission to the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin as a student, and continued en-
rollment
. there
,
may be made to depend upon consent
to a regime in which due process may be denied by
vague prohibitory standards
,
or freedom of expression
may be threatened or denied by vague or overly broad
prohibitory standards. For the reasons I have discussed
the answer must be no, unless there is some compelling
reason why the university should escape this particular
constitutional stricture, some reason why it should
be wholly free to refrain from promulgating reason-
ably definite and narrow rules of conduct. In
Esteban v. Central Missouri State College
, 290 F. Supp
.
622
,
630 (1968), it was said:
"Judicial notice is taken that outstanding
educational authorities in the field of
higher education believe, on the basis
of experience, that detailed codes of
prohibited student conduct are provocative
and should not be employed in higher
education. For this reason, general
affirmative statements of what is
expected of a student may be preferable
in higher education. Such affirmative
statements should, of course, be
reasonably construed and applied in
individual cases."
I cannot agree that university students should be
deprived of these significant constitutional pro-
tections on so slender a showing. The American
Association of University Professors has
declared
:
Disciplinary proceedings should be insti-
tuted only for violation of standards of
conduct defined in advance and published
through such means as a student handbook
or a generally available body of university
regulations. Offenses should be as clearly
defined as possible, and such vague
phrases as 'undesirable conduct' or ’conduct
injurious to the best interests of the
institution' should be avoided. Concep-
tions of misconduct particular to the
institution need a clear and explicit
definition." Statement on the Academic
Freedom of Students, 51 A.A.U.P. Bull.,
447
,
449 (1965).
For the reasons stated, and upon the basis of the
entire record herein, I conclude that the constitu-
tional doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth are
applicable, in some measure, to the standard or
standards to be applied by the university in disciplin-
ing its students, and that a regime in which the
term "misconduct" serves as the sole standard violates
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment by
reason of its vagueness, or, in the alternative,
violates the first amendment as embodied in the
fourteenth by reason of its vagueness and overbreadth.
I have said that these doctrines are applicable "in
some measure." It is neither necesary nor wise presently
to decide whether they are applicable to disciplinary
proceedings in which the range of prossible sanctions
is mild, such as the denial of social privileges or
a minor loss of academic credits or perhaps expulsion
from a specific course or perhaps a brief suspension.
JMor is it necessary or wise presently to decide
whether the standards of vagueness and overbreadth are
to be applied as stringently to university regulations
of conduct as to criminal statutes in non-university
life. Nor is it necessary or wise presently to decide
whether these standards are to be applied with equal
stringency in every phase of the life of the univer-
sity; in non-university society, it appears that they
are not applied with equal stringency to economic
regulations, regulations of speech or assembly , public
employment, penal institutions, court room decorum,
the military establishment, and other situations; it
may be that within the university community the
standards may permissibly apply differently to the
teacher's control of the classroom
dormitory life, picketing, parking
decorum in disciplinary hearings.
demonstrations
,
regulations, and
The judgment here declared is that a standard of
misconduct
,
without more, may not serve as the solefoundation for the imposition of the sanction of
expulsion, or the sanction of suspension for any
significant time, throughout the entire range of
student life in the university.
Regarding Chapter 11.02, the court said,
Obviously it is not a simple matter to draft a regula-tion which deals with means by which "causes" are
supported or opposed, and which undertakes to prohibit
those means unprotected by the first amendment without
impairing those which are so protected, and which also
avoids the vice of vagueness. I appreicate that those
who drafted and approved Chapter 11.02 may reasonably
have supposed it sufficient to use a general phrase,
such as "lawful means which do not disrupt the operation
of the university", and allow its narrower meanings and
scope "to be hammered out case by case * * #."
Dombrowski v. Pflster
, 380 U.S. 479, at 487, 85 S. Ct.
Ill 6^ at Tl21, 14 T77 Ed. 2d 22. But in the view I
have taken, expressed in the preceeding section of
this opinion, such vagueness or overbreadth, or both,
are impermissible in the first amendment area when the
potential of serious disciplinary sanctions exists.
When the standards of vagueness and overbreadth are
applied to Chapter 11.02, however mildly, I am
obliged to find it invalid. Neither the element
of intention, nor that of proximity of cause and
effect, nor that of substantiality, for example, is
dealt with by it^ langungp Mor dn<=><? it contain ever,
the most general description of the kinds of conduct
which might be considered disruptive of the operations
of the university, nor does it undertake to draw any
distinctions whatever as among the various categories
of university "operations".
I conclude that Chapter 11.02 is unconstitutionally
vague
.
Assuming, again with difficulty as was true with respect
to "misconduct" as a standard, that the term "lawful
means which do not disrupt the operations of the
univeristy " is sufficiently definite to avoid the vice
of vagueness, I conclude that it is overly broad. As
explained above..., when the end can be more narrowly
achieved, it is not permissible to sweep within the
scope of a prohibition activities that are constitution-
ally protected free speech and assembly. And one may
attack such an overly broad prohibition although his
own conduct may have been constitutionally uunishable
had the rule been more narrowly drawn. In such a
situation, "possible applications of the... (rule)
in other factual contexts besides that at bar" may be
taken into account in appraising the rule's inhibitory
effect upon first amendment freedoms. NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 432.
A "possible application" of Chpater 11.02 in a practical,
realistic factual context is its application to the
organizing of a mid-day campus mass meeting, otherwise
lawful, as a "means" of demonstrating "support" for the
"cause" of peace or civil rights. If a substantial
number of students are attracted to the mass meeting
and absent themselves from classes scheduled at that
hour, the "operations of the university" may well be
"disrupted"
.
Another "possible application" of Chapter 11.02 to a
practical and realistic factual context is its applica-
tion to an otherwise lawful campus meeting of a group
to support a cause which is so offensive to others
that the latter are moved to physical attack upon those
in attendance. See Terminiello v. City of Chicago ,
337 U.S. 1, 69 S. Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed. 1131. The meeting
may well be a means which disrupts the operations of
the university.
I conclude that Chapter 11.02 violates the first
amendment, as embodied in the fourteenth, in that its
prohibitory scope is overly broad.
The judgment is to declare that Chapter 11.02 is un-
constitutional and invalid by reason of its vagueness
and overbreadth.
The University appealed the District Court's ruling,
and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, responded by
upholding the decision of the lower court:
The use of "misconduct" as a standard in imposing
the penalties threatened here must therefore
-al
for vagueness. The inadequacy 01 the rule xc
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apparent on its face. It contains no clues which could
assist a student, an administrator or a reviewinrjudge in determining whether conduct not transgressing
statutes is susceptible to punishment by the University
as "misconduct." Since the minconduct standard is in-
valid on its face, it was unnecessary for the district
court to make any findings with respect to plaintiffs’
activities on October 18
,
1967 .
. . .Hence we feel compelled to strike down the Univer-
sity’s reliance on the doctrine of misconduct in order
to ensure that "reasonable regulation of speech-
connected activit ies . .
.
(of students remains confined
to) carefully restricted circumstances." Tinker v.
Des Moines School District
, 393 U.S. 503, 513 .
The question of specificity and vagueness of charges
was raised in Scott v. Alabama State Board of Education
,
300 F. Supp . 163 (1969). Approximately 50 students at
139Alabama State College were suspended or dismissed for
participating in a demonstration in and around the college's
dining facility.
During subsequent disciplinary hearings, counsel for
the students "objected to the statement of charges on the
grounds that the charges were unduly vague, and did not
advise students specifically of the acts they were alleged
to have committed."
Each student had received a form letter listing
eleven charges. Those charges which applied to the addres-
see were marked with a large "X".
139Note
:
case
.
This is the school involved in the l-xon
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With regard to the specificity of the statement of
charges. Chief Judge Johnson said, in part:
The student's attack in this Court on theirdismissals and suspensions continued to center on the
alleged vagueness of the charges. Dixon, at 158
advises that: *
"The notice should contain a statement
of the specific charges and grounds
which, if proven, would justify
expulsion under the regulations of
the Board of Education."
An examination of the statement of charges reveals that
some . of the charges do indeed lack the specificity
required to enable a student adequately to prepare
defenses against them. For example, the first charge
provides
:
"Willful refusal to obey a regulation or
order of Alabama State, such refusal being
of a serious nature and contributed to a
substantial disruption of the administra-
tion and operation of the College,
March 29-April 8, 1969 ."
That charge is rendered completely open-ended by the
failure to specify which regulation or order was
involved
.
On the other hand, certain of the other charges,
when viewed in the circumstances of the case, make
quite clear the basis upon which the college pro-
poses to take disciplinary action. For example, the
second charge provides:
"Principals in the seizure, occupation,
and unauthorized use of the Alabama
State Dining Hall and Union building,
March 29-April 8, 1969 ."
The students contend that one bad apple spoils the
entire bushel, i.e., that if any of the charges
against a student was unconstitutionally vague
then he was deprived of an education without due pro-
cess of law. This Court, however, cannot adopt such
a rigid and formalistic approach. Dixon make clear
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that the question in each case is whether the rudimentary
elements of fair play have been observed. Thus, thisCourt concludes that if a student was notified and
found .guilty of one satisfactory specific charge, thenhis dismissal or suspension will not be held to be
procedurally inadequate on the ground of vagueness,
whether or not he was also charged with unduly vague
charges. By way of analogy, it may be observed that
in the criminal law, where more rigorous procedures are
required, an appellate court will not examine alleged
errors with respect to one court of an indictment when
the appellant was also convicted and sentenced concur-
rently on another count found to be or conceded to be
valid. Benefield v. United States
, 370 F . 2d 912 (1966).
An examination of the exhibits reveals that al] but
eight of the dismissed or suspended students were
charged with and convicted of,... being principals
in the seizure, occupation, and unauthorized use of the
dining hall. Of those eight remaining, Timothy Mays
was found guilty of the specific charge that he
"threatened and/or pushed an Alabama State Official
who was carrying out his appropriate functions at the
College Dining Hall and Union building, March 29-
April 8, 1969 "; Jonny F. Hall was found guilty of the
specific charge that he "misappropriated and/or removed
without authority Alabama State equipment and supplies,
March 29-April 8, 1969 "; and Marvin E. Wilson,
Sandrew Marshall, and Bobby L. Cobb were found guilty
of the specific charge that they "blocked entrances
and/or held doors so as to deny rightful persons normal
entrance and exit to the Alabama State Dining Hall
March 29-April 8 , 1969."
Murry A. Hardy and Joshua Booker were charged only
with the willful refusal to obey a regulation or
order of Alabama State College—the charge which was
indicated above to be unduly ' vague . Leroy Dunbar. was
charged with the above vague charge and, in addition,
with the charge that he "through verbal exhortations
and/or threats and/or intimidation prevented or
discouraged other Alabama State students from attending
classes, March 31-April 7> 1969-" That charge is also
ambiguous and vague. "Exhortation" in normal usage
would be used to describe speech that might well be.
constitutionally protected. These three students •'•
T
- ^ 1
be ordered reinstated, pending, if the college
desires, a further specification of the charges and
another hearing.
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In Sill v. Pennsylvania State University
, reported in
section 6.6, the court concerned itself with among other
things, the question of specificity of a campus regulation:
It is well established that a law forbidding or re-
quiring conduct in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application violates the first
essential of due process. Baggett v. Bullitt
, 377 U.S.
360, 367
,
(1964). Furthermore, this "void for vague-
ness" doctrine has also been applied to determine if
the statutory language is "overbroad", that is, could
a reasonable application of its sanctions include con-
duct protected by the Constitution? Zwickler v. Koota
,
389 U.S. 24l, ( 1967 ). The important question for our
purposes is whether the vagueness and overbreadth
standard applies with equal force to student regulations
at a State University. The tenor of the cases appears
to recognize that the doctrine is applicable to student
regulations, but not with the same specificity that is
required of state criminal statutes. Even the opinion
of Judge Doyle at the District Court level in Soglin
v. Kauffman ,... noted that the doctrine applied "in
some measure" to university regulations and, on appeal,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals expressly held
that university codes of conduct are not required to
satisfy the same rigorous standards as criminal
statutes. Similar reasoning has been employed in Norton
v. Discipline Committee , 419 F . 2d 195, 200 (1969);
Esteban v. Central Missouri State College , 415 F . 2d
1077, 1088 (1969); Jones v. State Board of Education ,
and Seige
1
v. Regent s of University of California , 308
F. Supp . 8*32
,
8 3 0 (1970) . The Report of the American
Bar Association Commission on Campus Government and
Student Dissent (1970), advises against detailed codes
of conduct comparable to criminal statutes and recom-
mends rules which will provide fair notice of what is
expected and what is forbidden. Otherwise, the
Commission fears such elaborate codes may detract^from
the educational character of an academic institution,
and may inadvertently create an adversary relationship
between school officials and students. The. Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals suggests "flexibility and
reasonable breadth, rather than meticulous^
specificity" and further ' observed , with reierence t
the ability of the body to whom the rules c-a e
directed to understand them, that "the college
student * * * is appropriately expected to possess
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some minimum intelligence. * * *" Esteban v. CentalMissouri State College
. The regulation hereiTT Ltherefore, will be read in the light of the prin-
ciples enunciated above, viz., mindful of the compre-hensive authority possessed by school officials
to prescribe and control conduct in the schools, the
need for flexibility and reasonable breadth in the
promulgation of rules of conduct, the educational
ends sought to be accomplished in a university setting,
and the . intellectual competency of the student body,
is Section 11(A) of the University Guide so vague and
overbroad on its face as to deny fundamental con-
stitutional safeguards to the ...(students)? I hold
that it is not.
After specifying the laudable purposes underlying
free and open expression, and emphasizing that it will
be promoted and protected by the Univer-sity, section
11(A) recognizes the right of lawful assembly and
demonstration. However, while recognizing that these
rights must be protected by the University, the
regulation excludes any action or combination of actions
which unreasonably interferes with the operation of,
and right of access to, physical accommodations used
in the performance of the teaching, research, and
administrative functions and related adjunct activities
of the University, or infringes upon the rights
of others to freely participate in its programs and
services. What is unreasonable, much less uncon-
stitutional, about a regulation declaring physical
accommodations used in the performance of teaching,
research, and administrative functions out of bounds
for such disruptive actions? Whether it is speech -
connected or stems solely from an aim to physically
confiscate University property, when it becomes
action that unreasonably interferes with the operation
of certain essentail functions of the University, it
is not const itutioanlly protected and need not be
tolerated . The regulation provides an adequate guide
to the student of what is expected and what is forbidden.
Even under the standard applicable to statutes
generally, men of common intelligence would not
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application and a reasonable application of its
terms would not include conduct protected by the Con-
stitution. In Cameron v. Johnson , 390 U.S. 6ll, olo,
(1968), plaintiffs argued, as here,. that a statute
prohibiting "picketing * * * in such a manner. as to
obstruct or unreasonably interfere with free ingress
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or egress to and from any * * * country * * *
courthouses * * *" was so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
as to its application. Mr. Justice Brennan,
speaking for the Court, rejected this contention by*
holding that
" ( t )he terms 'obstruct' and 'unreasonably
interfere' plainly require no ’guess(ing)
at ...(their) meaning.' Appellants focus
on the word 'unreasonably.' It is a widely
used and well understood word and clearly
so when juxtaposed with 'obstruct' and
'interfere.' We conclude that the statute
clearly and precisely delineates its
reach in words of common understanding."
390 U.S. at 6l6.
The occasion to infringe upon the rights of others
is more available in the University community, and
especially in those facilities where study, concentra-
tion and attentiveness are so much more the order of
the day, than in a non-university setting. A classroom
where an instructor is lecturing interested students
is entitled to at least as much protection as the
theatre where the shouting of "fire" is not to be
countenanced. Research functions similarly
involve a tranquil, non-disruptive atmosphere wherein
the work at hand can be appropriately accomplished.
Administrative functions are usually confined and
centralized and would involve the use of only a small
part of university property. In order to function
properly and to provide educational opportunity and
appropriate atmosphere, school administrators must
protect against unreasonable interference with the
operation of these vital and sensitive facilities.
That is what was done here in language that provides as
much of a compass as a student should need to fairly
notify him of what is expected and what is not.
The regulation here. Section 11(A) of the University
Guide, is reasonable, non-discriminatory , and
sufficiently specific and necessary to fulfill the
University mission. Plaintiffs' contention tnat xt _s
vague and overbroad is rejected.
A somewhat different opinion is given by District
Court Judge Allen in Lowery v. Adams , 3^ F. Supp . —c
(1972), a case Involving the dismissal of a number of
black students from Murray State University, Kentucky.
He upheld the law as it existed in the Sixth Circuit:
We come now to the contention that the regulations
of the University are so vague and overbroad that they
are invalid and unconstitutional when placed in their
context with the disciplining of the four male
plaintiffs
.
We repeat again for the convenience of the parties
the exact wording used in the second sentence of
Paragraph 4 of the Statement of Policy on Freedoms,
Rights, and Responsibilities. We refer specifically
to that sentence since that is the sentence of the
regulations under which the plaintiffs were charged
and found guilty. The words of that second sentence
are as follows:
"The University will not allow or tolerate
any disruptive or disorderly conduct which
interferes with the rights and opportunities
of those who attend the University for the
purpose for which the University exists
—
the right to utilize and enjoy the
facilities provided to obtain an education."
The ...(students) in their contentions about vagueness
and overbreadth of these regulations rely heavily on
the case of Soglin v. Kauffmann . In that case it
was held that the university was without authority
to discipline students where the applicable regulation
provided that the university had the power to
expel students for misconduct. With that portion ot
Judge Doyle’s opinion I am in accord. However, Judge
Doyle also held that a regulation which provided . that
students might support causes by lawful means .which
did not disrupt the operations of the university . or .
organizations accorded the use of university facilitie
was overbroad. That portion of Judge Doyle’s state-
ment was not appealed.
The Court takes cognizance of the holdings of the _
United States District Court for the Western District
of Tennessee in the case of Baxt er v. Ellingtg, 31-
F Sudd 1079 ( 1970 ),.'.. wherein it was held that tne
Tennessee statute relating to disorderly conduct
was
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invalid as being vague and overbroad. The Court-takes notice of the decision of Three Judge Panel sit tine
MstrLt orV tate ? rl0t C0Urt ror ‘he EasternDis ic f Pennsylvania in the case of Cornorat- 1 onofHaverford Co llere v. Reeher, 329 P. fuFp^TI^-
wher® a Tliree Judge Court... held Pennsylvaniastatutes pertaining to financial aid to students tobe unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. In thatcase one of the statutes held to be unconstitutionalpertained to a refusal to obey a lawful regulation ororder of any Institution of higher education which
refusal in the opinion of the Institution contributedto a disruption of the activities of the institution.
t can be seen that this statute is much broader than
and much more subjective than the regulation of theUniversity in the case at bar since It is predicated
upon a disruption in an opinion of the school which
would require only such meaning as any given institu-
tion might attach to it at any given time.
These cases which pertain 'to civil or criminal statutes
are not applicable in the case at bar for the reasons
cited by Chief Judge William E. Miller in Jones v.
State Board of Education of and for the State of
Tennessee
, 27 9 F . Supp . 190 (1968 ) . In that case the
applicable regulations were as follows:
"(1) Disrespect for University authority;
(2) Any act In violation of city, county,
state or federal law; and (3) Any other
infractions of standards of conduct that
require severe disciplinary action. It
is these three regulations which the plain-
tiffs attack."
Judge Miller's comments and holdings relative thereto
are as follows:
"The Court is of the opinion that no con-
stitutional right of the plaintiffs has
been infringed because disciplinary action
was taken against them pursuant to these
three regulations. Plaintiffs have
cited several cases to the effect that
T a law forbidding or requiring, conduct
in terms so vague that men of intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its -application violates due
process of lav;.’ Raggett v. Bullitt , 377
U-S. 360
, 366-267
, (1964 ) . The Courtdoes not quarrel with this well estab-lished rule of law but believes that it isinopposite in this case. The plaintiffshere are not attacking a state statute.
ather, the attack is upon student regu-lations found in a university handbook.No case is cited to this Court in which anattack upon a student regulation as being
unconstitutionally vague has been sustained,lo iulfill its function of imparting
knowledge, a university must of course
maintain order on its campus and exclude
therefrom those who are detrimental to its
well being. A university has inherent
general power to maintain order and to
formulate and enforce reasonable rules
of' student conduct. Goldberg v. Regents
of. University of California
. 57 CaI7
463 ( 1967 ) . University regulations
for students because of the very nature
of the institution and its goals and
purposes
,
should not be tested by the same
requirements of specificity as are state
statutes."
In accord with Judge Miller’s decision are such cases
as Estaban
,
Buttny v. Smiley
,
28l F. Supp. 280
( 1968 ) • and Goldberg v. Regents of University of
California
. An examination of each of these
cases will reveal that the regulations upheld are at
least as imprecise or more so than the regulation which
is under attack in the case at bar. The Court is not
unaware of Professor Wright’s criticism of some of
the cases other than J ones as being too lax in not
sustaining poorly drawn and improvised regulations
of universities pertaining to student conduct.
However, the Court must be governed by the present
state of the applicable law as it exists in the
Sixth Circuit, the only example of which is found
in Jones . .
.
Coming now to a discussion of the regulation itself,
the Court is much impressed by the comments of
District Judge Talbot Smith in the case of MeAlpine
v. Reese
, 309 F. Supp. 136 (1970). In that case the
Court had before it a city ordinance which was as
follows
:
"No person shall willfully or maliciously
make or assist in making any noise,disturbance, or improper diversion’by
which the peace, quietude or good order
of any public, private, or parochial
school is disturbed."
In discussing that ordinance. Judge Smith made theiollowing comments which seem pertinent here:
The plaintiffs argue that the words
'disturbance' and improper diversion’
are unclear. Cases are cited criticiz-
ing such words as 'breach of the Deace’
’good order’, ’peace', and similar
terms. But of this kind of semanticism
there can be no end. No word has an
intrinsic content. It gets meaning
and contour from its context, from its
association, and from its commonly
understood usage. The thought ex-
pressed in the term 'fast horse' is
not the same as that in the term 'fast
woman’ despite the similarity in
terminology
.
* * * The vagueness
label is properly applicable only to
a statute or ordinance the terms of
which are such that one of common
intelligence must be in doubt both
as to its meaning and its application."
Applying the principles set out by Judge Smith in
McAlpine
,
the Court finds that the words "disorderly
conduct" and "disruptive" are not used in a vacuum
but are used in connection with interference with the
rights of those who attend the university and more
specifically with the rights to utilize and enjoy
the facilities provided to obtain an education.
There is, therefore, a qualifying objective with
regards to the disruptive or disorderly conduct
which is referred to in the first part of the
sentence
.
In the light of the broad scope which the majority of
courts have given to the universities in the formula-
tion of standards of conduct for their students and
in light of the holding of Judge Miller in Jones
and the affirmance of that case by the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals, the Court is of the opinion that
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the regulation, and particularly the last sentencethereof taken as a whole, is not such that a person ofoomnon intelligence is in doubt both as tc its meaning'nd its application. While the language used could bemore precise, it is the opinion of this Court that itis suf i icient to convey a definite warning as to theproscribed conduct when measured by common understanding
and practices.
The Court in the 1974 Marin case, reported in section
6.4, also dealt with the question of vagueness and came to
^ different conclusion than the court in Lowerv
:
Initially, we are confronted with a question regarding
the proper vagueness standard to apply to university
regulations. We think the suggestion that the standard
should be different from those applied to criminal
statutes is without foundation. First, the Supreme
Court has from the beginning refused to apply different
standards to civil enactments. "The ground or
principle of the ..’..(earlier vagueness) decisions was
not such as to be applicable only to criminal prosecu-
tions. It was not the criminal penalty that was held
invalid, but the exaction of obedience to a rule
or standard which was too vague and indefinite as
really to be no rule or standard at all." A. B. Small
Co
.
v. American Sugar Refining Co
., 267 U.S. 233, 239
Cl925) . And it has recently reaffirmed that "the
’void for vagueness’ doctrine. .. (is) applicable to
civil as well as criminal actions." Boutilier v. INS.
387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967).
Second, the policies underlying the doctrine are as
appiicaoie to civii enactments ana to university rules
as they are to criminal prohibitions. There are three
basic policies: to provide fair warning to those
governed by the rule, to guide the officials enforcing
the rule thus preventing arbitrary or discriminatory
enforcement, and to prevent infringement upon con-
stitutionally protected activity. Gravnea v. City of
Rockford
,
408 U.S. 104, 108-109, (1972H Self-
evidently all three purposes are fostered when the
doctrine is applied to rules governing the conduct
of students on a university campus. Indeed, two of
them would seem to apply with particular force in the
college setting. Given the experimental spirit
and dissenting viewpoints of the young, college
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campuses display a greater diversity of life-stvlf**than found in the society as a whole. Thus thp • v
hf traffrnt t 2 the enforcing officials is likely°t 0
C
be greater and consequently the potential for dis-crimina.tory enforcement enhanced. Similarly, thepolitical ferment and activism recently so commonon university campuses suggest that the vaguenessdoctrine is peculiarly necessary to insure fullprotection for the exercise of guaranteed rights ofexpression.
Finally, a. comparison of the penalties actuallyimposed in different circumstances indicates theillogic of a criminal-civil or society-university
distinction. In Grayned
, where the Court fully
applied the vagueness doctrine, the appellant was
only fined $25.00 for the ordinance conviction he
/
ha
Jr
enged
‘ Giaccao v * Pennsylvania
, 382 U.S. 399(1966), the Court applied the vagueness doctrine
to. a state rule defining the circumstances under which
a jury could assess costs against an acquitted mis-
demeanor defendant, in a case where costs of $230.95
were imposed. It should be evident that a year's
suspension from college could well have a far more
devastating and long-term effect on the reputation,
career, and hence finances of an individual than an
assessment of costs after a criminal acquittal or a
conviction under an anti-noise ordinance and a fine
of $25. For all of these reasons, we believe that
the normal vagueness standards apply to university
regulations
.
Turning to the merits of the vagueness challenge, we
have no difficulty in finding Article 10A(4) clearly
inadequate. It purports to prohibit: "Improper or
disrespectful conduct in the classroom or campus."
We find it hard to distinguish these terms from the
words "reprehensible" and "improper" found impermis-
sibly vague in Giaccio
,
the phrase "annoying to
persons passing by" struck down in Coates v. Cincinnati
,
402 U.S. 6ll, (1971) j and the all-encompassing ban on
"misconduct" rejected in Soglin v. Kauffman . The
inadequacy is obvious--the purpose of a prohibitory
rule is to inform those affected what is improper
not merely that the "improper" is prohibited.
The other two regulations present quite different
situations. 10A(6) makes it impermissible "To inter-
rupt, hinder, or disturb the regular tasks of the
498
activities
°r
°f
dUly auth°rized
S4‘ws?i»* ? «“ jsysr
n„,:™ -t ,
alfect the normal functioning: of theniversity s operations and proceedings." Theprecedent is Orayned
. The Court there unheidagainst a vagueness challenge an ordinance nnnliin,one who "shall willfully msJ e or the maWnK
distur b
n
?he
e °r dlverslcn whlch disturbs or tends to
'J
t peace or good order of such school session
ever
aSVhre ° f -" U ' S ; at 108 ' « did So! how-
3 on ly because of judicial interpretations whichmade it
^
dear that the term "tends to disrupt" meansonly imminent interference" with the school's order
"actual^
onviction could lie only if the diversion wasually incompatible with normal school activity"there was a demonstrated causality" between thedisruption and the diversion and "the acts were will-fully done. Id. at 111-114. Article 10A(6) uses thevery verb disturb" approved by the Court in Gravned
.
The other verbs seem to us to be of equal if notgreater specificity
— speaking to behavior which not
merely disturbs but is so incompatible with the uni-
versity activity as to cause a complete interruption
or a temporary retarding interference. These termsdictate actual incompatibility, demonstrated causality,
and willfulness (though we do not mean to imply that
the standards of intent required for a criminal con-
viction apply here).
In sharp contrast is Article 3C(2)(b). It bars only
activities that "affect the normal functioning" of
university activities. The breadth of the term
affect 1 suggests its indefiniteness. Does it cover
a silent picket whose sign causes the passing reader
to reflect on its message; does it include a statement
in a class which causes an abnormally interested
conversation among fellow classmates; is a meeting
advocating research into university contact with the
military which produces abnormally high attendance at
the library encompassed? Moreover, what of the
inadvertent dropping of a pen which causes several
heads to turn or a quiet huddle on campus which
attracts undesired participants. Though we are not
unmindful of the limitations of language, we thing
that Article 3C(2)(b) too loosely defines the conduct
which its seeks to avoid, and which is far more
sharply described by the nearly entirely overlapping
Article 10A(6).
And finally, differing from the vagueness opinion in
Marin
,
but more in line with the decision in Lowery
, is
Jenkins
, reported in section 6.4:
. .
.
(The students) last challenged their suspension on
the grounds that Grambling College and Louisiana State
Board of Education regulations they are said to have”
violated, are unconstitutionally vague arid overbroad
in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments.
Although these constitutional doctrines have been
applied to regulations of education institutions,
Soglin v. Kauffman
,
it is clear that school disciplinary
regulations need not be drawn with the same precision
as are criminal codes. Murray v. West Baton Rouge
Parish School Board
, 472 F.2d 438 (1973). We find the
Murray case controlling:
(S)ome degree of discretion must, of
necessity, be left to... school officials
to determine what forms of misbehavior
should be sanctioned. Absent evidence
that the broad wording in the statute
is, in fact, being used to infringe on
first amendment rights... we muse assume
that school officials are acting
responsibly in applying the broad
statutory command.
These regulations are codes of general conduct only.
College students should have no difficulty in under-
standing what conduct the regulations allow and
what conduct they prohibit. They ask for adherence
to standards of conduct which befit a student,
enhance the educational purposes of the school, and
warn of the danger of mass involvement.
There is no evidence in this case that the Grambling
administrative officials or the Disciplinary Hearing
Board utilized the regulations to infringe on con-
stitutional rights. We do not find the challenged
regulations to be so vague or so overbroad as to
evade protected freedoms contrary to the first and
fourteenth amendments.
The principle laid down in Connally v. General
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Con struction Co,
- that a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application violates the first essential
of due process of law - is applicable to state colleges
and universities, but not with the same specificity that is
required of state criminal statutes.. Some courts feel that
university codes of conduct do not have to satisfy the same
rigorous standards as criminal statutes. (see Sill and
So^l_iri ) , while other courts feel that normal vagueness
standards should apply to university codes of conduct
(see Marin )
.
University officials have a responsibility to
promulgate clear and explicit rules of conduct, giving
fair notice of what is expected and what is forbidden. The
college authorities should indicate what is improper
behavior, not just that "improper behavior" is prohibited,
(see Marin )
Clear, precise codes of conduct, and other regulations,
provide fair warning to those governed by the rule, guide
college officials in enforcing the rules, thereby reducing
or preventing arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement of
the regulation, and prevent infringement upon constitu-
tionally protected activity (i.e., could a reasonable
application of the regulation prevent conduct which is
protected by the Constitution?) (see Grayned v. city of
Rockford
. 408 U.S. 104 (1972))
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6.10 Due Process For Non-Students
When involved with non-students, must university
officials bear in mind the principles of due process? The
answer is yes.
In 1973 s & case came before the Supreme Court of
14 0Colorado which raised the above question. Clarke Watson
had applied for admission to the University of Colorado,
and was denied beca.use of a prior criminal record. He
applied for reconsideration, and again was denied.
Following this second denial, Watson on Saturday,
April 8th, went to the home of Dean William Douglas, a
member of the Admissions Committee, and allegedly
threatened his safety.
Upon learning of the incident with Dean Douglas, the
President of the University, Dr. Thieme, sent a letter to
Watson which read, in part:
On the following day, namely, Sunday, April 9, in
the company of several persons, you again went
to Mr. Douglas' home. Although you did not seek to
gain admission, your presence, under the circumstances
here involved, was calculated to harass or intimidate.
1 ^°Wat son v. Board of Regents of University of
Colorado
,
512 P.2d 1162 (1973 )
•
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Upon apprehension, I am advised that you have been
charged by the City of Boulder with assault relatingt°
<
the Saturday
...(April 8th) incident under appro-priate municipal ordinances.
Based upon the above, it is my determination that ycur
physical presence upon the campus of the University
is detrimental to the well being of the University,
its students and staff, and incompatible with the
University’s function as an educational' institution
.
Accordingly, acting in my capacity as chief executive
officer of the University
,
I direct that you refrain
from entering upon the campus. of the University of
Colorado, all buildings located thereon, and any
other property owned or possessed by the University.
Your failure to comply with this directive will
result in the University using every available legal
means to have you arrested and removed as a trespasser
and, if necessary, restrained from entering upon
University properties.
Watson was afforded no opportunity for a hearing in
which to challenge the various allegations made against him.
After receiving President Thieme ’ s letter, Watson
went to the University's Memorial Center, to continue
his work with the Black Student Alliance, a group with which
he had been working. While there, he was cited for
trespass
.
Watson orougnt nis case to court, and the trial judge
found for the University. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Colorado, sitting "en banc” reversed the decision and
found for Watson.
Judge Groves said, in part:
"Colo. Const. Art. IX, I 14 vests in the Board _ of
Regents general supervisory power over the University
of Colorado. Pursuant to this power, the Regents
adopted the following regulation:
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"The University, acting through its
administrative officers, reserves the
right to exclude those deemed
detrimental to its well-being or
incompatible with its function as
an educational institution.”
The .authority of President Thieme to exclude...(Watson) from the University's campuses was based onthe above regulation. (Watson) alleges that the
regulation is unconstitutionally vague under thedue process” clause of the fourteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution. The initial ques-tion is whether that clause applies to the University
regulation. J
Evidence introduced at the court hearing indicated
that the various campuses (Boulder, Denver and
Colorado Springs) of the University of Colorado are
open to all members of the general public, with the
exception of the Computer Center, research laboratories
and other highly specialized facilities, and private
offices
.
Further, the evidence indicated that ...(Watson)
had a substantial, albeit unofficial, connection with
the University. He was a consultant to the Black
Student's Alliance, a co-instructor in a course offered
by the University, and tteVice President and General
Manager of the Colorado Cooperative Council (an
organization which provided low-cost housing for
students off-campus). Additionally, ...(Watson) had
arranged to do consultant work with the University's
College of Environmental Design. Finally, there
was uncontradicted evidence at trial that ...(Watson's)
ability to carry on these various activities would be
seriously jeopardized if he was denied access to the
University campuses.
We recently recognized that many University-sponsored
functions held outside University classrooms, are of
educational benefit not only to students enrolled at
the University, but also to attending members of the
public at-large. Boulder v. Regents, Colo.
,
501 P.2d
123 (1972). We need not and cannot close our eyes
to the fact that a University campus is oftentimes
a focal point for the discussion of public questions
,
cultural events, recreational activities, and general
educative functions. The University of Colorado
opened its doors to the public. Accordingly, on
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this basis, we hold that a non-student’s right to accessto University functions and facilities, which are open
° « 110 at ~ larSe > cannot be permanently deniedwithout due process of law under the fourteenth amend-ment to the United States Constitution.
The due process clause, in part, requires that a reg-ulation not be so vague that men of common intel-ligence must necessarily guess at its meaning anddiffer as to its apolicat ion . " Connally v. General
Construction Company
, 269 U.S. ^85 / —(1926 ) . Although the language of the regulation atissue here is broad, we believe the clear intent ofthe regulation is to protect the University againstpersons whose activities disrupt the functioning
of the University as an educational institution.^ As
so interpreted, we do not view the regulation to beimpermissibly vague.
...(Watson) urges that the University’s exclusion order
was void because it issued without procedural due
process, i.e., a hearing was not afforded plaintiff
prior to his exclusion from University property. We
agree. Where students have been subjected' to disci-
plinary action by University officials, courts have
recognised thst procedural due process requires
—
prior
to imposition of the disciplinary action—adequate
notice of the charges, reasonable opportunity to
prepare to meet the charges, an orderly administra-
tive hearing adapted to the nature of the case, and a
fair and impartial decision. Buttny v. Smiley
,
281 F.
Supp . 280 ( 1968 ). The same protections must be
afforded non-students who may be permanently denied
access to University functions and facilities. Dunkel
v. Elkins, 325 F. Supp. 1235 (1971).
As part of a valid Regent's regulation of this type, in
addition to providing for a hearing, there should be
a provision for the person or persons who will act
as adjudicator ( s )
.
In the present posture of this matter we should not
attempt to "spell out" all proper elements of such a
regulation. This task should be undertaken first by
the Regents. We should say, however, that when a
genuine emergency appears to exist and it is
impractical for University officials to grant a
prior hearing, the right of non-students to access to
the University may be suspended without a prior
hearing, so long as a hearing is thereafter provided
with reasonable promptness.
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6.11 Irrebuttable Presumptions
The State of Connecticut requires that non-resident
students, enrolled in the State University system, pay
tuition and other fees at higher rates than state residents.
A statute was developed which said that if the legal
address of a student, if married, was outside the state at
the time of application for admission, or, if single, was
outside the state at . some point during the preceding year,
he/she remains a nonresident, for purposes of tuition and
fees, as long as he is a student in Connecticut. The
statute continues to say that, f, the status of a student,
as established at the time of his application for admission
...shall be his status for the entire period of attendance...
Several students at the University of Connecticut
brought suit alleging that the Connecticut statute was an
irreversible and irrebuttable statutory presumption, which
denied them their fourteenth amendment rights to due
process
.
The District Court agreed, and the Supreme Court
141 .
affirmed the decision.
Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the
Supreme Court, which said, in part:
1 ^ 1Vlandis v. Kline, 346 F. Supp. 526, 412 U.S. 441
( 1973 ).
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The students do not challenge, nor did the DistrictCourt Invalidate, the option of the State to classify
students as resident and nonresident students there-by obligating nonresident students to pay highertuition and fees than do bona fide residents. TheState’s right to make such a classification is un-questioned here. Rather, the ...(students) attack
Connecticut’s irreversible and irrebuttable statutory
presumption that because a student’s legal address
was outside the State at the time of his application
for admission or at some point during the preceding
year, he remains a nonresident for as long as he is
a student there. This conclusive presumption, they
say, is invalid in that it allows the State to classify
as "out-of-state students" those who are, in fact,
bona fide residents of the State. The appellees
claim that they have a constitutional right to contro-
vert that presumption of nonresidence by presenting
evidence that they are bona fide residents of Con-"
necticut. The District Court agreed: "Assuming that
it is permissible for the state to impose a heavier
burden of tuition and fees on non-resident than on
resident students, the state may not classify as
'out of state students’ those who do not belong in
that class" 3^6 F. Supp., at 528. We affirm the
judgment of the District Court.
Statutes creating permanent irrebuttable presump-
tions have long been disfavored under the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
...It may be that most applicants to Connecticut’s
university system who apply from outside the State or
within a year of living out of State have no real
intention of becoming Connecticut residents and will
never do so. But it is clear that not all of the
applicants from out of State inevitably fall in this
category. Indeed, in the present case, both...
(students) possess many of the indicia of Connecticut
residency, such as year-round Connecticut homes,
Connecticut drivers’ licenses, car registrations,
voter registrations, etc.; and both were found by the
District Court to have become bona fide residents
of Connecticut before the 1972 spring semester.
Yet, under the State’s statutory scheme, neither was
permitted any opportunity to demonstrate the bona
fides of her Connecticut residency for tuition pur-
poses, and neither will ever have such an.
opportunity in the future so long as she remains a
student
.
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In sum, since Connecticut purports to be concerned
with residency in allocating the rates for tuition
and fees in its university system, it is forbidden
by the due process clause to deny an individual the
resident rates on the basis of a permanent and irrebutt-
able presumption of nonresidence, when that presump-
tion is not necessarily or universally true in fact, and
when the State has reasonable means of making the
crucial determination. Rather, standards of due
process require that the State allow such an individual
the opportunity to present evidence showing that he
is a bona fide resident entitled to the in-state
rates
.
Since the statute precluded the appellees from ever
rebutting the presumption that they were nonresidents
of Connecticut, that state operated to deprive them
of a significant amount of their money without due
process of law.
We are aware, of course, of the special problems in-
volved in determining the bona fide residence of
college students who come from out-of-state to attend
that State’s public university. Our holding today
should in no... (way) be taken to mean that Connecticut
must classify the students in its university system
as residents, for purposes of tuition and fees, just
because they go to school there. Nor should our decision
be construed to deny a State the right to impose on
a student, as one element in demonstrating bona fide
residence, a reasonable durational residency require-
ment, which can be met while in student status. We
fully recognize that a State has a legitimate interest
in protecting and preserving the quality of its
colleges and universities and the right of its own
bona fide residents to attend such institutions on a
preferential tuition basis.
We hold only that a permanent irrebuttable presumption
of nonresidence—the means adopted by Connecticut to
preserve that legitimate interest— is violative of
the due process clause, because it provides no opoor-
tunity for students who applied from out-of-state to
demonstrate that they have become bona fide Connecticut
residents
.
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6.12 Principles of Law and
Conclusions
The due process clause of the fou rteenth amende
imposes on the states the same restrictions that th» Pin nr
Mghts places on the national government
.. .Whenever a
mental body acts so as t o injure an individual, the
Constitution requires tha t the act be consonant with due
process. . .Students at tax-support e d institutions can not
—-
arbit rarily disciplined without benefit of ordinary
well-recognized principles of fair play .
The requirements of due process, under the fourteenth
amendment, are applicable to students. However, college
officials will not be held to the strict requirements of
due process in criminal lawj and college regulations
need not be drawn with the same orecision as criminal codes.
The degree of protection to which a student is
entitled in the process of determining his/her guilt and
punishment, is in direct proportion to the harm which could
result to him/her from such a determination. Some level
of due process should be afforded the student prior to any
determination that would adversely affect the student.
Such an adverse determination may be as simple as
probation, or suspension of privileges, or it may be as
serious as expulsion or suspension from school.
College officials should develop well defined
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procedures for affording due process to students in
discipline cases: and the procedures should be followed
in all cases. Deviation from such processes does not
necessarily constitute a deprivation of due process.
However
,
the courts will consider the extent of the
deviation. Has the college deviated from their
written procedures to the extent that the student has
been denied the fundamental fairness required in due
process?
It is clear, that the Federal Courts, acting
under the cloak of civil rights legislation, will re-
view cases where students have been denied due
process, without requiring any prior resort to state
courts
.
The courts have defined two aspects of due
process. First, a rule or regulation may itself violate
due pi’Occoo ucuauSc it is uxii cds onab 1c
,
arbitrary
or discriminatory; second, the unfairness of the
procedures in carrying out the regulation may violate
due process.
Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled
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t o
__
be heard, and In order that they may en.lov that right-.
,
th ey must first be
,
notlfled
. . . due process requires notice
and_son^pp0rtunlty for n hearing before atudent Q
tax
-supported Institu tion can be expelled for
Failure by the student to exhaust administrative remedies
,
bars a civil rights suit, unless the remedies are Inade -
quate or resort to them would be futile
.
Full due process rights should be provided to students
who face severe punishment by the college, such as expul-
sion. Less severe punishments require less reliance on
due process procedures. To this extent, due process for
students is analagous to the due process rights of the
criminally accused. The nature of the hearings varies
with the circumstances of the case.
College officials should incorporate the following
elements in disciplinary hearings which may result in
expulsion or suspension from school:
1. The student should receive a written notice which
should contain the specific charges made against
the student, the specific written college rules
and regulations which the student has allegedly
violated, the actions to be taken by the college
should the charges be proved, and the time and
place of the hearing. This notice should be
given to the student in sufficient time, usually
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ten days, to afford him an opportunity to prepare
his defense
.
2. The student should be given the names of witnesses
against him/her and an oral or written report of
the witnesses' testimony. While not a specific
requirement of due process, the student should be
allowed to cross-examine witnesses. This is
especially true if the hearing is "adversary" in
nature, or if there is a serious question as to
the credibility of a witness.
3. The student should be allowed to see any informa-
tion which the college plans to enter into the
record of the hearing.
4. The student should be given a fair and adequate
opportunity to present his/her defense, and
witnesses on his/her behalf.
5. The right to legal counsel is not an essential
ingredient for a fair hearing in all types of
proceedings; it is the nature of the hearing
which should determine one’s right to counsel. In
the author’s opinion, in cases involving major
disciplinary hearings, (i.e., hearings which could
result in expulsion or suspension for lengthy
periods of time) counsel should.be allowed. For
less severe disciplinary problems, students can
512
be allowed to have an advisor to help in the
preparation and conduct of his/her defense. in
all cases where the college proceeds to use
legal counsel, either in preparation for, or in the
proceedings of, the hearing, the student must
also be allowed to be represented by counsel.
The college, however, need not provide that
counsel for the student.
6. The student has a right to an impartial tribunal,
preferably one composed of students and faculty,
and to have his/her hearing conducted by an
impartial hearing officer. The fact that the
hearing officer is a member of the college staff,
or even an associate of those who are bringing
charges, does not, in itself, violate due process.
But in the opinion of the author, the hearing
officer should be someone not previously involved
in the situation.
7. The decision of the hearing board should be based
solely on the facts presented at the hearing.
The hearing officer should allow only pertinent
information to be introduced. The burden of
proof should lie with the institution and the
student should not be punished on the basis of
some grounds other than those stated in the
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written charge.
8. Either the student or the university may make a
record of the hearing.
9. The results of the hearing, or the findings of
the hearing board, should be made available to
the student, in writing, and should contain the
findings of fact, the substantial evidence upon
which the findings rest, the conclusions of the
hearing board, the actions to be taken against the
student by the college, and a notice of a right
to appeal.
10.
If the hearing is not before the highest adminis-
trative body, then the student should have the
opportunity to appeal to that body. The procedures
for such an appeal should be set forth in the
rules and regulations of the institution. The
student should be given an adequate time in which
to formualte his/her appeal, usually five working
days
.
Legislation which uses terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at i t s meaning
,
and differ as to its application, violates due process...
School disciplinary regulations need not be drawn with the
same precision as are criminal codes .
Rules and regulations must convey sufficiently
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definite warnings so as to prescribe conduct when measured
by common understanding and practice; they must convey
what is expected and what is forbidden.
Definitive rules and regulations provide fair warning
to those governed by the rule; guide the officials who
must enforce the regulations, thereby preventing arbitrary
or discriminatory enforcement; and help to prevent
infringement upon constitutionally protected activity.
Overbroad rules and regulations will be struck down
by the courts because they may prevent activity that may
be legitimate under the constitution; or because they try
to cover so much, that they effectively cover nothing.
While university regulations for students will not
be tested by the same requirements of specificity as are
state statutes or criminal codes, college administrators
should endeavor to promulgate reasonably definite and
narrow rules of conduct, which are also both functional and
practical. To make sure that rules are sufficiently
explicit, it may be helpful to specify examples of dis-
orderly conduct, or conduct which clearly inhibits the
educational process. Affirmative statements of what is
expected of students may also be helpful.
Regulations which are based on permanent and irrebutt-
able presumptions, which are not universally
true, and
which provide no opportunity for students to
refute the
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presumptions, will be held to be violative of the due
process by the courts.
Pending action on c harges, the status of a student
should not be a ltered, or his/her right to be present on
campus and to attend classes suspended, except for reasons
re lating to his/her physical or emotional safety or
well-being, or for reasons relating to the safety and well -
being of students, faculty, or university property
.
There are occasions when it may be appropriate and
advisable to remove a student from the campus, pending a full
disciplinary hearing, in effect, to impose an "interim
suspension" on the student. Unless the element of danger to
persons or property is present, the "interim suspension"
should not be considered. The college officials must
weigh the danger involved in keeping the student on the
campus, with the time it will take to provide that student
with a full disciplinary hearing.
Should an "interim suspension" be considered, it can-
not be imposed without a"preliminary hearing". If a "pre-
liminary hearing" is not immediately possible or practical,
it should be held at the earliest possible time.
"Preliminary hearings" should include a notice of
charges, the specific regulations under which the student
is charged, a statement of the issue for decision at the
"preliminary hearing", i.e., should the student be suspended
516
from the college pending a "full hearing", and notice of
the student’s rights to a full, prompt hearing. "Prelimin-
ary hearings" should only result in a decision to allow the
student to remain on campus, or the imposition of an
"interim suspension".
Should an "interim suspension" be imposed, a "full
hearing" should be held within a reasonable time, usually
two weeks.
A non-student’s right to access to a public university’s
functions and facilities, which are open to the public
at large, cannot be permanently denied without due process
of law .
Non-students (i.e., the public) cannot be permanently
denied access to a public college’s facilities or events,
which are open to the public, without some justification,
and without providing those who are denied access, an
opportunity to a hearing. Non-students should be afforded
the same due process rights as those given to students.
The amount of due process afforded to a non-students
should be in direct proportion to the severity of the
punishment
.
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CHAPTER 7;
THE FUTURE
7.1 Impact on College Administrators
The relationship between the college and the student
has changed; the values and morals of society have changed;
and the courts of our land now view, the student as a citizen.
Now the college administrator, historically trained as a
scholar or counselor
,
must add a working knowledge of the
law to his skills, and take some responsibility in applying
the Const itution to the campus. To not do so could result in a
loss of some control over the college administrator’s once
sovereign domain: the campus and the students.
One need only look at the nation’s public secondary
schools to sense the control that the courts are now exerting
over that system. When the Supreme Court heard Brown
,
the
courts were still showing considerable deference to state
and local officials: while the Supreme Court order was to
not operate segregated schools, the responsibility to carry
142
out that order rested with the public school administrator.
"However, after several years of delay... courts began
1 ho
"The Power of Our Judges: Are They Going Too Far?",
U.S. News and World Report, January 19, 1976, p. 30.
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turning to an 'affirmative action’ approach, ordering precise
techniques for desegregation, including forced busing, to
carry out their orders
.
'
,:L 1,3
The message was clear: when
public school officials default in their responsibilities,
the courts will take the initiative. In Boston, the Federal
District Court bypassed the duly elected school board, re-
moved the administration of South Boston High School, and
placed that school in receivership, under the court’s control.
Other examples of such control by the courts, and the
law, are also evident:
—The State of Ohio has proposed legislation which
specifically defines the rights to which students are en-
titled in administrative hearings. The legislation repre-
sents an assertion, by the state, of primary responsibility
in the disciplining of disruptive students. The State of
Oregon has defined its colleges as administrative bodies, and
requires them to abide by the state's "administrative pro-
cedure act". New York requires all colleges to file rules
for dealing with campus demonstrations and demonstrators.
The Federal Government could enact similar legislation,
or regulations, under its power to control, inherent in
federal grants.
Such legislation would further alter the college/student
1*13 ibid, p. 30.
523
relationship, and limit the ability of the college admlnistra-
tor to respond to campus problems.
—The cases reported in this dissertation, especially
the landmark decisions of Tinker
,
Dixon
,
and Brown
, are in-
dicative of the fact that it is the courts which have
dictated the process and means by which college administra-
tors will control students. The discretion and judgment
of the federal courts have been substituted for that of
legislatures, boards of trustees, and administrators.
—The once authoritarian power of deans, presidents,
and even boards of trustees has been diminished by the need
of these people to secure approval from staff attorneys
before passing on policy. Such a system of approval, usually
results in policies which are legally sound, but are found
wanting from a humanistic, administrative, and educational
point of view. On the author's own campus, there are a half
dozen policies, which should have been enacted months,
even years, ago, but which have been held up for want of
legal approval.
—And the relationship of the college administrator
and the student has changed. The once powerful dean was not
one to be questioned. Today his/her actions are not only
being questioned and challenged, they are being carefully
scrutinized to see if they are legal. Fifteen years ago the
dean may have been able to effectively deal with a group of
demonstrating students, or a single student, on a one-to-one
basis; today the dean must learn to work with student unions,
or to talk, not with the student him/herself, but with the
student's attorney. And it is not enough that the dean may
be questioned; he/she may also be sued as an individual, if
he/she has denied a student of his/her civil rights.
The future of the college/student relationship, and even
the future roles of college administrators, may depend on
how administrators react to these changes. It is a working
relat ionship with the law and legal professionals which
must be sought, not a school system administered by the
courts and/or dominated by lawyers
.
It is the contention of the author that to accomplish
this objective, the college administrator must accept the law,
and students' rights, as part of his/her new environment. The
administrator must use it in a positive sense to help in the
decision-making process, the formulation of campus policy and
regulations, the protection of the college and him/herself
from needless court appearances, and, in setting an example so
that others may learn about the law and its application to the
campus. The college administrator must develop a working
knowledge of the law.
To ignore the import of the effect of the law on the
campus and students' rights, is to place oneself in a
quagmire of litigation, much of which may be needless; and
to place oneself in a situation where lavjyers, and
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possibly the courts, determine educational policy.
7.2 The Future
The Supreme Court gives no forthright answers, but
only temporary solutions to problems; solutions which change
to meet current social standards. Sometimes the courts are
ahead of these social trends, as the courts have been with
criminal rights; and, sometimes the courts work
slower than public opinion, as was the case in the 1930’s
when a conservative court did not reflect the temper of the
times
.
In the area of students’ rights, the courts have been
ahead of college administrators, and, in the opinion of the
author, administrators will spend much of the next ten years
modifying their conduct, and campus regulations, to conform
to what the courts are telling us today.
But this can be misleading, for while educators are try-
ing to catch up to the Constitution, the climate of the country
is changing to reflect a new conservatism, and so too will
the courts and court opinion change. By the time that
college administrators have moved to reflect the new citizen-
ship of college students, the courts will already by embarking
on a new course that will change the lives of all campus
citizens
.
The future* is not easily forecasted. But there are
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things happening today which can give us a sense of the
direction of the economy, politics, values, morals, and
bther factors which influence public opinion, and hence, the
courts perception of the Constitution. Consider the
following
:
—The balance on th e Supreme Court, with the appoint -
ment of Justi ce John Paul Stevens, will change to a more con -
servative view. Opinions of Justice Stevens show that he
"...is unsympathetic to the rights of the accused, is inclined
to uphold government wiretaps, hesitates to strike down
legislative redistricting that might be discriminatory, and
wants to give states more leeway in applying the law under
the federal constitution
.
"
ll^^
The battle against crime . The FBI reports that crime
was up 18 # in 197^ over 1973; and up 38# in the last five
years. 36.3% of those arrested in property crimes were
under 18 years old; 77 % of those arrested for robbery, were
under 25.
Referring to our losing battle against crime, FBI
Director Clarence Kelly told a U.S. Senate Committee, that
in order to successfully compete against criminal elements,
the majority of Americans may have to give up some basic
rights, as we’ve known them in our Constitution.
1 U li
The Boston Globe, November 29, 1975.
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The demise o f th e Equal Rights Amendment
. It now
seems very possible that the amendment, which guarantees
equal rights and protections for women, will not be ratified
by the States.
The proposal of United States Senate Bill S-l .
Some political observers say that if passed, this bill will
make illegal every form of protest developed in the civil
rights and anti-war movement of the 1960’s. The ACLU has said
that the bill’s alleged purpose is to revise and reform the
United States criminal codes; but that the real reason is
to have a legal or constitutional means for stifling
protest
.
—The economy
. According to some economic indicators,
such as the Kondratieff or long wave cycle, our economy hits
peaks about every 50 to 60 years. "Such peaks of economic
activity have been placed around 1810, i860, and 1920. After
the peaks in economic activity around 1920, the Great
Depression of the 1930’ s represented a typical low point
in such a cycle. Now, some fifty years after the preceding
peak, economic activity has again risen to a high level,
lli 5but with many signs of faltering." Will history repeat
1
^^Porrester
,
Jay W.
,
New Perspectives for Growth Over
the Next 30 Years, a paper presented to tie Conference on
Limits to Growth ’75, Houston, Texas, October 20, 1975, p.
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itself? Is a war necessary to energize the economy and
reduce the world's population?
-
ven the literature of the modern era reflects a
chang e in scholarly opinion of the future
. Once
,
"new society" novels such as Christ ianapolis were utopian
in nature and forecast. Latter day "new society" novels such
as 19 8
4
and Future Shock reflect a more conservative, con-
trolled society.
Professor Jay W. Forrester, of MIT, and others, have-
considered some of these factors in forecasting the future.
Through "systems dynamics analysis", a process which
relies on computer models to furnish an analysis of how
social systems will behave and interact, Professor
Forrester's team of researchers has made some startling
1 46predictions of the future society in the United States:
--A population growth rate, which has the capacity to
double in a relatively short period of time, will
produce such great numbers of people, that our
environment will be destroyed. We will have produced
our own termination. The population will have to be
limited and controlled, either through government
legislation, or removal of tax benefits (or perhaps
through a major educational program).
146The Boston Sunday Globe, June 15, 1975.
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Cities will have to choose what type of city they
want to be, and laws will be passed to insure this
identity: migration to the cities will be banned as
a maximum population is legislated; limits will be
placed on the number of housing units and available
jobs; and building permits and water connection will
be denied to any newcomers in .order to maintain
sufficient resources for those already living in the
city
.
— It will be impossible for the United States to
maintain its present qualify of life, if population
and industrialization continue to grow.
— Laws, attitudes, goals, expectations, traditions,
religion, government, and corporate activity will
change.
What Forrester's "futurists" predict is a society
with less individual freedom and more government control;
a society where there will be a limited number of choices
left for the individual; a new society, with different
values; ones which may appear undemocratic to us now.
What will this "new society" mean for college
administrators? Considering the implications of the
negative factors mentioned above, i.e., overpopulation,
rising crime, the economy, etc., arrl Professor Forrester's
conclusions, a guess can be made as to students' rights
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on campus, in two time frames: the immediate future, 10
to 15 years; and a look towards the end of the century.
As to the immediate future, it seems inevitable that
our society will be more litiguous; people will resort to
the courts for resolution of conflict. Students will be no
different, opting to use the courts rather than resolving
their conflicts with administrators' on the campus. The
courts, and the state. and federal governments will become
more involved and hence will have more control in the opera-
tion of public colleges.
One of the consequences of the students' rights move-
ment will be a contract system. Colleges will contract with
individual students for their education. While these con-
tracts will initially be general in nature, eventually
they will be more individualized agreements, where conditions
and responsibilities will be set and agreed to by both
parties: the student and the college. College catalogues
will be re-written by legal staffs and will become, in
essence, legal documents; part of the contract system.
Faculty will continue to be scholars, but university
administrative officials will become less educational leaders
and more impersonal, bureaucratic, business managers.
Unless public college officials gain and use a working
knowledge of the law and how it should be applied on the
campus, the system of due process, as we know it today.
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will be replaced. Most notable of these changes will be
the introduction of lawyers into student disciplinary pro-
ceedings, as colleges and their administrative staff rely
more heavily on their own lawyers for guidance and advice.
Informal hearings and proceedings will be replaced by a
system which will parallel the due process rights of the
criminally accused.
Students will gain a much more powerful voice on the
campus, but not in the areas of curriculum development and
academic standards. The courts will leave those areas to
professional educators. Student Unions will flourish, with
the support of the courts, and students will be able to
negotiate with the administration
,
but only in business
associated areas, such as wages and working hours.
The demand for higher education will be such that
state legislatures will be forced to consider in-state
students first, severely limiting the number of out-of-
state students who can attend tax-supported colleges.
It is possible that students will only be able to obtain a
public college education at schools within their own state.
Young reports that there is an old legal adage that
1 i[ 7
says, "precedents should be guideposts, not hitching posts."
147 Young, Donald J., op. cit., p. 179*
532
The courts do change; and in our rapidly changing society
and technology, precedents may not be compatible with
problems once faced before, or even conceived of yet.
By the end of this century, college administrators
will face drastically different problems than today, the
solutions to which may be dictated by the broader society.
A public college education will, become a right, guaranteed
under the Constitution. Some states have already included
the right to a public secondary school education in their
state constitutions.
Admission policies will have to be changed, and the
growth in population may require new legislation to control
who will attend college and who will not; perhaps states
will even legislate which school a student will attend.
Many private schools will be driven out of business
because of economic reasons. Or, the state and federal
governments will bolster these schools with tax monies, to
the point where
,
the predominant number of colleges in the
United States will be public. A college education will
become a major responsibility of the state and the federal
government, and it is not inconceivable that legislatures
will set the standards for admission, and the standards for
dismissal, and even academic standards.
A balance will eventually be found, between the state’s
need to operate colleges effectively, and students'
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rights. For example, some colleges, may, out of necessity,
be more restrictive in their operations than others. In
such cases, students will knowingly contract to abide by
such restrictions in advance.
Students rights will not be forsaken. Even in a more
''corporate" atmosphere, and even in a society which may
restrict, to a large extent, such basic rights as propaga-
tion and marriage, education will be of major concern and
importance, and college officials will have to prove severe
misconduct before being able to terminate a student's con-
tract of attendance. In such ca’ses, due process procedures
will be equivalent to those afforded the criminally charged
today. It is possible with a change in society’s values,
that in the fight against crime, the rights of the accused
will be diminished, while in education, the rights of students
in disciplinary hearings will become greater. Both the
sixth and eighth amendments will apply to students and
raise new standards for disciplinary hearings.
To study at a public college will become a property
right, once the student is admitted, much the same as the
property rights the courts now associate with an
individual’s job. Such a property right will not be easily
taken away.
Slowly, the courts will tire of educational problems,
while at the same time, face problems of a greater magnitude:
restrictions on travel, control of propagation, marriage,
and food, etc. Little time will be left to allow the
federal courts to concern themselves with education.
The sheer volume of cases will cause a restructuring
of the court system. Perhaps students' rights cases will
be heard only by state courts, or by whatever will exist to
replace the state itself, as a governmental entity. Cases
of the future may be decided by a programmed computer. Who
will be the programmers and operators?
To ensure survival, societal values will need to re-
flect greater restrictions on personal freedom. The
Constitution and basic rights will be re-evaluated and re-
interpreted by the courts to reflect these new "values”.
The legal interpretations of future United States courts
may seem as strange and undemocratic to us as some of those
interpretations made by the United States courts 100 years
ago. One generation’s policies and values, are not the
same as anothers.
7.3 The Need For Further Research
In developing a proficient knowledge of the law, the
college administrator must consider more than the first
,
fourth, and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. The
author suggests that this dissertation be expanded to
include the fifth, sixth and eighth amendments to the
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Constitution, and broadened to include the rights of faculty
and administrators.
Further, there is a need to study the impact of the
Constitution and student’s rights, in the private colleges.
Finally, the state laws regarding tort liability, and
the college administrator’s responsibilities in this area,
must be explained and analyzed.
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Appendix A
General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedures
and Substance in Review of Student Discipline
in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education
United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri
^5 Federal Rules Decisions 133 (1968)
Relations of Courts and Education
. "Achieving the ideal ofjustice is the highest goal of humanity. Justice is not
the concern solely of the courts. Education is equally
concerned with the achievement of ideal justice. The
administration of justice by the courts in the United
States represents the people's best efforts to achieve the
ideal of justice in the field of civil and criminal law.
It is generally accepted that the courts are necessary to
this administration of justice and for the protection of
individual liberties. Nevertheless, the contributions of
the modern courts in achieving the ideals of justice are
primarily the products of higher education. The modern
courts are, and will continue to be, greatly indebted to
higher education for their personnel, their innovations,
their processes, their political support, and their future
in the political and social order. Higher education is the
primary source of study and support of improvement in the
courts. For this reason, among others, the courts, should
exercise caution wnen importuned to intervene in the
important processes and functions of education. A court
should never intervene in the processes of education with-
out understanding the nature of education.
Before undertaking to intervene in the educational pro-
cesses, and to impose judicial restraints and mandates on
the educational community, the courts should acquire a
general knowledge of the lawful missions and the continually
changing processes, functions, and problems of education.
Judicial action without such knowledge would endanger. the
public interest and be likely to lead to gross injustice.
Education is the living and growing source of our pro-
gressive civilization, of our open repository of
kn°wled6 e > culture and our salutary democratict As such
» education deserves the highest respect
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There have been, and no doubt in the future there will beinstances of erroneous and unwise misuse of power by thoseinvested with powers of management and teaching in the
academic community, as in the case of all human fallibleinstitutions. When such misuse of power is threatened or
occurs, our political and social order has made available
a wide variety of lawful, non-violent, political, economic,
and social means to prevent or end the misuse of power.
These same lawful, non—violent
,
political, economic and
social means are available to correct an unwise but lawful
choice of educational policy or action by those charged
with the powers of management and teaching in the academic
community. Only where erroneous and unwise actions in the
field of education deprive students of federally protected
rights or privileges does a federal court have power to
intervene in the educational process.
With education the primary force, the means to provide the
necessities of life and many luxuries to all our national
population, and to many other peoples, has been created.
This great progress has been accomplished by the provision
to the educational community of general support, accompanied
by diminishing interference in educational processes by
political agencies outside the academic community.
If it is true, as it well may be, that man is in a race
between education and catastrophe, it is imperative that
educational institutions not be limited in the performance
of their lawful missions by unwarranted judicial inter-
ference.
Obligations of A Student . Attendance at a tax supported
educational institution of higher learning is not compulsory.
The federal constitution protects the equality of opportun-
ity of all qualified persons to attend. Whether this pro-
tected opportunity be called a qualified ''right" or "privilege"
is unimportant. It is optional and voluntary.
The voluntary attendance of a student in such institutions
is a voluntary entrance into the academic community,
such voluntary entrance, the student voluntarily assumes
obligations of performance and behavior reasonably imposed
by the institution of choice relevant to its lawful
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missions, processes, and functions. These obligations aregenerally much higher than those imposed on all^citizens bythe civil and criminal law. So long as there is noinvidious discrimination, no deprival of due process, no
abridgement of a right protected in the circumstances, and
no capricious, clearly unreasonable or unlawful action
employed, the institution may discipline students to
secure compliance with the higher obligations as a
teaching method or to sever the student from the academic
community.
No student may, without liability to lawful discipline,
intentionally act to impair or prevent the accomplishment
of any lawful mission, process, or function of an educa-
tional institution. .
The Nature of Student Discipline Compared To Criminal Law.
The discipline of students in the educational community
is, in all but the case of irrevocable expulsion, a part
of the teaching process. In the case of irrevocable
expulsion for misconduct, the process is not punitive or
deterrent in the criminal law sense, but the process is
rather the determination that the student is unqualified to
continue as a member of the educational community. Even
then, the disciplinary process is not equivalent to the
criminal law process of federal and state criminal law.
For, while the expelled student may suffer damaging
effects, sometimes irreparable, to his educational, social
and economic future, he or she may not be imprisoned,
fined, disenfranchised, or subjected to probationary
supervision. The attempted analogy of student
discipline to criminal proceedings against adults and
juveniles is not sound.
In the lessor disciplinary procedures, including but not
limited to guidance counseling, reprimand, suspension of
social or academic privileges, probation, restriction to
campus and dismissal with leave to apply for readnission,
the lawful aim of discipline may be teaching in performance
of a lawful mission of the institution. The nature and pro-
cedures of the disciplinary process in such cases should
not be required to conform to federal processes of criminal
law, which are far from perfect, and designed for cir-
cumstances and ends unrelated to the academic community.
By judicial mandate to impose upon the academic community
in student discipline the intricate, time consuming,,
sophisticated procedures, rules and safeguards of criminal
law would frustrate the teaching process and render the
institutional control impotent.
^tudent Discipline
. A federal court should not Interveneto reverse or enjoin disciplinary actions relevant to alawful mission of an educational institution unless thereappears one of the following:
1* a dePr ival of due process, that is, of fundamental
concepts of fair play;
2. invidious discrimination, for example, on account of
race or religion;
3- denial ot federal rights, constitutional or statutory,
protected in the academic community; or
4. clearly unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious action."
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